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V 
 
Summary 
 
This study examines the protective principle of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in 
international law and its use for combatting the threat of international terrorism. The 
study is, generally speaking, one of two parts.  
 
The first part explores the rationale of protective jurisdiction and the interests that it 
serves, and assesses the importance of the rationale of this jurisdiction for combatting 
transnational crimes, including the problem of international terrorism. It also sheds 
important light on the modern historical development of protective jurisdiction and the 
various public and private efforts made to codify this ground of jurisdiction during the 
first half of the twentieth century.  
 
The second part of the study provides original, empirical research into contemporary 
State practice, in an effort to examine whether, and, if so, to what extent, States have 
used protective jurisdiction for combatting the threat of international terrorism. It also 
enumerates, based on this practice, as well as the use of a range of other primary 
sources, including relevant treaty and U.N. Security Council practice, a list of vital 
interests that have been included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata and 
around which a basic level of agreement appears to have clustered. The study proposes 
that it may be possible to define protective jurisdiction in contemporary customary 
international law based on a ‘shared vital State interests’ approach. That is, the 
protection of certain vital interests is in conformity with the practice of the international 
community of States.  
 
The study concludes that, in the light of the findings of State practice inter alia and the 
recent decision of the International Law Commission to include the topic of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in its long-term programme of work, the codification of 
protective jurisdiction is necessary and desirable more than ever before. The most 
important advantages of the adoption of such an instrument are that it could be used as a 
persuasive source to guide States and courts in the adoption and interpretation of 
domestic laws; provide for the more effective protection of shared vital State interests 
by the international community; and complement the existing legal framework and ‘fill 
in’ gaps left by ad hoc sectoral treaties for combatting the increasingly complex, diffuse 
and evolving threat of international terrorism.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Preliminary Remarks 
 
International terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to the State and, 
according to the U.N. Security Council, to ‘international peace and security’. The 
transnational and increasingly complex and diffuse nature of the threat also poses a 
major challenge to the way in which States are able to combat it under international law. 
The focus of this study is on the protective principle of jurisdiction in international law, 
a ground upon which States are permitted to criminalise conduct by foreign nationals 
abroad deemed to threaten certain of their vital interests. It examines the use of this 
jurisdiction for combatting the threat of international terrorism. The study is, broadly 
speaking, one of two parts. The first part looks at the historical and modern 
development of, and theoretical justifications for, protective jurisdiction. Part two 
provides original empirical research into in contemporary State practice in order to 
investigate whether, and, if so, to what extent, protective jurisdiction has been used in 
response to the problem of international terrorism. As will be explained, State practice 
evinces a strong trend as to the use of the principle in response to international 
terrorism, a trend that has been encouraged by relevant treaty practice and Security 
Council resolutions.  
 
The study, having examined this State practice, enumerates some of the vital State 
interests, a core category of which are ‘shared’ by the international community, that 
have been included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata. It also proposes 
that it may be possible to define protective jurisdiction in contemporary customary 
international law based on what will be referred to as a ‘shared vital State interests’ 
approach, rather than a narrow a list of crimes. That is, the protection of certain vital 
interests is in conformity with the practice of the international community of States. In 
that connection, a fundamental conceptual distinction is made between jurisdiction for 
protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ and ‘international community values’, in 
order to try and mark out more clearly protective jurisdiction from the theory of 
universal jurisdiction. Having identified the law lex lata, the study, by way of 
conclusion, assesses the codification of protective jurisdiction as a way forward. It 
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suggests that, in the light of the trend in State practice inter alia and the decision by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) to include the topic of ‘Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work, the codification of protective 
jurisdiction is necessary and desirable. The most important advantages of such an 
instrument is that it could provide for the more effective protection of shared vital State 
interests by the international community and complement and ‘fill in’ gaps left by the 
existing ad hoc regime of counter-terrorism treaties.  
 
The study uses a legal positivist methodology and a doctrinal method, both of which are 
explained below in further detail. The remainder of this introductory chapter will 
provide some preliminary explanations of jurisdiction in international law, generally, 
and of protective jurisdiction, more specifically. It also aims to contextualise the 
problem of international terrorism and explain the study’s central argument. 
 
1.2. Protective Jurisdiction – An Overview 
 
The protective principle of jurisdiction permits the State, as a matter of international 
law, to give extraterritorial effect to its national laws criminalising conduct committed 
wholly outside of its territory, when the conduct in question is deemed to pose a threat 
to or implicates its ‘vital interests’. The place where the conduct occurs, the nationality 
of the accused and any other link with the prescribing State are irrelevant to jurisdiction 
under the protective principle.1 The protective principle, while contested in legal 
scholarship, occupies an important place in international law and international relations; 
indeed, it is the only accepted theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction that allows the State, 
during peace and in time of war, to protect itself and certain of its vital interests from 
the conduct of other State and non-State actors. A number of these vital interests appear 
to be shared by the international community, not least sovereignty, security, territorial 
integrity and political independence. The vital interest concept, then, is at the heart of 
protective jurisdiction, which provides for the principle’s rationale and forms the 
                                                        
1 Cameron, I. (1994). ‘The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction’. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, at p.2; Blakesley, C.L., ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, in Bassiouni, M.C. (ed.) (2008). 
‘International Criminal Law, II, Multilateral and Bilateral Enforcement Mechanisms’. The Netherlands: 
Martinus Nijhoff, at pp.108-109; Lowe, V. & Staker, C., ‘Jurisdiction’, in Evans, M.D. (2010). 
‘International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at p.325; Ryngaert, C. (2008). ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’. 
Oxford: OUP, at p.96. Akande, D., ‘“The Protective Principle”; “The Active Nationality Principle”; “The 
Passive Personality Principle”; “The Territoriality Principle”’, in Cassese, A. et al. (eds.) (2009). ‘Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice’. Oxford: OUP, at p.474. 
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essential nexus between the prescribing State and an offence committed outside its 
territory.2 The protective principle falls within the general rules of jurisdiction in public 
international law and forms an aspect of international criminal law.3 Before explaining 
the reasons for studying protective jurisdiction, it is perhaps useful first to put the 
principle in context by explaining the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ in international law and, 
thereafter, the various theories relating to grounds of jurisdiction.  
 
1.3. Jurisdiction in International Law 
  
‘Jurisdiction’ is a manifestation of State sovereignty and is governed by international 
law.4 One of the most important and fundamental aspects of international law’s role 
within the international community is to reconcile competing sovereign authorities and 
to prevent inter-State disputes.5 International law does that by delimiting jurisdiction 
and determining whether, and in what circumstances, States are permitted to regulate 
conduct in and outside their territory.6 Jurisdiction has two distinct aspects: prescriptive 
and enforcement.7 The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
in the Lotus case, the first and only occasion that an international court has discussed 
                                                        
2 Cameron, ibid., at p.31; Lowe & Staker, ibid., at p.326; Shaw, M.N. (2008). ‘International Law’. 
Cambridge: CUP, at p.667.  
3 Cameron, ibid., at pp.3, 9-10.    
4 Shaw, supra n 2, at p.645; Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Reports 1927, 
Series A, No.10, at p.19; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway), Judgment, PCIJ 
Reports 1933, Series A/B, No.53, at p.48; Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems, 
(1990), reprinted in (1991). ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction’. 3 CLF 441, at p.455; Greenwood, C., 
‘State Jurisdiction’, U.N. Audiovisual Library of International Law, Lecture Series (2008); U.N. 
Doc.A/61/10 (2006), Annex E, at p.517 (ILC Secretariat); Bowett, D.W. (1982). ‘Jurisdiction: Changing 
Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources’. 53 BYIL 1; Crawford, J. (2012). ‘Brownlie’s 
Principles of Public International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at p.456; Higgins, R. (1994). ‘Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use it’. Oxford: OUP, at p.56; Jennings, R.Y. (1962). ‘The 
Limits of State Jurisdiction’. 32 NoTIR 209; Mann, F.A. (1964). ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in 
International Law’. 111 Recueil des Cours 1, at pp.9, 15-17; Simma, B. & Müller, A.T., ‘Exercise and 
Limits of Jurisdiction’, in Crawford, J. & Koskenniemi, M. (2012). ‘The Cambridge Companion to 
International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at pp.135-136. 
5 E.g., Council of Europe, ibid.; Mann, ibid., at pp.10-11, 14-15; Simma & Müller, ibid.; Arrest Warrant 
of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3, para.75 (J. Sep. Op. Judges 
Higgins et al.); Institute of International Law, ‘Universal criminal jurisdiction with regard to the crime of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’ (Rapporteur C. Tomuschat), Preparatory Work: 
Report-Replies and Observations of the Members of the Commission, 71 Y.B.Inst.Int’lL. 218 (2005); 
Kiobel, at al. v Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al., U.S. Supreme Court, ‘Brief of Amicus Curiae of the 
European Commission in Support of Neither Party’, 13 June 2012. 
6 Lotus, supra n 4, at p.19; Advisory Opinion Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, PCIJ Reports 
1923, Series B, No.4, at pp.23-24; Mann, ibid., at pp.11, 16. 
7 Lotus, ibid., at pp.18-19; Greenwood, supra n 4; ILC Secretariat, supra n 4, at p.517; Bowett, supra n 4, 
at p.1; Crawford, supra n 4, at pp.457, 478; Jennings, supra n 4, at pp.209, 212; Lowe & Staker, supra n 
1, at pp.318, 335; Mann, ibid., at pp.13-14 & chapter 4; Shaw, supra n 2, at pp.645-646; Simma & 
Müller, ibid., at pp.136-137; Akehurst, M. (1972). ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’. 46 BYIL 145; 
O’Keefe, R. (2004). ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’. 2 JICJ 735, at pp.736-738.  
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jurisdiction in international law, may be regarded as the starting point for the 
consideration of the rules of international law governing the extraterritorial exercise of 
jurisdiction by a State.8 The PCIJ in that case stated obiter that: ‘the first and foremost 
restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that - failing the existence of a 
permissive rule to the contrary - it may not actually exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another State.’9 A State is therefore prohibited by international law from 
enforcing its criminal law, by investigating, arresting, detaining, prosecuting, sentencing 
and punishing persons for acts criminalised, in the territory of another State without the 
latter’s consent.10  
 
Jurisdiction to prescribe, sometimes called ‘legislative’ jurisdiction, refers to a State’s 
authority under international law to make its criminal law applicable over given 
conduct.11 The protective principle is a form of jurisdiction to prescribe. International 
law places limits on the conduct over which a State may assert the applicability of its 
criminal law, by requiring that the extraterritorial application of national laws is 
grounded in one of a number of principles of prescriptive jurisdiction recognised by 
international law. These principles are thought to evidence a sufficiently close nexus 
between the impugned conduct and the interests of the prescribing State.12 Specifically 
with reference to jurisdiction to prescribe, the PCIJ in the Lotus case was of the view 
that, while the territoriality of criminal law is a ‘fundamental’ principle of international 
law, it is equally true that nearly all States extend their criminal law to offences 
committed outside their territory ‘in ways which vary from State to State’.13 Due to the 
diversity of State practice, the PCIJ suggested that international law leaves to a State ‘a 
wide measure of discretion’ with respect to the exercise of jurisdiction outside its 
territory and that ‘every State remains free to adopt the [jurisdictional] principles which 
                                                        
8 Lotus, ibid. Cf. dissenting and separate opinions appended to the judgment in Arrest Warrant, supra n 5. 
9 Ibid., at p.18.   
10 See also Arrest Warrant, ibid., para.54 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); ibid., para.54 (Sep. Op. 
President Guillaume); ibid., para.49 (Diss. Op. Judge Van Den Wyngaert); Greenwood, supra n 4; ILC 
Secretariat, supra n 4, at pp.519, 526; Akehurst, supra n 7, at pp.146-149; Bowett, supra n 4, at p.1; 
Lowe & Staker, supra n 1, at p.335; Shaw, supra n 2, at p.646; Island of Palmas (Netherlands v U.S.), 4 
April 1928, in RIAA, vol.II, U.N. (2006), at pp.829, 838; Schooner Exchange v McFadden, 11 U.S. 116 
(1812). 
11 Greenwood, ibid.; ILC Secretariat, ibid., at pp.517-518; Bowett, supra n 4, at p.1; Jennings, supra n 4, 
at p.212; Lowe & Staker, supra n 1, at pp.318-320; Mann, supra n 4, chapter 2; Shaw, ibid., at pp.646, 
649. 
12 Mann, ibid., at p.19. Simma & Müller, supra n 4, at p.137. 
13 Lotus, supra n 4, at p.20. 
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it regards as best and most suitable.’14 The PCIJ observed the ‘diversity of the 
principles’ of jurisdiction adopted by various States but it was not, however, prepared to 
discuss the more complex issue as to what these ‘principles’ might have been in existing 
State practice.15 Indeed, all that the PCIJ was prepared to say, in this regard, was that 
‘all that can be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits which 
international law places upon its jurisdiction’.16 The limited analysis by the PCIJ inter 
alia should, perhaps, be of little surprise, given that this aspect of the judgment was 
merely obiter. Nonetheless, it follows that a State is prohibited from exercising 
jurisdiction outside its territory unless permitted by certain principles recognised by 
international law.17 It is therefore important to understand what these principles may be, 
given that they appear to evidence the permissible limits of international law and, in 
practice, are likely to determine whether assertions of prescriptive jurisdiction are 
tolerated, accepted or acquiesced.  
 
In the absence of a treaty codifying jurisdiction, the principles that may be valid under 
contemporary customary international law and their scope and application have to be 
inferred from State practice. There have been a number of significant developments 
with respect to principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction since the Lotus case was decided 
which merit further discussion. As will be explained, the question has to be raised 
whether these principles have been defined satisfactorily. It is to these principles that the 
chapter will now turn. 
 
1.4. Principles of Jurisdiction in International Law  
  
While jurisdiction has developed in State practice over many centuries, it is certainly the 
case that theories or typologies of ‘grounds of jurisdiction’ have their origin in legal 
scholarship and are relatively recent in the history of modern international law. In one 
of the most important developments in the field of jurisdiction since the Lotus case was 
decided, the first systematisation of theories of jurisdiction occurred in 1935 by the 
‘Research on International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School’ 
(Harvard Research).18 The Harvard Research defined in its preparation of a ‘Draft 
                                                        
14 Ibid., at p.19.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17 See also Bowett, supra n 4, at p.3. 
18 Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 
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Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’ (Draft Convention) five principles of 
jurisdiction to prescribe: (i) territoriality; (ii) nationality; (iii) protection; (iv) passive 
personality; and (v) universality. These jurisdictional principles were purportedly based 
on customary international law. It is useful, at this point, to briefly explain each of these 
theories of jurisdiction.  
 
The territoriality of jurisdiction is based on the place where one of the constituent 
elements of an offence is initiated or consummated, and has long been regarded ‘as of 
primary importance and of fundamental character’.19 The theory of territoriality, as was 
pointed out by the PCIJ in the Lotus case, ‘is not an absolute principle of international 
law’.20 The nationality principle permits a State to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over the conduct of its nationals, or domiciled residents, abroad, and, as with that of 
territoriality, is well established in international law.21 The protective, passive 
personality and universality theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction are subsidiary and are 
applicable over certain offences committed by foreign nationals abroad. The protective 
principle has already been alluded to above and is based on threats to the State and 
certain of its vital interests.22 The passive personality principle determines jurisdiction 
based on the nationality of the victim injured by an offence abroad. Notably, the validity 
of this principle in international law was dismissed by the Harvard Research and has 
traditionally been opposed in legal scholarship.23 Nevertheless, in more recent years, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’, 29 AJIL (Spec. Supp.) 435 (1935). 
19 Harvard Research, ibid., at p.445; also Lotus, supra n 4, at p.20; Schooner Exchange, supra n 10, at 
p.136; Akehurst, supra n 7, at p.152; Bowett, supra n 4, at p.4; Crawford, supra n 4, at p.458; Lowe & 
Staker, supra n 1, at p.320; Mann, supra n 4, at pp.24, 28, 84; Shaw, supra n 2, at p.652; Simma & 
Müller, supra n 4, at pp.137-141; Report of Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to the President, case of 
Antonio Pelletier, 10 January 1887, Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1887, at p.606; IBA, Legal Practice 
Division, ‘Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (28 September 2008), at p.142 (Task 
Force). 
20 Lotus, ibid.   
21 Harvard Research, supra n 18, at p.519; Akehurst, supra n 7, at p.156; Bowett, supra n 4, at p.7; 
Crawford, supra n 4, at p.459; Lowe & Staker, supra n 1, at p.323; Mann, supra n 4, at p.88; Shaw, supra 
n 2, at p.659; Simma & Müller, supra n 4, at pp.141-142; Task Force, supra n 19, at p.144. 
22 See also Arrest Warrant, supra n 5, para.4 (Sep. Op. Judge Guillaume); ibid., para.4 (Sep. Op. Judge 
Rezek); Lotus, supra n 4, at p.20; ibid., at pp.35-36 (Diss. Op. Judge Loder); Greenwood, supra n 4; ILC 
Secretariat, supra n 4, at pp.522, 525; Akehurst, ibid., at pp.157-158; Bowett, supra n 4, at p.10; 
Carwford, supra n 4, at p.462; Harvard Research, ibid., at p.445; Simma & Müller, supra n 4, at pp.143-
144; Task Force, ibid., at p.149; Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Adolf Eichmann, 36 ILR 
5 (District Court, 12 December 1961), at pp.49-57; Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Adolf 
Eichmann, 36 ILR 277 (Supreme Court, 29 May 1962), at p.304; Church v Hubbart, 2 Cranch, U.S. 187 
(1804); Moore, J.B. (1887). ‘Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case’. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of State, Government Printing Office. 
23 Harvard Research, ibid., at p.579; Mann, supra n 4, at pp.39, 91-92; ALI, Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (1965), para.30(2) (Second Restatement); Higgins, R., ‘The general 
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and particularly since the publication by the American Law Institute (ALI) of the 
Restatement (Third) in 1987, the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain serious 
offences, mainly relating to acts of terrorism, committed against a State’s nationals 
abroad has increasingly been described in judicial opinions and in legal scholarship as 
being based on a theory of passive personality.24 The common element underlying these 
principles is evidence of a link between an offence committed abroad and the interests 
of the prescribing State. The purpose of this prescriptive nexus is to justify the 
regulation of the relevant conduct with regard to the sovereignty and internal affairs of 
other States and to minimise inter-State conflict.25  
 
The principle of universal jurisdiction, by contrast, does not require any such 
connection to the prescribing State. This arguably makes universal jurisdiction the most 
controversial theory defined by the Harvard Research. This theory is suggested by 
courts and in legal scholarship as being based solely on the ‘heinous’ nature of certain 
international crimes, the suppression of which is a concern of every State.26 The theory 
is based on the premise that States act as ‘agents of the international community’ and 
have a sufficient interest to prosecute the perpetrators of such crimes to protect the 
‘values’, sometimes also referred to as ‘vital’ or ‘fundamental’ interests, of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
international law of terrorism’, in Higgins, R. & Flory, M. (eds.) (1997). ‘Terrorism and International 
Law’. London: Routledge, at p.24. 
24 ALI, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (1987), para.402 (Third Restatement); 
also Arrest Warrant, supra n 5, para.47 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); Council of Europe, supra n 4, 
at p.450; Greenwood, supra n 4; ILC Secretariat, supra n 4, at pp.522, 524; Akande, supra n 1; Bowett, 
supra n 4, at p.10; Crawford, supra n 4, at p.461; Higgins, supra n 4, at pp.66, 68-69; Lowe & Staker, 
supra n 1, at p.330; Ryngaert, supra n 1, at p.94; Shaw, supra n 2, at pp.665-666; Simma & Müller, supra 
n 4, at p.143; Task Force, supra n 19, at pp.146-147; U.S. v Yunis, 681 F.Supp.896 (1988), at pp.896-902; 
U.S. v Benitez, 741 F.2d1312 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2679 (1985); Bates, S.E. 
(2011). ‘Terrorism and International Law. Accountability, Remedies, and Reform. A Report of the IBA 
Task Force on Terrorism’. Oxford: OUP, at p.222; McCarthy, G. J. (1989). ‘The Passive Personality 
Principle and Its Use in Combating International Terrorism’. 13 Fordham Int’lL.J. 298; Watson, G.R. 
(1993). ‘The Passive Personality Principle’. 28 Tex.Int’l L.J. 1. 
25 Jennings, R. & Watts, A. (eds.) (1992). ‘Oppenheim’s International Law’. London: Longman, at 
pp.457-458. 
26 Arrest Warrant, supra n 5, at p.82 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); ibid., at p.167 (Diss. Op. Judge 
Van Den Wyngaert); Akehurst, supra n 7, at p.162; Bowett, supra n 4, at p.11; Harvard Research, supra n 
18, at p.563; Jessberger, F., ‘Universal Jurisdiction’, in Cassese, supra n 1, at pp.155-157; Lowe & 
Staker, supra n 1, at p.326; Mann, supra n 4, at pp.39, 95; Ryngaert, supra n 1, at pp.101, 106-119; Shaw, 
supra n 2, at p.668; Simma & Müller, supra n 4, at p.144; Task Force, supra n 19, at p.150; AU-EU 
Technical Ad hoc Expert Group on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Report, Council of the E.U. 
Doc.8671/09 (16 April 2009), Annex, para.8 (Expert Group); U.N. Doc.A/65/181 (2010), at p.4; Macedo, 
S. (ed.) (2001). ‘The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’. Princeton: New Jersey, at p.45; 
Scharf, M.P., ‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: Universal Jurisdiction and the Harvard Research’, in 
Grant, J.P. & Barker, J.C. (eds.) (2007). ‘Harvard Research in International Law: Contemporary Analysis 
and Appraisal’. Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., at p.276. 
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international community.27 The essence of universal jurisdiction, then, at the concept’s 
most basic level, is the absence of what has been described variously as any ‘normal’, 
‘acceptable’ and even ‘lawful’ prescriptive link between an alleged offence and the 
prosecuting State.28 
 
The Harvard Research was a ‘private’ effort to codify international law and the Draft 
Convention was proposed lex ferenda, and was not in fact adopted. Nonetheless, in the 
absence of a treaty codifying jurisdiction, it has subsequently had a profound influence 
on the way by which theories relating to grounds of jurisdiction in international law are 
defined and understood by States, courts and in legal scholarship.29 What is more, the 
grounds of jurisdiction defined by the Harvard Research have increasingly been referred 
to and relied upon and treated as reflecting customary international law. In that regard, 
the influence of the Harvard Research is evident not only in State practice but also in 
other efforts, both public and private, to clarify or codify customary international law, 
for example, by the ILC, Council of Europe and the ALI, and in the adoption of 
numerous multilateral treaties.30  
 
It is important to make clear, from the outset, that misapprehension and divided opinion 
                                                        
27 Arrest Warrant, ibid., at pp.76, 79, 81 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); ibid., at p.141 (Diss. Op. 
Judge Van Den Wyngaert); ibid., (Diss. Op. Judge Al-Khasawneh); Eichmann (Supreme Court), supra n 
22, at p.300; Jessberger, ibid.; Mann, ibid.; Boister, N. (2003). ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’. 14 EJIL 
953, at p.964; Cassese, A. (2003). ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of 
Universal Jurisdiction’. 1 JICJ 589, at p.591; Cassese, A. (2005). ‘International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at 
p.50; Institute of International Law (Rapporteur C. Tomuschat), ‘Resolution on Universal Criminal 
Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes’, Krakow, 
2005, preambular paras.1-2 (Institute); Kreß, C. (2006). ‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
and the Instiut de Droit International’. 4 JICJ 561, at pp.566, 569; Nagle, L.E. (2010)(a). ‘Should 
Terrorism Be Subject to Universal Jurisdiction?. 8 SantaClaraJ.Int’lL. 87, at p.90; Nagel, L.E. (2010)(b). 
‘Terrorism and Universal Jurisdiction: Opening Pandora’s Box’. 27 GSUL. Rev. 339, at pp.342-343; Yee, 
S. (2011). ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’. 10 Chinese JIL 503, at p.506.  
28 Yee, ibid., at p.504; O’Keefe, supra n 7, at pp.740, 745; Meron, T. (1995). ‘International 
Criminalisation of Internal Atrocities’. 89 AJIL 554, at p.568; O’Keefe, R. (2009). ‘The Grave Breaches 
Regime and Universal Jurisdiction’. 7 JICJ 811, at p.814; Reydams, L. (2003). ‘Universal Jurisdiction: 
International and Municipal Perspectives’. Oxford: OUP, at p.5; Williams, S. (2012). ‘Arresting 
Developments? Restricting the Enforcement of the UK’s Universal Jurisdiction Provisions’. 75 MLR 368. 
29 See Grant & Barker, supra n 26, at pp.20-29. 
30 E.g., Council of Europe, supra n 4; Expert Group, supra n 26, paras.8, 12; ILC Secretariat, supra n 4, at 
pp.520-526; Second Restatement, supra n 23; Task Force, supra n 19, chapter 3; Third Restatement, 
supra n 24; Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (97) 11 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the Amended Model Plan for the Classification of Documents Concerning State 
Practice in the Field of Public International Law, 12 June 1997, ‘Part eight: jurisdiction of the state’; U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/596 (31 March 2008); ILC, ‘Origin and background of the development and codification of 
international law’, available online: www.legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm#_ftnref2; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/13 and 
Corr.1-3 (12 April 1949), at pp.279-281; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/661 (4 April 2013), para.40; U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/1/Rev.1 (1949), at pp.36-37. See also Eichmann (District Court), supra n 22; Eichmann 
(Supreme Court), supra n 22.  
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attends jurisdiction in international law. This is illustrated by D’Aspremont, who has 
argued that ‘grounds of jurisdiction’ provided by international law are, in fact, ‘nothing 
but a construct of legal scholars’31 and that ‘international law does not prescribe the use 
of any title to exercise jurisdiction’ and therefore ‘the legality of unilateral exercises of 
jurisdiction cannot, as a matter of principle, be questioned’.32 It would, perhaps, be an 
overstatement to say, as does D’Aspremont, that grounds of jurisdiction are ‘nothing but 
a construct of legal scholars’, given their assimilation in State practice. The suggestion 
made by D’Aspremont that grounds of jurisdiction are not a part of international law 
and, as such, may be freely asserted by States in any circumstance, unless it can be 
shown that it violates a prohibitive rule to the contrary, is one of the most frequently 
misquoted passages of the Lotus case.33 Lowe and Staker have gone so far as to describe 
this interpretation of the Lotus case as a ‘tiresome and oddly persistent fallacy’.34 The 
argument made by D’Aspremont, if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that 
international law has no relevance to jurisdiction; moreover, every State would be able 
to assert jurisdiction outside its territory, unilaterally and prima facie without any 
limitation, which does not appear to reflect State practice and the formation of 
customary international law, or the way in which jurisdiction has been codified in 
numerous multilateral treaties.35  
 
On closer inspection, the reason why D’Aspremont argued that grounds of jurisdiction 
are not a part of international law, it should be noted, is in order to justify the legality of 
                                                        
31 D’Aspremont, J. (2010). ‘Multilateral versus Unilateral Exercises of Universal Jurisdiction’. 43 
Isr.L.Rev. 301, at p.311. 
32 Ibid., at p.309; also ibid., at p.311.   
33 E.g., Arrest Warrant, supra n 5, paras.45, 50-51 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.) (though cf. ibid., 
paras.46, 57-58, 61); ibid., paras.49-51 (Diss. Op. Van Den Wyngaert); Ryngaert, supra n 1, at pp.21-30, 
116; Scharf, supra n 26, at pp.287-289; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.226, para.21; R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p. 
Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [1999] 2 All ER 97, at p.174 (Lord Millett); Inazumi, M. (2005). ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious 
Crimes under International Law’. Belgium: Intersertia, at p.58. 
34 Lowe & Staker, supra n 1, at p.318; also Arrest Warrant, ibid., paras.4, 13-16 (Sep. Op. Judge 
Guillaume); Nuclear Weapons, ibid., paras.12-15 (Dec. Judge Bedjaoui); ibid., at pp.394-396 (Diss. Op. 
Judge Shahabuddeen); Lotus, supra n 4, at p.34 (Diss. Op. Judge Loder); ibid., at pp.60-61 (Diss. Op. 
Judge Nyholm); Boister, supra n 27, at p.964Cameron, supra n 1, at p.319; Harvard Research, supra n 
18; Higgins, supra n 4, at pp.76-77; Mann, supra n 4, at pp.35, 83; Shaw, supra n 2, at p.656; Yee, supra 
n 27, at pp.524-527. 
35 These multilateral treaties are discussed in chapter five. See also Shaw, supra n 2, at p.656; Nottebohm 
Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala), Judgment (second phase), I.C.J. Reports 1955, p.4, at pp.20-24; Anglo 
Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v Norway), I.C.J. Reports 1951, p.116; North Sea Continental Shelf, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.3, para.74. 
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‘unilateral’ assertions of universal jurisdiction.36 Interestingly, while D’Aspremont 
maintained that grounds of jurisdiction have no relevance to international law, as 
‘international law does not organise and attribute jurisdiction’, at the same time, 
D’Aspremont argued that one particular ground of jurisdiction - the theory of 
universality - is different from all others in that it is a positive rule of international 
law.37 Putting aside the development of jurisdiction in customary international law, to 
which D’Aspremont gives no consideration, the only way in which D’Aspremont is able 
to support the legality of universal jurisdiction in international law is to suggest that it 
has been codified in various treaties that use the obligation to extradite or prosecute.38 
As will be shown, however, there exists fundamental disagreement in the views of 
States, judicial opinion and in legal scholarship on the proper relationship between the 
theory of universal jurisdiction and the treaty obligation to extradite or prosecute. The 
argument made by D’Aspremont suggests that an alternative explanation to the 
confusion attending jurisdiction may be due to the way in which theories relating to 
grounds of jurisdiction were originally defined by the Harvard Research and 
subsequently adopted in legal scholarship.   
 
1.5. Misinterpretation of Jurisdiction by the Harvard Research 
 
The Harvard Research, as will be explained in greater detail in chapter three, appears to 
have confused and misinterpreted the theory of protective jurisdiction over piracy, 
which developed in State practice roughly between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries for the protection of vital State interests that were ‘shared’ by the international 
community, or at least among the maritime powers, and called it by a different name, as 
universality.39 The misinterpretation of principles of jurisdiction by the Harvard 
Research is not merely of historical significance and it has a number of important 
conceptual and practical implications. The acceptance of the Harvard Research has led 
to the widespread assumption by States, courts and in legal scholarship that, for 
hundreds of years, universal jurisdiction has applied to the crime of piracy and is 
                                                        
36 See supra n 31.  
37 Ibid., at p.311. 
38 Ibid., at pp.305-306.  
39 Garrod, M. (2014). ‘Piracy, the Protection of Vital State Interests and the False Foundations of 
Universal Jurisdiction in International Law’. 25 DiplomacyandStatecraft 1; Rubin, A.P. (1997). ‘Ethics 
and Authority in International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.24; Rubin, A.P. (1998). ‘The Law of Piracy’. 
U.S.: Translational Publishers, Inc.; Reydams, L. (2010). ‘The Rise and Fall of Universal Jurisdiction’, 
Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, Working Paper No.37, at pp.10-13.  
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therefore well established as a permissive rule of customary international law.40 It has 
also led to the suggestion by States, courts and in legal scholarship that, following the 
prosecution in the aftermath of World War II of thousands of alleged war criminals in 
Europe and the Far East, and the creation of International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo, the theory of universal jurisdiction over piracy has expanded to 
include other crimes under international law.41 An arguably more persuasive 
interpretation of State practice inter alia, and one that is adopted by the present study, is 
that jurisdiction was based on the protective principle, which developed out of the need 
by the ‘Allies’ to protect from persons belonging to the ‘enemy’ certain vital State 
interests ‘shared’ by the international community.42 Since the present author has 
published on the development of a customary rule of protective jurisdiction over piracy 
and war crimes elsewhere, based on the analysis of a wide range of primary sources, the 
present study will be confined to a summary of the findings.   
 
The purpose of the present study is not to challenge the validity of the theory of 
universal jurisdiction in contemporary international law, which would require nothing 
less than a rigorous assessment of State practice and opinio juris and has already been 
                                                        
40 E.g., Arrest Warrant, supra n 5, para.46; ibid., at pp.79, 81 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); ibid., at 
pp.37-38 (Sep. Op. President Guillaume); ibid., at p.55 (Dec. Judge Ranjeva); ibid. (Sep. Op. Judge 
Koroma); Akehurst, supra n 7, at p.160; Bowett, supra n 4, at pp.10-11; Cassese (2003), supra n 27, at 
p.591; Crawford, supra n 4 at p.468; Kreß, supra n 27, at pp.566, 569; Lowe & Staker, supra n 1, at 
p.326; Macedo, supra n 26, at pp.40, 45; Mann, supra n 4, at pp.39, 95; Ryngaert, supra n 1, at pp.108-
109; Institute, supra n 27, para.2; Third Restatement, supra n 24, para.404; Filartiga v Pina-Irala, 630 
F.2d876 (2nd Cir., 1980); U.S. v Layton, 509 F.Supp.212 (N.D. Cal., 1981); In re Extradition of 
Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d571; U.S. v Yousef, 327 F.3d56 (2nd Cir., 2003); Abi-Saab, G. (2003). ‘The Proper 
Role of Universal Jurisdiction’. 1 JICJ 596, at pp.599-600; Kontorovich, E. (2004). ‘Universal 
Jurisdiction and the Piracy Analogy’. 45 Harvard Int’l L.J. 183, at pp.184, 190; Randall, K. (1987-1988). 
‘Universal Jurisdiction’. 66 Tex.L.Rev. 785, at p.793. 
41 Arrest Warrant, ibid., paras.61-63 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); Eichmann (Supreme Court), 
supra n 22, at pp.293-300; Pinochet, supra n 33, at p.275 (Lord Millett); Akehurst, ibid.; Crawford, ibid.; 
Higgins, supra n 4, at p.61; Institute, ibid., para.3(a); Kreß, ibid., at pp.566, 568, 573-576; Lowe & 
Staker, ibid.; Randall, ibid., at pp.802-810; Reydams, supra n 39, at p.34; Ryngaert, ibid., at pp.110-115; 
Scharf, supra n 26, at pp.278-279; Shaw, supra n 2, at p.668; Third Restatement, ibid., para.404; 
Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 101 ALR 545; Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on 
the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (2 October 1995), para.57; Prosecutor v 
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), paras.147, 156; Benoit, J.P. (2006). ‘The Evolution 
of Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes’. 53 NLR 259, at p.264; Broomhall, B. (2003). ‘International 
Justice and the International Criminal Court’. Oxford: OUP, at p.112; ILA, Committee on Human Rights 
Law and Practice, ‘Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human 
Rights Offences’, 69th Conference, 2000, at pp.3, 22; Joyner, C.C. (1996). ‘Arresting Impunity: The Case 
for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability’, 59 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 153, at pp.155-156, 166, 172; Morris, M.H. (2001). ‘Universal Jurisdiction in a Divided World: 
Conference Remarks’. 35 NewEng.L.Rev. 337, at pp.344-345. 
42 Garrod, M. (2012). ‘The Development of Protective Principle Jurisdiction over War Crimes and the 
Hollow Concept of Universality’. 12 ICLR 763; Röling, B.V.A. (1960). ‘The Law of War and the 
National Jurisdiction since 1945’. 100 Recueil des Cours 323, at pp.355-377. 
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undertaken elsewhere.43 Rather, the above discussion aims, more temperately, to shed 
light on the lessons that history can teach and to highlight that there has thus developed 
- to borrow a phrase from Robinson - an unproven ‘collective belief’ in respect of 
universality that has come to diverge dramatically from history.44 It suffices to say that 
the cause of this collective belief is due to a persistent reliance on tentative, secondary 
sources, or the citation of a handful of primary sources, wholly out of context.45 The 
consequence of this collective belief is that the nature of protective jurisdiction and its 
relationship with other theories of jurisdiction has tended to be confused. It has also led 
to the idea that the theory of universality is applicable over crimes under international 
law, while theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction other than universality are limited to 
crimes under domestic law. This ‘jurisdictional dichotomy’ over international and 
domestic crimes, as it will be referred to by the present study, has framed and shaped 
the current legal debate on the codification of jurisdiction in international law. Lastly, it 
has been suggested by a number of States, courts and in legal scholarship in recent years 
that the treaty obligation to extradite or prosecute, a provision first used in the grave 
breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and subsequently incorporated 
into more than 60 treaties, including treaties dealing with transnational crimes, for 
example, acts of terrorism, can be interpreted as the implied embodiment or codification 
of a theory of universal jurisdiction.46 
 
1.6. Reasons for Studying Protective Jurisdiction 
 
A number of reasons justify the study of protective jurisdiction. First of all, the 
protective principle is a neglected area of international law and, as has already been 
                                                        
43 Yee, supra n 27; Garrod, M., ‘The Development of Universal Jurisdiction: A Plea for a More Rigorous 
Approach to International Law Making’ (under preparation). 
44 Robinson, D. (2011). ‘The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflections on ICL 
Discourse’. 9 JICJ 355, at pp.378-379. 
45 Garrod, supra n 39, at p.5; Garrod, supra n 42, at pp.766, 796; Yee, supra n 27, at p.512. 
46 E.g., Council of Europe, supra n 4, at p.453; Expert Group, supra n 26, paras.9, 11; Akehurst, supra n 
7, at pp.160-161; Cryer, R., ‘Zardad’, in Cassese, supra n 1, at p.979; D’Aspremont, supra n 31, at 
pp.305-306; Cassese (2003), supra n 27, at pp.591-592; Crawford, supra n 4, at p.471; Institute, supra n 
27, para.2; Kreß, supra n 27, at pp.567-568; Macedo, supra n 26, at p.46; Mann, supra n 4, at p.95; 
O’Keefe, supra n 7, at pp.735, 747, 755; O’Keefe, supra n 28, at pp.811, 817, 826; Randall, supra n 40, 
at pp.817-819; Scharf, supra n 26, at pp.284-285; Simma & Müller, supra n 4, at p.145; Williams, supra 
n 28, at p.369; Third Restatement, supra n 24, para.404; U.N. Doc.A/65/181, supra n 26, paras.21-22; 
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2012, p.32, para.74; U.N. Doc.A/66/93 (2011), paras.121-128; Cryer, R. & Friman, H. & 
Robinson, D. & Wilmshurst, E. (2010). ‘An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure’. 
Cambridge: CUP, at pp.51-53, 336. 
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pointed out elsewhere by Cameron, is only ‘dimly understood’.47 The most 
comprehensive study of protective jurisdiction to date has been undertaken by Cameron, 
although this was limited to a comparative analysis of the principle’s supposed use in 
the domestic law of Sweden and the U.S.48 Since the Harvard Research, little research 
of primary and secondary sources has been undertaken to critically assess protective 
jurisdiction.49 Consequently, the principle has either been overlooked or defined in 
overly-narrow terms by courts and in legal scholarship, for example, as the protection of 
‘narrow self-interest[s]’ of ‘security and credit’.50 Other commentators have suggested 
that the principle is ‘rarely invoked’51 and that its validity is ‘uncertain and 
controversial’,52 or have described the principle as an ‘aggressive’ assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.53 
 
Since the Harvard Research, the nature of protective jurisdiction and its relationship 
with other grounds of jurisdiction, as discussed above, has been confused. The latter 
point was alluded to by the 1990 Report of the Council of Europe, which stated that 
‘[t]here is sometimes no clear distinction between the principle of universality and other 
principles on which extraterritorial jurisdiction is based’, including the ‘principle of 
protection’.54 The Report continued, moreover, ‘[t]here are often differences of opinion 
as to which principle should form the basis of a particular term of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.’55 More recently, the only way by which the 2009 ‘AU-EU Expert Report 
on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’ was able to distinguish the theory of 
                                                        
47 Cameron, supra n 1, at p.24. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Cf. Task Force, supra n 19; Third Restatement, supra n 24 (it should be noted that the Restatement is of 
limited relevance for present purposes since it focuses primarily on U.S. practice).  
50 Reydams, supra n 28, at p.5. See also Expert Group, supra n 26, para.12; Kiobel, supra n 5, at p.4; 
Akande, supra n 1; Cryer at al., supra n 46, at p.50; O’Keefe, supra n 7, at p.739; Ryngaert, supra n 1, at 
p.99; Scharf, supra n 26, at p.276; Shaw, supra n 2 at p.667; Simma & Müller, supra n 4, at p.143; Task 
Force, ibid., at p.149; AI, ‘Universal Jurisdiction. A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the 
World’ (2011), at p.8; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/5 (1949), at p.80; Chehtman, A. (2010). ‘The Philosophical 
Foundations of Extraterritorial Punishment’. Oxford: OUP, at p.70; Murphy, J.F. ‘Protected Persons and 
Diplomatic Facilities’, in Murphy, J.F. & Evans, A.E. (eds.) (1978). ‘Legal Aspects of International 
Terrorism’. D.C. Heath & Co.: Massachusetts, at p.284. 
51 Kontorovich, supra n 40, at p.189. 
52 Kontorovich, E. (2008). ‘The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction’. 1 U.Ill.L.Rev. 390, at p.394; 
Kontorovich, ibid.; also Augenstein, D.H. & Boyle, A. & Singh Galeigh, N. (2010). ‘Study of the Legal 
Framework on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises Operating 
Outside the European Union’. Brussels: European Commission, note 55.  
53 Colangelo, A.J. (2007). ‘Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the 
Intersection of National and International Law’. 48 Harv.Int’lL.J. 121.   
54 Council of Europe, supra n 4, at p.451. 
55 Ibid. 
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universality from that of protection was by defining the former as covering crimes that 
do not pose a ‘direct threat to the vital interests of the state asserting jurisdiction.’56 Yet, 
this presupposes that protective principle jurisdiction is restricted to crimes posing a 
‘direct threat’ to the prescribing State’s vital interests, an assumption for which there is 
no evidence in support.57 It implies that States are able to assert universal jurisdiction 
over crimes that pose an indirect threat to their vital interests; this does not sit 
comfortably with the theory’s rationale. The protective principle has yet to be studied 
by the ILC, although the ILC’s Secretariat has commented that the principle ‘may be 
viewed as a specific application of the objective territoriality principle or the effects 
doctrine’.58 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Arrest Warrant was 
presented, for the first time since the Lotus case was decided, with the opportunity to 
examine extraterritorial jurisdiction but chose not to do so.59 The Joint Separate Opinion 
of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal appended to the judgment, inter alia, did 
not give any mention at all to protective jurisdiction, despite observing the ‘striking’ 
trend in recent years towards grounds of jurisdiction ‘other than territoriality’, and it 
appears to confuse the theory of protection with the theories of universality and passive 
personality.60 The lack of understanding of protective jurisdiction and of conceptual 
clarity between grounds of jurisdiction may explain the suggestion in legal scholarship 
that grounds of jurisdiction interweave, and may be used in combination, with each 
another.61 
 
A further reason for studying the principle is that the Harvard Research remains today 
the most comprehensive study on jurisdiction and there has been no subsequent treaty 
codifying grounds of jurisdiction. This may go some way to explaining, on the one 
hand, the reason why the Harvard Research has had such an extensive influence on 
                                                        
56 Expert Group, supra n 26, para.8.  
57 See also Akehurst, supra n 7, at p.159; O’Keefe, supra n 7, at p.745; Kontorovich, supra n 40, at 
pp.189-190; Ryngaert, supra n 1, at pp.85, 100; Third Restatement, supra n 24, para.404.  
58 ILC Secretariat, supra n 4, para.13; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/596, supra n 30, n 22; see also Kontorovich, 
supra n 40, at p.189; Third Restatement, supra n 24, para.404. 
59 Arrest Warrant, supra n 5, para.46. 
60 Ibid., para.47 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); see also ibid., para.5 (Sep. Op. Judge Rezek); ibid., 
para.4 (Sep. Op. Judge Guillaume); Eichmann (District Court), supra n 22, at pp.49-57; Eichmann 
(Supreme Court), supra n 22, at p.304; Lotus, supra n 4, at pp.55-58 (Diss. Op. Judge Finlay); ibid., at 
pp.91-92 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore); chapters three & five.    
61 Crawford, supra n 4, at p.477; Eichmann (District Court), ibid., at pp.49-57; Eichmann (Supreme 
Court), ibid., at p.304; Brownlie, I. (2008). ‘Principles of Public International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at 
p.308; Kiobel, at al. v Royal Dutch Petroleum, et al., U.S. Supreme Court, ‘Supplemental Brief of Amici 
Curiae German Institute for Human Rights and International Law Experts in support of petitioners’, 13 
June 2012, at p.7. 
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State practice and in legal scholarship and, on the other, why the misinterpretation of 
grounds of jurisdiction by the Harvard Research has not been assessed more critically or 
questioned. The fact that jurisdiction is left to State practice to regulate has meant that 
there is no accepted definition of protective jurisdiction, or of the category of ‘vital 
interests’ capable of falling under the principle’s ambit, in contemporary customary 
international law. An issue of great practical importance is that States and courts have 
no common, authoritative point of reference for grounds of jurisdiction in international 
law, or of their scope and application, when drafting and enacting or interpreting the 
extraterritorial application of national laws. The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to the adoption by the ILC and the U.N. General Assembly of treaties that make 
provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the adjudication of disputes by the ICJ. In 
practice, the way in which jurisdiction is interpreted inter alia is simply to point to one 
of the grounds of jurisdiction, as originally defined by the Harvard Research, that 
appears most convenient at the time and with little further analysis. The time is 
therefore opportune to provide a new analysis of protective principle jurisdiction and to 
assess whether or not the codification of this jurisdiction is necessary and desirable.  
 
This is all the more pressing, given that extraterritorial jurisdiction has become one of 
the most important, and yet controversial, topics in contemporary international law, 
which is best illustrated, perhaps, by the vigorous debate in recent years by the General 
Assembly and its Sixth Committee on ‘[t]he scope and application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction’;62 the decision by the ILC to include the topic of ‘Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’ as part of its long-term programme of codification;63 and the centrality of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to other topics of international law currently under study by 
the ILC.64 The way in which jurisdiction in international law, and its potential 
codification, has been framed, however, is fragmented: the General Assembly has 
limited its debate of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the theory of universal jurisdiction 
over crimes under international law, while the ILC has proposed to limit its study to 
theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction other than universality over domestic crimes.65 
                                                        
62 U.N. Doc.A/63/237/Rev.1 (23 July 2009); A/RES/64/252 (18 September 2009); Sixth Committee, U.N. 
Doc.A/C.6/64/SR.12 (20 October 2009); ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.10 (13 October 2010). 
63 ILC Secretariat, supra n 4.    
64 E.g., U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/596, supra n 30; U.N. Doc.A/59/10 (2004); U.N. Doc.A/60/10 (2005); U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/571 (7 June 2006). 
65 ILC Secretariat, supra n 4, paras.16, 35; U.N. Doc.A/63/237/Rev.1, supra n 62, U.N. Doc.A/65/181, 
supra n 26, para.28. See U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/603 (10 June 2008), paras.46-47; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/612 (26 
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This has further entrenched the ‘jurisdictional dichotomy’ over international and 
domestic crimes.66 Consequently, protective jurisdiction has been overlooked in terms 
of its development and applicability over crimes under international law. Assessment of 
the codification of protective jurisdiction is important for a further reason: the 
increasing importance of this jurisdiction for combating international terrorism, to 
which this chapter will now turn.  
 
1.7. International Terrorism – Contextualising the Problem 
 
The second part of this study examines the use of protective jurisdiction for combating 
the threat of international terrorism. It is useful, therefore, to explain briefly the nature 
of the problem. It has to be stressed, from the outset, that one of the most significant 
problems with ‘terrorism’ is the continued absence of a universal definition of the 
concept. Without such a definition, it is not possible to determine the nature and extent 
of the problem and there is, as yet, no fully coherent legal regime governing terrorism 
and responses to terrorism, not least because it allows the existence of many diverse, 
and often incompatible, national and regional definitions which cannot be harmonised 
with one another.67 International terrorism is not a new phenomenon, with the first 
treaty being drafted by the League of Nations in 1937.68 Nevertheless, the subjective 
and contentious nature of terrorism continues to prevent the General Assembly, and has 
done so since the 1970s, from completing negotiations on, and subsequently adopting, a 
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which is attributable, in 
particular, to the notion that one State’s ‘terrorists’ are another State’s ‘freedom 
fighters’; in that connection, fundamental disagreement exists regarding whether or not 
non-State actors engaged in armed self-determination and resistance to foreign 
occupation, as well as the conduct of a State’s organs - a concept known as ‘State 
terrorism’ - should fall within its scope.69 It is also not uncommon for States to label 
                                                                                                                                                                  
March 2009), para.33; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.774 (24 June 2010), at pp.6-7; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.829 (22 
July 2013); Expert Group, supra n 26; Institute, supra n 27. 
66 This dichotomy appears to have its roots in the confusion between the protective and universal theories 
of jurisdiction by Judge Moore, which was subsequently adopted by the League of Nations and, 
thereafter, codified by the Harvard Research; see further chapter three.  
67 Samuel, H.L.K. & White, N.D. & De Friás, S.M. (eds.) (2012). ‘Report of Key Findings and 
Recommendations on the Rule of Law and Counter-Terrorism’. Multi-National Counter-Terrorism Expert 
Network, at pp.1, 12; also Hoffman, B. (2006). ‘Inside Terrorism’. Chichester: CUP, chapter 1.  
68 1937 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 League of Nations O.J. 23 
(1938), League of Nations Doc.C.546(I).1937.V (1938). See Saul, B. (2006). ‘The Legal Response of the 
League of Nations to Terrorism’. 4 JICJ 78. 
69 E.g., Hoffman, supra n 67, chapter 3; U.N. Doc.A/RES/3034/(XXVII) (18 December 1972); 
U.N.G.A.O.R., ‘Question of Palestine’, twenty-ninth session, U.N. Doc.A/PV.2282 and Corr.1 (13 
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their military and political opponents as ‘terrorist’, often interchangeably with the terms 
‘subversives’, ‘mercenaries’, ‘armed bands’; ‘separatists’ and ‘militia’.70 Rather, during 
the past fifty years, the General Assembly has responded to international terrorism by 
adopting counter-terrorism conventions sporadically and ad hoc; a response driven, it 
appears, over the specific concerns of some States, at particular points in time, by 
threats posed by non-State actors to certain of their vital interests. These treaties treat 
acts of terrorism simply as ordinary criminal offences.71 As will be shown, it is for the 
same reason that the Security Council has taken an increasing, albeit selective, role in 
the use of its powers under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, determining international 
terrorism as constituting a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and permitting 
States to define unilaterally acts and groups as ‘terrorist’, while at the same time 
obliging States to make provision in their national laws for extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over ‘terrorist acts’ and to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders found on their 
territory.72 International terrorism is, therefore, a crime defined, in various and often 
divergent ways, under domestic laws, rather than a crime under international law.73  
  
It has been widely suggested in legal scholarship that there has, since the 1990s, 
occurred a number of changes in the nature of international terrorism which, taken 
                                                                                                                                                                  
November 1974); U.N. Doc.A/66/37 (2011), Annex I, paras.10, 18; U.N. Doc.A/68/37 (2013), Annex III, 
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332/08, 42509/10), Judgment, Strasboug, 29 April 2013; HRC, Report of the independent international 
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Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and President of the Security 
Council’, U.N. Docs.A/57/273-S/2002/875 (6 August 2002), para.14; Law No. 19, The Counterterrorism 
Law, 2 July 2012 (Syria); Dalsh, A.A., ‘Saudi Arabia designates Muslim brotherhood terrorist group’, 
Reuters, 7 March 2014; International Commission of Jurists, ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’, Report 
of its Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, Geneva, at p.29; 
Leonard, E. (2010). ‘The Lord’s Resistance Army: an African Terrorist Group?’. 4 Perspectives on 
Terrorism 20; Smith, M.A., ‘The Second Chechen War: Foreign Relations and Russian Counter-
Reaction’, in Aldis, A.C. (ed.) (2000). ‘The Second Chechen War’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 
United Kingdom, Department of Defence. 
71 See also Guillaume, G. (2004). ‘Terrorism and International Law’. 54 ICLQ 537. 
72 E.g., S/RES/731 (21 January 1992), preambular para.2; S/RES/748 (31 March 1992), preambular 
paras.4 & 7; S/RES/883 (11 November 1993), preambular paras.5-6; S/RES/1333 (19 December 2000), 
preambular para.7; S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001), preambular para.2 & operative para.1; S/RES/1373 
(28 September 2001), preambular paras.3 & 5.  
73 Saul, B. (2006). ‘Defining Terrorism in International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at pp.262-270.    
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together, represent the emergence of a ‘new terrorism’.74 The ‘new terrorism’ is said to 
differ from more traditional forms of international terrorism in three main ways. First of 
all, in contrast to the more traditional, formalised terrorist organisations, which usually 
have an identifiable structure and hierarchy and operate within a particular territory or a 
well defined geographical area, the structure of new terrorist groups is comprised of 
amorphous and diffuse networks made up of autonomous individuals and cells that are 
loosely tied to each other, with no apparent hierarchy. These cells are transnational in 
nature and operate across national territorial boundaries in order to inter-link 
international networks.75 Al-Qaeda networks, for example, are estimated to operate in 
over 60 countries, making it the most widely dispersed non-State terrorist network in 
history.76 The U.S. Supreme Court has described al-Qaeda as a ‘new’ and ‘amorphous’ 
enemy that poses new threats to national security.77 A number of other groups, which 
the Security Council has designated as ‘terrorist’ and suggested to be ‘associated’ with 
al-Qaeda, namely Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, 
Al-Shabab, Al Nusrah Front (ANF) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
are also reported to operate in numerous countries.78 The Security Council has 
expressed its ‘gravest concern’ over the ‘large-scale offensive’ and ‘control of territory 
in parts of Iraq and Syria’ by the ISIL and ANF and ‘concern’ over the scale of the flow 
of foreign terrorist fighters from more than 80 countries to assist them, which threatens 
the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, independence, diplomatic personnel and 
premises, government officials and nationals of Iraq and Syria and of other States.79 The 
recent advances of ISIL in Iraq illustrate not only the complex, transnational nature of 
international terrorism but also the relative power of terrorist groups to that of States. Of 
                                                        
74 See Neumann, P. (2009).‘Old and New Terrorism’. Cambridge: Polity Press; Ganor, B. ‘Terrorism in 
the Post-Cold War Era’, in Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, 2006, ‘Global Terrorism and 
International Cooperation’, Ankara: The Turkish General Staff Printing House, at p.21; Lippman, M. 
(2002-2003). ‘The New Terrorism and International Law’. 10 Tulsa.J.Comp.&Int’lL. 297; Wilkinson, P. 
(2005). ‘International terrorism: the changing threat and the EU’s response’, Institute for Security Studies, 
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9/11’. 25 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 303.  
75 U.N. Docs.A/57/273-S/2002/875, supra n 70, para.12; Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change’, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004), at p.47; Council Framework Decision 
2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008, amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating 
terrorism, OJ L 330 of 9 December 2008, p.21, paras.3-4. 
76 Wilkinson, supra n 74, at p.13.  
77Shafiq Rasul, et al., v President of the U.S., et al. & Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad al Odah, et al. v 
U.S., 542 U.S. 466 124 S.CT 2686 159 L.ED 2D 548 (2004).  
78 E.g., U.N. Doc.A/HRC/22/59, supra n 70, para.15; S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012), para.2; Forest, 
J.J.F. (2011). ‘Al-Qaeda's Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa: Myths, Realities and Possibilities’. 5 
Perspectives on Terrorism 63; Mapping Militant Organisations, Stanford University, available online: 
www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61#attacks.  
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particular importance to the transnational nature of terrorist acts, which has to date been 
given little consideration, is ‘cyber-terrorism’ and the ‘use of the Internet for terrorist 
purposes’.80 A further aspect to this problem is the contemporary phenomenon known 
as ‘State-sponsored’ terrorism, that is, the active and often clandestine support, 
encouragement and assistance provided by a government to a terrorist group and while, 
at the same time, falling outside the international rules on State responsibility.81  
 
Secondly, terrorist networks are based increasingly on religious motivations and 
ideologies, rather than the pursuit of national aims. Finally, the methods of irregular 
warfare and the lethality of violence used by new terrorist groups are heretofore 
unknown. It has to be understood that al-Qaeda is only one of many different Islamic 
terrorist groups, specifically, some of which are sympathetic to al-Qaeda but no more 
than loosely and indirectly linked to it, and of terrorist groups more generally, which 
have vastly differing political, ideological, religious and economic causes.82 That said, 
al-Qaeda is, perhaps, a notable manifestation of the ‘new terrorism’, not least because 
the attacks on the U.S. in 2001 led to an unprecedented legislative response by the 
Security Council and also because, other than the Taliban, al-Qaeda is the only group - 
and, more recently, individuals and entities ‘associated with it’ - which the Council has 
agreed to designate as ‘terrorist’.83  
 
Two further points, which are of importance to the present study, are worthy of note: 
first, whether or not one accepts the emergence of a ‘new terrorism’, one of the broad 
characteristics of international terrorism is that the State and its nationals tend to be the 
target, and acts of terrorism not only violate human rights but are also deemed to 
threaten or implicate, directly and indirectly, certain shared vital State interests. Some of 
                                                        
80 Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA, supra n 75; U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘The use of 
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these interests are illustrated by recent incidents and include, for example, the State’s 
sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national security, diplomatic 
personnel and embassies and military personnel, installations and property. That said, 
the actual nature and scale of the threat remains insufficiently clear. One of the main 
reasons for this is due to the lack of a legal definition of ‘terrorism’, discussed above, 
which means that the threat of terrorism is relative and can differ considerably, 
depending on the State against which terrorist groups are fighting. A separate but 
related matter is the scarcity of primary source-based research and the absence of an 
independent, U.N. monitoring mechanism that records alleged incidents and 
prosecutions.84 Nevertheless, in spite of the sizeable and growing body of scholarly 
literature on the subject of international terrorism, it is rather surprising that the threat to 
shared vital State interests has been given little consideration, even though, as will be 
shown, it has partly shaped the behaviour of States, as it has taken shape through the 
agreement of numerous counter-terrorism conventions and the adoption of resolutions 
by the General Assembly and Security Council, as well as the enactment of specific 
domestic laws. 
  
Secondly, the transnational nature of terrorist networks poses a serious challenge to the 
adequacy of the traditional grounds of territoriality and nationality jurisdiction in 
international law. The complex and evolving nature of the threat also means that it is 
ipso facto incapable of being encompassed wholly within the jurisdictional regime 
provided for by sectoral treaties. On a separate but closely related matter, the 
transnational nature of the threat posed to certain vital State interests, and the 
prohibition, without consent, of enforcing jurisdiction in the territory of foreign States, 
has led some States to seek to justify the use of military force and targeted killing of 
non-State terrorist actors under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the laws of war.85 
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The problem of establishing jurisdiction over terrorist acts outside the State’s territory 
has been little discussed in legal scholarship, with existing works being either 
insufficiently comprehensive and/or largely out of date.86 Assessment of the use of 
protective jurisdiction for combating the threat is all the more important, given that the 
existing response by the international community has predominantly been under a 
criminal law paradigm, and protective jurisdiction has been included in numerous 
counter-terrorism conventions and been at the heart of important cases for the 
prosecution of terrorist acts abroad.87   
 
Limiting discussion to protective jurisdiction, which is only one potential aspect of an 
otherwise multifaceted approach to combating international terrorism, necessarily 
involves the exclusion of a number of other important issues. Firstly, the study is not 
concerned with examining ‘terrorism’ per se, or the definition or typologies of 
‘terrorism’, or the ‘root causes’ of ‘terrorism’, which have already been discussed 
elsewhere.88 Secondly, it does not examine the lawfulness, as a matter of international 
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law, of the use force or the practice of targeted killing against terrorists, pursuant to 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and the laws of war. Lastly, it is not concerned with 
domestic acts of terrorism, that is, crimes which occur and are prosecuted wholly within 
the territory of a single State, such as the Chechen hostage crisis in Moscow in 2002;89 
the Bogota bombing in 2003;90 the Madrid train bombings in 2004;91 and the London 
bombings in 2005.92 As the Appeals Chamber for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon put 
it, ‘the requirement of a cross-border element goes …to its character as international 
rather than domestic’.93 The ‘cross-border element’ may take many different forms and 
is illustrated, for example, by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World 
Trade Centre and the Pentagon, which, though clearly occurring primarily on U.S.’ 
territory and resulting in the loss of nearly 3,000 lives, the destruction of hundreds of 
millions of dollars in property and severe damage to the American economy, were 
carried out by foreign nationals who were part of a transnational conspiracy and 
received their orders, funding, training and support from persons in foreign countries.94 
A further example of the ‘cross-border element’ is an act of terrorism committed in the 
territory of one State against, for example, the nationals or diplomatic personnel or 
premises of one or more foreign States. While the nature of the ‘new terrorism’, to a 
certain extent, dissolves any neat distinction between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ 
terrorism, nevertheless, such a distinction, for the purpose of jurisdiction in international 
law, is necessary and important, and accordingly it is one that has long been made by 
counter-terrorism conventions.95         
 
1.8. Central Argument of the Study  
 
The central argument of this study is that protective jurisdiction, though regarded as 
contentious and given little consideration in legal scholarship, is more established in 
historical and modern State practice than is generally appreciated. The empirical 
research into contemporary State practice and the detailed analysis of national laws 
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shows that protective jurisdiction is the principal means by which States combat 
international terrorism, a trend that has been encouraged by counter-terrorism treaties 
and the adoption of binding resolutions by the Security Council. It may be possible, 
based on this practice, to enumerate a core category of vital interests that States have 
included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata. These vital interests, which 
States have in common, may be said to be ‘shared’ by the international community. 
That is, the protection of such interests has sufficient uniformity in the practice of the 
international community of States. These shared vital interests could provide a means 
by which to define protective jurisdiction in contemporary customary international law 
and is referred to as a ‘shared vital State interests’ approach.  
 
In that connection, and contrary to the collective belief, discussed above, the use of the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties should not 
automatically be interpreted as impliedly codifying a theory of universal jurisdiction. 
The reason for this suggestion is that it gives insufficient consideration to the nature of 
the threat posed by international terrorism and the reason why States negotiate the 
adoption of such treaties in order to combat it; more importantly, it conflates the treaty 
obligation to extradite or prosecute with the theory of universal jurisdiction, both of 
which are capable of having different rationales; and, more fundamentally, it 
misinterprets the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ as the protection of 
‘international community values’.96 An alternative interpretation of the prescriptive 
jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle, proposed by the present 
study, is a form of ‘treaty-based jurisdiction’, which States are able to use in order more 
effectively to protect certain of their vital interests. Indeed, this jurisdiction enables 
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States to prosecute treaty-offences committed by foreign nationals abroad, without 
having to evidence any nexus with the alleged offence, as soon as the accused is present 
on its territory, or otherwise have the accused prosecuted on its behalf, failing 
extradition. This interpretation inter alia has already been explained by the present 
author elsewhere and this study is limited to a summary of the key findings.97 It is 
therefore necessary to reconsider the relationship between extradite or prosecute and 
universal jurisdiction and, for the purpose of conceptual clarity, to make an important 
distinction between the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ and ‘international 
community values’, to which they will be referred throughout this study.98  
 
In the light of the State practice examined by the present study and also the decision by 
the ILC to include ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work, the 
codification of protective jurisdiction and the clarification of its relationship with other 
grounds of jurisdiction is necessary and desirable more than ever before. The adoption 
of such an instrument could be used to complement and ‘fill in’ the gaps left by the 
existing regime of counter-terrorism treaties.    
 
1.9. Research Methodology and Method 
 
It is useful, at this stage, to explain the methodological framework used to underpin the 
present study. This is important, for methodology informs how law is conceptualised 
and understood and, as will be explained, is linked to the type of research questions 
asked and the method used to identify, collect and analyse data.99 Methodological 
approaches thereby entail theoretical and practical significance. This study is based on 
legal positivism. Before explaining the reasons for using this approach, it is perhaps 
useful to first say a few words on the meaning of legal positivism. 
  
1.9.1. Legal Positivism 
 
The core tenet of positivist legal theory is that ‘valid’ law is created and laid down by 
                                                        
97 Garrod, M., ‘The Unreasoned Relationship between Extradite or Prosecute and Universal Jurisdiction 
in International Law in Light of the Judgment by the ICJ in Belgium v Senegal’ (under review by the 
Chinese ILJ). 
98 See also Kreß, supra n 27, at pp.566-567; Yee, supra n 27.   
99 Cryer, R. & Harvey, T. & Sokhi-Bulley, B. & Bohm, A. (2011). ‘Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law’. Oxford: Hart. 
25 
 
recognised law-making bodies.100 The central aim, or aspiration, of positivism is 
therefore to provide the intellectual and practical tools whereby the law can be 
identified and described ‘as it is’, in terms of formal criteria, and, in turn, distinguished 
from extra-legal sources, such as coercion, morality and religious doctrine. Legal 
positivism may be understood as the ‘need to distinguish, firmly and with the maximum 
of clarity, law as it is from law as it ought to be’.101 Under the theory of legal 
positivism, law is observable empirically, such as in the form of legislation, custom, 
adjudication by courts and the practice of legal institutions.  
 
It should be noted, from the outset, that the legal positivist theory has been the subject 
of criticism for being an outdated, conservative and rigid methodology, and because it 
gives insufficient consideration to broader external and contextual factors, such as 
morality, power and political and social and economic forces, which may shape and 
influence the law’s creation, development and practical operation.102 These issues, 
which continue to dominate contemporary legal theoretical debate, are beyond the 
present study’s scope. It is important, nevertheless, that the limitations of positivism, as 
with all other theories of legal research, are not exaggerated. It has to be borne in mind, 
moreover, that these theories undergo continual evolution, and it is safe to say that the 
modern, enlightened positivist method of today would have been unrecognisable to the 
classical view in the nineteenth century.103 For instance, many modern positivists accept 
that there can be more than one possible ‘correct’ interpretation of the law.104 Nor do 
many modern positivists accept that law is objective and independent of its context.105 It 
is also important not to become bogged down with the question of whether there are 
necessary connections between law and morality, as did Hart and Fuller, which in the 
end turned out to be a somewhat misconceived debate.106 While there is no necessary 
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conceptual connection between law and morality in order for law to be valid, many 
legal positivists are of the view that morality and the law are capable of coinciding and 
overlapping and that a perhaps more important consideration is the identification of law. 
Thus, while positivism is concerned with identifying the law ‘as it is’, this does not 
necessarily mean that important moral questions have no relevance in terms of what 
rules become valid ‘law’, or the quite separate issue of how judges decide cases.107 A 
positivist approach is useful for identifying the law in order to then subject the law to 
critique, including moral critique, and to show how and why the law, and its practical 
operation, may, in fact, be influenced by broader contextual factors.  
 
1.9.2. Reasons for using Legal Positivism 
 
Positivism is among the most influential theoretical approaches to international legal 
scholarship.108 It is suited, in particular, to research concerning the identification and 
explanation of the law; analysis of complex legal texts; systematisation of legal norms; 
and understanding the relationship between different legal norms.109 These 
considerations are of importance to the present study. Indeed, as has already been 
explained above, there is little understanding by courts and in legal scholarship of 
protective jurisdiction, which has since the Harvard Research been confused, to varying 
degrees, with other grounds of jurisdiction. The result of this confusion means that 
theories invoked in order to support particular assertions of jurisdiction do not always 
reflect the law, lex lata, or describe it with sufficient accuracy. The use of positivism, 
which has as its most basic aim the description of the law ‘as it is’, in order to provide a 
more rigorous analysis of jurisdiction is therefore more important than ever before. A 
further reason for using a positivist approach is because methodologies have important 
implications, not only for the way in which law is conceptualised but also for concepts 
of the State and its sovereignty. Positivism is distinctly State-centred; the concept of the 
State and its sovereignty are of fundamental and primary importance in international 
law and international relations. Jurisdiction is a manifestation of sovereignty and, as 
will be shown, protective jurisdiction has as its purpose the protection of sovereignty 
and certain other shared vital State interests. A positivist approach is also useful for 
identifying the shortcomings of and gaps in the law, lex lata, and for proposing law 
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reform; one of the aims of the present study is to assess the advantages and 
disadvantages of the codification of protective jurisdiction.  
 
Inherent in legal positivism is a critical approach to examining the law and the way in 
which the law has developed and is enforced; indeed, it is not concerned with the mere 
description or acceptance of the law at face value. It is therefore important to examine 
the law ‘as it is’, as claimed or described by recognised law-making bodies, critically 
and with sufficient rigour and depth, in order to draw out shortcomings, inconsistencies 
and contradictions, particularly as such claims may themselves be based on 
misinterpretations or misunderstandings. This is best illustrated, perhaps, by grounds of 
jurisdiction.  
 
A critical approach to examining the law is all the more important in respect of one 
particular method by which to identify the law ‘as it is’, namely, the ‘modern positivist’ 
understanding of the process of international law-making.110 This method focuses on the 
evolution of customary international law by placing significant weight on ‘verbal State 
practice’, rather than on ‘hard’, or ‘physical’, State practice as required by the test 
adopted by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.111 The ILC has interpreted 
verbal practice not as State practice stricto sensu but, rather, ‘as secondary sources of 
information regarding State practice’ in its use of materials for identifying customary 
rules.112 There is, in principle, nothing wrong with this method for identifying 
customary international law. However, for several reasons, a cautionary approach is 
needed in relying on and interpreting such practice and, in turn, the customary rules 
deduced in this way. First of all, the nomenclature used by States and courts in order to 
describe the law may be based on little more than ‘loose language’ and without 
undertaking an inquiry into the law or going into the matter in depth; verbal practice 
may be based on lofty language, for example, that used in political declarations or 
preambular paragraphs of multilateral treaties; verbal practice may not be sufficiently 
tested judicially or in inter-State disputes; verbal practice may be irrelevant to the 
specific issue, or it may not sit neatly with, and may even be contradicted, by physical 
practice; verbal practice may even be based on misinterpretations of physical practice or 
                                                        
110 See Paulus & Simma, supra n 101, at p.302; Kreß, supra n 27, at pp.573-576. 
111 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.3.  
112 U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/659 (14 March 2013), para.24. 
28 
 
of the way in which rules of customary international law have traditionally developed; 
and, lastly, verbal practice may not necessarily reflect opinio juris, that is, the belief of 
States with regard to the existence or content of a given rule. Conversely, opinio juris 
may be informed by, or based on, inaccurate or incorrect verbal descriptions of the law 
and such belief may not sit neatly with physical practice. It has to be borne in mind that 
courts and commentators relying on this method risk oversimplification and may 
misinterpret customary rules of describe such rules with insufficient accuracy. In that 
respect, the work by Kreß, one of the proponents of the modern positivist method, is 
particularly illustrative. 
 
Kreß has asserted the ‘undeniably customary title to universal jurisdiction in the case of 
piracy’,113 despite not having undertaken any research or analysis of primary or 
secondary sources. According to Kreß, by adopting the ‘modern positivist’ method, it is 
‘evident’ that what has emerged from ‘verbal’ State practice is ‘the existence of true 
universal jurisdiction over all the crimes under international law’.114 Kreß went on to 
conclude that:  
 
... customary international law empowers States to exercise universal 
(prescriptive and adjudicative) jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes to the extent that such crimes have acquired the 
status of general customary international law.115 
 
It is evident that Kreß assumed that universal jurisdiction developed historically in 
‘hard’ State practice and already existed as an undeniable rule of customary 
international law in respect of piracy, which Kreß then assumed may be expanded to 
cover ‘all’ crimes under international law. In respect of the modern positivist method, 
the verbal State practice cited as proof by Kreß is a singular preambular paragraph of 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).116 The conclusion reached by 
Kreß inter alia is potentially misleading. The preambular paragraph, to which Kreß 
refers, contains rather loose language agreed upon by States, which does not sit neatly 
with the different, and perhaps more important, operative provisions from the same 
source. Nonetheless, Kreß assumes that all crimes under international law are ipso facto 
subject to universal jurisdiction. The same line of reasoning leads Kreß to suggest that 
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the obligation to extradite or prosecute, where it is used in treaties that proscribe 
conduct that is criminal under international law, is also the codification of universal 
jurisdiction. As will be explained in chapter five, this appears to misinterpret the effect 
of the obligation to extradite or prosecute and, ultimately, the law ‘as it is’. It is worth 
noting, by way of aside, that the potential misinterpretation of the formation and sources 
of evidence of custom is one of the reasons why the ILC, in 2012, included this topic in 
its programme of work.117 
 
Although legal positivism provides a critical approach for analysing the law, it is 
different from, and is not to be confused with, what have been described under the 
broad label as ‘critical approaches’, which includes Marxist, postcolonial, third world, 
feminist and critical theories.118 These latter approaches are said to differ from more 
traditional methodologies, such as positivism and naturalism, in that they provide a 
‘critique’ of the law from a particular theoretical perspective, and they share a common 
‘concern with the extent to which purportedly neutral concepts are neither neutral 
‘givens’, nor neutral, but rather cultural constructs usually blind to themselves’.119 They 
also challenge legal scholarship by pointing out the ways in which the law both 
represents and is made up of power relations.120 It is not suggested that critical 
approaches are inappropriate for the study of extraterritorial jurisdiction.121 Rather, a 
more fundamental issue is to first establish more clearly what the protective principle is 
and this is best done through a positivist analysis. Moreover, positivism may equally be 
used to provide a critique of the law and of legal scholarship, such as where the law is 
depicted as neutral, self-evident and universal. Positivism therefore provides a suitable 
methodology to realise the goals of the present research project.  
 
1.9.3. Doctrinal Research Method 
 
As the present study examines jurisdiction in international law, and the law of 
jurisdiction is, in the absence of treaty law, primarily customary international law, it is 
useful to set out the method for ascertaining customary international law that will be 
used. Method is different from, although is related to, methodology. Method is the way 
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in which the research project is pursued and research questions are answered. As noted 
above, the methodology used to underpin research determines the type of method used 
to collect and analyse data. The method of legal research based on positivism is referred 
to as doctrinal legal research. There is no single, all-encompassing definition of 
doctrinal legal research. Nevertheless, it may be said that this method has at its core the 
systematic and in-depth exposition of the law. Such exposition can include the law’s 
historical development, the relationship between different rules, clarifying ambiguities 
within rules and the law’s operation in practice. It also consists of explaining the 
problems with and identifying the shortcomings of the law, providing a critique of the 
law, as well as making proposals for the future development of the law. Doctrinal 
research is centred on critically analysing the content of primary sources of material, for 
example, the judgments of courts, legislation, treaties and the trévoux préparatoires of 
treaties, policy documents, archival documents, resolutions and reports adopted by 
General Assembly and Security Council, and other documents originating from 
lawmakers and institutions at the national, regional and international level, as well as 
the writings of renowned jurists and scholarship.   
 
Research methods are not free from criticism, and doctrinal research is certainly no 
exception.122 Many scholars using a doctrinal method take what may be described as an 
‘internal’ or ‘inward’ perspective in studying the law, but it is exactly this feature of 
doctrinal research which is most often criticised for being overly narrow.123 It is 
certainly the case that such an approach can mean that the law may be studied in the 
abstract, isolated from important social, political and economic contextual factors which 
may otherwise explain why the law has developed in the way that it has, or how it is 
selectively enforced.124 This has led to the argument that the doctrinal legal research 
method should be replaced, or at least supplemented, by a ‘law in context’, or what is 
often described as a ‘socio-legal research’, approach.125  
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It is difficult to come up with one generally accepted definition of what is a socio-legal 
approach to the study of the law.126 In general terms this approach has been described as 
placing emphasis on law in action, with a focus on the use of empirical research of the 
law and of the broader social, political and economic context in which the law develops 
and operates. The emphasis placed on the use of empirical research is apparently in 
order to understand ‘how the law works in the real world’.127  
 
It is important, however, that criticism of the doctrinal research method is not 
overstated.128 While many scholars using doctrinal research may adopt a narrow, inward 
perspective in studying the law, this does not have to be the case, and there are many 
different genres within doctrinal work. Doctrinal research is useful in order to study the 
law in textual analysis, as well as the law in action, or in the ‘real world’, and to 
critically assess whether or not the law presented in doctrine corresponds with the law’s 
operation.129 It is thus a somewhat artificial and misplaced proposition, and perhaps 
even an outdated one, that doctrinal research is too simple, narrow, rigid, theoretical and 
uncritical, and is incapable of examining the law in its broader context, in its practical 
operation.130 It is also worth noting that doctrinal research has moved beyond seeing 
legal research as a matter of discovering law that is autonomously somewhere ‘out 
there’ waiting to be found in order to provide the one and only right answer to a legal 
problem.131 The legal doctrinal paradigm is, all too often, criticised from the perspective 
of its nineteenth century, formalistic origins and the claim of positive science to 
objective knowledge, or otherwise from that of the traditional role of legal practitioners, 
which is based on a narrow framework of tracing common law precedent and legislative 
interpretation, and usually limited to a particular dispute between parties. This tends to 
result, unwarrantedly, in doctrinal research being undervalued or of lacking importance 
in legal research. The doctrinal and socio-legal approaches should, in any case, be seen 
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as complementary and intertwined, rather than distinctly separate and irreconcilable.132  
 
A broader issue, however, is that the doctrinal method is rarely discussed or articulated 
in legal scholarship and therefore there tends to be a lack of understanding of either 
what this method is or of what it entails.133 In that connection, a more important issue, 
perhaps, is not the method itself, but, rather, the way in which this method is used by 
courts and in legal scholarship. Doctrinal analysis, despite being the method of choice 
for the vast majority of legal scholars, is not always done well.134 The existing studies 
on jurisdiction in international law, the vast majority of which have used the doctrinal 
method, lack sufficient rigor. Indeed, as has already been discussed above, one of the 
reasons why the historical development of protective principle jurisdiction over piracy, 
and its subsequent expansion to include war crimes in the aftermath of World War II, 
has been interpreted by courts and in legal scholarship as the theory of universal 
jurisdiction, for the protection of ‘international community values’, is due to the lack of 
analysis of primary sources, or else the citation of primary sources wholly out of their 
proper context, and, as is more often the case, the overreliance on tentative secondary 
sources.135 This ultimately leads to a misinterpretation of jurisdiction in international 
law.136  
 
The present study uses the doctrinal method in order to identify and examine the law ‘as 
it is’, although it takes what may be described as a more ‘outward’ or ‘external’ 
perspective by also examining the law’s development and operation in context, and the 
study is immersed in a variety of contemporary and historical primary and secondary 
sources. The operation of the law in society and, from the perspective of international 
law, within the international community, is just as important as understanding the law in 
and of itself. The doctrinal method is supplemented in the present study with an 
extensive empirical analysis of the national laws of 181 States, in order to provide for a 
more comprehensive understanding of protective principle jurisdiction in contemporary 
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State practice and to show that it has developed as a rule of customary international law 
for the protection of a core category of shared vital State interests. These national laws, 
as will be explained, have been enacted by States and used in response to international 
terrorism. It is also worth noting that these national laws include the implementation by 
States of counter-terrorism conventions. In accordance with the central argument, 
outlined above, the use of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in these treaties is 
interpreted by the present study as broad treaty-based jurisdiction, as opposed to a 
theory of universal jurisdiction, which States parties have used in order more effectively 
to protect certain of their vital interests; the national laws adopted by States in order to 
implement these treaties is interpreted as State practice in support of protective 
jurisdiction. The method of data collection, and the interpretation and limitations of this 
data, are discussed further in chapter three.   
 
1.10. Research Questions  
 
The present study has advanced the following research questions:  
 
1. What is the protective principle of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction? 
2. How has protective jurisdiction developed? 
3. What is the relationship between protective and other grounds of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction?  
4. How does protective jurisdiction fit within the framework of international law? 
5. Whether and, if so, to what extent, is protective jurisdiction used in State practice for 
combatting the threat of international terrorism? 
6. Is the codification of protective jurisdiction necessary and desirable?  
 
1.11. Structure of the Study 
  
This study examines protective jurisdiction and its use for combatting the threat of 
international terrorism. This examination begins in chapter two with the rationale of 
protective jurisdiction and the interests that it serves. The modern rationalisation of 
protective jurisdiction is based on three interrelated grounds. The first of these is the 
mutually beneficial need by States to protect certain of their vital interests, a number of 
which are shared by the international community, by offences emanating from outside 
their territorial borders. The protective principle is the only recognised ground of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law over offences occurring wholly outside 
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the State’s territory, including inchoate and preparatory offences, which threaten or 
implicate vital interests, as well as those interests which are located abroad, and where 
no constituent element of an offence or other tangible effect has actually been felt 
within the prescribing State’s territory. The two other related grounds justifying 
protective jurisdiction are, first of all, that the adequate protection of vital interests 
cannot be wholly entrusted to other States; and, secondly, international law does not 
impose sufficient obligations on States to protect such interests or adequately hold 
States responsible for the failure to protect such interests by non-State actors. The 
protection of vital interests provides a sufficiently close connection between the 
legislating State and the impugned conduct and justifies in international law a limited 
amount of interference in the territorial sovereignty and internal affairs of other States. 
However, the same prescriptive connection is not required to be established by 
international law in the case of piracy on the high seas. This distinction regarding the 
requirement to evidence a prescriptive connection is one of great importance for, as will 
be explained, the latter has been misinterpreted during the twentieth century as a ground 
of universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community values. The 
rationale of protective jurisdiction, which does not require a connection with an alleged 
offence to be established, other than where the offence implicates or threatens vital 
interests, is of great importance for combatting transnational crimes, including the 
problem of international terrorism.  
 
The third chapter shows that grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction have traditionally 
been little understood and, more often than not, subject to considerable confusion. The 
chapter sheds important light on the way in which protective jurisdiction has 
traditionally developed and examines the various efforts made to codify extraterritorial 
jurisdiction during the first half of the twentieth century. The reason for this is that it is 
not possible to understand the reason why protective jurisdiction is presently little 
understood and why there has emerged a collective belief, discussed above, without 
understanding these codification efforts. This is particularly relevant to the later 
discussion of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties for the 
protection of shared vital State interests, in chapter five, and the codification of 
protective jurisdiction by the ILC, in chapter six.   
 
Chapter four presents the key findings of empirical research into contemporary State 
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practice and a detailed analysis of national laws, the purpose of which is to shed 
important light on whether, and, if so, to what extent, protective jurisdiction is used for 
combatting international terrorism. It shows that protective jurisdiction has been at the 
heart of the response to, and is the principal means by which States combat, the threat of 
international terrorism. This practice, which has been encouraged by the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, may be sufficiently widespread and uniform to 
permit the codification of protective jurisdiction. An effort is made to systematise 
offences into categories, in order to identify more general themes and trends in national 
laws, in particular the types of vital interests that have been included under the ambit of 
protective jurisdiction lex lata. The findings of this chapter are important not only for 
showing that protective jurisdiction is used more widely than is commonly understood 
and for clarifying some of the uncertainty surrounding the most appropriate grounds of 
jurisdiction for combating international terrorism; they are also of particular importance 
for defining protective jurisdiction in contemporary customary international law, in 
chapter five, and discussing the codification of protective jurisdiction by the ILC, in 
chapter six.   
  
Chapter five sheds important light on the definition of protective jurisdiction in 
contemporary customary international law. It proposes that it may be possible to define 
protective jurisdiction, lex lata, based on vital interests. This approach, which was first 
proposed by the Harvard Research, differs from defining protective jurisdiction based 
on a narrow list of offences. The latter approach is problematic in that national laws 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to harmonise and risks being overly rigid and 
inflexible for responding to the complex and evolving threat of international terrorism. 
The chapter enumerates, by building on the empirical research into State practice in 
chapter four, 13 vital interests that have been included under protective jurisdiction lex 
lata. In addition to national laws, there are a number of other sources by which the 
inclusion of vital interests under protective jurisdiction is verified, namely judicial 
practice, counter-terrorism treaties and the practice of the Security Council. It proposes 
lex ferenda that 10 of these vital State interests are shared by the international 
community and could be used as a way of defining and codifying protective 
jurisdiction. Chapter five also makes a fundamental conceptual distinction between 
jurisdiction for the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ and ‘international 
community values’. The reason for making this distinction, at least in the context of 
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counter-terrorism treaties, is because of the collective belief, discussed above, that the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute impliedly codifies a ground of universal jurisdiction 
for the protection of international community values.  
 
In the light of the recent decision by the ILC to include the codification of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in its long-term programme of work, chapter six concludes 
by discussing the codification of protective jurisdiction as a necessary and desirable 
way forward and the principal advantages and disadvantages of the adoption of such an 
instrument by the ILC, in particular its use for filling in gaps left by the existing 
international legal regime for combatting international terrorism.  
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Chapter Two 
 
‘The Rationale of Protective Principle Jurisdiction’ 
  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
  
Protective jurisdiction has developed under customary international law over a period of 
several centuries and to varying degrees in the practice of different States, although the 
full extent of the diverse historical ‘origins’ of this jurisdiction are not yet fully 
understood. It was not until the early twentieth century, when a number of public and 
private efforts were made to codify jurisdiction in international law, that the 
nomenclature ‘protective principle’ was used and the rationale of this jurisdiction was 
given substantive consideration. One of the main reasons for this, as will be explained 
below, is that protective jurisdiction has traditionally been treated as a part of, and 
justified under, two broader rights in international law, both of which were used by 
States to protect their vital interests, namely self-defence and necessity. The purpose of 
this chapter is to explain the modern rationalisation of protective jurisdiction in 
international law. The theoretical justification for this jurisdiction, as will be explained, 
is based on three interrelated grounds. The first of these is the mutually beneficial need 
by States to protect themselves and certain of their vital interests, a number of which are 
shared by the international community, from offences emanating outside their territorial 
borders. The territoriality of jurisdiction, in and of itself, is wholly inadequate for the 
protection of such interests. The theories of territoriality and protection therefore ought 
to be treated as complementary, rather than in opposition, to each other. The two other 
related grounds justifying protective jurisdiction are, firstly, that the adequate protection 
of vital interests cannot be wholly entrusted to other States; and, secondly, international 
law does not impose sufficient obligations on States to protect such interests or 
adequately hold States responsible for the failure to protect such interests by non-State 
actors.  
 
It is important to make clear, from the outset, that the protection of vital interests 
evidences a sufficiently close connection between the legislating State and the 
impugned conduct and justifies in international law a limited amount of interference in 
the territorial sovereignty and internal affairs of other States. However, the same 
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prescriptive connection is not required by international law to be evidenced in the case 
of piracy on the high seas. The reason why international law has traditionally permitted 
this ‘no nexus requirement’, as it will be referred to, is because the high seas are beyond 
the exclusive territorial sovereignty of any State and pirates are deemed to fall outside 
the flag protection of any State. Thus, it is not necessary, as a matter of international 
law, for a State to justify the assertion of protective jurisdiction over pirates on the high 
seas by evidencing in national laws, or proving in inter-State disputes, a prescriptive 
connection with its vital interests. This distinction regarding the requirement to 
evidence a prescriptive connection is of one great importance for, as will be explained, 
the latter has arguably been misinterpreted during the twentieth century as a ground of 
universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community values. 
 
The chapter begins, in part one, by examining the traditional rationale of protective 
jurisdiction, which was, until the early twentieth century, justified in international law 
based on the broader and well-established rights of self-defence and necessity. In this 
regard, an important difference existed between Anglo-American countries, such as 
Britain and the U.S., and countries in continental Europe, such as France. The former 
tended to exercise protective jurisdiction as part of a broad right of self-defence and 
necessity and treated them as one and the same. The latter justified protective 
jurisdiction based on self-defence and necessity but also made provision for such 
jurisdiction in their criminal codes independently from the rights of self-defence and 
necessity. It was not until the twentieth century, when the rights of self-defence and 
necessity began to be restricted, and public and private efforts were made to codify 
jurisdiction in international law, that protective jurisdiction and its rationale were treated 
independently from self-defence and necessity. Thereafter, in part two, the chapter 
explains the modern rationalisation of protective jurisdiction in international law, 
particularly from the perspective of those attempting to codify the international law of 
jurisdiction. The chapter concludes that protective jurisdiction is the only recognised 
theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law over offences occurring wholly 
outside the State’s territory, including inchoate and preparatory offences, which threaten 
or implicate vital State interests, as well as those interests which are located abroad, and 
where no constituent element of an offence or other tangible effect has actually been felt 
within the proscribing State’s territory. This makes the rationale of this jurisdiction of 
great importance for combatting the complex and diffuse threat of international 
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terrorism.   
 
2.2. Relationship between Protective Jurisdiction and Self-Defence and Necessity  
 
The rationale of protective jurisdiction was not given substantive consideration until the 
early twentieth century, when public and private efforts were made to codify 
jurisdiction in international law. This was despite the fact that this ground of jurisdiction 
has varied historical origins and was, by the early nineteenth century, widely established 
in State practice.1 The reason why this is so is because protective jurisdiction has 
traditionally been treated as being a part of, and justified under, two other well-
established and broader rights in international law, both of which were used by States in 
order to protect their vital interests, namely self-defence and necessity. Before 
examining the modern rationalisation of protective jurisdiction in international law, 
particularly as it was understood by those attempting to codify jurisdiction, it is useful 
first to examine the relationship in international law between this jurisdiction and self-
defence and necessity.  
  
Prior to the twentieth century, protective jurisdiction was considered to be based on the 
sovereign’s inherent right to defend itself under the doctrine of necessity and the right 
of self-defence.2 This is best illustrated, perhaps, by the 1873 case of Fornage, in which 
the French Cour de Cassation held that the ‘single exception’ under the law of nations 
permitting a sovereign to punish foreign nationals for crimes committed outside its 
territory is for ‘a crime against the safety of the state’, which is ‘founded on the right of 
legitimate self-defense’.3 The Cutting incident, which gave rise to a diplomatic dispute 
                                                        
1 Chapter three.  
2 Westlake, J. (1910). ‘International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.262; Report of the Sub-Committee by 
Brierly, J.L. (Rapporteur) & De Visscher, C. ‘Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime’, annexed to 
Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, ‘Criminal Competence of 
States in respect of Offences Committed Outside their Territory’, 20 AJIL (Spec. Supp.) (1926) 252, at 
p.257; Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Reports 1927, Series A. No.10, at 
p.45 (Diss. Op. Judge Weiss); Bowett, D.W. (1958). ‘Self-Defence in International Law’. Manchester: 
MUP, at pp.62-64; Cameron, C. (1994). ‘The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction’. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, at pp.45-46; Donnedieu de Vabres, H.F.A. (1928). ‘Les principes modernes du 
droit pénal international’. París: Librarie du Recueil Sirey, at p.86; Research on International Law under 
the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Part II, ‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’. 29 AJIL (Supp.) 
(1935) 435 (Harvard Research), at p.552; Note (1973-1974). ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Following 
Forcible Abduction: A New Israeli Precedent in International Law’. 72 Mich.L.Rev. 1087, at pp.1090, 
1095; Paust, J.J. (1982-1983). ‘Federal Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Non-
immunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine’. 23 
Va.J.Int.L. 191, at p.210; Ryngaert, C. (2008). ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at p.97. 
3 Fornage case (Cour de Cassation, 84 J du Palais 229, 1873), cited in Moore, J.B. (1887). ‘Report on 
40 
 
between the U.S. and Mexico in 1886,4 led J.B. Moore, the Assistant Secretary of State 
for the U.S. Government, to undertake an extensive review of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in State practice, which included the case of Fornage. Moore observed that:  
  
[t]he punishment by a nation of extraterritorial offenses against the safety of 
the state, and the counterfeiting or forging of national seals, papers, moneys 
and bank bills is regarded as an exception to the general principles of 
criminal jurisprudence, and is placed by those who maintain and defend it 
upon the high ground of necessity and self defense.5 
 
The same view was shared by the Institute of International Law, in the first private 
efforts to codify jurisdiction in international law, at its sessions in 1879 and 1883.6 In 
order to understand the reason why protective jurisdiction was traditionally justified 
under self-defence and necessity, it is useful to examine their relationship in State 
practice and the commentaries of jurists in the nineteenth century. 
 
The relationship between protective jurisdiction and self-defence and necessity under 
customary international law has been given little consideration in legal scholarship. As 
with the rights of self-defence and necessity,7 protective jurisdiction appears to have 
been regarded as an exceptional and inherent right of the sovereign under the law of 
nations.8 Moreover, it seems that protective jurisdiction was treated as part of self-
defence, which was itself an aspect of the very broad and vague rights of necessity and 
self-preservation. After examining the use of force in State practice and the 
commentaries of jurists in the nineteenth century, Brownlie found ‘self-defence’, on the 
one hand, and ‘self-preservation’, ‘self-protection’ and ‘necessity’, on the other, to be 
confused and interchangeable terms.9 Brownlie also found that the concept of self-
defence was used synonymously or equated with necessity and self-preservation in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case’. Washington: U.S. Department of State, Government 
Printing Office, at p.55.  
4 See chapter three. 
5 Supra n 3, at p.37. 
6 Cited in Moore, ibid., at pp.109 & 111, respectively. 
7 Westlake, supra n 2, at pp.306, 313; Brownlie, I. (1961). ‘The Use of Force in Self-Defence’. 37 BYIL 
183, at p.184; Higgins, R. (1961). ‘The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States United 
Nations Practice’. 37 BYIL 269, at p.302. 
8 Church v Hubbart, 2 Cranch, U.S. 187 (1804), at pp.234-235; Fornage case, supra n 3, at pp.54-56; 
U.S. v Rodriguez, 182 F.Supp.479 (S.D. Cal., 1960), at p.491; U.S. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d8 (2nd Cir., 
1968), at pp.9-10; U.S. v Gonzalez, 776 F.2d931 (11th Cir., 1985); Hall, E.W., ‘A Treatise on 
International Law’ (ed. by Higgins, P.A. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924)), at p.264; Hyde, C.C. (1922). 
‘International Law’. Boston: Little, at p.426; see also authorities cited in Moore, supra n 3. 
9 Brownlie, supra n 7, at pp.184-201. 
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order to justify defensive force.10  
 
The right of self-preservation, which was used interchangeably with ‘self-protection’, 
was the sovereign’s inherent right and justified a broad range of self-protective 
measures against any violation of the rights and interests of the State or its subjects, 
whether committed by the offending State or its subjects.11 Hall was of the view that 
self-preservation was applicable to all circumstances in which international law did not 
provide adequate protection to the State or its interests from harm.12 The linking of self-
defence with necessity and self-preservation, as had the jurists of modern international 
law, including Grotius, Hobbes, Puffendorf, Wolff and Vattel, created a right of 
‘indefinite’ limits for the protection by the sovereign of what were variously described 
as its ‘essential’ or ‘fundamental’ or ‘vital’ interests.13 The bulk of the reasons behind 
the declarations of war by sovereigns during the several centuries prior to the early 
twentieth century were for the protection of their vital interests.14 As late as the 
twentieth century it was widely accepted that the State’s ‘superior vital interests’ could 
be protected by force as was necessary and, moreover, were beyond international 
arbitration in the determination of inter-State disputes, ‘as only the sovereign can be 
judge of them’.15 The concept of ‘vital’, ‘essential’ and ‘special’ interests was itself 
vague and included the protection of a range of political, economic and military 
interests, including the State’s security, independence, nationals and overseas trade, as 
well as sovereign honour and dignity.16 
 
The broad concept of self-defence is of particular importance to the modern 
development of protective jurisdiction. Indeed, not only were self-defence and 
                                                        
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.; also Westlake, supra n 2, at pp.212-213; Phillimore, R. (1854). ‘Commentaries upon 
International Law’. Philadelphia: T. &. J.W. Johnson, vol.I, at p.180; Twiss, T. (1861). ‘The Law of 
Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities. On the Right and Duties of Nations in Time 
of Peace’. Oxford: OUP, at p.144; De Vattel, E., ‘The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of 
Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the 
Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury’ (ed. by Kapossy, B. & Whitmore, R. (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2008)), at p.88. 
12 Hall, supra n 8, at p.322. 
13 Rodick, B.C. (1928). ‘The Doctrine of Necessity in International Law’. New York: CUP, chapter one; 
Brownlie, supra n 7, at p.187 and authorities cited therein; Higgins, supra n 7, at p.315; Brierly, J.L. 
(1924). 5 BYIL 4, at pp.6-10; also Boed, R. (2000). ‘State of Necessity as a Justification for 
Internationally Wrongful Conduct’. 3 Yale Human Rights and Development L.J. 1, at pp.4-7. 
14 Von Elbe, J. (1939). ‘The Evolution of the Concept of Just War in International Law’. 33 AJIL 665, at 
pp.685-687.  
15 Westlake, supra n 2, at pp.302-305; Brierly, supra n 13, at pp.6-7. 
16 Higgins, supra n 7, at p.315; Rivier, ‘Principes du Droit des Gens’, cited in Westlake, ibid., at p.306. 
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protective jurisdiction inherent rights of sovereignty but, as will be explained below, 
they also shared the same rationale, namely the protection of vital State interests. 
Moreover, protective jurisdiction was exercised as part of self-defence. Thus, Rodick 
has suggested that, since the close of the eighteenth century, States have declared that 
self-defence, necessity and self-preservation excused the action of the State for 
exercising criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals for offences of a serious nature 
committed beyond its borders. This was especially the case if such offences were 
concerned with the counterfeiting of its currency, plotting against its ruler, or seeking to 
overthrow its existing government.17 
 
The use of protective jurisdiction under the broad right of self-defence is evident in 
State practice in respect of the search and seizure of foreign vessels on the high seas in 
time of peace. For example, in the case of Le Louis, Sir William Scott held that States 
have under the law of nations a right to visit and search foreign vessels on the high seas, 
‘particularly for fiscal and defensive regulations more immediately affecting their safety 
and welfare’, a right which existed, he asserted, as a matter of necessity ‘upon the 
ground of repelling injury, and as a measure of self-defence’.18 In the same case, Lord 
Stowell justified jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas on the ground that pirates are 
‘subject to the extreme rights of war’. In a diplomatic dispute between the U.S. and 
Britain arising out of the Caroline incident of 1838, a group of armed rebels, a number 
of whom were U.S. citizens and taking refuge in the U.S., used the steamship, the 
Caroline, to mount attacks against British territory, property and nationals in Canada. 
The British Government dispatched a military expedition and destroyed the Caroline, 
which was justified under a broad right of self-defence, necessity and self-preservation. 
The British Government also claimed that the American rebels were ‘pirates’.19 The 
reason for this was presumably in order to justify in international law the same broad 
right of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the foreign rebels as it claimed over so-called 
pirates, should they fall into British hands. Indeed, Britain had, by the nineteenth 
century, begun to unilaterally claim that there existed a crime of ‘piracy’ under the law 
of nations and applied this crime liberally to foreign nationals whose conduct implicated 
or interfered with its sovereignty, overseas trade and colonial interests, such as the slave 
                                                        
17 Rodick, supra n 13, at pp.30, 35.  
18 (1817) 2 Dodson’s Admiralty 210, at p.246. 
19 Miller, H., ‘The Caroline’, The Avalon Project, available online:  
http:avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp#intro.  
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trade, and regardless of whether the alleged ‘piracy’ had occurred on the high seas.20 In 
the 1893 Behring Fur Seal Arbitration between the U.S. and Britain, it was argued by 
Edward J. Phelps on behalf of the U.S. that the general practice of States, including that 
of Britain and the U.S., as regards the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals on the high seas in time of peace for the protection of national interests was 
based on the right of self-defence, and the broader grounds of necessity, self-protection 
and self-preservation.21 Other instances, albeit beyond the scope of the present work, 
include the Ukase of 1821;22 the Alabama and Kearsage incident of 1864;23 and the 
Virginius incident of 1873.24 It is notable that nineteenth century Anglo-American 
jurists, on the one hand, opposed the validity of protective jurisdiction on the basis that 
it involved the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the State’s territorial 
sovereignty and yet, on the other, seemingly accepted the validity of such jurisdiction 
(particularly over foreign vessels on the high seas for the protection of the State’s 
security and customs and revenue interests) under a broad right of self-defence and self-
preservation.25 The broad concept of self-defence and the linking of self-defence with 
protective jurisdiction, for the protection of ‘special’ or ‘vital’ interests, continued to be 
claimed by some States and commentators well into the twentieth century.26 
 
The right of self-defensive force, however, gradually underwent considerable change 
and, following the adoption of the U.N. Charter, was confined to circumstances of 
‘armed attack’ under Article 51, while the rights of self-preservation and self-protection 
                                                        
20 E.g., Rubin, A.P. (1998). ‘The Law of Piracy’. U.S.: Translational Publishers, Inc., chapter four. 
21 Fur Seal Arbitration, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (1895), vol.IX, pp.130-179 and 
authorities cited therein.  
22 Cited in Fur-Seal Arbitration, ibid., vol.I, at pp.66-68. 
23 See Bowett, supra n 2, at pp.74-75; Moore, J.B. (1906). ‘Digest of International Law’, vol.II, at pp.723-
724; Reuland, R.C.F. (1989). ‘Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime 
Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag State Jurisdiction’. 22 Vand.J.Transnat’l.L. 1161, at p.1211. 
24 Hyde, supra n 8, at pp.114-115; Moore, ibid., at pp.895-903; Reuland, ibid., at pp.1211-1213; Rodick, 
supra n 12, at pp.37-39; Westlake, supra n 2, at pp.171-173; Westlake, J. (1894). ‘Chapters on the 
Principles of International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.119. 
25 Lotus, supra n 2, at p.69 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore); Westlake (1910), ibid., at pp.171-173; Westlake 
(1894), ibid., at pp.115-119; Hall, supra n 8, at pp.264, 328-330; Hyde, ibid., at pp.106, 114-115, 406-
407, 421; Phillimore, supra n 10, at p.179; Van Zwanenberg, A. (1961). ‘Interference with Ships on the 
High Seas’. 10 ICLQ 785, at p.793 and authorities cited therein. 
26 Bowett, supra n 2, at pp.62-65, 71; Brierly, supra n 2, at p.257; Brownlie, supra n 7, at p.205; Higgins, 
supra n 7, at p.306; Reuland, supra n 23, at pp.1206-1208 and note 166 and authorities cited therein; 
Rodick, supra n 13, at p.40; ‘Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics’, in 
34 AJIL 1 (1940), at p.18; Colombos, C.J. (1967). ‘The International Law of the Sea’. London: 
Longmans, at p.315; Masterson, W.E. (1940). ‘The Hemisphere Zone of Security and the Law’. 26 
A.B.A.J. 860; Oppenheim, L. (1955). ‘International Law’ (ed. by Lauterpacht, H. London: Longmans, 
vol.I, at p.319. 
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were outlawed.27 Article 51 thus codified the right, as a limited exception to the ban on 
inter-State force, for States to protect, by means of defensive force, their territorial 
integrity and political independence, as well as their sovereignty and security and 
certain other of their vital interests, against ‘armed attacks’. The category of vital State 
interests which may be protected by defensive force, though not unlimited, has been left 
undefined. Protective jurisdiction, on the other hand, has continued to develop under 
customary law independently from self-defence but, as will be explained in chapter 
three, has gone uncodified. It would appear, then, that self-defence and protective 
jurisdiction are the legal remnants of the once broad rights of ‘self-protection’ and ‘self-
preservation’ in classical legal doctrine; both are permitted by international law and are 
inherent rights of sovereigns and both share the same rationale, namely the need by the 
State to protect itself and certain of its vital interests from threats emanating from 
outside the State’s territory. There is some overlap between the vital interests which 
may be protected by self-defence and protective jurisdiction.28 However, the latter, as a 
non-forcible measure, is not dependent upon the existence of a link with self-defence or 
an ‘armed attack’ and accordingly has a potentially broader category of vital interests 
falling under its ambit, although this too has been left uncodified and undefined.  
 
The protective principle and self-defence are also closely linked philosophically; 
indeed, both belong to the sphere of preventative justice against future harm. Unlike 
defensive force, however, protective jurisdiction may be used also to punish past harms, 
for purposes of retribution or vengeance or deterrence, or as incapacitation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that self-defence and protective jurisdiction are independent 
rights under international law, conceptually, protective jurisdiction remains justifiable, 
perhaps, as a non-forcible measure of self-defence.29  
 
The doctrine of necessity has also been greatly circumscribed and reconceptualised by 
the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility from that of a ‘right’ to an ‘excuse’ for 
internationally wrongful conduct under certain limited circumstances in order to protect 
                                                        
27 Charter of the U.N., San Francisco, 26 June 1945. See also Corfu Channel Case, (U.K. v Albania), 
Merits, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p.4, at p.35. 
28 Paust, supra n 2. 
29 See also Cameron, supra n 2, at p.46.  
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the State’s ‘essential interests’.30 However, the doctrine of necessity, as defined by the 
ILC, is of relevance only to the enforcement of jurisdiction in the territory or against the 
flag vessels on the high seas of foreign States and accordingly will not be considered 
further by the present study. Nonetheless, the theory of necessity remains an important 
aspect of the protective principle’s contemporary rationalisation, as the only non-
forcible means available in international law by which a State is permitted vis-à-vis its 
relations with other States to protect its vital interests. Necessity thus excuses what 
would otherwise constitute an unlawful interference in the territorial sovereignty and 
internal affairs of other States, a point which will be returned to below. It is perhaps 
worth noting that the theory of ‘functional necessity’ provides the modern 
rationalisation for immunities from jurisdiction, the purpose of which is to facilitate the 
maintenance of stable international relations by ensuring that persons who enjoy 
immunity are able to perform functions on behalf of States uninhibited and, more 
broadly, to ensure respect for the principle of the sovereign equality of States, protect 
sovereign independence and prevent interference in their internal affairs.31 The same 
considerations may be relevant to protective jurisdiction, which is necessary to enable 
States to protect their sovereignty and independence and without which they would not 
be able to maintain a degree of stability and predictability in inter-State relations.   
  
2.3. The Modern Rationale of Protective Jurisdiction 
 
The theory of territorial jurisdiction, as has been already been explained in chapter one, 
is of fundamental importance and widely adhered to in State practice but it is by no 
means ‘an absolute principle of international law’ governing the exercise of the State’s 
prescriptive jurisdiction.32 International law does not normally permit the State to 
exercise its prescriptive jurisdiction in respect of acts committed by foreign nationals 
outside its territory; however, customary international law permits exceptions to 
territoriality based on certain principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction - borne out of the 
practice of States - the limits of which the State ‘should not overstep’.33 These 
principles of jurisdiction are supposed to evidence a sufficiently close connection 
                                                        
30 ILCYB, 2001, vol.II (Part Two); A/RES/56/83 (12 December 2001), Article 25. For commentary, see 
Crawford, J. (2002). ‘The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, 
Text and Commentaries’. Cambridge: CUP.  
31 U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/601 (2008), at p.39; U.N. Charter, supra n 27, Articles 2(1), 2(4), 2(7); Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3, para.53. 
32 Lotus, supra n 2, at p.20. 
33 Ibid, at p.19.  
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between the legislating State and the alleged offence and, in turn, justify the 
criminalisation of conduct outside its territory, which would otherwise constitute an 
unlawful interference in the exclusive territorial sovereignty and internal affairs of other 
States.34 One such exception to territoriality is protective jurisdiction. The protective 
principle, as will be explained in chapter three, has varied historical origins and was, by 
the early nineteenth century, widely established in the practice of States; however, it 
was not until the first public and private efforts were made to codify extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction during the first half of the twentieth century, first by the League of 
Nations and more particularly, thereafter, by the Harvard Research, that the 
nomenclature of ‘protective principle’ jurisdiction was used and the rationale of this 
jurisdiction - as distinct from the rights of self-defence and necessity - was given 
substantive consideration.35 It is therefore useful to examine the rationale of protective 
jurisdiction by paying particular attention to the perspective of those attempting to 
codify the international law. The theoretical justification for this jurisdiction is based on 
three interrelated grounds: (i) the mutually beneficial need by States to protect 
themselves and certain of their vital interests, a number of which are shared by the 
international community, from offences emanating outside their territorial borders; (ii) 
the protection of such interests cannot be left to other States; and (iii) international law 
does not sufficiently impose an obligation on States to protect each other’s vital 
interests or adequately hold States responsible for the failure to protect such interests 
from threats and injuries by non-State actors. Each of these grounds will be considered 
in turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34 Ryngaert, supra n 2, at pp.31, 35, 144-146; Sixth Committee, Government of the People’s Republic of 
China, Information from and observations by China on the scope and application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, Note submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs pursuant to General Assembly 
resolution 64/117 of 16 December 2009 (2010), paras.1-2, 8; Mann, F.A. (1964). ‘The Doctrine of 
Jurisdiction in International Law’. 1 Recueil des Cours 1, at pp.44-45, 47, 49, 83; O’Keefe, R. (2004). 
‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’. 2 JICJ 735, at p.738; Love, V. & Staker, C., 
‘Jurisdiction’, in Evans, M.D. (2010). ‘International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at p.320; Shaw, M.N. (2008). 
‘International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.667. 
35 Brierly & De Visscher, supra n 2; Harvard Research, supra n 2. 
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2.3.1. The Need to Protect Vital Interests 
 
According to De Visscher, who assisted Brierly, as Rapporteur, during the effort made 
by the League of Nations to codify ‘criminal competence of States in respect of offences 
committed outside their territory’, positive law contains two exceptions to the theory of 
territorial jurisdiction.36 The first of these, suggested De Visscher, is ‘based upon the 
nature of the interests prejudiced’, which are ‘essential’ to the prescribing State, while 
the second exception is based on the nationality of the victim and relates to offences 
committed against nationals.37 De Visscher was of the view that ‘[t]he first exception 
figures in many legislative systems and has sound reasons to justify it. The second is 
less generally admitted and is much more disputable.’38 The opinion of De Visscher 
sufficiently indicates the rationale of protective jurisdiction. It is based solely on the 
nature of interests that are regarded by the State as ‘essential’, which may be threatened 
by crimes committed outside the prescribing State’s territory.39  
  
The protection by the State of itself and of certain of its ‘essential’ interests, a term that 
is often used interchangeably with ‘vital’ or ‘fundamental’ interests,40 threats to which 
may be posed equally by foreign nationals as by the State’s own nationals, has long 
justified protective jurisdiction.41 As jurisdiction under this theory is based on the 
                                                        
36 Ibid., at p.253.   
37 Ibid., at p.258.    
38 Ibid. 
39 See also Lotus, supra n 2, at pp.35-36 (Diss. Op. Judge Loder); ibid., at p.100 (Diss. Op. Judge 
Altamira); Arrest Warrant, supra n 31, para.16 (Sep. Op. President Guillaume); Bowett, supra n 2, at 
p.62; Cameron, supra n 2, at pp.31-32; Harvard Research, supra n 2, at p.543; Love, & Staker, supra n 
34, at p.326; Mann, supra n 34, at pp.93-94; Ryngaert, supra n 2, at p.96; Shaw, supra n 34, at p.667; 
Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems (1992). ‘Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction’, reprinted in 3 CLF 441, at pp.451, 467; Council of the European Union, AU-EU Technical 
ad hoc Expert Group, ‘Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, Final Report (16 April 2009) 
(Doc.8672/1/09 REV1), Annex, paras.8, 12 (Expert Report); Blakesley, C.L. (1982). ‘United States 
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime’. 73 J.Crim.L.&Criminology 1109, at pp.1137-1138; Blakesley, 
C.L., ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, in Bassiouni, M.C. (ed.) (1999). ‘International Criminal Law’. 
Ardsley: Transnational, vol.II, at p.54; Bowett, D.W. (1982). ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of 
Authority over Activities and Resources’. 53 BYIL 1 at p.10; IBA, Legal Practice Division, ‘Report of the 
Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (28 September 2008), at p.149; Lauterpacht, H. (1947). 
‘Allegiance, Diplomatic Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens.’ 9 CLJ 330, at pp.343, 348.  
40 E.g., Council of Europe, ibid., at p.451; Expert Report, ibid.; Harvard Research, ibid., at p.552; Lowe & 
Staker, ibid., at pp.325-326; U.N. Doc.A/61/10 (2006), Annex E, para.20 (ILC Secretariat); U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime, ‘Guide for the Legislative Incorporation and Implementation of the Universal Anti-
Terrorism Instruments’. New York: U.N. (2006), paras.359, 385. 
41 E.g., Church v Hubbart, supra n 8, at pp.234-235; Moore, supra n 3; Mann, supra n 34, at p.39, 93-94; 
Le Louis, (1817) 2 Dodson’s Admiralty 210, at pp.245-246; Brown, P.M. (1940). ‘Protective 
Jurisdiction’. 34 AJIL 112, at p.114; Brown, P.M. (1953). ‘Protective Jurisdiction over Marginal Waters’. 
47 AJIL 452, at pp.453-454; Dickinson, D.M. (1926). ‘Jurisdiction at the Maritime Frontier’. 40 
Harv.L.Rev. 1; Garrod, M. (2012). ‘The Development of Protective Principle Jurisdiction over War 
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protection of vital interests, the place of the offence and the nationality of the accused, 
or any other connection with the legislating State, are irrelevant.42 A matter of great 
importance, then, as has already been noted elsewhere by Mann, is an assessment of the 
meaning of vital interests that are capable of falling under the ambit of protective 
jurisdiction.43 Such an assessment has not, since the Harvard Research, been undertaken 
and, as will be explained in chapter five, is not straightforward as States have 
traditionally left undefined in their national laws, or at least with sufficient precision, 
the interests that they regard as ‘vital’. That said, all States have vital interests and it is 
reasonable to suppose that a number of these may be shared by the international 
community. The Harvard Research, for example, inferred from State practice the State’s 
security, territorial integrity, political independence and national credit and public 
documents as shared vital State interests falling under the ambit of the protective 
principle. It is also illustrated, for example, by the development of protective 
jurisdiction over war crimes in the aftermath of World War II for the protection of the 
State’s sovereignty, security, independence, nationals and armed forces.44 As will be 
shown in chapter five, contemporary State, treaty and U.N. Security Council practice 
evinces a core category of shared vital State interests in combatting the threat of 
international terrorism.   
 
2.3.2. An Exception to the Theory of Territoriality and the Duty of Non-
Interference 
 
The protective principle, as a ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction, would appear at first 
glance to conflict with the theory of territoriality and the customary duty of non-
interference in the State’s internal affairs, which renders unlawful such legislation as 
would have the effect of regulating the conduct of foreigners in the territory of other 
States.45 The duty of non-interference is based on customary international law and was 
codified by Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, by which one sovereign is bound to respect 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Crimes and the Hollow Concept of Universality’. 12 ICLR 763; Garrod, M. (2014). ‘Piracy, the 
Protection of Vital State Interests and the False Foundations of Universal Jurisdiction in International 
Law’. 25 Diplomacy&Statecraft 1; Masterson, W.E. (1927). ‘National Jurisdiction in the Marginal Seas 
over Foreign Smuggling Vessels’. 13 Problems of Peace and War 53.  
42 Harvard Research, supra n 2, at p.543; Lauterpacht, supra n 39, at p.344; Council of Europe, supra n 
39, at p.451; Espionage Prosecution Case, 94 ILR 69, at p.74; Akehurst, M. (1972-1973). ‘Jurisdiction in 
International Law’. 46 BYIL 145, at pp.168-169, 179-180. 
43 Mann, supra n 34, at p.94, n 184.  
44 Garrod (2012), supra n 41.  
45 A/RES/2625(XXV) (24 October 1970). See also Bowett, supra n 39, at pp.15-16; Mann, supra n 34, at 
pp.30, 47; Beale, J.H. (1923). ‘The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State’. 36 Harv.L.Rev. 241. 
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the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own territory and is closely related to 
the principle of sovereign equality. As Article 2(1) of the U.N. Charter makes clear, 
sovereign equality is one of the fundamental principles of the international legal order.46 
The principles of sovereign equality and non-interference have to be viewed together 
with the restriction imposed by international law upon a State that ‘it may not enforce 
its power in any form in the territory of another’.47 That rule follows the basic notion of 
‘territorial sovereignty’, which was described by Chief Justice Marshall in the Schooner 
Exchange v McFaddon and later by Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas arbitration as 
the exclusive right of each State to exercise the power of sovereignty over its own 
territory.48 The importance of territorial sovereignty is such that it has been codified in 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and has been described in the jurisprudence of the ICJ 
and the work of the ILC as providing the ‘cornerstone’ and the ‘essential foundation’ of 
inter-State relations in modern international law.49 The importance of territorial 
sovereignty should not be underestimated; indeed, as will be explained in chapter three, 
Anglo-American jurists, in support of an exclusively territorial theory of jurisdiction in 
international law, have traditionally adopted this line of reasoning in order to 
characterise the exercise of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction in a State’s territorial 
sovereignty as ‘an invasion of its sovereign rights’ and thus a violation of international 
law.50 It follows from the rule of non-interference that, in order to be permitted by 
international law to assume jurisdiction, there must exist a sufficiently close connection 
between the alleged offence and the State imposing criminal liability.51  
  
On closer inspection, however, protective jurisdiction per se does not breach the duty of 
non-intervention.52 Indeed, while the State’s sovereignty is limited to its territory, the 
concept of jurisdiction, which is governed by international law and is exercised by the 
State in virtue of its sovereignty, as was made clear by the PCIJ, ‘by no means coincides 
                                                        
46 U.N. Charter, supra n 27; Bowett, ibid.; R v Jameson [1896] 2 Q.B. 425, at p.430 (Lord Russell C.J.); 
Schooner Exchange McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), at p.137. 
47 Lotus, supra n 2, at pp.18-19. 
48 Schooner Exchange, supra n 46, at p.136; Church v Hubbart, supra n 8, at p.234; Island of Palmas 
(Netherlands v U.S.), 4 April 1928, in RIAA, vol.II, U.N. (2006), at pp.838-839. 
49 U.N. Charter, supra n 27; U.K. v Albania, supra n 27, at p.35; Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.14, para.190; Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p.168, para.148; ILCYB, 1966, 
vol.II, at p.247.  
50 E.g., Brierly & De Visscher, supra n 2, at p.257. 
51 Mann, supra n 34, at p.83.  
52 Ibid., at pp.93-94; also Lotus, supra n 2, at p.20; Cameron, supra n 2, at p.348; Jennings, R.Y. (1962). 
‘The Limits of State Jurisdiction’. 32 NoTIR 209, at p.151.  
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with territorial sovereignty’.53 As was explained by Chief Justice Marshall as early as 
1808, ‘[t]he authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive’, in 
respect of the enforcement of jurisdiction; however, in terms of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
the right of the State under international law to ‘secure itself from injury may certainly 
be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.’54 This principle of protection, Marshall 
explained, is ‘universally acknowledged’.55 The duty of non-intervention is itself ill-
defined and is not absolute and must be weighed against other aspects of sovereignty, 
not least the equally legitimate right of a State to protect its sovereignty and other vital 
interests.56 Judge Huber alluded to this point in the Island of Palmas arbitration, in 
which he stated that territorial sovereignty has a corollary duty: ‘the obligation to 
protect within the territory the rights of other States’.57 It follows that, if the territorial 
State is incapable or unwilling to fulfil this customary duty, the scope of which is 
unclear and has been left uncodified, then international law permits the State whose 
vital interests are threatened to assert jurisdiction under the principle of protection. Of 
course, in accordance with territorial sovereignty, the prescribing State is not entitled to 
actually enforce its jurisdiction in the territory of another.58  
 
The closeness of the connection between the legislating State and the importance of the 
interests at issue means that protective jurisdiction is better viewed as a universal and 
mutually beneficial, albeit limited, exception to territoriality of jurisdiction and the duty 
to not exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals outside the State’s territory.59 This 
exception to territoriality, which has developed through the consensual practice of 
States, is permitted by international law in time of armed conflict and during peace as 
States would otherwise be unable to protect themselves and their vital interests, some of 
which are safeguarded by international law as part of its role in regulating inter-State 
relations. As is indicated by numerous treaties, such interests include, for example, the 
State’s sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, political independence, diplomatic 
personnel and premises and the freedom of trade and navigation on the high seas, and 
                                                        
53 Lotus, ibid., at p.20; Jennings, ibid., at pp.212-213; Mann, supra n 34, at pp.15-17, 87. 
54 Church v Hubbart, supra n 8, at p.234. 
55 Ibid.   
56 Cameron, supra n 2, at p.348.  
57 Island of Palmas, supra n 48, at p.839.  
58 Wharton, F. (1885). ‘A Treatise on Criminal Law’. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, at p.312; Espionage 
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nationals and armed forces during armed conflict.60 It would certainly be unreasonable, 
and perhaps even unusual, if international law safeguarded these vital interests, which 
appear to be shared by the international community, and did not permit States, in a 
decentralised legal system, to protect them.61 A useful illustration of this mutually 
beneficial right of protection - and one that reflects an important aspect of the origins of 
protective jurisdiction and dates back to the modern historical development of 
international law in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries - is jurisdiction over piracy 
on the high seas.62 
 
If the protection of vital interests justifies, as a matter of international law, the assertion 
of prescriptive jurisdiction over crimes occurring within the territorial sovereignty of 
other States - by evidencing a sufficiently close connection with the legislating State - 
then it has to be stressed that there is a fundamental distinction to be made in respect of 
the development of protective jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas. On the high 
seas, it has not traditionally been necessary, as a matter of international law, for the 
legislating State to justify the assertion of jurisdiction over piracy by evidencing a 
prescriptive connection with the alleged offence. The reason for this no nexus 
requirement, as has already been discussed in chapter one and shown in greater depth by 
the present author elsewhere, is that the high seas is beyond the exclusive territorial 
sovereignty of any State and in which all States are equal and independent, and so-
called ‘pirates’ are treated as falling outside the flag protection of any sovereign. The 
fact that a legislating State is not required by international law to evidence a sufficiently 
close connection with piracy on the high seas under a particular ground of prescriptive 
jurisdiction does not mean that States exercised jurisdiction over pirates in the absence 
of any prescriptive connection at all. Rather, jurisdiction developed over piracy for the 
mutually beneficial protection by States of certain of their own vital interests, a number 
of which were shared by the international community, or at least among the maritime 
powers, not least their sovereignty, security and overseas trade routes and colonial trade 
and settlements.63  
                                                        
60 E.g., U.N. Charter, supra n 27, Article 2(4); Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973, 
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Nonetheless, the apparent no nexus requirement in the case of piracy has been described 
in the early twentieth century by Anglo-American jurists as a theory of ‘universal 
jurisdiction’. As will be explained in chapter three, these jurists opposed the use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the territorial sovereignty of States and regarded it as 
being contrary to international law; and they sought to distinguish jurisdiction over 
piracy on the high seas, which had prominently developed in the practice of Britain and 
the U.S., as the only exception to territoriality, by interpreting it as a theory of 
universality that is permitted only because it is exercised ‘in the interest of all’. This 
misinterpretation is not merely of historical significance. It had a direct bearing on the 
public and private efforts made in the first half of the twentieth century to codify 
jurisdiction in international law. It has also blurred a fundamental conceptual distinction 
between the development of jurisdiction for the protection of ‘shared vital State 
interests’ and ‘international community values’.64  
  
2.3.3. The Complementarity between Theories of Territoriality and Protection  
  
Anglo-American jurists, in support of an exclusively territorial theory of jurisdiction in 
international law, have traditionally conceived the protective and territorial principles of 
jurisdiction as being in irreconcilable conflict with each other. This was the approach, 
for example, adopted by Brierly in his capacity as Rapporteur during the effort made by 
the League of Nations to codify protective jurisdiction.65 However, these grounds of 
jurisdiction are not necessarily opposed to each other. Indeed, the vital State interests 
falling under the ambit of protective jurisdiction would, if a constituent element of an 
offence committed abroad occurred within the prescribing State’s territory, equally be 
protected by the theory of objective territoriality.66 A perhaps more accurate way to 
view the relationship between these two theories of jurisdiction is that, as a matter of 
practicality, protective jurisdiction supplements territoriality which is, in and of itself, 
‘entirely inadequate’ over the conduct of foreign nationals abroad.67 The limitations of 
territoriality are illustrated by the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of 
Strassheim v Daily, in which the defendant had committed a fraud against the State of 
                                                        
64 Chapters three and five. 
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Michigan.68 The Supreme Court in that case stated that ‘[a]cts done outside a [State’s 
territorial] jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within 
it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the 
effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power’.69 The theory of 
territoriality thus requires acts outside the legislating State’s territory to be ‘intended to 
produce and producing detrimental effects within it’.70  
  
The limitations of territoriality subsequently led the American Law Institute and some 
U.S. courts to misinterpret the reasoning of the Supreme Court inter alia as the right 
under international law for States to assert territorial jurisdiction over conduct that is 
merely ‘intended’ to produce an effect in, but has no other connection with, the 
legislating State’s territory. The consequences of such an interpretation, as will be 
explained in chapter four, are twofold. First, it has the effect of transforming 
territoriality into a theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which is referred to as the so-
called ‘effects’ principle. Second, it confuses the theory of territoriality with that of the 
protective principle and the latter has been erroneously interpreted by the ILC, some 
U.S. courts and in legal scholarship as requiring an offence to be directed at or intending 
to have ‘effects’ within the prescribing State’s territory.  
 
A few years after the case of Strassheim, the inadequacy of territoriality was recognised 
by the Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v Bowman, which involved conspiracy to 
defraud a corporation in which the U.S. Government was the sole stakeholder. The 
court in that case, while noting that some offences can only be committed within the 
State’s territorial jurisdiction, went on to assert that the U.S. Government had adopted 
criminal statutes which applied outside the State’s territory and were, nevertheless, in 
conformity with international law. These statutes were, according to the court: 
 
not logically dependent on their locality for the government’s jurisdiction, 
but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself 
against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed 
by its own citizens, officers or agents. 
 
The court continued:  
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70 As was also made clear by the PCIJ in the Lotus case. 
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to limit their locus to the strictly territorial jurisdiction would be greatly to 
curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and open a large immunity of 
frauds as easily committed by citizens on the high seas and in foreign 
countries as at home.71 
 
While the facts of that case involved U.S. citizens, the reasoning of the Supreme Court, 
if taken to its logical conclusion, is not dependent upon the nationality of the offender 
and inevitably leads to the theory of protective jurisdiction.72 
 
The inadequacy of an exclusive territorial approach to jurisdiction and the idea that 
theories of territoriality and protection are not fundamentally in conflict with each other 
were also alluded to by the U.N. Secretary-General in a preparatory survey of subjects 
of international law for potential codification by the ILC at its First Session. The 
Secretary-General inter alia identified the subject of ‘Jurisdiction with regard to Crimes 
committed outside National Territory’ as one of fourteen topics in urgent need of 
codification and suggested that the British House of Lords has ‘declined to recognise 
the unqualified validity of the rule that in no case can a State assume jurisdiction over 
an alien for an offence committed abroad [and that] […] adherence to the strict rules of 
territoriality may lead to results of some absurdity.’73 The Secretary-General was 
referring to the case of Joyce v Director of Public Prosecutions, in which the Lord 
Chancellor, delivering the lead judgment, stated that: 
  
It would, I think, be strangely inconsistent with the robust and vigorous 
common-sense of the common law to suppose that an alien quitting his 
residence in this country and temporarily on the high seas beyond territorial 
waters or at some even [more] distant spot now brought within speedy reach 
and there adhering and giving aid to the King’s enemies could do so with 
impunity.74 
  
The Lord Chancellor, with whom the majority of the House of Lords agreed, recognised 
and gave effect to the right under international law to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under the protective principle.75 That said, the Secretary-General suggested 
that: 
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the question of the jurisdiction of States in the matter of offences committed 
by aliens abroad is of limited compass, and it is arguable that, in any scheme 
of codification, it ought to figure merely as a subdivision of a larger topic 
such as “Obligations and Limitations of Territorial Jurisdiction”.76 
 
The Secretary-General was thus of the opinion that the ILC should give priority to the 
territoriality of jurisdiction by codifying the territorial State’s obligations and, in 
particular, ‘the general recognition of the rule that a State must not permit the use of its 
territory for purposes injurious to the interests of other States in a manner contrary to 
international law’.77 If such obligations were codified, then this would, the Secretary-
General assumed, greatly reduce the importance of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the 
need to codify it. However, contrary to the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the 
territorial State’s obligations in international law have not been codified; in any case, 
the assumption by the Secretary-General that the territorial State would be willing and 
capable of adequately protecting the vital interests of other States is not sufficiently 
reliable. It is to this point that the chapter will now turn.  
 
2.3.4. The Protection of Vital Interests by other States  
 
The rationale of protective jurisdiction is based on two further, interrelated grounds. The 
first of these was explained by De Visscher. The ‘sound reasons’ that justify protective 
jurisdiction, as an exception to territoriality, according to De Visscher, are that, firstly, 
in the case of offences directed at the State’s essential interests, ‘it is hard to conceive of 
any law competent to repress them other than that of the State which is menaced.’78 The 
repression of such offences, suggested De Visscher, in most cases ‘is of no interest to 
the State on whose territory the acts are committed; it may even happen that the 
consequences deriving from them are a cause of profit to it.’79 De Visscher was of the 
view that ‘[i]n any case, a State cannot abandon to another the task of dealing with and 
punishing acts susceptible of causing injury to its essential interests.’80 The same 
justification for this jurisdiction was also explained by the Harvard Research, which 
suggested that the protective principle exists due to the ‘inadequacy’ of national 
legislation and political unwillingness for the protection of the ‘security, integrity and 
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independence of foreign States’.81 Thus, for the Harvard Research, ‘[s]o long as the 
State within whose territory such offences are committed fails to take adequate 
measures, competence must be conceded to the State whose fundamental interests are 
threatened.’82  
 
Protective jurisdiction is thus justified on the ground that States may be either unwilling 
or incapable of protecting each other’s vital interests, or doing so to the extent that is 
viewed adequate, from within their territorial sovereignty.83 The need for the ‘self-
defence’ or ‘self-protection’ of overseas trade and trade routes, and the fact that other 
States are unwilling or incapable of protecting such interests, and in some cases allow 
their territories to be used by so-called ‘land pirates’, in which such persons operate 
with impunity, is precisely the reason why protective jurisdiction and the right of every 
State to exercise such jurisdiction has traditionally developed over piracy on the high 
seas.84 The reason why protective jurisdiction developed in the aftermath of World 
Wars I and II was based on the need of injured belligerents to punish violations of the 
law of war, who were well aware that the enemy could not be entrusted to fulfil its 
obligations under international law, by prosecuting breaches of the law of war by their 
own armed forces and civilians.85 A more recent illustration of this point is the threat to 
vital interests by international terrorism. There is no definition of ‘terrorism’ in 
international law and national laws define ‘terrorism’ and related offences in radically 
different ways. Likewise, groups designated as ‘terrorist’ by some States may not be 
treated as such by others.86 This means that the State’s vital interests may well go 
inadequately protected. In the light of this complex reality, there has since the 1960s 
been a proliferation of counter-terrorism treaties that provide for the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute. This obligation, as will be explained in chapter five, requires 
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States parties to protect certain of the vital interests of each other by initiating criminal 
proceedings against alleged offenders found in their territory, failing extradition. These 
treaties do not define ‘terrorism’ but, rather, require States parties to criminalise specific 
conduct as ordinary crimes. In any case, the ‘ungoverned spaces’ in which terrorists are 
able to operate and plan external attacks against other States means that the 
implementation of treaty obligations may be ineffective.87 Beyond these treaty 
arrangements, however, a detailed empirical analysis of national laws shows that States 
do not generally criminalise conduct that implicates the vital interests of other States.88  
 
The protection by the State of its vital interests is therefore a matter of necessity; States 
have no option but to assert, unilaterally, jurisdiction over offences which are capable of 
threatening or implicating their vital interests.89 It is perhaps worth noting, by way of 
aside, that jurisdiction based on the protective principle would appear to function in a 
similar way to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is 
‘complementary’ to the jurisdiction of the lex loci.90 Thus, the protective principle, as 
with the ICC, fills a jurisdictional gap where the lex loci is unwilling or incapable of 
undertaking a ‘genuine’ prosecution.91  
 
2.3.5. The Imposition of International Legal Obligations 
 
The third justification of protective jurisdiction, first noted by the Harvard Research, is 
that international law does not sufficiently impose an obligation on States to protect the 
fundamental interests of foreign States from the conduct of private actors within their 
territorial boundaries.92 The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which were 
not adopted by the U.N. General Assembly until 2001, thus bringing to an end nearly 
fifty years of ILC work on the subject, are defined in narrow terms and States are not, as 
a general rule, responsible under international law for the failure to prevent and punish 
the activities of private actors for breaches of international law which threaten or injure 
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the vital interests of foreign States.93 As a limited exception, a State may be held 
responsible for an ‘internationally wrongful act’ where the conduct of private actors 
breaches an ‘international obligation’ and is ‘attributable’ to that State, namely ‘if the 
individual or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct’.94 The level of control 
which must be exercised by the State in order for the conduct of private actors to be 
attributable to that State, as has been reaffirmed by the ICJ, is one of ‘effective control’ 
in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred.95 The exercise of 
‘general control’ by the State over private actors, even ‘with a high degree of 
dependency on it’, would not, without further evidence, be sufficient to give rise to 
State responsibility in international law.96 The rules on State responsibility may be 
preferable to the exercise of protective jurisdiction, in cases where States are involved in 
the perpetration of a crime against another State.97 However, the complexity of State 
attribution and the requirement of a high threshold for the test of control and the burden 
of establishing satisfactory evidence of State involvement, which must be proved by 
evidence that is ‘fully conclusive’,98 means that State attribution may be rare.99 In any 
case, the rules on State responsibility are limited to breaches of ‘international 
obligations’ and this means that many of the offences potentially covered by protective 
jurisdiction may fall outside such rules.  
  
A further issue raised by international law and non-State actors arises where the 
territorial State merely tolerates or is complicit in the activities of private actors either 
operating in its own territory or that of a third State.100 A useful illustration of this 
historically is the Caroline incident, discussed above, in which the British Government 
claimed that private armed groups had been ‘permitted’ to arm and organise themselves 
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within the territory of the U.S.101 The obligation to extradite or prosecute, a principle 
contained in more than sixty treaties since 1970, requires the State in whose territory the 
accused is present, to extradite the accused to another party or, failing extradition, to 
initiate criminal proceedings on the latter’s behalf.102 However, this obligation is limited 
to treaty regimes and to specific offences; it has also given rise to serious limitations in 
circumstances where an alleged offence is sponsored by the custodial State.103 Nor does 
international law impose a general duty on States to criminalise or actively prosecute or 
assist in surrendering those individuals who have committed acts threatening or injuring 
the vital interests of other States. It is in the light of these legal and practical realities 
that Bowett has argued that:  
  
It is as a result of the failure of international law to contain duties relating to 
the conduct of individuals which threatens the security and political 
independence of states that states impose penalties under their own 
municipal law as a protection against such conduct and thereby assume a 
somewhat extensive jurisdiction …104 
  
The argument by Bowett would appear to be unobjectionable. Garcia-Mora is often 
cited in legal scholarship as the main opponent of the protective principle, due to what 
Garcia-Mora perceived as the potential abuse, and unjust and politically motivated 
prosecutions, that could arise under the principle. However, Garcia-Mora ultimately 
recognised that the strength of his own argument was dependent upon the ‘solidarity of 
the World Community, which imperatively demands the suppression within each 
nation’s territory of activities endangering the peace and security of States.’105 The 
problem with this view, he suggested, is that it would require ‘an overhaul of the basic 
principles upon which the international community has thus far rested.’106 It is fair to 
say that Garcia-Mora’s conception of international society is still found wanting, which 
is perhaps illustrated no clearer than within the context of the complex nature of 
international terrorism. 
 
  
                                                        
101 Supra n 19. 
102 See chapter five. 
103 E.g., Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the 
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. 
Reports 1992, p.3.  
104 Bowett, supra n 1, at pp.60-61.  
105 Garcia-Mora, supra n 83. 
106 Ibid., at p.588. 
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2.3.6. The Threat of International Terrorism 
 
While States are the major actors in the international community and the international 
legal system, the emergence of international terrorism shows that the State is not the 
only cause of injurious acts to other States. This is illustrated most vividly, perhaps, by 
the ‘large-scale offensive’ and ‘control of territory in parts of Iraq and Syria’ by the 
ISIL and ANF.107 The unwillingness or inability of States to protect each other’s vital 
interests from the activities of private actors within their territory, and the limited nature 
of State attribution under the rules on State responsibility, is of particular importance in 
respect of diffuse, transnational terrorist networks, which have a large degree of 
independence and are dispersed across multiple countries, while often maintaining 
loose, complex relationships with governments.108 In recognition of this situation, the 
U.N. General Assembly has adopted, since the 1970s, several resolutions which, though 
not defining ‘terrorism’, have urged States to refrain from organising and assisting, or 
from acquiescing in or encouraging acts of terrorism within their territories that are 
directed against other States.109 These provisions are, according to the ICJ, declaratory 
of customary international law; that said, they are limited to acts reaching the threshold 
of ‘a threat or use of force’ under the law governing self-defence.110 This high threshold 
is not the case in respect of the more recent legally binding resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, requiring States to 
prevent and refrain from providing support to and acquiescing in acts terrorism against 
other States.111 However, these resolutions do not define key concepts, including 
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist acts’.112 It is notable that, even in circumstances where 
international law imposes a duty to provide ‘special protection’ to the vital interests of 
foreign States, for example, diplomatic personnel and premises, the territorial State may 
be prepared to sponsor or acquiesce in acts of terrorism against those interests.113 In 
response to the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Security 
Council, acting under Chapter VII, strongly condemned the Taliban for allowing 
                                                        
107 S/RES/2169 (30 July 2014), preambular para.4. 
108 See Becker, T. (2006). ‘Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility’. 
Oxford: Hart. 
109 A/RES/2625(XXV) (24 October 1970); A/RES/2131 (21 December 1965); A/RES/3314(XXIX) (14 
December 1974); A/RES/40/61 (9 December 1985); A/RES/42/22 (18 November 1987); A/RES/49/60 (9 
December 1994); A/RES/51/210 (17 December 1996). 
110 DRC v Uganda, supra n 49, para.162 ; U.N. Doc.A/C.6/65/L.10 (3 November 2010), para.i.  
111 S/RES/1189 (13 August 1998); S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001); S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001).  
112 See chapter four.  
113 U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.3. 
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Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven for the training, planning and preparation of 
‘terrorist acts against other States or their citizens’.114State involvement in acts of 
terrorism is illustrated, most notably, by the Libyan Governments involvement in the 
Lockerbie incident and, more recently, by the alleged involvement of the Syrian 
Government in the assassination of the President of Lebanon and 22 others and the 
alleged involvement of the Russian Government in acts of terrorism in Ukraine.115 
States accused of sponsoring or shielding terrorists from prosecution has led to, and 
continues to dominate, the negotiations by the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism of a 
draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.116 
 
These issues are underscored by the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, in New York, 
and the Pentagon, in Washington, on 11 September 2001 and, in response, the U.S.-led 
invasion of Afghanistan, which had been determined by the U.S. and U.K. to be 
harbouring al Qaeda.117 The invasion of Afghanistan has precipitated considerable 
recent literature as to whether and under what conditions international law permits self-
defensive force against non-State terrorist actors operating in the territory of foreign 
States in order to protect their vital interests.118 The same point applies mutatis mutandis 
to the practice of targeted killing. Given that forceful measures may be permissible only 
in very narrow circumstances, and that international terrorism is being combated 
primarily under a criminal law paradigm,119 the protective principle of jurisdiction, in 
the words of the Harvard Research, is ‘indispensable’ and must ‘remain the principal 
defence’ of vital interests.120  
 
 
                                                        
114 S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999). 
115 See chapter six. 
116 U.N. Doc.A/54/301 (3 September 1999), para.10; U.N. Doc.A/64/37 (2009), Annex II, para.4; U.N. 
Doc.A/66/37 (2011), Annex I, paras.10 &18. 
117 The U.S. and U.K. did not establish evidence of the international responsibility of the Taliban for the 
terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda on 11 September 2001. See Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent 
Representative of the U.S. to the U.N. addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc.S/2001/946 (2001). 
118 Greenwood, C. (2002). ‘International law and the war against terrorism’. 78 International Affairs 301; 
Jinks, D. (2003). ‘State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups’. 4 Chinese ILJ 83; Tams, 
J.C. (2009). ‘The Use of Force Against Terrorists’. 20 EJIL 359; Trapp, N.K. (2010). ‘The Use of Force 
Against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J. Tams’. 20 EJIL 1049.  
119 Samuel, H.L.K. & White, N.D. & De Friás, S.M. (eds.) (2012). ‘Report of Key Findings and 
Recommendations on the Rule of Law and Counter-Terrorism’. Multi-National Counter-Terrorism Expert 
Network, at pp.2, 10. 
120 Harvard Research, supra n 2, at pp.553, 561. 
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2.4. Concluding Remarks  
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain the contemporary rationalisation of 
protective jurisdiction and the interests that it serves. The protective principle is the only 
recognised ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law over offences 
occurring wholly outside the State’s territory, including inchoate and preparatory 
offences, which threaten vital State interests, as well as those interests which are located 
abroad, and where no constituent element of an offence or other tangible effect has 
actually been felt within the proscribing State’s territory. This distinguishes protective 
jurisdiction from the territorial and so-called ‘effects’ principles.121 As jurisdiction 
under this theory is based on the protection of vital interests, the place of the offence 
and the nationality of the accused, or any other connection with the legislating State, are 
irrelevant. The principle applies equally in time of war as it does during peace. The 
protective principle, as has been explained, provides an exception to the theory of 
territorial jurisdiction but may also be viewed as complementary with territoriality 
which would, in and of itself, be wholly inadequate for dealing with offences occurring 
outside the State’s territory.  
  
The theoretical justification for protective jurisdiction, as has been explained, is based 
on three interrelated grounds. The first of these is the need by States to protect 
themselves and certain of their vital interests, a number of which are shared by the 
international community, from offences emanating outside their territorial borders. The 
two other grounds are, first of all, that the protection of vital interests cannot be left to 
other States and, secondly, international law does not sufficiently impose an obligation 
on States to protect each other’s interests or adequately hold States responsible for the 
failure to protect such interests from threats and injuries by non-State actors. This 
rationale would suggest that protective jurisdiction is based on the theory of necessity 
and the absence of any other means, in a decentralised international legal system, to 
protect vital State interests from crimes occurring outside national territory. The 
perpetrators of such crimes would otherwise escape with impunity. It is precisely for 
this reason that protective jurisdiction has, for example, traditionally developed over 
                                                        
121 See Bin Laden, supra n 72, at pp.219-220; Pizzarusso, supra n 8, at pp.10-11; U.S. v Cardales 168 
F.3d548 (1st Cir., 1999); U.S. v Gonzalez, 311 F.3d440 (1st Cir., 2002); ALI, Restatement (Second) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (1965), Comment c; Blakesley, supra n 83, at pp.163-164; Blakesley 
(1999), supra n 39, at p.55.  
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piracy and war crimes.122 The protective principle, the scope of which is limited to the 
protection of certain vital interests, also provides for a degree of stability and 
predictability in inter-State relations. Also of relevance to the rationale of this 
jurisdiction is reciprocity. Indeed, all States have vital interests and protective 
jurisdiction provides States with a mutually beneficial right by which to protect such 
interests in time of peace and during armed conflict.  
 
The protection of vital interests evidences a sufficiently close connection in order to 
justify, as a matter of international law, the criminalisation of conduct in the territorial 
sovereignty of other States and excuses what would otherwise constitute an unlawful 
interference in the latter’s sovereignty and internal affairs. In the case of piracy on the 
high seas, on the other hand, an offence falling outside the territorial sovereignty and 
flag protection of all States, the need to evidence such a connection is not required by 
international law. This distinction is one of great importance. The no nexus requirement 
in the latter case has been described in the early twentieth century by Anglo-American 
jurists as a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’. These jurists opposed the use of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the territorial sovereignty of States and they sought to 
distinguish jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, as the only exception to the theory 
of territoriality, by interpreting it as a theory of universality. As has been explained, 
however, the fact that States do not need to evidence a prescriptive connection over 
piracy on the high seas does not mean that States exercised jurisdiction over pirates in 
the absence of such a connection. The no nexus requirement does not transform 
jurisdiction over piracy into a theory of universality. Rather, jurisdiction developed for 
the protection of vital State interests, a number of which were shared by the 
international community, or at least among the maritime powers. It is thus inappropriate 
and even misleading to refer to the no nexus requirement over piracy as ‘universal 
jurisdiction’. Nonetheless, the views of these jurists had a profound influence on the 
public and private efforts in first half of twentieth century to codify protective 
jurisdiction. This is explored in further depth in the proceeding chapter.  
 
It will be recalled that the Secretary-General, above, proposed in 1949 that protective 
jurisdiction is of ‘limited compass’ and that the ILC in its codification of topics of 
international law should focus on the territorial State’s obligations to prevent crimes 
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being committed in their territory against other States. If such obligations were codified, 
then this would, the Secretary-General assumed, greatly reduce the importance of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the need to codify it. It is fair to say that, even if the 
opinion of the Secretary-General was accurate in 1949, it does not reflect accurately the 
developments in transnational crimes that have subsequently occurred since that time, 
most notably international terrorism. The territorial theory of jurisdiction, as has been 
shown, is wholly inadequate for responding to international terrorism. 
 
The rationale of protective jurisdiction, which does not require a connection with an 
alleged offence to be established, other than where the offence implicates or threatens 
vital interests, is of great importance for combatting transnational crimes, including the 
problem of international terrorism. The reason why this is so is twofold: first of all, 
international terrorism poses one of the most serious threats to States and certain of their 
vital interests, including where such interests are located abroad.123 Secondly, this threat 
is increasingly sophisticated and complex, with diffuse networks and cells (in particular 
by the use of the Internet) operating, planning, financing, preparing and launching acts 
of terrorism across numerous States. While some of these networks operate 
autonomously and have a large degree of independence, others have close and complex 
relationships with States or operate in ungoverned spaces and fall outside the rules of 
State responsibility. The radically different ways in which States define ‘terrorism’ and 
the absence of a definition of it in international law means that the ‘terrorist’ groups of 
one State will continue in some circumstances to be the freedom fighters of others.124 
The upshot of all this is that it would, at best, be inappropriate and, at worst, naïve, to 
rely wholly on the territorial State to protect the vital interests of other States. Given the 
relative power of some terrorist groups to that of States and the ability of such groups to 
overpower States, and the determination by the Security Council that the threat is 
‘growing’,125 the time is ripe to consider whether protective jurisdiction could be more 
effectively utilised by States and strengthen the existing international legal framework 
by clarifying what this jurisdiction is and subjecting it to codification. Before doing so, 
however, it is important first to examine the extent to which protective jurisdiction has 
been used in contemporary State and treaty practice in response to international 
                                                        
123 Chapter one. 
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terrorism. The key findings of an empirical study into State practice are presented in 
chapter four, while the types of vital interests that have been included under the ambit of 
this jurisdiction are examined in chapter five.  
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Chapter Three 
 
‘The Modern Development of and Early Efforts to Codify Protective Principle 
Jurisdiction’ 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The ‘origins’ of protective jurisdiction are little understood and the tracing of its 
development is problematic. One of the main reasons why this is so is because it is a 
theory of jurisdiction to prescribe, and the nomenclature ‘protective principle’ and a 
definition of it, did not materialise until the publication of a Draft Convention on 
jurisdiction by the Harvard Research on International Law in 1935.1 The purpose of this 
chapter is to shed important light on the modern development of protective jurisdiction, 
in particular during the nineteenth century, and to examine the various public and 
private efforts made to codify this jurisdiction in the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
One of the most important aspects of the modern development of protective jurisdiction 
that this chapter will consider is Article 7 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure of 
1808.2 The protective principle of jurisdiction, as exemplified by Article 7, was, by the 
mid-nineteenth century, replicated in the national laws of the majority of other States 
and used to protect certain vital interests, including the State’s ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
security, sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, Head of State and 
public officials and currency and official documents. These vital State interests appear 
to have been shared by the international community and, as explained in chapter one, 
are referred to in this study as ‘shared vital State interests’.  
 
Notwithstanding Article 7 inter alia, protective jurisdiction has a longer and more 
varied history than is generally appreciated. One of the most important of these is the 
development of protective jurisdiction over ‘piracy’ on the high seas, roughly between 
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, for the protection of certain shared vital State 
interests, for example, the State’s sovereignty, independence, security, the sovereign 
right to navigate the high seas and overseas trade routes and colonial trade and 
                                                        
1 Harvard Research, infra n 116.  
2 Moore, J.B. (1887). ‘Report on Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case’. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of State, Government Printing Office; Cameron, C. (1994). ‘The Protective Principle of 
International Criminal Jurisdiction’. Aldershot: Dartmouth, at pp.34-35. 
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settlements.3 Another important aspect of the development of protective jurisdiction, 
which has its roots in the early history of modern international law, since the sixteenth 
century, and was widely used in the aftermath of World War II, has occurred in respect 
of violations of the laws and customs of war.4 The present author has published on the 
development of protective jurisdiction over piracy and war crimes elsewhere and the 
present chapter is confined to noting a summary of the findings.5 
 
A greater understanding of the way in which protective jurisdiction has traditionally 
developed is of great importance for, as will be explained, grounds of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction have traditionally been little understood and, more often than not, subject to 
considerable confusion. An important source of this confusion was the divergence that 
has traditionally existed between the so-called Anglo-American and Continental schools 
of thought in international law.6 Anglo-American jurists regarded protective 
jurisdiction, which was widely recognised by States as the only exception to the 
territoriality of jurisdiction, as being contrary to international law because it involved 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in another State’s territorial sovereignty and 
internal affairs; and they assumed that Anglo-American States, in particular Britain and 
the U.S., adhered to a strict territorial approach to jurisdiction.  
   
One of the most influential of these jurists was J.B. Moore, whose academic 
commentary was later repeated by Moore in his Dissenting Opinion while serving as the 
first U.S. Judge before the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Lotus 
case.7 In an effort to show that protective jurisdiction violated international law, Moore 
distinguished between extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, which 
had developed prominently in the practice of Britain and the U.S., from extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in general international law over crimes, other than piracy, occurring in 
another State’s territorial sovereignty. Moore went one step further and elaborated an 
                                                        
3 Garrod, M. (2014). ‘Piracy, the Protection of Vital State Interests and the False Foundations of 
Universal Jurisdiction in International Law’. 25 Diplomacy&Statecraft 195. 
4 Garrod, M. (2012). ‘The Development of Protective Principle Jurisdiction over War Crimes and the 
Hollow Concept of Universality’. 12 ICLR 763.  
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AJIL 87, at p.89. 
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entirely new ground of jurisdiction over piracy and called it ‘universal jurisdiction’.8 To 
that end, Moore suggested that this ground of jurisdiction, as the only exception to 
territoriality, is confined to ‘piracy by the law of nations’ and, as such, is restricted to 
the high seas and is exercised ‘in the interest of all’.9 Yet Moore based this opinion on 
little more than his own, earlier, academic commentary and the commentaries of other 
Anglo-American jurists, none of which provided any evidence, by way of State practice, 
to support a theory of universal jurisdiction over piracy under the law of nations either. 
As will be explained, the consequence of this is that Moore confused the development 
and applicability of protective jurisdiction over piracy for the protection of shared vital 
State interests with what Moore called ‘universal jurisdiction’. The opinion of Moore 
had a profound influence on the various efforts made to codify extraterritorial 
jurisdiction during the first half of the twentieth century.  
 
The League of Nations decided not to include protective jurisdiction in its list of topics 
as ‘ripe’ for codification ‘at the present moment’, based on the recommendation by 
Brierly, acting as Rapporteur. The opinion of Brierly reflected that of Moore and he 
dismissed the codification of protective jurisdiction based on the assumption that Britain 
and the U.S. adhered to a strictly territorial approach and that the possibility of any 
agreement on an international convention would ‘demand sacrifices’. At the same time, 
Brierly summarily dismissed jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas as having ‘little in 
common’ with protective jurisdiction.10 The Harvard Research, which was established 
with the anticipation that its research would be of interest to the League, is notable as 
the first study to systematise theories relating to grounds of jurisdiction under 
customary international law, including the ‘protective principle’, and define them in a 
Draft Convention. The Harvard Research defined protective jurisdiction based on a 
narrow category of vital interests - security, territorial integrity and political 
independence - with the aim of bridging the supposed divergence identified by Brierly 
inter alia between Britain and the U.S., on the one hand, and the majority of other 
States, on the other. However, the Harvard Research followed the same approach as 
Brierly and dealt with piracy in a separate draft article and codified, lex ferenda, the 
theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’ over a crime of ‘piracy by the law of nations’ defined 
                                                        
8 Lotus, ibid., at pp.69-71. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Infra n 75, at p.253.  
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by Moore.11  
 
The International Law Commission (ILC), at its First Session in 1949, identified 
protective jurisdiction as one of fourteen topics in urgent need of codification based on 
preparatory work by the U.N. Secretary-General.12 The Secretary-General 
recommended that this jurisdiction is of a ‘controversial nature’ and ‘limited compass’ 
and that the ILC may wish to prioritise other topics.13 The work by the Secretary-
General was based almost exclusively on a review of Brierly and the Harvard Research 
and no consideration was given to the development of protective jurisdiction in State 
practice, in particular the development of this jurisdiction over piracy and in widespread 
State practice over war crimes in the aftermath of World War II. The ILC ultimately 
decided to adopt, based on a recommendation by the Secretary-General, a fragmented 
approach and prioritised the codification of other topics. One of these was jurisdiction 
over piracy under the special legal regime governing the high seas. The ILC, in the 
codification of this latter topic, relied exclusively on the Harvard Research; at the same 
time, the ILC did not give any consideration to theories relating to grounds of 
jurisdiction under custom or specify which of these grounds, if any, it intended to 
codify. The ILC also considered whether the ‘laws of war’ should be selected as a topic 
for codification but the majority of the ILC declared itself opposed to the study of this 
topic at that time. The ILC thus missed an important opportunity to clarify and codify 
the scope and application of the protective jurisdiction under custom, in particular over 
piracy and war crimes.  
 
The chapter concludes that protective jurisdiction has developed over crimes under 
domestic and international law for the protection of a range of shared vital State 
interests. However, this jurisdiction has not been codified by the ILC, let alone debated 
and the views of governments exchanged. Nor has the development and applicability of 
this jurisdiction over piracy and war crimes been examined by the ILC. The absence of 
an instrument codifying grounds of jurisdiction has resulted in protective jurisdiction 
being perceived to be highly controversial and interpreted in narrow terms (confined to 
domestic crimes) by courts and in legal scholarship. It has also given rise to a collective 
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12 Infra n 151, at pp.279-281. 
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belief, discussed in chapter one, which has developed out of haphazard analyses of State 
practice and the overreliance on tentative, secondary sources of evidence of customary 
international law. This belief posits that a theory of universal jurisdiction has for the 
past 500 years developed as a customary rule over piracy in order to protect 
‘international community values’, as they will be referred to in the present study, and 
that this ground of jurisdiction was codified by the ILC; moreover, the protection of 
such values on the basis of this theory expanded in the aftermath of World War II from 
piracy to encompass war crimes and other crimes under international law. The 
codification of protective jurisdiction and the clarification of its relationship with other 
grounds of jurisdiction are thus necessary and desirable more than ever before.  
 
The chapter begins, in part one, by examining Article 7 of the French Code of Criminal 
Procedure of 1808, which served as the prevalent model for the drafting of criminal 
codes both within and outside of Europe and appears to have been regarded by many 
States as the only exception to the theories of territoriality and nationality jurisdiction 
under customary international law. That said, the national laws of some States expanded 
protective jurisdiction, without any apparent qualification, to include minor offences 
committed abroad against the prescribing State’s nationals. This conflated protective 
jurisdiction stricto sensu with the more controversial ‘passive personality’ principle of 
jurisdiction, as it subsequently came to be defined by the Harvard Research. The latter 
point is illustrated, rather effectively, by a diplomatic controversy which arose between 
the U.S. and Mexico in the Cutting incident of 1886 and by the decision of the PCIJ in 
1927, in the Lotus case, which arose out of a dispute between France and Turkey.14 Part 
two of the chapter analyses the Lotus case, the first and only case in which an 
international court has directly addressed grounds of jurisdiction under customary 
international law.15 While the PCIJ in that case affirmed the validity of protective 
jurisdiction, the judgment and the Dissenting Opinions illustrate that the judges serving 
on the PCIJ had a limited understanding of theories relating to grounds of jurisdiction 
under customary international law and of the protective principle in particular.16 The 
decision of the PCIJ in the Lotus case and these judicial statements thus serve as, at 
best, questionable and, at worst, misleading, guides to one of international law’s more 
                                                        
14 Lotus, supra n 7.  
15 Cf. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3, at p.35 (Sep. 
Op. President Guillaume); ibid., at p.63 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.). 
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71 
 
controversial topics. The final part of the chapter, part three, analyses the public and 
private efforts made to codify the protective jurisdiction in the first half of the twentieth 
century.  
 
3.2. The ‘Modern’ Historical Development of Protective Jurisdiction 
 
The theory of ‘protection’, as a ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction in international 
law, it has to be stressed from the outset, was not defined until 1935 by the Harvard 
Research, although such jurisdiction has historically developed in State practice and is 
governed by customary international law. This makes the examination of this 
jurisdiction and the tracing of its development rather problematic and therefore it is little 
understood by courts and in legal scholarship. That said, the ‘modern’ historical 
development of protective jurisdiction is often traced to the Napoleonic era and the 
French Code of Criminal Procedure of 1808, Article 7.17 Article 7 applied to offences 
committed by foreign nationals abroad against the State’s security. According to Moore, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for the U.S. Government, as well as a member of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration and a judge serving on the PCIJ, these offences were 
divided into those committed against the ‘exterior’ and ‘interior’ security of France:  
 
Among the former are machinations and holding communications with foreign 
powers, or their agents, to induce them to commit hostilities or enter upon war 
against France; committing hostile actions, not approved by the Government, 
which expose it to a declaration of war. Offenses against the interior safety of 
the state are attempts or plots directed against the governing powers, crimes 
tending to trouble the state by civil war, the illegal employment of an armed 
force, devastation and public pillage.18 
 
Article 7 also applied to the counterfeit of the seal of France, including its currency, 
banknotes and official documents.19 It would appear that ‘security’ was used as an all-
encompassing term and it is reasonable to suppose that it is sufficiently broad to 
encompass other vital interests, including the State’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
political independence and Head of State and public officials.20 Foreign nationals could 
                                                        
17 Moore, supra n 2, Cameron, supra n 2; Akehurst, M. (1972-1973). ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’. 
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only be prosecuted for offences under Article 7 where accused persons were arrested in 
French territory, or the French Government obtained extradition from a foreign State.21 
The use of protective jurisdiction in the domestic law of France at this time has led 
some commentators to describe it as a product of ‘nationalistic political philosophy’ and 
‘the juridical by-product of the aggressive racial nationalism’, which emerged out of the 
French Revolution.22 Cameron has suggested, perhaps more accurately, that protective 
jurisdiction was ‘developed by revolutionary France as a matter of practical necessity in 
response to the problem of foreign invasions and attacks against French interests’.23 The 
need for States to protect certain of their interests that they regard as important, as will 
be shown below, would also appear to explain the reason why this ground of 
jurisdiction developed in other areas of State practice, having no connection at all with 
the French Revolution. In any case, by the mid-nineteenth century, a fairly uniform 
pattern had emerged in State practice, whereby the national laws of the majority of other 
States provided for extraterritorial jurisdiction over offences committed against the 
State’s security and credit. Article 7 of the French Code appears to have served as the 
prevalent model for the drafting of criminal codes both within and outside of Europe. 
These States included, inter alia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, China, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Russia and 
Switzerland.24 It would therefore appear that, by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
protective jurisdiction was widely established in State practice, and recognised as the 
only exception to the territoriality of jurisdiction under customary international law.   
 
The latter point is illustrated, rather effectively, by a diplomatic controversy which arose 
between the U.S. and Mexico in the Cutting incident. The incident concerned the arrest 
and indictment for criminal libel by Mexican authorities of Augustus K. Cutting, a U.S. 
national, while he was travelling in Mexico, for publishing an article in a Texan 
newspaper criticising a Mexican national. The U.S. Government protested the right of 
Mexico to prosecute an American national under Article 186 of its Penal Code, as it was 
based on, what subsequently came to be defined as by the Harvard Research in 1935, 
the theory of ‘passive personality’ jurisdiction and, therefore, was in violation of 
                                                        
21 Moore, supra n 2, at p.38. 
22 Brierly, J.L. (1928). ‘The “Lotus” Case’. 44 LQR 154, at p.162; also, Krizek, supra n 17, at p.339; 
Lenhoff, A. (1964). ‘International Law and Rules of International Jurisdiction’. 50 CornellL.Q. 5, at p.12.  
23 Cameron, supra n 2, at p.36. 
24 Cameron, ibid; Moore, supra n 2, at p.51; Rodick, B.C. (1928). ‘The Doctrine of Necessity in 
International Law’. New York: CUP, at p.35. 
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international law. The Mexican Government argued that its law was based on the 
criminal codes of certain other European countries, in particular Article 7 of the French 
Code. In order to demonstrate that passive personality principle jurisdiction was not a 
valid right under customary international law, Moore, the Assistant Secretary of State to 
the U.S. Government, to whom reference has already been made above, undertook a 
comprehensive survey of extraterritorial jurisdiction in State practice.25 On the basis of 
this analysis, Moore made a crucial distinction between the passive personality 
principle, which was claimed by Mexico in the present incident, and protective 
jurisdiction, which was used in the national laws of the majority of States, including 
Mexico, over ‘offenses against the safety of the state, or coinage felonies, or other 
particular crimes.’26 The passive personality principle was, according to Moore, 
‘obsolete’.27 Thus, Article 186 of the Mexican Penal Code, argued Moore, ‘blends two 
wholly distinct, and indeed antagonistic, principles of criminal jurisdiction, and treats 
them as if they were the same’.28  
 
On the other hand and contrary to the position taken by Moore, the protective and 
passive personality principles were treated in the penal codes of some States and by 
jurists in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as different aspects of a single, 
broader ‘principle of protection’, rather than as separate jurisdictional principles.29 This 
caused a certain amount of confusion as to the relationship between grounds of 
protective and passive personality jurisdiction. This very point arose in a dispute 
between France and Turkey in the Lotus case, which was submitted to the PCIJ in 
1927.30 
 
3.2.1. The Lotus Case  
 
The Lotus case concerned the collision on the high seas of a French steamer, the Lotus, 
                                                        
25 Moore, ibid. On the Cutting incident, see also Moore, supra n 7, at pp.228-242; Lotus, supra n 7, at 
p.93 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore). 
26 Ibid., at p.86. 
27 Ibid., at p.87. 
28 Ibid., at p.73.  
29 See Cameron, supra n 2, at p.17; Rodick, supra n 24, at p.35; Beckett, W.E. (1925). ‘The Exercise of 
Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners’. 6 BYIL 49; Blakesley, C.L., ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, in 
Bassiouni, M.C. (ed.) (1999). ‘International Criminal Law’. Ardsley: Transnational, vol.II, at p.67; L.H. 
(1927-1928). ‘Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction’. 26 Mich.L.Rev. 429, at p.430; Westlake, J. (1910). 
‘International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.262. See also Lauterpacht, H. (1947). ‘Allegiance, Diplomatic 
Protection and Criminal Jurisdiction over Aliens.’ 9 CLJ 330, at p.343. 
30 Supra n 7. 
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and a Turkish vessel, the Boz Kourt, which resulted in the deaths of eight Turkish 
sailors, and the prosecution by Turkish authorities of a French officer. France contended 
that protective jurisdiction was the only recognised exception to the territoriality of 
jurisdiction under international law. Accordingly, Turkey was not entitled to extend its 
law to the conduct of a French national aboard a French vessel on the high seas. Turkey 
accepted the validity of protective jurisdiction, but argued that customary international 
law also permitted passive personality jurisdiction. The Turkish Penal Code was based 
on a combination of the protective and passive personality principles under a broader 
principle of protection, in the same way as the Mexican Penal Code in the Cutting 
incident. Thus, Article 6 of the Turkish Penal Code, which according to Turkey was 
‘taken word for word from the Italian Penal Code’, provided for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over ‘[a]ny foreigner who ... commits an offence abroad to the prejudice of 
Turkey or of a Turkish subject’.31 As France and Turkey both recognised principles of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the incident in the present case occurred on the high 
seas and had caused ‘effects’ on a Turkish vessel, the majority of the Court ruled in 
favour of Turkey, as its jurisdiction could ‘also be justified from the point of view of the 
so-called territorial principle’.32 While the majority of the Court recognised that a State 
is permitted by international law to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction outside its territory 
under certain ‘principles’ of jurisdiction, it was not prepared to discuss the more 
complex issue as to what these principles might have been, or to clarify their scope of 
application in State practice.33 Consequently, the majority of the Court, while declaring 
protective jurisdiction to be consistent with international law, did not distinguish 
protective jurisdiction stricto sensu from the more controversial theory of passive 
personality.34 
 
The Dissenting Opinions of the Lotus case are worthy of consideration, particularly as 
the case was decided by the casting vote of the President of the Court and several of the 
dissenting judges did express opinion on principles of jurisdiction, including protective 
jurisdiction. Judge Moore dissented on the single ground that the Turkish Penal Code 
was based on what he called the ‘protective principle’, which he believed to be 
                                                        
31 Law No. 765 of 1st March 1926 (Officia1 Gazette No.320 of 13th March 1926), cited in Lotus, ibid., at 
pp.9, 14. 
32 Ibid., at p.23. 
33 See also chapter one.  
34 Lauterpacht, supra n 29, at p.343.  
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‘contrary to well established principles of international law’.35 In support of his 
argument, Moore cited Hall, who rejected the validity of the ‘protective principle’ 
because it created concurrent jurisdiction in the territory of foreign States.36 Moore 
asserted that: ‘[i]n substance, it means that the citizen of one country, when he visits 
another country, takes with him for his “protection” the law of his own country and 
subjects those with whom he comes into contact to the operation of that law.’37 It is 
apparent that Moore, as with Hall, was referring here to the passive personality principle 
of jurisdiction. It is important to note that Moore was dismissive, more generally, of the 
very idea that extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction may be exercised in another State’s 
territorial sovereignty, as it enabled the State to claim that ‘its penal laws apply to other 
countries and to what wholly takes place within such countries, or, if it does not claim 
this, that it may punish foreigners for alleged violations, even in their own country, of 
laws to which they are not subject.’38 Moore thus took the view that jurisdiction other 
than territoriality was not a part of customary international law.39  
 
Moore made his view on extraterritorial jurisdiction clear elsewhere, in his earlier report 
as Assistant Secretary of State arising out of the Cutting incident. In that report, Moore, 
in support of an exclusively territorial approach to jurisdiction, asserted that ‘in no case 
has an English or an American court assumed jurisdiction, even under statues couched 
in the most general language, to try and sentence a foreigner for acts done by him 
abroad’.40 Moore concluded his report by observing that protective jurisdiction is 
‘advocated by so many continental jurists and provided for in so many continental 
codes’; nevertheless, he doubted the legality of this jurisdiction and asserted that ‘it may 
become necessary for foreign powers to consider whether those measures [adopted 
pursuant to protective jurisdiction] violate their sovereign prerogatives or the rights of 
their citizens’.41 This may explain the reason why Moore in the Lotus case did not 
examine State practice and, instead, supported his argument by citing Hall, a jurist who 
also opposed extraterritorial jurisdiction. It may also explain why Moore deliberately 
did not distinguish protective jurisdiction stricto sensu from the controversial passive 
                                                        
35 Lotus, supra n 7, at pp.91-92 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore). 
36 Ibid.  
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., at p.93.  
39 Ibid., at p.94. 
40 Moore, supra n 2, at p.34.  
41 Ibid., at p.126.  
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personality principle under the broader ‘principle of protection’, in the same way that 
Moore had previously done so in his report arising out of the Cutting incident.42 To be 
sure, the same approach was used in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Finlay, in order to 
assert that protective jurisdiction proper is not valid under international law.43  
 
Judge Weiss, by way of contrast, did distinguish protective jurisdiction over offences 
committed against the ‘institutions, security and credit of the State’ from what he called 
‘the right of protection’.44 However, Judge Weiss did not distinguish the principle of 
territorial sovereignty from the concept of jurisdiction which flows from that 
sovereignty; consequently, Judge Weiss conceptualised protective jurisdiction as an 
‘extension of territorial jurisdiction’, rather than as a principle of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction which is an exception and functions subsidiary to territoriality.45 This led 
Judge Weiss to question the validity of protective jurisdiction and to restrict the concept 
of jurisdiction as being ‘based on and limited by’ the territory over which a State 
exercises sovereignty.46 Judge Loder, as with Judge Altamira, also made the crucial 
distinction between protective jurisdiction over offences ‘directed at the security of the 
State itself’, which has been included in the national laws of a ‘large majority’ of States, 
from what he called the ‘system of protection’, which has not been accepted by the 
‘great majority of States’.47 
 
3.2.2. An Absolute Approach to Territoriality 
 
Judges Moore, Finlay, Weiss and Nyholm dismissed the validity of protective 
jurisdiction in favour of an ‘absolute’ territorial approach to criminal jurisdiction in 
international law. This extreme and rigid view was not uncommon, particularly among 
Anglo-American jurists, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The argument 
against extraterritorial jurisdiction by these jurists, such as Hall, Oppenheim, Westlake 
and Woolsey, was similar to that advanced by Moore in the Lotus case, above, and was 
typically expressed along the following lines: first of all, the State’s nationals should not 
be punished for violating the laws of foreign countries, with which they are unfamiliar. 
                                                        
42 On the distinction between these two theories, see De Visscher, infra n 75, at p.258. 
43 Lotus, supra n 7, at p.56 (Diss. Op. Judge Finlay); also ibid., at p.62 (Diss. Op. Judge Nyholm).  
44 Ibid., at pp.45-46 (Diss. Op. Judge Weiss).  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., at pp.44-45. 
47 Ibid., at pp.35-36 (Diss. Op. Judge Loder); ibid., at p.100 (Diss. Op. Judge Altamira). 
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Secondly, the concept of jurisdiction over the State’s territory is exclusive to the 
sovereign; therefore, the protective principle constitutes an invasion of sovereign rights 
and a violation of the State’s independence.48 Both of these arguments, however, appear 
to be somewhat overstated, as was opined by Wharton in his 1885 treatise.49 Wharton 
added, moreover, that: 
  
There is no civilised State which has not passed statutes making it a criminal 
offence for foreigners even in their own countries to forge its securities, or 
make false and fraudulent oaths before its consuls.50 
 
In the Lotus case, it is rather surprising that, in support of an exclusively territorial 
approach to jurisdiction, Judges Moore and Weiss relied only on the supposed practice 
of the U.S. and Britain, and particularly the Cutting incident.51 This was also despite the 
fact that Moore’s own report arising out of that incident revealed that protective 
jurisdiction was widely established and practically uniform in State practice and, 
arguably, part of customary international law. Moore’s report also illustrated that the 
U.S. Government did not regard protective jurisdiction as being contrary to international 
law and carefully limited its diplomatic protest to the principle of passive personality. 
Britain had similarly made it clear in the mid-nineteenth century that it accepted the 
validity of protective jurisdiction in international law, although this was not the case in 
relation to offences committed against the State’s nationals under the passive 
personality principle.52 As will be explained below, both of these latter countries 
extended their own national laws to conduct outside of their respective territories, on 
what would appear to be based on the protective principle. It will be recalled from 
chapter two that protective jurisdiction has traditionally been linked with and exercised 
as part of a broad right of self-defence by these countries. This enabled Anglo-American 
jurists, such as Moore, to claim the right to exercise protective jurisdiction under the 
cloak of a broad right of self-defence and maintain, at the same time, that international 
                                                        
48 See Hall, E.W., ‘A Treatise on International Law’ (ed. by Higgins, P.A. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924)), at 
pp.263-264; Institute of International Law, session at Brussels in 1879, cited in Moore, supra n 2, at 
p.112; Westlake, cited in ibid., at p.108; Westlake, J. (1894). ‘Chapters on the Principles of International 
Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.126; Woolsey, H.L. (1926). ‘Extraterritorial Crimes’. 20 AJIL 757; L.H., 
supra n 29 and authorities cited therein. 
49 Wharton, F. (1885). ‘A Treatise on Criminal Law’. Philadelphia: Kay & Brother, Book I, para.284; also 
ibid., Book II, para.1264. 
50 Ibid., at p.312.   
51 Lotus, supra n 7, at p.93 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore); ibid., at pp.44-45 (Diss. Op. Judge Weiss). 
52 McNair, A. (1956). ‘International Law Opinions’. London: CUP, at pp.152-153; also Emperor of 
Austria v Day & Kossuth (1861), 30 L.J.Ch. 690. 
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law limited jurisdiction to that of territoriality.53 
 
Judge Finlay relied on the commentary of Oppenheim to dismiss the validity of 
protective jurisdiction.54 Oppenheim preferred a strict territorial approach to jurisdiction 
and suggested that protective jurisdiction ‘ought’ not to be valid in international law; at 
the same time, and contrary to his view, Oppenheim accepted the validity of protective 
jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war. Oppenheim also came to recognise that 
this view was not reflective of State practice and therefore could no longer be sustained. 
Accordingly, subsequent volumes of Oppenheim abandoned this approach to reflect 
more accurately ‘the practice of States’ and ‘common sense’.55 Judge Nyholm, by way 
of contrast, dismissed the validity of protective jurisdiction on the ground that the recent 
effort by the League of Nations to codify international law had decided to ‘set aside the 
question of the extension of criminal jurisdiction’ as the derogation from the territorial 
principle had not been recognised by ‘important nations’, including the U.S. and 
Britain.56 As will be shown below, however, the League’s decision not to submit the 
topic of extraterritorial jurisdiction to a codification conference was based on a 
recommendation by Brierly, an Anglo-American jurist, whose report lacked rigour and 
accuracy, and Brierly himself advocated a strict territorial approach to jurisdiction. 
  
3.2.3. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over ‘Piracy’ on the High Seas  
 
While Moore and Finlay opposed the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in another 
State’s territorial sovereignty, both of them accepted, as an exception to the territoriality 
of jurisdiction, the right under international law to exercise expansive jurisdiction - what 
Moore called a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’ - over ‘piracy by the law of nations’, 
that is, on the high seas and outside the exclusive territorial sovereignty of any State.57 It 
is notable that, Moore, in support of this theory, turned not to State practice but, rather, 
to the commentaries of Wheaton and Hall and, implicitly, the previous academic 
commentary of Moore. These Anglo-American jurists, eminent as they are, did not 
examine the development of jurisdiction over piracy in State practice either; nor, for that 
                                                        
53 Cameron, supra n 2, at p.45; McNair, ibid., at p.154.  
54 Lotus, supra n 7, at p.57 (Diss. Op. Lord Finlay).  
55 Oppenheim, L. (1955). ‘International Law’ (ed. by Lauterpacht, H. London: Longmans), vol.I, at p.331. 
See also Lauterpacht, supra n 29, at pp.342-343. 
56 Lotus, supra n 7, at p.62 (Diss. Op. Judge Nyholm). 
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matter, did they suggest that jurisdiction over piracy is based on a theory of universality. 
Although it is not acknowledged by Moore in the present case, the earlier opinion of 
Moore in the Cutting incident did not define jurisdiction over piracy as a theory of 
‘universality’.58 The reason why Moore elaborated an entirely new theory of ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ over an international crime of piracy was due to an effort by Moore to 
distinguish between extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, which had 
undeniably developed in the practice of the Britain and the U.S., from extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in general international law over crimes occurring in another State’s 
territorial sovereignty, the latter of which Moore regarded as a being contrary to 
international law. To that end, Moore suggested that jurisdiction over piracy on the high 
seas is exercised ‘in the interest of all’. On closer inspection, it would appear that the 
opinions of Moore and Finlay misinterpreted the universal and equal right under 
international law of all independent States to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas - ‘the 
scene of the pirate’s operations’59 - in order to protect certain of their own vital interests, 
a number of which were shared by the international community, with a theory of 
universal jurisdiction. This alternative interpretation to the development of jurisdiction 
over piracy, which is supported by State practice, is returned to below. 
 
The judgment in the Lotus case and the Dissenting Opinions in that case illustrate that 
the judges serving on the PCIJ had a limited understanding of theories relating to 
grounds of jurisdiction under customary international law and the protective principle in 
particular. The majority of the Dissenting Opinions supported, with the exception of 
piracy on the high seas, an absolute territorial approach to jurisdiction in international 
law, while protective jurisdiction was described as if it was a new phenomenon and no 
attention was dedicated to its origins; little or no effort was made to elucidate the 
development, nature and scope of this jurisdiction, including over piracy on the high 
seas, or to clarify its relationship with other grounds of jurisdiction, most notably 
passive personality. These considerations are of great importance, given that the Lotus 
case is the first and only occasion that an international court has directly discussed 
principles of jurisdiction in international law.  
  
The idea that the theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’, as defined by Judge Moore, has 
                                                        
58 Moore, supra n 2, at p.37. 
59 Lotus, supra n 7, at p.70 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore).  
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traditionally developed over ‘piracy by the law of nations’ as the only established 
exception to the territoriality of jurisdiction had a profound influence on subsequent 
legal thought, and Moore’s Dissenting Opinion continues to be cited as a reliable 
authority by courts and in legal scholarship.60 The Dissenting Opinions in the Lotus case 
have been relied upon by some commentators to dismiss the validity of protective 
jurisdiction.61 It has also been maintained well into the twenty first century that Anglo-
American countries have traditionally opposed protective jurisdiction.62 Thus, Ryngaert 
has recently suggested that protective jurisdiction was ‘historically non-existent’ in 
common law countries.63 However, contrary to the opinion of Anglo-American jurists, 
the idea that Anglo-American countries adhered to an exclusively territorial approach to 
criminal jurisdiction is simplistic and fallacious.64 It follows that the supposed 
divergence between the Anglo-American and Continental schools of thought in 
international law in relation to jurisdiction over foreign nationals abroad was 
considerably overstated.65 Many of these issues are reflected in the first efforts made to 
codify international law.  
  
3.3. Early Efforts to Codify Protective Jurisdiction 
 
Since the late nineteenth century, several ‘private’ efforts - that is, draft codes and 
proposals prepared by research societies and institutions - have been made to codify 
protective jurisdiction. The first of these was made by the Institute of International Law, 
which adopted at its 1879 session in Brussels, and reaffirmed at its 1883 session in 
Munich, a resolution containing protective jurisdiction:  
 
Each state has the right to punish for acts committed outside of its territory by 
                                                        
60 E.g., Huang, Y. (2012). ‘Universal jurisdiction over Piracy and East Asian Practice’. 11 Chinese JIL 
623, at p.625; Attorney-General v Mohamud Mohammed Hashi & 8 others [2012] eKLR, para.31; 
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61 Brierly, supra n 22, at p.162; Garcia-Mora, M.R. (1958). ‘Criminal Jurisdiction over Foreigners for 
Treason and Offences Against the State Committed upon Foreign Territory’. 19 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 567, at 
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63 Supra n 17, at p.97. 
64 See also Preuss, L. (1944). ‘American Conception of Jurisdiction with Respect to Conflicts of Law on 
Crime’. 30 Problems of Peace and War 184, at p.191. 
65 Lauterpacht, supra n 6; Scott, supra n 6. 
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foreigners, in violation of its penal laws, when these acts constitute an attack on 
the social existence of the state, compromising its safety, and which are not 
cognizable by the penal law of the country where they take place.66  
 
At both sessions the resolution was regarded as a valid exception to the territoriality of 
jurisdiction in international law. Protective jurisdiction is permitted by the resolution 
where the criminal law of the locus delicti does not prohibit the particular conduct; 
nevertheless, national laws applied protective jurisdiction irrespective of whether an act 
was prohibited in the locus delicti.67 It is also worth noting that the resolution defined 
jurisdiction in rather narrow terms, namely where proscribed conduct ‘constitute[s] an 
attack on the social existence of the state, compromising its safety’, which does not 
reflect the national laws on which the resolution is based; and, conceptually, it appears 
to treat jurisdiction in a similar way to self-defence.68 It is for this reason, perhaps, that 
the Institute, in a resolution adopted in 1931, redefined protective jurisdiction as 
covering crimes committed against the State’s ‘security’ and ‘credit’ and the 
abovementioned words were omitted.69 
 
3.4. League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of 
International Law 
 
The first public effort to codify protective jurisdiction was made by the League of 
Nations. In 1924 the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a resolution to 
prepare a list of subjects under international law that were ‘sufficiently ripe for 
codification’ and regulation by international agreement was ‘desirable and realisable’.70 
To that end, the League’s Council appointed a ‘Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law’ (the Committee).71 At its First Session in 
1925, one of the subjects identified by the Committee was the ‘criminal competence of 
States in respect of offences committed outside their territory’.72 The Committee 
decided to appoint a Sub-Committee, consisting of Brierly, as Rapporteur, and De 
Visscher, to enquire ‘[w]hether it is possible to lay down, by way of conventions, 
principles governing the criminal competence of States in regard to offences committed 
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67 Westlake (1894), supra n 48, at p.128.  
68 See chapter two. 
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outside their territories and, if so, what these principles should be.’73 At its Second 
Session in 1926, the Committee adopted Brierly’s report.74 It is useful, therefore, to 
examine Brierly’s report.75  
 
Brierly was of the view that the codification of extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis 
of a convention would be impracticable since it depended on a ‘fundamental question 
whether the territorial basis is to admit of any exception at all’. Brierly suggested that:  
 
the crux of the problem lies in the divergence of view between those States 
which do and those which do not allow the legitimacy of any such exceptions, 
and we have to ask ourselves whether the Committee would be justified in 
hoping for a possible reconciliation between these two groups of States.76  
 
According to Brierly, the U.S., Britain, Portugal and Denmark ‘hold the view that by 
international law no State is entitled to assume such jurisdiction’.77 It should be noted, 
from the outset, that Brierly did not undertake any primary research, for example, of 
State practice and the actual views of States, and, it would appear, little primary analysis 
either. Rather, in support of this finding, inter alia, Brierly relied, rather surprisingly, 
upon the academic commentary of Beckett.78 Beckett did not undertake any primary 
research either, or cite any secondary commentary to support his argument.  
  
Brierly proposed bridging the supposed gap between the two groups of States which he 
had identified with the theory of objective territoriality, a wholly different and 
‘territorial’ theory of jurisdiction.79 Once again, however, in support of this proposal, 
Brierly cited Beckett.80 Beckett observed that protective jurisdiction is ‘claimed by ... a 
large number of states’ and yet he refused to recognise the validity of this jurisdiction as 
‘an exception to the strict rule of territoriality’; instead, suggested Beckett, protective 
jurisdiction could be replaced by the objective theory of territorial jurisdiction.81 Beckett 
did not provide any reasoned argument to support this assertion and his view was 
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typical of that of Anglo-American jurists at that time. Nonetheless, Brierly accepted 
Beckett’s argument and he assumed that objective territoriality would provide an 
adequate basis of jurisdiction over all acts by foreign nationals abroad against the 
State’s ‘security’ and ‘credit’, even though, as was acknowledged by Brierly, this did 
not reflect the practice of the majority of States.82 The theory of territoriality, as has 
already been explained in chapter two, is wholly inadequate, in and of itself, to protect 
the State’s sovereignty and certain of its vital interests, including where such interests 
are located abroad.  
 
On closer inspection, it may be presumed that the reason why Brierly preferred the 
theory of objective territoriality is because it resonated with his own views of a strict 
territorial approach over crimes committed in another State’s territorial sovereignty. 
Indeed, Brierly made his view on protective jurisdiction well-known elsewhere; thus, 
commenting on the Lotus case, Brierly cited Beckett and the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Moore in support of the assertion that Britain and the U.S. are ‘firmly attached to 
the territorial basis of criminal jurisdiction’ and that customary international law limits 
jurisdiction to a State’s territory.83 In order to dismiss the validity of protective 
jurisdiction under international law, Brierly adopted the same argument as Judges 
Moore and Finlay in the Lotus case and treated the protective and passive personality 
principles as ‘the same’.84 Brierly also suggested that protective jurisdiction is ‘novel’ 
and at ‘variance with the whole organisation of the world into independent, but 
territoriality delimited, States.’85  
 
The alternative proposal made by Brierly was to codify protective jurisdiction by 
enumerating a uniform list of specified offences over which this jurisdiction should be 
permissible.86 The reason for this proposal is that Brierly was concerned with the scope 
and potential abuse of protective jurisdiction and he suggested that such an approach 
would mean that States, ‘instead of reserving to themselves the right to decide … what 
acts endanger their security, would accept an agreed and uniform list in which such acts 
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would be specified.’87 This proposal seems to have been made by Brierly in response to 
the concern raised by Beckett that the [t]ype and number of acts made criminal [under 
protective jurisdiction] is so various [and] a state is judge as to what endangers its 
security and credit’.88 In any case, this latter proposal was ultimately rejected by Brierly 
on the ground that those States which adhered ‘strictly’ to the territoriality of 
jurisdiction would perceive protective jurisdiction as an ‘invasion of its sovereign 
rights’, while those States which did recognise the validity of this jurisdiction, by 
curtailing this right, ‘may throw doubt on its right to self-defence’.89 It is worth noting, 
by way of aside, that those States which supposedly perceive protective jurisdiction as 
an ‘invasion’ of their sovereign rights appears to have been taken by Brierly from the 
report by Moore in the Cutting incident, although it is not expressly acknowledged as 
such by Brierly, and it is a view that is unfounded.90 
 
The supposed divergence between the two groups of States identified by Brierly appears 
to be overstated and his discussion is wrongly postulated. In the first place, although it 
was not realised by Brierly, the U.S. has traditionally preferred to conceptualise 
jurisdiction in terms of an expansively interpreted theory of objective territoriality 
which, according to Preuss, one of the research assistants of the Harvard Research for 
the codification of protective jurisdiction, is in many cases ‘scarcely distinguishable, in 
its actual operation, from the principle of State security or protection.’91 Had Brierly 
examined State practice then he may have realised that the U.S. and Britain did not 
adhere exclusively to a theory of territoriality and the national laws of these countries 
may be interpreted as including several early examples of protective jurisdiction.92 This 
is best illustrated, perhaps, by the following example.  
 
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Schooner Exchange v McFaddon is often 
cited as embodying the principle of territoriality in modern international law, in which 
Chief Justice Marshall stated that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory 
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is necessarily exclusive and absolute.’93 Marshall was referring inter alia to the 
enforcement of jurisdiction by a sovereign ‘within its own territory’.94 However, the 
earlier opinion by Marshall before the Supreme Court in the case of Church v Hubbart 
has been treated by the U.S. Government and domestic courts as the ‘essence’ of 
protective jurisdiction and being ‘no less vital today’ than it was in the early nineteenth 
century.95 In that case, Portuguese authorities seized two U.S.-flagged merchant vessels 
hovering on the high seas, off the coast of Brazil, for allegedly attempting to participate 
in Portuguese colonial trade, contrary to a Portuguese statute of 1605, entitled: ‘A law 
by which foreign vessels are prohibited from entering the ports of India, Brazil, Guinea, 
and Islands, and other provinces of Portugal’.96 The Supreme Court refrained from 
commenting on the legality of the seizure, but Marshall stated obiter: 
 
That the law of nations prohibits the exercise of any act of authority over a 
vessel in the situation of the Aurora [inter alia]… cannot be admitted. [...] It 
is opposed by principles which are universally acknowledged. The authority 
of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of 
a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of 
that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to 
secure itself from injury, may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its 
territory. Upon this principle the right of a belligerent to search a neutral 
vessel on the high seas for contraband of war, is universally admitted, 
because the belligerent has a right to prevent the injury done to himself by 
the assistance intended for his enemy: so too a nation has a right to prohibit 
any commerce with its colonies. Any attempt to violate the laws made to 
protect this right, is an injury to itself which it may prevent, and it has a 
right to use the means necessary for its prevention.97 
 
Marshall thus recognised the existence, under the law of nations, of a ‘universally 
acknowledged’ principle of prescriptive jurisdiction, which could be exercised by a 
sovereign over foreign nationals ‘beyond the limits of its territory’, on the high seas, in 
order to ‘secure itself from injury’, and was applicable both to belligerents in t ime of 
war and to States in time of peace.98 Marshall’s opinion, given that it was merely obiter, 
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did not expressly specify the interests that a State may protect, other than its ‘colonial 
commerce, which is claimed by all nations holding distant possessions’, which was the 
concern of Portugal in the present case.99 Nevertheless, it would appear that the right of 
a State to prevent ‘injury’ to itself is broad enough to encompass other interests 
regarded as important, for example, the State’s sovereignty and sovereign 
independence, territorial integrity, security and its nationals. In recognising the right of 
protective jurisdiction, Marshall was careful to affirm the right of the U.S. to prescribe 
its own domestic law over foreign nationals on the high seas in order to protect certain 
of its own interests, including its revenue and customs.100  
   
It suffices to say that an important aspect of the development of protective jurisdiction 
under customary international law during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of 
which the national laws of Portugal, Britain and the U.S. have formed a part, has been 
in respect of offences committed on the high seas in areas contiguous to the prescribing 
State’s coasts (and the coasts of its colonies) for the protection of nat ional interests that 
were deemed vital. These interests included, for example, its sovereignty and sovereign 
independence, security, territorial integrity, trade and commerce, fisheries and customs 
and revenue, as well as belligerent rights to search neutral vessels and neutrality rights 
of non-belligerents in time of war.101 
 
It is perhaps notable that jurisdiction over piracy was summarily dismissed by Brierly as 
having ‘little in common’ with the subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign 
nationals on the basis that it occurred on the high seas (as opposed to the State’s 
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territorial sovereignty) and that it is ‘justiciable by any State’.102 It seems that Brierly 
was influenced on this issue, once again, by the commentary of Moore, whose opinion 
has already been discussed above, and by Beckett, who asserted that ‘[p]iracy stands on 
such an exceptional basis that it throws no light on the question of penal jurisdiction 
generally’.103 Had Brierly included jurisdiction over piracy in his analysis then he may 
have concluded that it represented an important aspect of the historical development of 
protective jurisdiction, not least in the practice of three of the principal maritime 
powers, namely Britain, Portugal and the U.S.104 Putting to one side the development of 
jurisdiction over piracy, a point to which the present chapter shall return below, the 
other important implication is that the subject of jurisdiction over piracy was dealt with 
by the League as a completely separate study.105 The Rapporteur, Matsuda, did not 
appear to undertake research of primary sources and suggested that ‘every’ State has the 
right to exercise and enforce jurisdiction over pirates on the high seas.106 However, 
Matsuda did not examine or define the ground of jurisdiction applicable over piracy 
either. 
  
Brierly’s conclusion was that the codification of extraterritorial jurisdiction would 
‘demand sacrifices from one or from both groups of States in a matter which is clearly 
one of great delicacy.’107 In turn, the Committee, after studying Brierly’s report, 
concluded in 1926 that the codification of the law on extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
‘although desirable, would encounter grave political and other obstacles.’108 
Consequently, the Committee refrained from including this topic in the provisional list 
of subjects which were ‘ripe’ for codification to be communicated to governments for 
their ‘opinion’ and, in turn, it was not included in the list of topics for deliberation at the 
1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law.109 
 
It is clear that the Committee regarded the codification of protective jurisdiction as 
‘desirable’. The reason why the Committee decided not to include this jurisdiction in its 
list of topics as ‘ripe’ for codification appears to have been due to practical and political, 
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rather than legal, considerations. As is made clear by the Committee’s terms of 
reference, the League had limited itself to the selection of subjects of international law 
whose codification by binding international conventions was ‘desirable and realisable at 
the present moment’ and which could be adopted by a conference to be convened in the 
immediate future. In that regard, the Committee mistakenly placed too great emphasis 
on Brierly’s conclusion that the U.S. and Britain opposed any exception to the 
territoriality of jurisdiction and therefore the negotiation of a convention would 
‘demand sacrifices’. The perceived opposition by the U.S. and Britain should not be 
underestimated; indeed, it will be recalled that Judge Nyholm in his Dissenting Opinion, 
above, dismissed the validity of protective jurisdiction by relying upon Brierly’s report 
and the assumption that derogation from territoriality had not been recognised by 
‘important nations’.110 It is certainly the case that these States were regarded as ‘Great 
Powers’ whose views and cooperation would undoubtedly be necessary in the 
formulation a convention on a particular subject of international law, even though the 
U.S. was not a member of, and opposed, the League.111 The Committee’s terms of 
reference made clear that subjects selected for codification would be communicated by 
the League’s Secretariat to States, ‘whether Members of the League or not, for their 
opinion’.112 This is probably what the Committee had in mind by its suggestion inter 
alia that a convention would face ‘grave political and other obstacles’. Incidentally, the 
Committee would have had in mind that the League in the inter-war period was in crisis 
and the political climate at the time was far from an environment that was favourable 
for the negotiation of a subject that was - to use Brierly’s words - one of ‘great 
delicacy’.  
 
The other reason why the Committee may have decided not to include protective 
jurisdiction as part of the League’s codification effort is because of its ‘close 
connection’ with the subject of extradition.113 Brierly was appointed as Rapporteur for 
the study of extradition. Having examined Brierly’s report, the Committee concluded 
that the difficulties surrounding extradition were ‘too great’ for a convention to be 
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‘realisable in the near future’.114 It is certainly the case that the Committee may have 
viewed a convention on extraterritorial jurisdiction, which would to a great extent be 
dependent on inter-State cooperation and extradition for the enforcement of jurisdiction, 
as impracticable due to the perceived unwillingness of some States to extradite their 
own nationals for trial abroad. 
  
The upshot of the Committee’s decision inter alia is that protective jurisdiction was not 
studied and codified by the League. That is despite evidence to suggest that such 
jurisdiction was, in fact, ‘ripe’ for codification. Although the Hague Conference 
ultimately did not produce any results and the League’s codification effort collapsed in 
1931, governments did not have the opportunity to transmit to the Committee reports on 
their views and practice on protective jurisdiction and have those reports examined and 
documented by the Committee, or have the ability to debate protective jurisdiction at 
the Hague Conference. Two repercussions are particularly noteworthy. The first is that 
the nature and scope and application of protective jurisdiction under customary 
international law are little understood, as are the vital interests falling under its ambit. 
Nor was the applicability of protective jurisdiction over piracy given any consideration 
by the League. These matters came to be of great importance, ten years after the 
collapse of the League’s codification effort, when the ‘Allies’, in the aftermath of World 
War II, needed to use extraterritorial jurisdiction for the prosecution of persons 
belonging to the ‘enemy’ for the alleged commission of crimes against peace and war 
crimes; and, thereafter, the adoption of multilateral conventions in response to acts of 
terrorism and other transnational crimes. Secondly, it had implications for the 
‘progressive development of international law and its codification’ by the League’s 
successor, the ILC, in 1949.115 Before examining the work of the ILC, however, it is 
important to consider the private effort made to codify jurisdiction in international law 
by the Harvard Research, which was the first study to systematise theories relating to 
grounds of jurisdiction under customary international law and to use the nomenclature 
‘protective principle’ and provide a definition of it. 
  
3.5. Harvard Research on International Law 
  
Following the initiation of the League’s effort to codify international law and its call for 
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a ‘Conference on the Codification of International Law’, the topic of jurisdiction was 
undertaken by the Third Phase of the ‘Harvard Research on International Law’, between 
1932 and 1935, for the preparation of a ‘Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect 
to Crime’ (Draft Convention).116 The League’s Committee had, it will be recalled, 
concluded that an international convention on extraterritorial jurisdiction would 
‘encounter grave political and other obstacles’. Nevertheless, the Harvard Research 
thought that the topic should be explored in the hope that a Draft Convention on the 
topic would be of interest to and merit the attention of the League.117 The Harvard 
Research appointed Dickinson, as Rapporteur, to study grounds of jurisdiction in 
international law other than jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, a point to which 
the present chapter shall return below. Protective principle jurisdiction is, according to 
the Harvard Research, ‘claimed by most States, regarded with misgivings in a few, and 
generally ranked as the basis of an auxiliary competence.’118 A fundamental difference 
between the report by Brierly under the auspices of the League and the Harvard 
Research is that the latter did examine State practice. On the basis of this practice, the 
Harvard Research defined the protective principle under Article 7 in the following way:  
 
A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its 
territory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political 
independence of that State, provided that the act or omission which constitutes 
the crime was not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by 
the law of the place where it was committed.119  
 
The commentary to this Article stated that, with the exception of the theories of 
nationality and universality jurisdiction, ‘legislation enacted in reliance upon the 
protective principle constitutes the most common extension of penal jurisdiction to 
offences committed abroad.’120  
  
The Harvard Research suggested that, with the exception of the U.S. and Britain, there 
was evidence of a ‘high degree of uniformity’ and ‘almost universal approval’ of 
protective jurisdiction in municipal laws, and that the divergence between those States 
which stress the territorial approach to jurisdiction and the majority of States which 
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make provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction as an exception to territoriality, as was 
suggested by Brierly, above, was not as wide as is generally assumed.121 The Harvard 
Research noted that the decision by the U.S. and Britain not to expressly extend their 
municipal law extraterritorially for the punishment of acts committed against their 
security and integrity is not evidence that those States perceived the protective principle 
to be contrary to international law.122  
 
The Harvard Research differed from Brierly’s report in at least one further important 
respect by making it clear that the validity of protective jurisdiction in international law 
is beyond any doubt. For the Harvard Research, the controversy surrounding the 
principle is not over its validity but rather fear that its practical application may be 
subject to abuse.123 In an effort to remove what were presumed by the Harvard Research 
to be the ‘principal objections’ by the U.S. and Britain, the Harvard Research proposed 
codifying the principle by agreement as to the acts which may be denounced as 
criminal.124 As indicated by Article 7 of the Draft Convention, however, the Harvard 
Research ultimately took a different approach and defined the principle by reference to 
‘any crime’ committed against the State’s ‘security, territorial integrity or political 
independence’. This approach appears to have as its aim, for the purpose of drafting a 
convention, a degree of certainty and specificity by defining more clearly the category 
of vital interests capable of falling under the principle’s ambit, and thereby providing 
some limitation to the principle’s scope and application; and, at the same time, it 
provides necessary flexibility by giving States sufficient discretion to define in their 
national laws the particular offences which may be committed against those vital 
interests. The Draft Convention also proposed lex ferenda the adoption of safeguards for 
the protection of human rights, including the exclusion from the principle’s definition 
‘every act or omission that is committed in the exercise of a liberty by the law of the 
place that it was committed’.125 The Harvard Research thought that this latter provision 
would prevent the potential abuse of protective jurisdiction by those States which are 
‘oversensitive about their prestige or security’.126 It was recognised by the Harvard 
Research that qualifying protective jurisdiction in this way did not reflect existing State 
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practice. Whatever were the objections of protective jurisdiction at that time by the U.S. 
and Britain, which are far from clear, the U.S. has since claimed just as extensive a 
jurisdiction.127 Although it was not considered by the Harvard Research, protective 
jurisdiction has also traditionally developed over piracy in the practice of these States, 
to which the present chapter will now turn.   
 
3.5.1. Article 9 of the Draft Convention: Jurisdiction over Piracy 
 
The commentary to Article 7 of the Draft Convention, it will be recalled, stated that, 
with the exception of the theory of universal jurisdiction, ‘legislation enacted in reliance 
upon the protective principle constitutes the most common extension of penal 
jurisdiction to offences committed abroad’. It is notable that the Harvard Research 
followed the same approach to codification as the League and dealt with the matter of 
jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas under a wholly separate article of the Draft 
Convention and appointed a different Rapporteur, J.W. Bingham. Perhaps more 
importantly, the Harvard Research went one step further than did the League by seeking 
to codify, lex ferenda, the theory of ‘universality’ over a crime of piracy under 
international law elaborated by Moore.128 It is useful to examine the treatment of 
jurisdiction over piracy by the Harvard Research in some depth, given that it has 
important implications for the historical and contemporary understanding of protective 
jurisdiction and its relationship with the theory of universality in international law.  
 
The Harvard Research, by virtue of Article 9 of the Draft Convention, provides that ‘[a] 
State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an 
alien which constitutes piracy by international law.’129 According to the comment to 
Article 9, ‘[t]he principle is one of universality’, which is ‘everywhere recognised’.130 
On closer inspection of the preparatory work of Article 9, the report by Bingham was of 
the view that there exists over the international crime of piracy ‘a special, common basis 
of jurisdiction beyond the familiar grounds of personal allegiance, territorial dominion, 
dominion over ships, and injuries to the interests under the state’s protection’.131 The 
topic was approached by Bingham from the perspective of both lex lata and lex ferenda, 
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in other words, of both codification and progressive development. This ‘special’ and 
‘common’ basis of jurisdiction ‘over offences committed by foreigners against foreign 
interests’, which Article 9 of the Draft Convention eventually came to define as a theory 
of ‘universality’, was, in fact, regarded by Bingham as desirable for the purpose of 
proposing a Draft Convention lex ferenda and not because it reflected existing State 
practice.132 The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to the Draft Convention’s 
reference to the applicability of universality over the offence of ‘piracy by international 
law’. Indeed, Bingham had found no evidence in State practice that piracy existed as a 
crime under international law, and was not able to define piracy under international law, 
due to ‘the chaos of expert opinion’ and the absence of any ‘authoritative definition’.133  
 
The basis on which Bingham founded this ‘special’ ground of jurisdiction was not State 
practice but, rather, reliance upon the argumentative commentaries of Anglo-American 
jurists. There is no attempt by Bingham to examine these writings critically or in any 
depth. What is more, none of the jurists relied upon by Bingham provide any evidence, 
by way of State practice, to support the theory of universal jurisdiction over piracy 
either.134 One of these jurists was Moore, whose view was later repeated verbatim in 
Moore’s Dissenting Opinion in the Lotus case, to which reference has already been 
made above.135 Moore, it will be recalled, defined jurisdiction over ‘piracy by the law of 
nations’ as a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’, which Moore treated as ‘sui generis’ and 
the only exception to the territoriality of jurisdiction in international law. The reason 
why Moore defined jurisdiction over piracy as a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’, it will 
be recalled, was due to an effort by Moore to distinguish between extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, which had undeniably developed in the 
practice of Britain and the U.S., from extraterritorial jurisdiction in general international 
law over crimes occurring in another State’s territorial sovereignty, the latter of which 
Moore regarded as a being contrary to international law. Thus, jurisdiction over piracy 
on the high seas was, according to Moore, exercised ‘in the interest of all’. The opinion 
of Moore was not supported by any evidence; rather, it was based, albeit implicitly, 
entirely on the previous academic commentary of Moore and the commentaries of other 
Anglo-American jurists, none of which provided any evidence of State practice in 
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support of a theory of universal jurisdiction over piracy either. Nonetheless, given that 
Moore’s treatise was regarded, at that time, as one of the most important American 
works on international law, and Moore’s position as the Assistant Secretary of State and 
a serving judge on the PCIJ, the Harvard Research appears to have codified Moore’s 
opinion with minimum critical analysis.  
 
On the other hand and contrary to the opinion of Moore, Bingham acknowledged that 
‘[m]any states do not undertake to punish a pirate who has not offended against its 
peculiar interests’.136 Bingham went on to suggest that ‘it is difficult to find cases of 
exercise of jurisdiction over piracy which could not be supported on one or more of the 
ordinary grounds’, and observed ‘… the paucity of pertinent cases and of evidence of 
modern state practice [to support the theory of universal jurisdiction] …’137 In fact, 
Bingham was unable to cite a single example of either historical or contemporaneous 
State practice in support of the theory of universal jurisdiction over piracy. While 
Bingham observed that ‘[o]nly through the voluntary action of some states are pirates 
seized, prosecuted, and punished’, Bingham did not consider that the selective, 
‘voluntary action’ by a handful of maritime powers was to secure their own trade routes 
and protect their own merchant shipping.138 According to Bingham, the ‘meaning’ and 
‘practical legal significance’ to be given to the traditional expression that piracy is an 
offence against the law of nations, beyond ‘extravagant hyperbole’, is ‘the legal rule 
that every state participates in a common jurisdiction to capture pirates and their ships 
on the high sea’.139 In this way, Bingham, as did Moore, appears to have made a great 
conceptual leap, from the right of ‘every state’ in international law to prescribe and 
enforce its jurisdiction on the high seas over so-called ‘pirates’ with the existence of a 
theory of ‘universal’, or - to use the words of Bingham - ‘a common’, jurisdiction.140  
 
It should, perhaps, be of little surprise that the theory of universal jurisdiction proved 
difficult for Bingham to reconcile with State practice. Accordingly, Bingham had to 
rationalise universality in rather tangential and even elusive terms, by proposing that 
States suppress piracy to ‘prevent the growth’ of a threat to the international 
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community141 and, ultimately, that piracy occurs on the high seas, ‘which engages the 
interest of the international community’.142 Notably, the Harvard Research adopted a 
different rationale to that of Bingham and in its commentary justified the inclusion of 
universality in Article 9 on the basis that piracy occurs ‘upon the seas where all have an 
interest in the safety of commerce and where no State has territorial jurisdict ion.’143 
Notably, the commentary to Article 9 treated universal jurisdiction as if it already 
existed in State practice, by asserting that the ‘common interest and mutual convenience 
which gave rise to the [universality] principle have conserved its vitality’.144  
 
An alternative interpretation, and one which has already been explained in depth by the 
present author elsewhere, is that jurisdiction over ‘piracy’ is better understood under the 
protective principle, as defined by Article 7 of the Draft Convention. This interpretation 
of jurisdiction, which is supported by a wide range of primary sources, developed 
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries out of the necessity of the maritime 
powers to protect certain of their vital interests, not least their sovereign right to freely 
navigate the high seas, overseas trade routes and colonial trade and settlements, from 
so-called ‘pirates’.145 The acts of these private armed vessels - or unlicensed privateers - 
amounted to the waging of unlawful warfare and could not be attributed to any 
recognised sovereign. As has already been explained in chapter two, the no nexus 
requirement, that is, the absence of any need to evidence a connection between a State 
prescribing its national laws over so-called ‘pirates’ on the high seas and - to use the 
words of Bingham - ‘threats against and injuries to interests under its protection’,146 has 
nothing to do with a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’. Rather, State practice has to be 
viewed in its proper historical context. State assertions of jurisdiction over piracy were 
restricted to unlicensed privateers on the high seas, which were, in effect, treated as 
‘stateless’ vessels, falling outside the protection of any sovereign power. As the high 
seas were, as a fundamental principle under the emerging code of international law, 
treated as being beyond the exclusive sovereignty of any one State, it followed from 
another equally fundamental principle under international law - of sovereign equality 
and independence - that all sovereign States possessed an equal right, without having to 
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provide any justification to each other, to prescribe and enforce jurisdiction over alleged 
pirates.147 Indeed, for a State to do otherwise would have undermined, and even 
amounted to an implied diminution of, its own sovereignty, equality and independence. 
All that had to be established in national laws, or proven in inter-State disputes, was that 
alleged pirates operated on the high seas without a valid privateering licence. This 
meant that every maritime power possessed, in time of peace, a broad right under 
international law to assert prescriptive jurisdiction over pirates (private armed vessels 
on the high seas that lacked sovereign authority) and to enforce that jurisdiction over 
such vessels, in order to protect their vital interests. States did not, as a matter of 
international law, have to establish in their domestic laws evidence of a prescriptive 
connection with the accused or the alleged offence. This would suggest that, regardless 
of whether a State asserts jurisdiction over an alleged offence that is deemed to threaten 
its vital interests on the high seas or in the State’s territorial sovereignty, the nature of 
that jurisdiction is one and the same; rather, the fundamental difference is the locus 
delicti.  
 
Although it is beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is worth noting that the right of 
States to prescribe and enforce jurisdiction over alleged ‘pirates’ on the high seas in 
order to protect their vital interests - without the need to evidence a prescriptive 
connection with an alleged offence - is further illustrated by the attempt made by Britain 
to expand this right in the early nineteenth century to include the trade of slaves in order 
to protect its economic interests and the economic competitiveness of its plantation 
colonies.148 Additionally, the U.S. has in recent years expanded the no nexus 
requirement over piracy to include foreign nationals aboard stateless vessels and foreign 
flag vessels (with the consent of the flag State) trafficking illicit drugs on the high seas. 
The consequence of this approach is that there is no need for the U.S. to establish that 
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the drugs in question are destined for, or have any connection with, the U.S.149 This no 
nexus requirement does not transform the jurisdiction of the U.S. into a theory of 
universality for the protection of international community values; rather, jurisdiction is 
to protect the sovereignty, security and governmental functions of the U.S.  
 
In sum, the Harvard Research, in reliance on Anglo-American jurists, most notably, the 
commentary of Moore, misinterpreted the universal right of every State in international 
law to exercise jurisdiction over ‘piracy’ on the high seas - without having to evidence 
any prescriptive connection with an alleged offence - in order to protect certain of their 
vital interests, a number of which were shared by the international community, or at 
least among the maritime powers, and called it ‘universal jurisdiction’ by a different 
name. At a conceptual level, the Harvard Research conflated jurisdiction for the 
protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ with ‘international community values’. This 
misinterpretation is not merely of historical significance; it had a profound influence on 
the codification of international law by the ILC. 
 
3.6. Codification of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by the ILC  
 
The way in which the League and the Harvard Research approached the codification of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was relied upon by, and had important implications for, the 
first codification effort by the ILC at its First Session in 1949. The U.N. General 
Assembly instructed the U.N. Secretary-General to do the necessary preparatory work 
and undertake a survey of international law with a view to the selection of topics for 
codification by the ILC.150 The ILC, based on a memorandum submitted by the 
Secretary-General, identified ‘Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside 
national territory’ as one of fourteen areas of international law which it considered 
‘necessary and desirable’ for codification.151 The preparatory work by the Secretary-
General was not based on an examination of State practice; rather, it was limited to a 
review of the previous codification efforts by the League and the Harvard Research, the 
latter of which was regarded as being ‘of great value’.152 The consequence of this 
approach is that the Secretary-General assumed that the U.S. and Britain adhered to a 
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strictly territorial approach to jurisdiction and therefore extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
described as requiring ‘clarification and authoritative solution’, not least because the 
protective principle is of a ‘controversial nature’ and is ‘not free from difficulty’.153 It is 
apparent that the Secretary-General adopted the recommendation by Brierly, above, 
namely that the theory of objective territorial jurisdiction provides an alternative to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.154 In that regard, the Secretary-General suggested that the 
ILC may wish to attach importance to, and expansion of, the theory of territoriality and 
concluded that: 
    
the question of the jurisdiction of States in the matter of offences committed 
by aliens abroad is of limited compass, and it is arguable that, in any scheme 
of codification, it ought to figure merely as a subdivision of a larger topic 
such as “Obligations and Limitations of Territorial Jurisdiction”.155 
 
Given that the preparatory work by the Secretary-General was limited almost 
exclusively to a review of the codification efforts by the League and the Harvard 
Research, it should, perhaps, be of little surprise that no consideration was given to the 
widespread development of protective jurisdiction in State practice over war crimes in 
the aftermath of World War II, or to the development and applicability of the principle 
over piracy on the high seas, which was treated by the Secretary-General under an 
entirely separate topic of ‘The Regime of the High Seas’.156 
  
The Secretary-General noted, as regards the selection of topics for codification, that a 
decision would have to be made by the ILC, in the first instance, ‘whether the topics 
selected shall cover limited and isolated branches of the law or whether the work of the 
Commission at any given period shall be devoted to a wider subject’. The Secretary-
General suggested that, by way of example, the ILC would have to decide whether its 
work would ‘embrace isolated and disconnected questions such as prescription, 
jurisdiction over aliens for crimes committed abroad, piracy, and extradition’ or whether 
the policy shall be to limit work to specific aspects of one integrated subject, such as the 
law of the sea.157 The ILC ultimately decided, and perhaps in light of the remarks by the 
Secretary-General, to focus on the latter approach to codification. Accordingly, rather 
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than codify grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ILC gave priority to the 
formulation of a ‘daft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States’158 and the 
codification of other topics, most notably ‘The Regime of the High Seas’.159 
  
As regards the latter topic, the Special Rapporteur and the ILC expressly relied 
exclusively and without question on the Harvard Research in the codification of the 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas.160 However, neither the Special Rapporteur 
nor the ILC examined the development of jurisdiction over piracy in State practice; nor 
were they prepared to examine grounds of jurisdiction under custom and explain which 
of these grounds, if any, was codified by the convention inter alia in respect of piracy, 
or the interests or values that States are supposed to protect in the suppression of 
piracy.161 The only extent to which the Special Rapporteur was prepared to discuss 
jurisdiction over piracy was indirectly, stating that piracy is ‘liable to prosecution by the 
authorities of any State, even if the interests of that State were not at stake.’162 This 
statement appears to have been taken directly from the Harvard Research and there is no 
further attempt by the Special Rapporteur to analyse it, or by the ILC to debate it. It will 
be recalled from the discussion above that States do not, as a matter of international law, 
have to evidence that their interests are ‘at stake’ in the prescription of their national 
laws over piracy on the high seas; that is fundamentally different from States 
prosecuting pirates where their interests are not ‘at stake’ at all, for which there is no 
evidence in support. Had the ILC examined State practice, then it may have realised that 
jurisdiction has developed over, and was applicable to, piracy for the protection of 
shared vital State interests.  
 
The ILC, perhaps for the sake of expediency and pragmatism, and thus bypassing any 
disagreement or debate on grounds of jurisdiction, formulated a broad, discretionary and 
mutually beneficial rule, namely the right of ‘every State’ to exercise jurisdiction over 
piracy on the high seas.163 The relevant draft article produced by the ILC stated that 
‘[o]n the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
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may seize a pirate ship’.164 This wording was codified by the Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas, which was repeated, once again without question, by the 1982 U.N. 
Convention for the Law of the Sea.165 There is no evidence, based on the ILC’s records, 
to suggest that the ILC intended to pre-empt the codification of grounds of jurisdiction 
under customary international law which were, at that time, unclear, or codify any one 
particular ground of jurisdiction over piracy. Nonetheless, the priority given by the ILC 
to the codification of jurisdiction over piracy and, to that end, the reliance placed on the 
Harvard Research, has led to the widespread suggestion that the ILC codified a ground 
of universal jurisdiction that has been developing in customary international law for the 
past 500 hundred years.166  
 
The ILC also considered, at its First Session, whether, in the light of widespread 
practice in the aftermath of World War II, the ‘laws of war’ and the punishment of war 
crimes should be selected as a topic for codification. The majority of the ILC declared 
itself opposed to the study of this topic at that time.167 The reason for this decision was 
that the codification of this topic, at the outset of the work by the ILC, might be 
interpreted by public opinion ‘as showing lack of confidence in the efficiency of the 
means at the disposal of the United Nations for maintaining peace’.168 Thus, the ILC 
was not willing to study extraterritorial jurisdiction over war crimes and other crimes 
under international law, including in the formulation by the ILC of ‘principles 
recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the 
Tribunal’.169 The decision by the ILC not to codify jurisdiction over war crimes has led 
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to the widespread suggestion by courts and in legal scholarship that a theory of 
universal jurisdiction expanded over piracy to include war crimes and other crimes 
under international law in order to protect international community values.170  
 
As has already been explained in depth by the present author elsewhere, by analysing a 
wide range of primary sources, the jurisdiction that developed out of the prosecution of 
thousands of alleged war criminals in Europe and the Far East, and the creation of 
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, is capable of an alternative 
interpretation. This jurisdiction appears to have been based on the protective principle, 
which developed out of the need by the ‘Allies’, each of whom had been injured by 
violations of the laws and customs of war, to protect certain of their vital interests by 
persons belonging to the ‘enemy’.171 Such interests appear to be shared by the 
international community and include, for example, the State’s sovereignty, political 
independence, security, nationals and armed forces. To that end, jurisdiction was even 
exercised by some of the Allies collectively, over war crimes committed against the 
nationals of other Allied nations and a crime against peace in one and the same war, in 
order to protect each other’s vital interests from a ‘common enemy’.172  
 
3.7. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has shed important light on the modern historical development of 
protective jurisdiction, and examined the public and private efforts made to codify this 
jurisdiction in the first half of the twentieth century. As has been explained, protective 
jurisdiction has developed over domestic and international crimes for the protection of 
certain shared vital State interests. These interests, which are no less vital today, 
included the State’s ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security, sovereignty, political 
independence, territorial integrity, Head of State and public officials, currency and 
official documents, overseas trade routes and shipping and armed forces. 
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Grounds of jurisdiction and the way which they have developed in State practice, 
including protective jurisdiction, have traditionally been little understood and, more 
often than not, subject to considerable confusion. This is best illustrated, perhaps, by the 
landmark case of Lotus before the PCIJ. It will be recalled that a small number of States 
expanded protective jurisdiction to include, without any apparent limitation, offences 
committed abroad that were deemed harmful to their own nationals. The PCIJ in that 
case affirmed the validity in international law of ‘principles’ of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, though it did not examine or explain what these ‘principles’ were, at that 
time, or distinguish protective jurisdiction from jurisdiction over relatively minor 
offences committed abroad against the State’s nationals under the more controversial 
‘passive personality’ principle.173 The PCIJ and the Dissenting Opinions in that case 
exhibit, at best, a limited and, at worst, confused understanding of grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and protective jurisdiction in particular. The PCIJ thus 
missed an important opportunity to provide some important clarification on grounds of 
jurisdiction under customary international law. This is not merely of historical 
significance. The Lotus case was the only opportunity for an international court to 
pronounce on grounds of jurisdiction in the twentieth century and provide some 
authoritative guidance to States. It is worth noting, by way of aside, that this has led, in 
part, to the relationship between protective jurisdiction and the theories of passive 
personality and universal jurisdiction to become confused in recent years by courts and 
in legal scholarship.174 
 
The need for the clarification and systematisation of extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
customary international law through a process of codification was recognised by the 
League of Nations. However, the League limited itself to the selection of subjects for 
codification by means of an international convention. This is important in view of the 
report by Brierly, acting as Rapporteur. The opinion of Brierly, which was typical of 
that held by Anglo-American jurists at that time, regarded the exercise of protective 
jurisdiction over crimes occurring in the territory of States as contrary to international 
law because it constituted a violation of their sovereignty and internal affairs. Anglo-
American jurists thus favoured an absolute territorial approach to jurisdiction in 
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international law, and they assumed that the U.S. and Britain strictly adhered to this 
approach and opposed any exceptions to it. As has been explained, this view was 
unfounded and incorrect. Nonetheless, the League decided that codification of this 
topic, ‘although desirable, would encounter grave political and other obstacles’ and 
other subjects were given priority.175   
 
The report by Brierly was based exclusively on secondary sources by Anglo-American 
commentators and, although it is not expressly acknowledged as such, the commentary 
of Moore. Moore was one of the most influential Anglo-American jurists in the early 
twentieth century and his academic commentary was later repeated by Moore in his 
judicial capacity serving on the PCIJ in the Lotus case. As has been shown, the 
Dissenting Opinion of Moore in that case conflated protective jurisdiction stricto sensu 
with the more controversial theory of passive personality jurisdiction and treated them 
as one and the same, in order to dismiss the former’s validity. In a further effort to 
dismiss the validity of protective jurisdiction, Moore made a distinction between 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, which had undeniably 
developed in the practice of Britain and the U.S., from extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
general international law over crimes occurring in another State’s territorial sovereignty. 
In the case of the former, Moore elaborated an entirely new theory of ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ over a crime of ‘piracy by the law of nations’.176 To that end, Moore 
suggested that jurisdiction over piracy, as the only exception to territoriality, is 
restricted to the high seas - outside the exclusive sovereignty of any State - and is 
exercised ‘in the interest of all’.177 More fundamentally, Moore misinterpreted the 
universal and equal right under international law of all independent States to exercise 
jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas in order to protect certain of their vital 
interests, a number of which are shared by the international community, most notably 
the State’s sovereignty and independence and the sovereign right to navigate the high 
seas and overseas trade routes and colonial trade and shipping, with a theory of 
universal jurisdiction. The ‘interest of all’ alluded to by Moore was, at best, incidental 
to the protection of these vital interests. This may explain the reason why Moore was 
not able to explain the international community values that States did, or were supposed 
to, protect in exercising ‘universal jurisdiction’ over piracy. It is worth noting, by way 
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of aside, that the PCIJ and none of the other Dissenting Opinions in the Lotus case 
recognised a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’ over piracy.  
 
The opinion of Moore had a profound influence on the efforts made by the Harvard 
Research and the ILC to codify protective jurisdiction. The Harvard Research adopted 
the same approach to codification as the League and limited itself to the adoption of a 
draft international convention. Thus, the Harvard Research defined protective 
jurisdiction in fairly narrow terms, namely the protection of the State’s security, 
territorial integrity and political independence. The other reason for doing so was to 
overcome the supposed divergence between the two groups of States identified by 
Brierly and reduce potential resistance to the adoption of such a convention, given that 
few States would object to the right to protect such interests. On the other hand, the 
Harvard Research dealt with jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas under a wholly 
separate draft article and went one step further than did Brierly by codifying, lex 
ferenda, the theory of ‘universality’ over a crime of piracy under international law 
elaborated by Moore.178 As has been explained, the Harvard Research was not able to 
cite a single example of State practice in support of universal jurisdiction over piracy 
and the way in which this theory was rationalised did not reflect the way in which 
jurisdiction has developed over piracy.  
 
The way in which the League and the Harvard Research approached codification 
influenced the League’s successor, the ILC, at its First Session. The ILC ultimately 
decided to adopt a fragmented approach to codification and gave priority to other topics, 
one of which was jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas under the ‘The Regime of the 
High Seas’.179 In the codification of this latter topic, the ILC relied exclusively and 
without question on the Harvard Research. At the same time, the ILC did not examine 
grounds of jurisdiction or specify which of these grounds, if any, it intended to codify. 
Nor did the ILC explain what vital State interests or international community values 
States were supposed to protect. It would have been odd, perhaps, for the ILC to codify 
one particular ground of extraterritorial jurisdiction given that the grounds of 
jurisdiction which existed under custom, at that time, was unclear and had not yet been 
examined by the ILC. The majority of the ILC also declared, at its First Session, 
opposed to the study of the ‘laws of war’ at that time.  
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The upshot of all this is that grounds of jurisdiction under customary international law 
and protective jurisdiction in particular have not been clarified and codified by the 
League and the ILC, let alone debated and the views of governments exchanged. Nor 
has the development and applicability of protective jurisdiction over piracy and war 
crimes been examined by the ILC. The absence of an instrument codifying jurisdiction 
has resulted in protective jurisdiction being perceived, in the words of the U.N. 
Secretary-General, above, as a topic of ‘controversial nature’ and in need of 
‘clarification’ and ‘authoritative solution’.180  
 
The first codification effort by the ILC raises two broader implications of great 
importance for the present study. The first relates to the fragmented approach to 
codification. The decision by the ILC to prioritise the codification of jurisdiction 
contained in the special legal regime governing piracy on the high seas had the effect, 
perhaps inadvertently, of formally entrenching the jurisdictional dichotomy over crimes 
under domestic and international law first developed by Moore and subsequently 
codified lex ferenda by the Harvard Research. That is, extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
an international crime of piracy on the high seas is, to borrow the words of the 
Secretary-General, above, ‘isolated and disconnected’ to the question of protective 
jurisdiction over domestic crimes.181 Thus, protective jurisdiction tends to be not only 
little understood but interpreted in narrow terms (confined to domestic crimes) by courts 
and in legal scholarship.182 
 
Second, the priority given by the ILC to the codification of jurisdiction over piracy and, 
to that end, the reliance placed on the Harvard Research has given rise to a collective 
belief. This belief, to which reference has already been made in chapter one, has 
developed out of haphazard analyses of State practice and the overreliance on tentative, 
secondary sources of evidence of customary international law. It posits that universal 
jurisdiction has for the past 500 years developed over an international crime of piracy as 
a customary rule in order to protect international community values and that this theory 
of jurisdiction was codified by the ILC. Moreover, according to this belief, the 
protection of such values based on universal jurisdiction expanded in the aftermath of 
World War II from piracy to encompass war crimes and other crimes under 
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international law.  
 
Contrary to this collective belief, this chapter has suggested that the supposed 
development of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction over piracy and war crimes 
simply does not provide for an adequate explanation of State practice. The collective 
belief inter alia provides a useful example of the reason why the ILC decided in 2012 to 
include in its programme of work the formation and sources of evidence of customary 
international law.183 A more persuasive theory underlying such practice is that 
jurisdiction developed over these crimes for the protection of certain shared vital State 
interests. Notwithstanding the confusion surrounding the origins of universal 
jurisdiction, this ground of jurisdiction is widely recognised by States today and its 
legality is beyond question. That said, the finding by the present chapter has important 
implications for the way in which the concept of universal jurisdiction is currently 
understood and the type of international community values that may be protected by 
such jurisdiction. This is of great importance for the following reason: according to the 
collective belief inter alia, regardless of the way in which jurisdiction has traditionally 
developed over piracy and war crimes, since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, more than sixty treaties, including counter-terrorism treaties, that utilise 
the obligation to extradite or prosecute have impliedly codified a ground of universal 
jurisdiction for the protection of international community values.184  
 
It will be recalled from chapter one that the present study has suggested that the 
prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties 
should not automatically be interpreted as a ground of universal jurisdiction; rather, this 
prescriptive jurisdiction is equally capable of being interpreted as a form of protective 
jurisdiction, albeit one deriving from treaty rather than custom, for the protection of 
certain vital interests shared by the States parties. The comments and statements made 
during the debate on universal jurisdiction by the U.N. General Assembly, which has 
been on-going since 2009, shows that the relationship between universal jurisdiction 
and extradite or prosecute, and the international community values that may be 
protected by universal jurisdiction, are far from clear and subject to considerable 
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confusion.185 Thus, there is a need to examine the relationship between the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute and universal jurisdiction and, for the purpose of conceptual 
clarity among grounds of jurisdiction, consider the extent to which international 
community values may be protected by extradite or prosecute and make a fundamental 
distinction between such values and ‘shared vital State interests’. This distinction is 
discussed in depth in chapter five. 
  
The confusion that has traditionally attended grounds of jurisdiction under custom and 
the need for greater clarification would suggest that the codification of protective 
jurisdiction is not only timely but also necessary and desirable more than ever before. 
This has recently been recognised by the ILC in the inclusion of the topic of 
‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work and is discussed in 
chapter six.186 It is useful first, in chapter four, to undertake empirical research into 
contemporary State practice in order to determine whether, and, if so, to what extent, 
protective jurisdiction has been used in response to international terrorism.  
 
Theories relating to grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction in contemporary customary 
international law are little understood and often subject to confusion, and protective 
jurisdiction is no exception. One of the reasons accounting for this is that the protective 
principle, as with other grounds of jurisdiction, has yet to be codified. The issue of 
whether it is possible to define the protective principle and, if so, the form that this 
ought to take, has remained contested in legal scholarship since the efforts were made to 
codify extraterritorial jurisdiction by the League of Nations.187 There is thus a lack of 
clarity and certainty on the definition of protective jurisdiction, but also its scope and 
application, in contemporary international law.  
 
                                                        
185 Letter dated 29 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to 
the U.N. addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.A/63/237/Rev.1 (23 July 2009); U.N. 
General Assembly, Sixty-third session, U.N. Doc.A/63/PV.105 (14 September 2009); A/RES/64/117 (16 
December 2009); U.N. Doc.A/65/181 (2010), paras.15, 21-22; Sixth Committee, U.N. 
Doc.A/C.6/64/SR.12 (20 October 2009), paras.19, 48, 59, 66, 71, 82, 90, 95, 96; ibid., U.N. 
Doc.A/C.6/64/SR.13 (21 October 2009), paras.1, 3-4, 13, 18, 23; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.10 (13 
October 2010), paras.56, 57, 71, 78; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.11 (13 October 2010), paras.10, 14, 17, 
25, 27, 40, 49; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.10 (3 November 2010), para.60); ibid., U.N. Doc. 
A/C.6/65/SR.12 (15 October 2010), paras.9, 13-14, 19, 24, 27-29, 30, 34; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/66/SR.12 
(12 October 2011), paras.4, 7, 17-18, 27, 34, 47, 53, 59, 62, 72-73; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/66/SR.13 (30 
November 2011), paras.5, 11, 13, 15-19, 21, 24, 28, 39, 41, 43, 48, 52, 58, 61; ibid., U.N. 
Doc.A/C.6/66/SR.26 (7 December 2011), paras.10, 18, 24, 42, 64; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/66/SR.27 (8 
December 2011), paras.41, 64, 81).  
186 U.N. Doc.A/61/10 (2006), Chapter XIII, paras.257, 260. 
187 Chapter three.  
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Chapter Four 
 
‘Protective Jurisdiction in State Practice for Combating International Terrorism: 
An Empirical Analysis’ 
  
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
The threat of international terrorism, in particular following the terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001 - whereby four aircraft on internal flights were seized by foreign 
nationals, two of which were crashed into the World Trade Centre in New York and 
another into the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., - has precipitated an unprecedented 
legislative response by States. This response has been described variously in legal 
scholarship as ‘legislative wildfire’,1 ‘legislative flurry’2 and even a ‘legislative 
overreaction’.3 Nonetheless, the enactment by States of domestic laws for combatting 
the threat has largely been encouraged, if not demanded, by the equally unprecedented 
‘rush to law’ by the U.N. Security Council in the form of resolution 1373, which was 
adopted unanimously by the Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in the 
immediate aftermath of 9-11.4 Resolution 1373 requires all States to take a number of 
wide-ranging steps necessary to combat international terrorism; these include, for 
example, the adoption of national laws criminalising ‘terrorist acts’; to ‘prevent and 
suppress terrorist acts’, including by fully implementing international treaties relating to 
acts of terrorism; and to ‘[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, 
planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in the supporting of terrorist 
acts is brought to justice’, including where such acts occur abroad.5 The resolution also 
makes provision for the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), whose 
duties include the monitoring of compliance with the resolution’s provisions and to 
                                                        
1 Zelman, J.D. (2001). ‘Recent Developments in International Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislations–Part 
One: An Overview’. 11 Transnat’lL.&Pol’y 184. 
2 Lynch, A. ‘The Tenacity of Bad Law: Why Anti-Terrorism Laws Proliferate and Persist’. Paper 
presented at Workshop 6–The rule of law in an age of terrorism. VIIIth World Congress of International 
Association of Constitutional Law, Mexico, 6-10 December 2010. 
3 Samuel, K.L.H. & White, N.D. & De Friás, A.M.S. (eds.) (2012). ‘Report of Key Findings and 
Recommendations on the Rule of Law and Counter-Terrorism’. Multi-National Counter-Terrorism Expert 
Network, at p.37. 
4 S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). See also Barker, J.C. (2007). ‘The Politics of International Law-
Making: Constructing Security in Response to Global Terrorism’. 3 J.Int’lL.&Int’lRel. 5; Warbrick, C. & 
McGoldrick, D. & Katselli, E. & Shah, S. (2003). ‘September 11 and the UK Response’. 52 ICLQ 245. 
5 S/RES/1373, ibid., preambular para.7 & operative paras.1, 2(b), 2(e), 3(c)-(e).  
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which States are to report periodically the actions that they have taken to combat 
international terrorism.6  
  
The legislative response has comprised a process of utilising existing general laws, 
which are not limited to ‘terrorism’, and the updating of national legal frameworks by 
providing for new offences and/or the introduction of amendments to existing penal 
codes, including special ‘terrorism’ offences. This constitutes a potentially substantial 
and widespread body of State practice. Yet it has tended to be overshadowed in legal 
scholarship by the Security Council’s rush to law and therefore has, to date, been given 
little consideration.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine this legislative response in order to provide an 
original, empirical analysis of protective jurisdiction in contemporary State practice; in 
particular, it aims to assess whether, and, if so, to what extent, this jurisdiction has been 
used for combatting the threat of international terrorism. It does so by drawing upon a 
wide range of primary sources.7 A comprehensive study of State practice, it has to be 
stressed from the outset, is of the scale that would undoubtedly require work to be 
undertaken by the International Law Commission (ILC). Incidentally, this has recently 
been recommended by the ILC’s Secretariat and endorsed by the ILC in the inclusion of 
the topic of ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work.8 The time 
may therefore be ripe, more than ever before, to shed new and important light on 
protective jurisdiction by examining whether, and, if so, to what extent, States use the 
principle, and also the type of offences which have been included under its ambit.  
   
There are two further reasons for providing empirical research into State practice. The 
first of these, as has already been explained in chapters one and three, is that there is no 
contemporary study, either public or private, that has examined protective jurisdiction in 
State practice.9 The principle is also little understood and tends either to be overlooked 
or defined in overly-narrow terms by courts and in legal scholarship.10 Some 
                                                        
6 Ibid., para.6. 
7 Infra at pp.10-12. 
8 U.N. Doc.A/61/10 (2006), Chapter XIII, paras.257, 260; ibid., ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’, Annex E. 
9 Cf. infra n 31.  
10 E.g., Akande, D., ‘“The Protective Principle”; “The Active Nationality Principle”; “The Passive 
Personality Principle”; “The Territoriality Principle”’, in Cassese, A. et al. (eds.) (2009). ‘Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice’. Oxford: OUP, at p.474.  
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commentators have gone as far as to question its validity in international law.11 The use 
of protective jurisdiction for combating international terrorism has also been given 
insufficient attention in legal scholarship and requires further examination. The latter 
point is best exemplified, perhaps, by the commentary of Simma and Müller, who have 
suggested that: 
  
[i]n the post-2001 atmosphere where ‘security’ appears to have become to some a 
catch-all concept, a sweeping application of the protective principle may present 
itself as highly opportune, but this is far from being a commonly accepted 
position.12  
  
The distinguished authors provide no empirical evidence in support of this finding.  
 
Secondly, grounds of jurisdiction have, since the Harvard Research, been confused, and 
there appears to be some uncertainty as to which of these grounds is the most 
appropriate for combatting international terrorism. It has been suggested by some courts 
and commentators that international terrorism is, or should be, transformed into a crime 
under international law and, in turn, subject to universal jurisdiction.13 The idea that 
‘terrorism’ is, or may be, treated as an international crime, however, does not appear to 
have been accepted by the vast majority of States. The comments and observations 
submitted by States to the debate on universal jurisdiction by the U.N. General 
Assembly shows that there is a lack of agreement as to what crimes are subject to 
universal jurisdiction, and the reasons why, and there is certainly insufficient agreement 
that acts of terrorism are, or should be, subject to universal jurisdiction.14 In any case, as 
has been explained by the present author elsewhere, the treatment of conduct as criminal 
                                                        
11 Kontorovich, E. (2008). ‘The Inefficiency of Universal Jurisdiction’. 1 U.Ill.L.Rev. 390, at p.394.  
12 Simma, B. & Müller, A.T., ‘Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction’, in Crawford, J. & Koskenniemi, M. 
(2012). ‘The Cambridge Companion to International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.144. 
13 E.g., Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law, 
Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/1, 16 February 2011, 
paras.83, 84, 86, 91 & n 134; Cassese, A. (2001). ‘Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal 
Categories of International Law’. 12 EJIL 993, at p.994; Samuel et al., supra n 3, at p.42; Saul, B. (2006). 
‘Defining Terrorism in International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at pp.7, 262, 269; Saul, B., ‘Criminality and 
Terrorism’, in De Friás, A.M.S. & Samuel, K.L.H. & White, N.D. (eds.) (2012). ‘Counter-Terrorism 
International Law and Practice’. Oxford: OUP, at p.136.   
14 U.N. Doc.A/65/181 (2010); U.N. Doc.A/66/93 (2011). Cf. Sixth Committee, ‘Observations by Belgium 
on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction’ (2010), para.16; ibid., ‘The scope 
and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction: information provided by Spain’ (2011), para.2. 
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under international law does not mean that such conduct is ipso facto subject to 
universal jurisdiction.15  
 
On the other hand, it has been suggested by a number of States and courts, as well as in 
legal scholarship, that the obligation to extradite or prosecute, a principle contained in 
the provisions of more than 60 treaties, including treaties relating to international 
terrorism, impliedly codifies or embodies a theory of universal jurisdiction and requires 
States parties to the relevant treaties to make provision in their national laws for 
universal jurisdiction over treaty crimes.16 As will be explained below, and in greater 
depth in chapter five, the use of extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties, the 
provision for which in national laws has also been made mandatory by the Security 
Council, starting with resolution 1373, should not automatically be interpreted as 
codifying a theory of universal jurisdiction. Rather, the principle, and the prescriptive 
jurisdiction arising out of it, is capable of being interpreted as a mutually beneficial 
means by which States whose vital interests are threatened by acts of terrorism are able 
to obtain the custody of the accused, or, failing extradition, have the accused prosecuted 
on their behalf.  
  
The chapter concludes that, notwithstanding the different and divergent ways in which 
‘terrorism’ and other substantive crimes are defined in national laws, protective 
jurisdiction not only appears to be widely used in State practice but has been at the heart 
of legislative response to, and is the principal means by which States combat, the threat 
of international terrorism. This practice, which may be attributable, at least in part, to 
resolution 1373, may be sufficiently uniform and widespread so as to support the 
finding that such jurisdiction is a rule of customary international law and to permit 
codification. The Security Council has obliged States to make provision for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the implementation of resolution 1373 but has not defined 
‘terrorism’ and has remained silent on grounds of jurisdiction. Thus, the codification of 
protective jurisdiction and the creation of a clearer and more coherent jurisdictional 
                                                        
15 Garrod, M. (2012). ‘The Development of Protective Principle Jurisdiction over War Crimes and the 
Hollow Concept of Universality’. 12 ICLR 763. 
16 E.g., U.N. Doc.A/65/181, paras.21-22; U.N. Doc.A/66/93 (2011), paras.121-128; U.S. v Layton, 509 
F.Supp.212 (N.D.Cal., 1981), at pp.221-224; U.S. v Yunis, 924 F.2d1086 (D.C. Cir., 1991), at p.1092; 
U.S. v Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp.2d.189 (S.D.N.Y., 13 March 2000), at pp.215-221; Mexico, Supreme Court, 
Cavallo Case, No.14012002, 10 June 2003; Council of the European Union, The AU-EU Expert Report 
on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, Doc. 8672/1/09, REV 1 (16 April 2009), para.11; ALI, 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (Third), Washington, D.C. (1987), para.404. 
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framework, in order to guide States and ensure sufficient uniformity and 
complementarity in national laws and, to that end, to enhance inter-State cooperation, 
may be more necessary and desirable than ever before.  
 
The chapter begins, in part two, by providing an overview of existing studies on 
protective jurisdiction, in order to place the present chapter in context and to illustrate 
its value and importance. Thereafter, in part three, the chapter explains the methodology 
used to collect primary sources of data, namely national laws, and its limitations, as well 
as the way in which the data are interpreted. Part four presents the key findings of a 
detailed empirical analysis of national laws and lists the number of States that have 
made provision for protective jurisdiction. It also makes an effort to systematise 
offences, where they appear to be of a similar subject-matter, over which the principle 
has been used in national laws, with the aim of identifying broader trends in State 
practice. The chapter then examines, in part five, the practice of the Security Council in 
response to international terrorism, in particular, its adoption of resolution 1373. As will 
be explained, this resolution requires States to make provision in their national laws for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to combat the threat of international terrorism and 
may be attributable, at least in part, to the trend in State practice. The chapter then 
discusses, in part six, the role of the CTC, which is, in effect, a committee of the whole 
of the Security Council, and the prioritisation of the obligation to extradite or prosecute 
in the national implementation of resolution 1373.  
 
4.2. Existing Studies of Protective Jurisdiction 
 
In order to place the present work in context, and to illustrate its value and importance, 
it is useful to consider existing studies of protective jurisdiction. Since the publication 
by the Harvard Research in 1935 of a ‘Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to 
Crime’, which, it will be recalled, found a ‘high degree of uniformity’ and ‘almost 
universal approval’ of the protective principle in municipal laws, there has not been a 
comprehensive study of this jurisdiction in State practice.17 Although the Harvard 
Research has had a profound influence on the understanding of theories relating to 
grounds of jurisdiction by States and courts, as well as in legal scholarship, and 
continues to be cited as an authoritative source, nonetheless, it is largely, if not wholly, 
                                                        
17 Research in International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 
‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime’, 29 AJIL (Spec. Supp.) 435 (1935) (Harvard Research).    
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out of date. The Harvard Research is also subject to an important shortcoming in that it 
appears to have misinterpreted jurisdiction for the protection of ‘shared vital State 
interests’ as a theory of universal jurisdiction for the protection of ‘international 
community values’.18  
  
4.2.1. Distinguishing between the ‘Protective’ and ‘Effects’ Principles of 
Jurisdiction 
  
The publication in 1987 of the ‘Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States’ by the American Law Institute (ALI), the successor of the Harvard 
Research, defined protective jurisdiction as permitting a State to ‘safeguard a limited 
class of state interests’, namely offences ‘directed against the security of the state or 
other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions’.19 The range of 
offences which the Restatement regarded as capable of falling within the ambit of this 
jurisdiction include ‘espionage, counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, 
falsification of official documents, as well as perjury before consular officials, and 
conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws.’20 Although the Restatement has 
been described as ‘the most comprehensive, contemporary statement of international 
law’, and that its ‘views carry considerable weight with Congress and the courts’,21 the 
definition of protective jurisdiction by the Restatement is based on the perspective of 
U.S. practice. That said, it does not reflect accurately, and is even at variance, with U.S. 
practice; nor does it represent an accurate reflection of international law.22  
 
Perhaps more fundamentally, the drafters of the Restatement misunderstood protective 
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Restatement suggested that the so-called ‘effects’ principle 
permits a State to prescribe its domestic law over conduct abroad that ‘is intended to 
have substantial effects within its territory’.23 This blurs the distinction between the 
effects and protective principles and makes the former - which is an expansion of the 
theory of territorial jurisdiction - into a principle of extraterritorial jurisdiction.24 The 
                                                        
18 Chapter three. 
19 Third Restatement, supra n 16, para.402, Comment (f); also ibid., para.403(3).  
20 Ibid.  
21 Doyle, C., (2012). ‘Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, Congressional Research 
Service, at p.12. 
22 See also Yousef, 327 F.3d56 (2nd Cir., 2003), at pp.68-69. 
23 Third Restatement, supra n 16, para.402(1) (italic added).  
24 Cameron, I. (1994). ‘The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction’. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, at p.62; Hixson, K. (1988). ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Third Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States’. 12 FordhamInt’lL.J. 127. 
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Restatement also gave a prominent position to the effects principle and asserted that 
protective jurisdiction is a ‘special application’ of the effects principle, which has ‘been 
treated as an independent basis of jurisdiction’, thus subsuming the former under the 
latter.25 Notably, the Restatement provided no evidence to support this assertion. This 
was pointed out by Jennings in his analysis of the ALI’s drafting of the Restatement 
(Second) in 1965, which first elaborated the ‘effects’ principle.26 Jennings argued that 
there is no authority in international law that has been cited by the Restatement to 
support the validity of the effects principle, which covers ‘the whole ground of the so-
called protective principle to which many States attach importance’.27 According to 
Jennings, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) had argued in support of the effects 
principle: 
 
the inadvisability of extending the protective principle to cover the anti-trust cases, 
on the ground that the protective principle might then equally be extended in other 
instances, possibly objectionable to United States’ interests, in which a state might 
like to enforce, whenever it could catch a defendant …  
 
Jennings, in reply to this argument, rightly pointed out that the ‘Reporters fail to notice 
that these objections must inescapably apply equally to a territorial principle so inflated 
to cover these cases.’28 Given that the effects principle is supposed to be based on the 
principle of objective territoriality and therefore is an ‘aspect of jurisdiction based on 
territoriality’, as was pointed out by the commentary of the Restatement,29 then the 
reasoning of the ALI, if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean that the protective 
principle is also an aspect of territoriality. Importantly, the Restatement has had a 
profound influence on the view of U.S. courts, legal scholarship and even the ILC, all of 
which have interpreted protective jurisdiction in narrow terms, confused the protective 
and effects principles and mistakenly assumed that protective jurisdiction is restricted to 
offences ‘directed’ at or intended to have an ‘effect’ within the prescribing State’s 
territory.30  
                                                        
25 Third Restatement, supra n 16, para.402, Comment (f). 
26 ALI, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. Washington, D.C. (1965), para.34. 
See also Mann, F.A. (1964). ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’. 111 Recueil des Cours 1, 
at p.42. 
27 Jennings, R.Y. (1962). ‘The Limits of State Jurisdiction’. 32 NoTIR 209, at p.222. 
28 Ibid., at p.223. 
29 Third Restatement, supra n 16, para.402, Comment (d); also Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v 
Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3, at p.73 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.). 
30 E.g., U.S. v Cadena, 585 F.2d1252 (5th Cir., 1978), at p.1258; U.S. v Keller, 451 F.Supp.631 (DPR, 
1978), at p.635; U.S. v May May, 470 F.Supp.384 (S.D. Texas, 1979); U.S. v Arra, 630 F.2d.836 (1st Cir., 
1980); U.S. v Baker, 609 F.2d134 (5th Cir., 1980), at p.139; U.S. v Egan, 501 F.Supp.1252 (S.D.N.Y., 
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A more recent study of protective jurisdiction in State practice was undertaken in 2009 
by the ‘Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, under the auspices of the 
International Bar Association (IBA).31 The State practice surveyed by the Task Force 
comprised the legislative and judicial practice of 27 States, although the Task Force did 
not explain the methodology used and the reason for focusing on the States selected. 
The Task Force found that 22 of the 27 States have enacted legislation based on the 
protective principle. According to the Task Force, over half of these States permit 
protective jurisdiction over any crime deemed to have been committed ‘against a state’s 
general, fundamental or economic interests’, while over one third of them permit 
protective jurisdiction ‘where the crime involves the state’s government, public 
authorities, military or agents abroad.’ The other crimes covered by national legislation 
under the protective principle, according to the Task Force, include ‘crimes involving 
national security, acts of war and arms offences’; ‘counterfeiting the state’s currency or 
seal and treason and/or interference with a state’s democratic rule, constitution or 
independence’; ‘arms control laws’; and ‘perjury before consuls’. This survey of State 
practice provides important insight into some of the offences which have been included 
under the ambit of protective jurisdiction, although it is far from being comprehensive. 
As for the remaining five States of the sample examined by the Task Force, the States 
which have not made use of protective jurisdiction in their national laws, according to 
the Task Force, are India, New Zealand and the U.K., while its use by South Africa and 
Tajikistan, suggested the Task Force, was unknown. As will be shown below, however, 
all of these States have, in fact, and to varying degrees, used protective jurisdiction, 
particularly in response to the threat of international terrorism.     
 
The present chapter aims to contribute to these existing studies by providing empirical 
research into State practice. Before presenting the findings of the number of States that 
have made provision for protective jurisdiction and the type of offences that have been 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1980); U.S. v Mann, 615 F.2d668 (5th Cir., 1980), at p.671; U.S. v Ricardo, 619 F.2d1124 (5th Cir., 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063, 101 S.Ct. 789, 66 L.Ed.2d 607; U.S. v Newball, 524 F.Supp.715 
(E.D.N.Y., 1981), at p.720; U.S. v Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d161 (3rd Cir., 1986), at pp.168-169; U.S. v 
Peterson, 812 F.2d486 (9th Cir., 1987); U.S. v Perlaza, 439 F.3d1149 (9th Cir., 2006), at p.1162; U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/596 (2008), at p.13; Kontorovich, E. (2004). ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Piracy 
Analogy’. 45 HarvardInt’lL.J. 183, at pp.189-190; Ryngaert, C. (2008).’ Jurisdiction in International 
Law’. Oxford: OUP, at p.96. 
31 IBA, Legal Practice Division, ‘Report of the Task Force on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (28 September 
2008), at pp.149-150. 
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included under its ambit, it is useful first to explain the methodology used for the 
collection of data and its principal limitations. 
  
4.3. Research Methodology 
 
The State practice examined by the present chapter is in the form of national legislation 
adopted by States which makes provision for jurisdiction under the protective principle 
and is used in response to international terrorism. The focus on national laws, as has 
already been explained in chapter one, is consistent with a legal positivist approach to 
international law-making, which aims to identify the law ‘as it is’ and the evolution of 
customary international law by placing weight on State practice. In addition to national 
laws, there is a relatively small, albeit important, corpus of domestic court decisions 
evidencing the use of protective jurisdiction for combating international terrorism, both 
in a criminal law context and for violations of the laws of war.32 
   
It has traditionally proven methodologically difficult to access national laws and those 
relating to ‘terrorism’ have been no exception, especially in a community of nearly 200 
States. The present work has sought to overcome this hurdle by utilising a number of 
primary sources. The first of these is the U.N. Legislative Series, entitled ‘National 
Laws and Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism’.33 
The Legislative Series is a compendium of national laws and reports submitted by 
States to the U.N. Secretary-General ‘relating to the prevention and suppression of 
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.’34 The submissions made by States inter 
                                                        
32 E.g., Bin Laden, supra n 16; U.S. v Ghailani, S10 98 Crim.1023 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y., 12 July 
2010)(Indictment); U.S. v Ghailani, 761 F.Supp.2d167 (S.D.N.Y., 21 January 2011); U.S. v Babar 
Ahmad, (D.Conn., 2004)(Indictment); U.S. v Mustafa Kamel Mustafa et al., S2 04 Cr.356 (JFK) 
(S.D.N.Y., 2006)(Indictment); U.S. v Khalid Sheikh Mohammed et al. (S14) 93 Cr.(KTD) (S.D.N.Y., 14 
December 2009)(Indictment); U.S. v Ahmed Abu Khatallah, 14-cr-00141 (D.D.C., 26 June 
2014)(Indictment); Military Order No.1 on the ‘Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism’, issued by the U.S. President on 13 November 2001; U.S. Office of 
Military Commissions, MC Form 458, Charge Sheet (18 June 2008) [Ghailani]; U.S. Office of Military 
Commissions, MC Form 458, Charge Sheet (31 May 2011) [KSM5]; U.S. Office of Military 
Commissions, MC Form 458, Charge Sheet (15 September 2011) [Al-Nassir]; U.S. Office of Military 
Commissions, MC Form 458, Charge Sheet (28 May 2008) [Binyam Ahmed Mohamed]. See further 
National Security Division of the Justice Department, ‘Introduction to National Security Division 
Statistics on unsealed International Terrorism and Terrorism-Related Convictions, available online: 
 www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/doj032610-stats.pdf; New York University, Center on Law and Security, 
‘Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2010’, 2010. 
33 U.N. Legislative Series, ‘National Laws and Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of 
International Terrorism’. Part I. New York: U.N. (2002); U.N. Legislative Series, ‘National Laws and 
Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism’. Part II. New York: U.N. 
(2005). 
34 Legislative Series (2002), ibid., at p.vi. 
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alia consist of specific legislation implementing international and regional counter-
terrorism conventions, as well as other national laws which are regarded as being 
relevant to the topic, and are prepared by the U.N. Codification Division of the Office of 
Legal Affairs, pursuant to paragraph 10(b) of the ‘Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism’, which is annexed to U.N. General Assembly resolution 49/60 
of 9 December 1994.35 The purpose of compiling these national laws and reports is to 
‘provide resource material and thereby contribute to enhancing international 
cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.’36 The Legislative Series, as has been 
pointed out by the ILC, is also one of the ways of evidencing customary international 
law.37  
  
The Legislative Series, according to the Secretary-General, should be read in 
conjunction with the annual reports produced by the Secretary-General on ‘Measures to 
eliminate international terrorism’, prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
50/53 of 11 December 1995, which provide a summary of the measures taken by States 
to address international terrorism;38 and the mandatory national reports submitted 
periodically by States to the CTC, pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373, which 
detail the measures taken by States to implement resolution 1373 in their national 
laws.39 The national reports submitted to the CTC detail existing national laws enacted 
prior to the adoption of resolution 1373, as well as legislative reform being carried out 
and that which is being planned, in order to implement resolution 1373. These reports 
provide a fairly comprehensive snapshot of national laws and practice regarded by 
States as being relevant to combatting the threat of international terrorism; they also 
exhibit official statements and attitudes and are indicative of opinio juris. The present 
chapter accordingly utilises both of these additional resources.  
 
The chapter also utilises the U.N. ‘Terrorism Legislation Database’, which is a 
compilation of national legal resources for combating acts of terrorism and is prepared 
                                                        
35 Ibid.   
36 Ibid.   
37 ILCYB, 1950, vol.II, paras.24-94. 
38 Legislative Series (2005), supra n 33, at p.vii. Annual reports are available online:  
www.un.org/terrorism/sg-reports.shtml.  
39 S/RES/1373, supra n 4, para.6. National reports are available online:  
www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/countryreports.html.  
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by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).40 The chapter draws upon the 
mandatory national reports submitted by States to a Committee established by the 
Security Council, pursuant to resolution 1540, concerning the implementation in 
national laws of provisions concerning the prevention and punishment of the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors, in 
particular for terrorist purposes;41 and the non-mandatory reports submitted by States to 
the CTC, pursuant to resolution 1624, concerning the implementation in national laws 
of provisions concerning the prohibition and prevention of incitement of terrorist acts.42 
The CTC has recently issued a number of reports relating the national implementation 
of resolutions 1373 and 1624.43 Lastly, it draws upon the reports of the European 
Commission on the measures taken by Member States of the Council of Europe to 
implement the 2002 Framework Decision on Terrorism, which provides for jurisdiction 
under protective principle.44 In that connection, the chapter also utilises ‘Country 
profiles on counter-terrorism capacity’, compiled by an inter-governmental committee 
of experts under the auspices of the Council of Europe.45 
 
It is important at this stage to make a few preliminary remarks regarding the principal 
limitations of the present chapter. The first of these is the selection of data, which is 
limited to the specific national laws that are perceived by States as relevant for 
combatting international terrorism and submitted or reported to the relevant U.N. 
bodies, rather than a comprehensive overview of national laws more generally. That 
                                                        
40 U.N. International Legal Resources, Terrorism Legislation Database, National Legal Resources on 
Terrorism, available online: www.undoc.org/tldb/browse_countries.html. 
41 S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004). The legislative database is available online: 
www.un.org/sc/1540/legisdatabase.shtml.  
42 S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005). The legislative database is available online: 
 www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1624.html.  
43 See ‘Survey of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Report of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee’, U.N. Doc.S/2008/379 (CTC Report (2008)); ‘Survey of the implementation of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) by Member States’, U.N. Doc.S/2009/620 (CTC Report (2009)); 
‘Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 
1624 (2005)’, U.N. Doc.S/2006/737; ‘Second report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to the Security 
Council on the implementation of resolution 1624 (2005)’, U.N. Doc.S/2008/29. 
44 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, O.J. L 164 of 22 
June 2002, p.3; Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision of 
13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, COM(2004)409 final of 08.06.2004, at p.7; Commission Staff 
Working Paper, Annex to the Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council 
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. COM(2004)409 final of 08.06.2004, 
COM(2007) 0681 final; Report of the Secretary-General of the European Commission, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, Annex to Report from the Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, SEC(2007)1. 
45 ‘The Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER)’, available online:  
www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/overview_en.asp. 
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said, all of the primary sources identified above comprise a range of ordinary criminal 
offences that are not limited to ‘terrorism’, a point which will be returned to below. The 
quality and accuracy of the data are dependent, firstly, upon the sufficiency and detail of 
the national laws and reports submitted by States and, secondly, the translation, 
presentation and publication of them by the relevant U.N. bodies. These national laws, it 
should be noted, are generally limited to time of peace and therefore do not include 
violations of the laws and customs of war committed during armed conflict. A number 
of national laws have had to be translated by the author. Temporally, the Legislative 
Series is limited to the period since 2005. Given the on-going process of legislative 
reform in responding to international terrorism, many of the laws included in this 
collection may therefore either be incomplete, not fully implemented and/or out of date. 
  
As regards the national reports submitted by States to the CTC relating to the 
implementation of resolution 1373, the vast majority of States, in accordance with its 
mandatory requirements, have submitted an initial report, and subsequently between 
two and four follow-up reports in the years 2002 to 2006. These reports vary in number 
as well as quality. The national reports submitted to the CTC relating to the 
implementation of resolution 1624 are much fewer in number, as this resolution is not 
mandatory; moreover, only one set of these reports is available, namely between 2005 
and 2006. Temporally, the national reports relating to resolutions 1373 and 1624 are 
available only until 2006, following a decision by the Security Council to no longer 
make them publicly available.46 The present chapter has collected some national laws 
up to the period of 2009, by using the annual reports produced by the U.N. Secretary-
General on ‘Measures to eliminate international terrorism’ and the ‘Terrorism 
Legislation Database’, as well as the ‘Country profiles on counter-terrorism capacity’, 
although this is by no means comprehensive.47  
 
A further important limitation is that national laws are not always drafted in clear terms; 
vaguely defined laws may cover a potentially broad range of conduct. Nor, it has to be 
stressed, is the extraterritorial scope and application of national laws always clearly 
defined, and rarely are grounds of jurisdiction spelled out, either in the laws themselves 
                                                        
46 The author has contacted the U.N. to obtain national reports dated between 2006 and 2011 but access to 
these documents was denied. 
47 See also Saudi Arabia, Penal Law for Terrorism Crimes and Financing of Terrorism, Official Gazette, 
Um Al-Qura, 31 January 2014. 
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or in the national reports submitted by States to the CTC or other relevant U.N. bodies. 
Grounds of jurisdiction may also be confused and/or inaccurately described by some 
States. A broader issue raised, which goes to the heart of the drafting, adoption and 
interpretation of legislation at the domestic level, is the conspicuous absence of an 
instrument codifying extraterritorial jurisdiction, or otherwise any authoritative 
guidance at the international level, for example, from U.N. organs such as the Security 
Council or the ILC or the ICJ. Notwithstanding the few existing private studies, 
discussed above, States have no informed point of reference, as a matter of international 
law, of grounds of jurisdiction, or their scope and application.48 Given the absence of 
any agreed definition of grounds of jurisdiction in international law, it should be of little 
surprise that States do not, as a general rule, expressly specify the theory relating to the 
ground of jurisdiction upon which their domestic laws apply to the conduct of foreign 
nationals abroad, or, for that matter, define the vital interests which they are seeking to 
protect. It is, perhaps, for the same reason that the numerous resolutions adopted by the 
General Assembly and Security Council in response to international terrorism do not 
make reference to grounds of jurisdiction. It should thus be borne in mind that national 
laws and their extraterritorial application based on protective jurisdiction are, in the 
majority of cases, based on the author’s subjective interpretation. Given the limitations 
outlined above, the present chapter does not claim to be comprehensive. 
 
There are two final remarks regarding the interpretation of national laws, the first of 
which relates to the theory of passive personality jurisdiction and the second concerns 
the extradite or prosecute principle. Turning to the first issue, it will be recalled in 
chapter one that the theory of passive personality has, it is submitted, been confused 
with protective jurisdiction. The national laws relating to serious offences and acts of 
terrorism committed against the State’s nationals are interpreted by the present work as 
based on the protective principle.49 As regards the second issue, a number of national 
laws analysed by the present chapter apply to the conduct of foreign nationals abroad, 
irrespective of any apparent prescriptive connection with the accused or the alleged 
offence, other than the presence of the accused in the legislating State’s territory. The 
reason for this is that these laws implement the obligation to extradite or prosecute 
contained in counter-terrorism treaties and, more recently, Security Council resolution 
                                                        
48 See further chapter six.  
49 See chapter five.  
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1373. The prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle, as 
will  be explained in greater depth in chapter five, has been interpreted in the present 
chapter as a form of ‘treaty-based jurisdiction’ that is used as a mutually beneficial 
means by which States are able to protect certain of their vital interests.50 The national 
laws making provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the extradite or prosecute 
principle are therefore interpreted in the present chapter as evidence of State practice in 
support of the protective principle of prescriptive jurisdiction and not as universal 
prescriptive jurisdiction.  
 
4.4. Protective Jurisdiction in National Laws 
 
On the basis of a detailed empirical analysis of the available data, the national laws of 
160 States, out of a total of 181 of the available sample, have made provision, to 
varying degrees, for an exception to the territoriality of jurisdiction under the protective 
principle.51 Only a small number of States, 21 in total, some of which regard acts of 
terrorism as posing a threat to their security and certain other of their vital interests, 
have not made provision in their national law for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the 
conduct of foreign nationals abroad.52 Of course, this does not mean that these States 
regard the protective principle as contrary to international law.  
 
The section that follows aims to present a summary of the key findings on the number 
of States and the type of offences covered by national legislation under the protective 
principle. It is useful at this stage to say a few words as to the methodology used for the 
presentation of data. The protective principle has been used by different States to 
varying degrees and over a broad range of offences. It is not the aim of the present 
chapter to undertake a comparative analysis of each of the provisions or elements of the 
many different offences contained in national laws, including the different and 
diverging definitions of ‘terrorism’, which would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
harmonise. Empirical analysis of the divergent ways in which national laws deal with 
and define ‘terrorism’ has already been undertaken elsewhere by Saul.53 Rather, the aim 
                                                        
50 See also chapter one.  
51 Appendix A.   
52 Ibid.  
53 See Saul (2006), supra n 13, at pp.262-270; Saul, B. (2011). ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The 
UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’. 24 LJIL 
677, at p.683. 
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here, having undertaken a detailed analysis of the objective and subjective elements of 
offences, is to provide a more general overview and identify, as a preliminary matter, 
some of the more common themes and general trends in national laws relating to 
jurisdiction, with a view to the potential codification of protective jurisdiction. This 
approach is not unusual and it is one that is used by the ILC for the codification of 
international law. Accordingly, with that aim in mind, and for the purpose of 
presentation and further analysis, an effort has been made, where possible, to 
systematise the offences contained in national laws into categories where they appear to 
be of a similar subject-matter. The same approach has been used by the IBA in its 
analysis of protective jurisdiction in State practice.54 The reason for categorising 
offences in this way in the present chapter, however, is in order to try and deduce from 
national laws vital interest typologies; that is, some of the vital interests that States have 
included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata and around which a basic 
level of agreement appears to have clustered.55 It may then, in turn, be possible to define 
and codify protective jurisdiction based not on a uniform list of specified offences but, 
rather, based on the enumeration of certain vital State interests, a core category of which 
is shared by the international community.56 A similar approach to the codification of 
jurisdiction appears to have been used by the Harvard Research and the ALI, discussed 
above. Given that there is no internationally agreed definition of ‘terrorism’, and the 
fact that national laws are not harmonised, it has to be borne in mind that the offences 
listed within a particular category may not be of the same, or even similar, definition; 
also, some of the categories may overlap.  
 
Due to the scope of the present chapter, these categories of offences are listed in full in 
Appendix A. The focus here is on those categories for which there is broad support in 
national laws. The categories of offences listed in Appendix A consist of legislation 
implementing international and regional counter-terrorism conventions and Security 
Council resolutions 1373 and 1640, as well as other national laws dealing with more 
general crimes which are regarded by States as being relevant, either directly or 
indirectly, to the topic of combatting international terrorism, as this term is defined or 
otherwise understood by each State. It may therefore be the case that some of the 
                                                        
54 Supra n 31. 
55 Chapters five. 
56 Chapters five & six.  
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offences contained in these national laws appear, at first glance, to have little or no 
relevance to or association with ‘terrorism’; for instance, forgery or counterfeit of the 
State’s official seals or currency; economic or commercial espionage; insult or 
destruction of the State’s flags or symbols; and insults against the President and the 
nation. The inclusion of these national laws in primary sources may have been 
incidental or due to the fact that the national laws of the majority of States traditionally 
have not defined ‘terrorism’ or provided for special ‘terrorism’ offences. Rather, they 
have dealt with terrorist acts under their Criminal Codes as ordinary criminal offences, 
such as laws dealing with armed bands, subversive associations, military and 
paramilitary groups and criminal organisations. These offences do not require proof of a 
specific ‘terrorist’ intent or outcome, such as a purpose to intimidate or terrorise a 
population or to coerce a government, and are applicable irrespective of any political, 
ideological, or religious motive.57 The national laws of over half of all States, as has 
already been explained elsewhere by Saul, prosecute terrorist acts as ordinary criminal 
offences.58 A similar approach has long been used in international counter-terrorist 
conventions and Security Council resolutions, due to the absence of an internationally 
agreed definition of ‘terrorism’.59 On the other hand, almost half of all States have now 
enacted special terrorism offences, which is the approach taken in common law 
jurisdictions, such as Britain, Australia, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and the 
U.S., and has been used increasingly by other countries since the adoption by the 
Security Council of resolution 1373.60 However, almost all of these special ‘terrorism’ 
offences, as rightly suggested by Saul, include widely divergent definitions of 
‘terrorism’.61 The upshot of all this is that the categories of offences listed in Appendix 
A contain a broad range of offences, some of which relate to a special crime of 
‘terrorism’, with others being based on ordinary criminal offences that are not limited to 
acts of terrorism. 
 
                                                        
57 E.g., Saul (2012), supra n 13, at p.134; Paust, J.J., ‘“Nonprotected” Persons or Things’, in Murphy, F.J. 
& Evans, E.A. (eds.) (1978). ‘Legal Aspects of International Terrorism’. D.C. Heath & Co.: 
Massachusetts, at p.348.  
57 See Saul (2006), supra n 13, at pp.262-270; Samuel et al., supra n 3, at pp.36-37. 
58 Saul, ibid., at pp.264-265.  
59 Cf. more recent conventions do require a specific terrorist intention, e.g., International Convention on 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, New York, 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197, Article 2b 
(Terrorist Financing Convention); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism, New York, 13 April 2005, 2445 UNTS 89, Article 2. 
60 Saul (2006), supra n 13, at p.50.   
61 Ibid.; also CTC Report (2008), supra n 43, at p.34; CTC Report (2009), supra n 43, at p.48. 
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It is apparent that some of the categories of offences listed in Appendix A are supported 
by the laws of very few States, and are regarded by some commentators as overbroad or 
even an abuse of jurisdiction.62 On the other hand, 17 of them have broader support in 
national laws, which are listed here in descending order:  
 
(i) Crimes committed against the State by terrorist groups, armed bands, 
subversive associations, military and paramilitary groups and criminal 
organisations (as defined by national laws) which transcend national 
boundaries. This includes the membership, organisation, participation, 
facilitation, instruction, direction, support, recruitment and leadership of 
such groups and their activities (86 States);  
(ii) Crimes committed against the State’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
political independence or constitution (76 States);  
(iii) Crimes and acts of terrorism (as defined by national laws) committed against 
the State’s nationals, inside or outside national territory (75 States);  
(iv) Crimes committed against the State’s ‘internal’ or ‘external’ security (70 
States);  
(v) Crimes committed against or on board the State’s registered civil aircraft (66 
States); 
(vi) Financing and support of terrorist and armed groups (63 States);  
(vii) Counterfeit of currency, seals and official documents (61 States);  
(viii) Hostage-taking (54 States);  
(ix) Illicit manufacture, traffic or supply of military weapons and explosives; 
unmarked plastic explosives; nuclear and radioactive materials; dangerous 
waste; chemical and biological weapons; contagious disease pathogens; and 
weapons of mass destruction, to be used or threatened to be used against the 
State’s interests (54 States); 
(x) Crimes committed against or on board the State’s registered vessels (53 
States);  
(xi) Crimes committed against diplomatic and consular personnel carrying out 
official duties abroad, as well as embassies and other diplomatic and 
consular premises and transportation located abroad (52 States);  
(xii) Damage or destruction, including by the use of explosives and bombs, of 
government buildings, property, premises, infrastructure facilities, 
installations and aircraft; public transportation systems; and information 
systems, located inside and outside national territory (50 States);  
(xiii) Crimes committed against Heads of State and government officials (39 
States); 
(xiv) Acts of terrorism (as defined by national laws) and crimes committed against 
international organisations (32 States);  
(xv) Unlawful obtaining, use, threat to use, or conspiracy to use nuclear materials 
(25 States);  
(xvi) Crimes committed against the State’s fundamental social, political, 
constitutional or economic order (23 States); and  
(xvii) Crimes committed against registered fixed platforms and off-shore 
installations (21 States).  
                                                        
62 E.g., Greenwood, C., ‘State Jurisdiction’, U.N. Audiovisual Library of International Law, Lecture 
Series (2008). 
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These categories are indicative of the main trends on the use of protective jurisdiction in 
national laws, at least within the context of international terrorism. The empirical 
analysis of national laws gives rise, however, to two broader, discernible trends. First of 
all, it is reasonable to suppose that, notwithstanding different and divergent definitions 
of substantive crimes, protective jurisdiction is deeply embedded in the legislation of a 
large number of diverse countries and that such practice may be sufficiently uniform 
and widespread so as to support the finding that protective jurisdiction is a rule of 
customary international law.63 The considerable variation in the definition of 
substantive crimes does not necessarily preclude the identification of a customary rule 
where there is an ‘underlying thread or theme’.64 It is perhaps notable that protective 
jurisdiction has been used by the national laws of all the permanent members of the 
Security Council, which is all important for the formation of custom. That said, while 
this practice may appear to evince a general opinio juris among States, the ‘belief’ of 
States with regard to the existence and content of this rule is less clear. The reason for 
this is due to the confusion and lack of certainty surrounding theories relating to 
grounds of jurisdiction and the nomenclature used to describe them. This consideration 
is illustrated, for example, by the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute, which has been described by a number of States and in legal 
scholarship as ‘universal jurisdiction’.65 Nonetheless, this finding of State practice is 
potentially of great importance. This is so because protective jurisdiction is little 
understood by States, courts and in legal scholarship and has either been defined in 
overly-narrow terms or else its validity in international law has been questioned.66  
 
The second of these trends is that States, it would appear, attach great importance to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the protection of certain of their vital interests and is the 
principal means by which States combat the threat of international terrorism.67 In that 
regard, the present chapter has found no evidence of the use of other grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, other than crimes committed by the State’s nationals and 
                                                        
63 E.g., see U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/659 (2013), paras.16-20.  
64 Ibid., at p.12. 
65 Supra n 16 & chapter five. 
66 See chapter one.  
67 See chapter five. 
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residents by virtue of the nationality principle.68 There also appears to be an ascending 
trend as to the use of protective jurisdiction for combatting the threat of international 
terrorism. This trend has recently been alluded to in a study by the ILC Secretariat, 
which found that protective jurisdiction may be of particular relevance for combatting 
international terrorism.69 It is important to note that this trend is not new and appears to 
be one that has been developing over the past few decades.  
  
4.4.1. Protective Jurisdiction for Combatting International Terrorism: An 
Ascending Trend?  
 
In order to illustrate the trend described above, it is perhaps useful to consider one of the 
earliest, modern examples of the use of protective jurisdiction for combatting 
international terrorism, in particular, Arab terrorist activities. In 1972, Israel amended 
its domestic law (Offences Committed Abroad), which by virtue of section 2(a) 
provided, in pertinent part, that:  
 
[t]he courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law a person who has 
committed an act which would be an offence if it had been committed in Israel and 
which harmed or was intended to harm the State of Israel, its security, property or 
economy or its transport or communications link with other countries.70 
 
This legislation provided for rather broad extraterritorial jurisdiction, on the basis of 
which an Israeli military court in 1973 convicted Faik Bulut, a Turkish citizen, who had 
been seized from a Palestinian refugee camp 100 miles into Lebanon and taken to Israel 
by Israeli forces, for membership of Al-Fatah in Lebanon and Syria. The court inter alia 
cited the protective principle in upholding the validity of the extraterritorial application 
of the Israeli statute. The statute, by virtue of section 4(a), also provided Israeli courts 
with protective jurisdiction over terrorist acts committed against or intended to harm the 
life, health, freedom or property of an Israeli national or resident abroad, with the only 
qualification being that the act also be recognised as an offence in the place where it is 
committed. The Israeli statute was criticised in legal scholarship at the time as a 
                                                        
68 Cf. ‘Observations by Belgium on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction’, 
supra n 14; ‘The scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction: information provided by 
Spain’, supra n 14. 
69 Supra n 8, at pp.523-525. 
70 See Murphy, J.F. ‘Protected Persons and Diplomatic Facilities’, in Murphy & Evans, supra n 57, at 
pp.284-285; Murphy, J.F. (1985). ‘Punishing International Terrorists’. USA: Rowan and Allanheld, at 
p.31; Note (1973-1974). ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Jurisdiction Following Forcible Abduction: A 
New Israeli Precedent in International Law’. 72 Mich.L.Rev. 1087. 
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‘deviation to the general pattern in national legislation of territorial jurisdiction’,71 as 
well as ‘very broad’,72 ‘exorbitant’73 and even an ‘abuse’74 of jurisdiction under 
international law. However, the broad jurisdiction used by Israel in the 1970s is now 
reflected in the current practice of many States. 
 
Another notable example of this trend is the inclusion of protective jurisdiction in the 
1973 Internationally Protected Persons Convention, which was negotiated in response to 
the rise of international terrorist attacks in various parts of the world against diplomatic 
personnel and premises.75 The convention inter alia had as its aim the enhancement of 
the protection of persons entitled to special protection under international law from 
terrorist attacks. This was achieved, by virtue of Article 3(1)(c), by establishing the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the sending State over attacks against its own 
internationally protected persons; it thus departed from the existing domestic laws of the 
majority of States, which left the prevention and punishment of such attacks solely to 
the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving State where the crime was attempted or had 
been committed.76 An examination of national laws by Murphy in 1978 in relation to 
the protection of diplomats, in particular terrorist attacks, found that the national laws of 
most States provided for severe criminal penalties over attacks against diplomats but 
their jurisdictional scope was limited to crimes within the territory of the prosecuting 
State. Murphy was of the view that some national laws might be interpreted so that 
attacks on a State’s diplomats abroad are covered under the protective principle, 
although ‘there seems to be no apposite case’.77 However, Murphy went on to doubt the 
applicability of protective jurisdiction, which he suggested ‘has generally been narrowly 
interpreted so as to apply only to a few offences in time of war directly affecting state 
security or to offences involving government administrative functions’.78 That said, and 
contrary to the analysis by Murphy, the 1975 French Code of Criminal Procedure, 
                                                        
71 Murphy (1978), ibid., at p.285. 
72 Meron, T. (1978). ‘Non-Extradition of Israeli Nationals and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Reflections on 
Bill No. 1306’. 13 Isr.L.Rev. 215, at p.219. 
73 Note, supra n 70, at p.1088. 
74 Gaynes, J.B. (1978). ‘Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach’. 11 CornellInt’lL.J. 
71, at p.76. 
75 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, New York, 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167. 
76 Rozakis, C.L. (1974). ‘Terrorism and the Internationally Protected Persons in the Light of the ILC’s 
Draft Articles’. 23 ICLQ 32, at p.52. 
77 Murphy, supra n 70, at p.284. 
78 Ibid.  
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Article 694, appears to have been one of the earliest examples of the use of protective 
jurisdiction over attacks against diplomatic and consular premises and agents and was 
adopted in response to a terrorist attack in the previous year on a French embassy in The 
Hague.79 In any case, the national laws examined by Murphy may be contrasted with 
the more recent State practice compiled by the present chapter, which has found that 52 
States permit jurisdiction over crimes committed against their diplomatic and consular 
personnel carrying out official duties abroad, as well as embassies and other diplomatic 
and consular premises and transportation located abroad. The protective principle, as 
will be explained in the next chapter, has in recent years been relied upon by the U.S. to 
ground numerous national prosecutions of acts of terrorism and offences that are 
deemed to be associated or have a link with such acts abroad (including inchoate 
offences), in particular attacks against its diplomatic personnel and premises, which has 
not been protested and, indeed, has received support by other States in the form of 
extradition of alleged offenders to the U.S and by the Security Council.80 There are also 
States, such as the U.K. and South Africa, which have traditionally refrained from 
providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction in their national laws but have nevertheless 
done so in recent years in order to protect their diplomatic persons and property and 
certain other of their vital interests from acts of terrorism.81 
 
The trend in State practice as to the use of protective jurisdiction for combatting 
international terrorism may have been facilitated, and even encouraged, by the 
discernible trend in the practice of the General Assembly to use this principle in 
counter-terrorism treaties, as well as its use in regional instruments.82 The trend may 
have also been intensified more recently by the increasing, albeit selective, role of the 
Security Council in taking measures against international terrorism, in particular the 
                                                        
79 Blakesley, C.L. (1984). ‘A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial 
Crimes’. 1984 UtahL.R. 685. Blakesley, C.L., ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’, in Bassiouni, C.M. (ed.) 
(1999). ‘International Criminal Law’. Ardsley: Transnational, at pp.60-61; Gaynes, supra n 74, at p.77. 
80 On the importance to the absence of opposition to a rule in the practice of States, see supra n 63, at 
p.20.  
81 As regards South Africa, see the ‘Prevention of Organised Crime Act 1998’; ‘Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 2004’; and ‘Prohibition or 
Restriction of Certain Conventional Weapons Act 2008’; ‘South Africa’s reply to the letter dated 15 April 
2002 received from the Chairperson of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
Ambassador J. Greenstock, containing comments on South Africa’s national report (S/2001/1281) 
submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)’, U.N. Doc.S/2002/792, at 
p.20; U.K., Terrorism Act 2000, Ch.11, section 63; Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Ch.24, 
sections 109, 113, as amended by the Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003, Ch.32, section 53; 
Terrorism Act 2006, Ch.11, sections 1 and 17. 
82 See chapter five. 
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‘rush to law’ by the Council in its adoption of resolution 1373.83 Indeed, protective 
jurisdiction has been at the heart of the unprecedented legislative response by States in 
the implementation of resolution 1373.84 In order to further illustrate the influence of 
resolution 1373, it is perhaps useful to consider, by way of example, the domestic law 
of Germany, which has undergone major changes to provide for broad jurisdiction 
under the protective principle in order more effectively to combat international 
terrorism.85 
   
The German Criminal Code has traditionally dealt with acts of terrorism as ordinary 
crimes and criminalised the formation of, and certain offences committed by, ‘criminal’ 
and ‘terrorist’ organisations where these were committed on German territory.86 
However, in August 2002, the Criminal Code was amended to include Article 129b, by 
virtue of which the formation, membership, support and recruiting of members or 
supporters of ‘criminal’ or ‘terrorist’ organisations abroad are criminalised.87 Article 
129b is applicable outside Member States of the European Union (EU), where an 
offence is ‘committed by way of an activity exercised within the Federal Republic of 
Germany or if the offender or victim is a German or is found within Germany’. The 
prescriptive jurisdiction of Germany may be interpreted as based on the protective 
principle where the victim is of German nationality or where the accused is ‘found’ on 
German territory. This latter ground of jurisdiction is the implementation of the 
extradite or prosecute principle and, as will be explained in chapter five, is broad 
enough to encompass offences committed abroad but means that Germany does not 
have to evidence any prescriptive connection with an alleged offence, for example, 
threats to its vital interests, other than the accused’s presence. It is worth noting that the 
EU had already issued, in 1998, a Joint Action, requiring Member States to criminalise 
the participation in a ‘criminal organisation’, which is broad enough to encompass 
                                                        
83 S/RES/1373, supra n 4. 
84 E.g., Britain, Canada, China, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, South Africa, 
Russia, San Marino, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and U.S.  
85 See also U.N. Doc.A/65/175 (2010), at pp.7-8; UNODC, ‘Guide for the Legislative Incorporation and 
Implementation of the Universal Anti-Terrorism Instruments’, U.N.: New York (2006), para.390; 
UNODC, ‘Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols’. U.N.: New 
York (2003), para.69; Germany, available online:  
www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/Country%20Profiles/CODEXTER%20Profile%20_2011_%20Germany_E
N.pdf. 
86 Criminal Code, sections 129-129a.  
87 The amendment of the Criminal Code, 22 August 2002, Federal Law Gazette, 2002 I, p.3390, passed 
into law 1 September 2002.   
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terrorist organisations, in the territory of EU Member States.88 In the light of the events 
of 9-11 and the adoption of resolution 1373, however, Germany considered it necessary 
to expand its jurisdiction over offences committed outside the boarders of the EU in 
order more effectively to combat international terrorism.89 
 
In 2009 Germany amended its Criminal Code, once again, and, by virtue of an ‘Act on 
the Prosecution of the Preparation of Serious Violent Acts Endangering the State’, 
introduced three new provisions that criminalise the preparation by individuals of 
‘serious violent acts’ which are capable of ‘endangering’ the State.90 Section 89a 
defines ‘a serious violent offence endangering the State’ as an offence ‘against life’ or 
‘against personal freedom’ which is ‘intended to impair and capable or impairing the 
existence or security of a state or of an international organisation … or to undermine the 
constitutional principles of the Federal Republic’.91 The preparatory offences that 
constitute a ‘a serious violent offence endangering the State’ and apply outside 
Germany may be summarised as follows: (i) training or receiving training to commit a 
serious violent act endangering the State; manufacturing, procuring, providing or 
storing specified weapons, specified substances or devices needed to carry out the 
offence prepared, as well as procuring or storing essential items of “precursors” needed 
to manufacture such weapons, substances, devices; and collecting, accepting or 
providing funds for the commission of an offence;92 and (ii) initiating contacts for the 
commission of a serious violent act endangering the State.93 Section 89a inter alia is 
applicable outside Germany to the conduct of foreign nationals where an offence is 
‘meant to be committed within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany or 
against a German citizen.’94 Section 89b inter alia applies to the act of establishing or 
maintaining of contacts abroad by foreign nationals but is limited to the territory of the 
Member States of the EU.95  
 
                                                        
88 Joint Action 98/733/JHA of 21 December 1998, O.J. L 87 351 of 29 December 1998, p.1. 
89 ‘Letter dated 22 October 2002 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to 
the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism’, U.N. Doc.S/2002/1193 (24 October 2002), at p.14. 
90 Criminal Code, sections 89a, 89b and 91.  
91 Ibid., section 89(a)(1).  
92 Ibid., section 89a(1)-(2).  
93 Ibid., section 89b. 
94 Ibid, section 89a(3). 
95 Ibid., section 89b(3). 
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The reason why section 89 criminalises certain offences ‘intended to impair and capable 
or impairing the existence or security of a state or of an international organisation’ is in 
order to implement the obligation to extradite or prosecute. The amendments made to 
the domestic law of Germany are intended to implement the binding law of the EU on 
combatting international terrorism.96 It is notable that the laws adopted by the EU were 
in reaction to the acts of terrorism on 9-11 and comprise measures taken by the EU in 
order to implement resolution 1373.97 This shows that the EU has recognised the 
transnational nature of the terrorist threat and, in order to implement resolution 1373, 
has required Member States to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain terrorist 
and other related offences under the protective principle, as well as under the extradite 
or prosecute principle in cases where a Member State refuses to hand over or extradite 
an accused of a relevant offence to another EU country or to a non-EU country.98 It is 
therefore useful to examine resolution 1373.   
 
4.5. The Role of the Security Council in Response to International Terrorism  
  
The approach of the Security Council to combating the problem of international 
terrorism changed profoundly in response to the terrorist attacks on 9-11. The Security 
Council determined, for the first time, that all acts of ‘international terrorism’ constitute 
a ‘threat to international peace and security’ under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
rather than its previous approach of making individual determinations of threats to 
peace and security.99 The Security Council, moreover, unanimously adopted resolution 
1373.100 What makes resolution 1373 notably different, and of great importance, is that 
it was adopted under Chapter VII and is therefore binding on all U.N. Member States. 
Resolution 1373 is thus of universal scope and application, rather than being confined 
temporally or to a specific situation or country, as had been previous counter-terrorism 
resolutions, and ‘imposed uniform, mandatory counter-terrorist obligations on all 
                                                        
96 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, supra n 44; Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA 
of 28 November 2008, amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism, OJ L 330 
of 9 December 2008, p.21. 
97 Report of the European Union to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 
1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, U.N. Doc.S/2002/928 (16 August 2002), Annex, at p.9.  
98 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA, supra n 44, Articles 1-4 & 9; Council Framework 
Decision 2008/919/JHA, supra n 96, Article 1. 
99 S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001), preambular paras.1, 3. See also S/RES/1456 (20 January 2003), 
preambular para.1; S/RES/1611 (7 July 2005), para.1; S/RES/1617 (29 July 2005), preambular para.1; 
S/RES/1618 (4 August 2005), para.1; S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005), preambular paras.1, 3; 
S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005), preambular para.3; S/RES/1805 (20 March 2008), preambular paras.1-2; 
S/RES/1963 (23 December 2010), preambular para.1. 
100 Supra n 4. 
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States’.101 It is therefore unsurprising that the Security Council is said to have taken on a 
new ‘legislative’ role in combating international terrorism.102 Resolution 1373 required 
all States to take a number of wide-ranging steps necessary to combat international 
terrorism. Not only does it require States to become parties ‘as soon as possible’ to the 
relevant international conventions relating to terrorism.103 It required, moreover, that 
States provide for specific domestic laws in order to ensure that ‘terrorist acts’ are 
established as serious criminal offences and to ‘prevent’ and ‘suppress’ such acts; and 
determined the timetable in which these legislative changes were to be introduced and, 
to that end, required States to report to the CTC on the steps taken to implement the 
resolution. Of particular importance to the present work, resolution 1373 envisaged the 
use by States of extraterritorial jurisdiction for combating international terrorism. 
  
Resolution 1373, by virtue of paragraph 2, required States to prevent and punish a range 
of ‘terrorist acts’ and to suppress ‘terrorist groups’ and bring ‘terrorists’ to justice. Thus, 
paragraph 2 provided, amongst other things, that States ‘shall (a) [r]efrain from 
providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in 
terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and 
eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists’; ‘(b) [t]ake the necessary steps to 
prevent the commission of terrorist acts’; ‘(c) [d]eny safe haven to those who finance, 
plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens’; and ‘(e) [e]nsure that 
any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of 
terrorist acts is brought to justice’. It is apparent that paragraph 2 thus imposed on States 
negative obligations, such as to ‘refrain’ from providing either active or passive support 
to persons involved in ‘terrorist acts’, as well as positive obligations, such as 
‘suppressing’ the recruitment of ‘terrorist groups’ and ‘eliminating’ the supply of 
weapons to ‘terrorists’; take all ‘necessary steps to prevent terrorist acts’; and ‘ensure’ 
                                                        
101 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2004), at 
p.50; also Szasz, P.C. (2002). ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’. 96 AJIL 901; Happold, M. 
(2003). ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United Nations’. 16 LJIL 593; 
Rosand, E. (2003). ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight 
Against Terrorism’. 97 AJIL 333, at p.334; Ward, C.A. (2003). ‘Building Capacity to Combat 
International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council’. 8 J Conflict Security Law 289; 
Talmon, S. (2005). ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’. 99 AJIL 175; Barker, supra n 4.  
102 Szasz, ibid., at p.905; Happold, ibid., at p.595; Talmon, ibid., at p.175; Barker, ibid., at p.14; 
Guillaume, G. (2004). ‘Terrorism and International Law’. 54 ICLQ 537, at p.543; Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, supra n 13, para.104. 
103 Supra n 4, preambular para.3. See also S/RES/1368, supra n 99, para.4; S/RES/1377 (12 November 
2001), para.9; S/RES/1456, supra n 99, para.2; S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004), para.4. 
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that persons who participate in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration or 
support of ‘terrorist acts’ are brought to justice.  
 
The type of offences included under paragraph 2, for example, ‘recruitment’, 
‘financing’, ‘planning’, ‘support’, ‘preparation’, requires States to take a proactive and 
preventative approach, and to criminalise conduct early on, before ‘terrorist acts’ are 
carried out.104 These provisions are also drafted in broad terms and are not confined to 
conduct which occurs wholly within the State’s territory or by its own nationals 
abroad.105 Nevertheless, paragraph 2 is silent as regards the use and scope of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and, by using the term ‘terrorist act’ throughout its operative 
provisions, fails to emphasise, as does the resolution more generally, the transnational 
aspects of the activities with which it is concerned. This is rather surprising, given the 
context in which the resolution was adopted and, as is made clear by the preamble, its 
focus on ‘international terrorism’.106 Consequently, on the face of it, resolution 1373 is 
not clear on the grounds of jurisdiction that States should use in order to implement the 
resolution in their national laws, or what the scope and application of such jurisdiction 
should be. This perhaps illustrates one of the dangers of circumventing the treaty-
making process, which would otherwise have involved some necessary deliberation by 
States of grounds of jurisdiction or stipulated the circumstances in which the exercise of 
such jurisdiction is permissive or mandatory.107 Nor does resolution 1373 define any of 
the offences used in it, including key terms such as ‘terrorist’, ‘terrorist group’ and 
‘terrorist act’. The lack of definition of any concepts, it has been suggested, was 
deliberate and the consensus on resolution 1373 by the Security Council’s permanent 
members depended upon avoiding their definition.108 The same consideration may apply 
mutatis mutandis to grounds of jurisdiction. The lack of definition of these key 
concepts, and, in effect, the bypassing of any debate on them, appears to have been 
                                                        
104 See also Shields, C. et al., ‘Final Report: An Assessment of Defense and Prosecutorial Strategies in 
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108 See Rosand, supra n 101, at p.334; Saul, B.  (2005). ‘Definition of “Terrorism” in the U.N. Security 
Council: 1985-2004’. 4 Chinese JIL 141, at p.157; Wainright, supra n 105.  
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important in terms of the speed by which the resolution was enacted, just seventeen 
days after 9-11. The resolution itself was adopted in just forty-eight hours, after the U.S. 
had first begun consultations with the Security Council’s other four permanent members 
on 26 September 2001.109 The resolution was prepared in draft during the Security 
Council’s informal consultations and adopted in a formal public meeting-lasting only 
five minutes; no Council member spoke on the draft resolution or explained its vote; 
non-members of the Council were not consulted and were not present.110  
 
4.6. The Extradite or Prosecute Principle and the Role of the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee  
 
The Security Council remained silent on the matter of jurisdiction in the implementation 
of resolution 1373 until 2003, with the adoption of a declaration annexed to resolution 
1456. The declaration inter alia provided that ‘States must bring to justice those who 
finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts or provide safe havens, in accordance 
with international law, in particular, on the basis of the principle of extradite or 
prosecute’.111 The last phrase of this provision is noteworthy, as it is the first time that 
the Security Council has indicated the method, albeit in a non-exhaustive way, by which 
States implement paragraph 2 of resolution 1373 and bring to justice those who commit 
such crimes, including where they occur abroad. The extradite or prosecute principle 
was subsequently reiterated by the Security Council in resolution 1566, which was 
adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and calls upon States to:  
 
… cooperate fully … especially with those States where or against whose citizens 
terrorist acts are committed, in accordance with their obligations under 
international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the 
basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, 
facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, 
preparation or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens.112 
 
The Security Council has also used the CTC in order to openly press States, in a climate 
of haste, to implement the extradite or prosecute principle in their national laws. The 
CTC, which was established, it will be recalled, by resolution 1373, is made up of 
members of the Security Council and has as its role the monitoring of the 
                                                        
109 Talmon, supra n 101, at p.189.  
110 Ibid. 
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112 S/RES/1566, supra n 103, para.2; also S/RES/1624, supra n 99, preambular para.15 and operative 
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implementation by States of the resolution’s requirements. In a report by the CTC to the 
Security Council in 2004 aimed at identifying the problems encountered in the 
implementation of resolution 1373, the Chair of the CTC specifically interpreted the 
offences under paragraph 2(c) and (e) as ‘oblig[ing] states to prosecute and try all those 
responsible for acts of terrorism, wherever they are committed’.113 According to the 
CTC’s Chair, [t]his measure is designed to ensure that terrorists have no place of refuge, 
since each State will be competent to try them or extradite them’.114 The Chair reported 
that ‘some States have shown certain reluctance to create such mechanism in their 
legislation.’115 As a way of circumventing such reluctance, the CTC has, in its dialogue 
with States, prioritised the ratification of counter-terrorism treaties, given that such 
agreements contain provisions on extradite or prosecute, ‘so as to create an international 
cooperation network and institutional machinery for mutual assistance and 
extradition’.116  
 
The matter of extraterritorial jurisdiction was not returned to by the Security Council 
until seven years after the adoption of resolution 1373. The Security Council requested 
the CTC, in 2008, to prepare an initial survey of State practice in order to assess the 
resolution’s implementation in national laws.117 In 2008 a group of experts of the CTC 
prepared an initial survey of State practice, which was based on, amongst other things, 
information provided by States and visit reports, none of which are publicly 
available.118 One of the ‘thematic areas’ examined by the experts is the implementation 
of paragraph 2 of resolution 1373 in national laws and, in particular, whether the 
‘[j]urisdiction of courts extends to acts committed abroad by nationals or foreign 
nationals currently within the State’.119 The experts regarded jurisdiction as being 
‘adequate’ where States have incorporated into their national laws the extradite or 
prosecute principle, although it is not explained by the report whether the survey of 
State practice focused on the use of this principle in respect of offences set forth in 
paragraph 2 of resolution 1373, in addition to those included in counter-terrorism 
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treaties. Nor does the report explain the meaning of extradite or prosecute in 
international law, or the reason why jurisdiction arising out of this principle is regarded 
as ‘adequate’ and prioritised in the assessment of the implementation of resolution 
1373. In that connection, the report does not provide any analysis of grounds of 
jurisdiction or whether, and, if so, to what extent, these grounds are evidenced in State 
practice in the implementation of resolution 1373.  
 
The CTC subsequently prepared, at the Security Council’s request, an updated survey of 
State practice in 2009. The only comment made by experts on the matter of jurisdiction 
related to terrorist financing, the countering of which ‘lies at the heart of Security 
Council resolution 1373’.120 The experts suggested that as regards the obligation to 
criminalise terrorist financing, as required by resolution 1373 and the Terrorist 
Financing Convention,121 ‘the jurisdiction of the courts does not generally extend to acts 
committed outside the State’s territory by foreign nationals currently within the State, 
except where the offence aims at undermining State security or counterfeiting the legal 
tender.’122 The CTC regarded the jurisdiction of these States, which appears to be based 
on the protective principle, as a ‘shortfall’.123 The reason for this is twofold. First, a 
‘significant number’ of States have either not yet criminalised terrorist financing or have 
introduced a terrorist financing offence that does not reflect the offences set forth either 
in resolution 1373 or the Terrorist Financing Convention. Second, these States have not 
made provision in their national laws for jurisdiction under the extradite or prosecute 
principle in respect of terrorist financing offences committed abroad.  
  
The CTC updated the 2009 survey in 2011. The only comment made by the experts on 
the matter of jurisdiction is that the legislative measures which States are obliged to take 
in implementing resolution 1373 ‘must be supported by adequate jurisdiction to ensure 
that domestic courts are competent to deal with potential offenders. This includes the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute in accordance with applicable counter-terrorism 
                                                        
120 CTC Report (2009), supra n 43, at p.44. 
121 Supra n 59. 
122 Supra n 120. 
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instruments to which they are parties.’124 In relation to the ‘gaps’ identified by the 
experts in the implementation of resolution 1373, the experts suggested that:  
  
[f]ull implementation of the obligation to bring terrorists to justice under the 
principle aut dedere aut judicare (“extradite or prosecute”) requires the adoption 
of implementing legislation in more States and a strengthened commitment to 
prosecute terrorism cases where extradition is not feasible.125  
 
The assessment by the CTC of extraterritorial jurisdiction in State practice, in the 
implementation of resolution 1373, thus appears to have focused solely and exclusively 
on the provision made by States for the extradite or prosecute principle in accordance 
with counter-terrorism treaties.126 No analysis has been expressly provided by the CTC 
on the extent to which States have made provision for jurisdiction arising out of this 
principle in the implementation of offences set forth in resolution 1373 itself. Nor has 
any express consideration been given by the CTC to other grounds of jurisdiction in 
international law, for example, under the protective principle, and the potential 
coordination of such jurisdiction in national laws in the implementation of resolution 
1373. It is therefore not clear what the experts inter alia mean by the phrase ‘adequate 
jurisdiction’, other than jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle. 
The CTC has not explained the reasons why some States are apparently reluctant to 
make provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction under the extradite or prosecute principle 
in their national laws.  
 
This brief analysis shows that the Security Council, both directly, in the form of 
resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, and indirectly, through the monitoring and 
dialogue of the CTC in the national implementation of resolution 1373, has promoted, 
and, indeed, demanded, that States make provision in their national laws for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist offences committed abroad, including where 
such offences are perpetrated by foreign nationals, pursuant to the extradite or prosecute 
principle. Yet the Security Council has not commented on the rationale of this principle 
or the reason why explicit prominence has been given to it for combatting international 
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terrorism. Nor has the Security Council explained the grounds of jurisdiction that States 
may use ‘in accordance with international law’ in the implementation of resolut ion 
1373,127 or, for that matter, which of these grounds, if any, arises out of the extradite or 
prosecute principle. The Security Council has thus obliged States to make provision for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction but has not provided for a clear and coherent legally binding 
jurisdictional framework, or promoted uniformity and complementarity in national laws, 
in the implementation of resolution 1373.  
 
The highly controversial relationship between extradite or prosecute and the theory of 
universal jurisdiction may explain the reason why the Security Council and the CTC 
have refrained from commenting on it. Indeed, there is fundamental disagreement 
among States, including the Security Council’s permanent members, on the meaning of 
extradite or prosecute and its relationship with universal jurisdiction.128 It is certainly 
the case that the phrase ‘extradite or prosecute’ is sufficiently broad to permit unilateral 
interpretations of resolutions by States, or what has been described elsewhere by Yee as 
the ‘dynamic interplay’ of interpretation, each of whom may have different 
understandings and opinio juris as to its meaning.129 This may explain why the Security 
Council has, on the one hand, been able to adopt binding resolutions on extradite or 
prosecute and, on the other, has remained silent on grounds of jurisdiction.  
 
The reason why priority has been given by the Security Council to the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute may also be because one of the major concerns among the 
Council’s members is the threat of terrorist acts being committed against themselves 
and certain of their vital interests and the perpetrators taking refuge in the territory of 
foreign States. In order to understand this concern, consideration has to be had to the 
role of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, to combat international 
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terrorism, starting with the Lockerbie incident and the bombing of the U.S. embassies in 
East Africa in the 1990s.130 The obligation to extradite or prosecute, as will be 
explained in chapter five, enables the States whose vital interests have been threatened 
or injured by acts of terrorism to obtain the custody of alleged offenders taking refuge in 
the territory of other States, including any person ‘who supports, facilitates, participates 
or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of 
terrorist acts’.131 The U.S., it will be recalled, sponsored resolution 1373 in response to 
9-11 and, it would appear, the continuing threat to the U.S., and ‘United States nationals 
and interests in the United States and abroad’, by members of al-Qaeda taking refuge 
abroad.132 As was made clear by the Security Council in resolution 1566, above, which 
was proposed by Russia following an act of terrorism committed against Russian 
nationals, States have a duty to ‘… cooperate fully … especially with those States where 
or against whose citizens terrorist acts are committed … on the basis of the principle to 
extradite or prosecute’.133 Alternatively, the States seeking extradition of alleged 
offenders are able to have such persons prosecuted on their behalf where, in the words 
of the experts of the CTC, above, ‘extradition is not feasible’.134 It is worth noting, by 
way of aside, that the Security Council may potentially be able to impose sanctions on 
States in order to coerce them to extradite alleged offenders taking refuge on their 
territory and without the legality of such measures being subject to judicial review by 
the ICJ, given that the obligation to extradite or prosecute is required by resolutions 
under Chapter VII and therefore may fall outside the ICJ’s jurisdiction.135 The 
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prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute obligation is necessarily 
broad so as to enable this mutually beneficial protection. At the same time, this 
prescriptive jurisdiction is sufficiently broad for States to criminalise offences 
committed abroad, including where such offences are deemed to threaten their own vital 
interests, which may be enforced as soon as the accused is present in the legislating 
State’s territory; and the legislating State does not have to evidence any prescriptive 
connection with the alleged offence. All that has to be proven by the legislating State is 
that the accused is ‘present’ or ‘found’ on its territory.136 This means that States are able 
to provide for broad prescriptive jurisdiction without the burden of having to expressly 
refer to or evidence the vital interests that they are seeking to protect. 
 
4.7. Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has presented the key findings of empirical research into State practice and 
a detailed analysis of national laws, the purpose of which is to shed important light on 
whether, and, if so, to what extent, protective jurisdiction is used in contemporary State 
practice for combatting the threat of international terrorism. As has been shown, 
protective jurisdiction has been used to varying degrees in the national laws of 160 
States. This ground of jurisdiction appears to be at the heart of the legislative response 
to, and is the principal means by which States combat, the threat of international 
terrorism. The present chapter does not claim to be comprehensive and is limited to 
national laws dealing with acts of terrorism and related offences. Notwithstanding the 
different and divergent ways in which ‘terrorism’ and other substantive crimes have 
been defined in national laws, such practice may be sufficiently uniform and widespread 
so as to support the finding that protective jurisdiction is a customary rule and permit 
codification. This finding is of great importance, for at least two reasons. The first of 
these is that protective jurisdiction is little understood and tends either to be overlooked 
or defined narrowly by courts and in legal scholarship. The consequence is that 
protective jurisdiction may not be used to the full extent permitted by custom and/or 
other grounds of jurisdiction invoked, inappropriately, in its stead. There is also a 
considerable amount of confusion and uncertainty by some courts and in legal 
scholarship as to the most appropriate grounds of jurisdiction for combatting the threat 
of international terrorism. Second, the ILC has recently decided to include 
                                                        
136 E.g., Yousef, supra n 22; Yunis, supra n 16; U.S. v Shi 396 F.Supp.2d, at p.1132, affirmed by U.S. v 
Shi, 525 F.3d709 (9th Cir., 2008), at pp.722, 724-725; U.S. v Bout, 12-1487-cr (2nd Cir., 2013). 
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‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’, with a view to the codification of protective jurisdiction, 
in its long-term programme of work.137 The ILC has also alluded to the relevance of 
protective jurisdiction for combating transnational crimes, including international 
terrorism. The findings of the present chapter provide a strong argument in support of 
the codification of protective jurisdiction and could inform the preliminary work of the 
ILC. The codification of protective jurisdiction is discussed in further depth in chapter 
six.  
 
The chapter has made an effort, where possible, to systematise the offences contained in 
these national laws into categories where they appear to be of a similar subject-matter. 
Given that protective jurisdiction has been used over a broad range of offences and there 
are many different and diverging definitions of ‘terrorism’, it has to be borne in mind 
that these categories are not self-contained and overlap. The reason for categorising 
offences in this way is in order to assist analysis in the identification of more common 
themes and general trends in national laws on jurisdiction. Some of these categories are 
supported by the national laws of very few States. On the other hand, 17 of them have 
broader support in national laws. It is on the basis of these categories of offences, as 
well as treaty and Security Council practice, that chapter five will enumerate some of 
the vital interests that have been included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex 
lata and around which a basic level of agreement appears to have clustered. In turn, 
chapters five and six, respectively, will propose the definition and codification of 
protective jurisdiction based on vital State interests, a core category of which are shared 
by the international community. This approach differs from defining protective 
jurisdiction based on a uniform list of specified offences, which would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to harmonise, and is not entirely appropriate for responding to the 
complex and evolving threat of international terrorism. The importance of vital interests 
being shared is that, at the very least, it goes some way to explaining the reason why 
States regard international terrorism as a serious threat, and provides a useful starting 
point for debate by the ILC and may facilitate agreement in the codification of 
protective jurisdiction.  
 
The trend in State practice identified by the present chapter is not new but appears to 
have been facilitated in recent years by the increasing, albeit selective, role of the 
                                                        
137 Supra n 8.  
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Security Council in taking measures against international terrorism under Chapter VII, 
in particular, the adoption of resolution 1373. This resolution requires States to make 
provision for extraterritorial jurisdiction. However, the Security Council has not 
explained either in this or in subsequent resolutions applicable grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the implementation of resolution 1373. Rather, having 
remained silent for two years following the adoption of resolution 1373, the Security 
Council has subsequently required States to make provision for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under the extradite or prosecute principle; to that end, the Council has used 
the CTC to openly press States to make provision for jurisdiction pursuant to this 
principle.  
  
The Security Council and the CTC have not been prepared to explain the rationale of 
extradite or prosecute or the reason why priority has been given to it. Nor have they 
explained grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction or, for that matter, which ground of 
jurisdiction, if any at all, arises out of the extradite or prosecute principle. The reason 
for this may be because there is no existing treaty on grounds of jurisdiction and such 
grounds are subject to considerable confusion and would require negotiation. There is 
also fundamental disagreement, including among the Security Council’s members, on 
the relationship between universal jurisdiction and extradite or prosecute.138 It may be 
the case that, as with the definition of ‘terrorism’, the Security Council, as a political 
organ, probably does not want to become bogged down in such legal matters and has 
simply negotiated around them. The notion that one State’s ‘terrorists’ are another 
State’s legitimate freedom fighters and the absence of an agreed legal definition of 
‘terrorism’, as is indicated no clearer than the Security Council’s practice, would 
suggest that it is inappropriate to interpret extradite or prosecute as impliedly codifying 
a ground of ‘universal jurisdiction’. The empirical analysis of State practice by the 
present chapter has not found evidence of sufficiently widespread and uniform practice 
to suggest that universal jurisdiction is an appropriate ground of jurisdiction for 
combatting international terrorism or for interpreting extradite or prosecute as a ground 
of universal jurisdiction.      
  
The absence of a clear and legally binding jurisdictional framework means that an 
international community of nearly 200 States does not have an authoritative guide, or, at 
                                                        
138 Chapter five.  
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the very least, a point of reference, in the implementation of resolution 1373. This risks 
creating an insufficient degree of uniformity, coherence and complementarity among 
national laws in combatting international terrorism, particularly as States define 
‘terrorism’ and related offences in radically different and sometimes overly vague ways. 
The experts of the CTC have stated that ‘essential’ to the effective implementation of 
resolution 1373 is the need ‘to establish a comprehensive and coherent legal framework 
on counter-terrorism’; they continued: ‘[a]lthough many States have introduced 
extensive penal legislation covering various criminal acts, such legislation often lacks 
the requisite specificity, comprehensiveness and complementarity.’139 While the experts 
inter alia were referring to the significant concern raised by the vague, overbroad and 
widely divergent definitions of ‘terrorism’ and other related offences in national laws,140 
the same point applies mutatis mutandis to the scope and application of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. In that regard, it is one thing to oblige States to extradite or prosecute 
persons accused of specific offences contained in counter-terrorism treaties but is it 
quite another to impose the same obligation over ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist acts’ and 
other related concepts used by resolution 1373, none of which the Security Council or 
the CTC have been willing to define.141  
 
The absence of a jurisdictional framework is also surprising, given that resolution 1373 
constitutes a cornerstone of the international legal framework for countering 
international terrorism, and extraterritorial jurisdiction is one of the most important 
measures in international law, not involving the use of force, by which States are able to 
combat it. It also gives rise to legal uncertainty in terms of the most appropriate grounds 
of jurisdiction for implementing resolution 1373 and combatting international terrorism. 
The priority given to the extradite or prosecute principle by the Security Council, 
without any further explanation, leaves unexplained in qualitative terms the reason why 
international terrorism is deemed by States as a serious threat, or the interests that States 
seek to protect in its criminalisation and suppression. One of the advantages of the 
adoption of an instrument codifying protective jurisdiction, as will be explained in 
                                                        
139 CTC Report (2008), supra n 43, at pp.29-30; CTC Report (2009), supra n 43, at p.43. 
140 CTC Report, 2008, ibid., at p.34; CTC Report (2009), ibid., at p.48; also ‘Statement by Professor 
Martin Scheinin, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism to the Counter-Terrorism-Committee of the Security Council’, 
New York (24 October 2005), para.7; ‘Address of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Navanethem Pillay to the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council’, New York (29 October 
2009), at p.6. 
141 Saul (2006), supra n 13, at p.265.   
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chapter six, is that it could provide a persuasive guide for States in the adoption of 
national laws and the implementation of Security Council resolutions, as well as fill in 
gaps left by the existing international legal regime of counter-terrorism treaties.     
 
As has been explained, above, the reason why the Security Council has given priority to 
the extradite or prosecute principle appears to be due to a serious concern by the 
Council’s members that terrorist acts may be committed against themselves and certain 
of their vital interests by persons taking refuge abroad. On the one hand, extradite or 
prosecute provides for a mutually beneficial means by which States that have a 
connection with an alleged offence, including threats to certain of their vital interests, 
are able to obtain the custody of the accused, or, failing extradition, have criminal 
proceedings initiated against the accused on their behalf. The Security Council may 
even have the ability to coerce States under Chapter VII to extradite alleged offenders 
who are present on their territory without having those measures subject to judicial 
review by the ICJ. On the other, the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of the principle 
is sufficiently broad to enable States to criminalise offences committed abroad, 
including where such offences are deemed to threaten their own vital interests, which 
may be enforced as soon as the accused is present in the legislating State’s territory; and 
the legislating State is not required to establish any prescriptive connection with the 
alleged offence. All that has to be proven by the legislating State is that the accused is 
‘present’ on its territory. This means that States are able to provide for broad 
prescriptive protective jurisdiction, which is grounded in treaty rather than custom, 
without the burden of having to expressly refer to or evidence the vital interests that 
they are seeking to protect. This alternative explanation of extradite or prosecute, at 
least within the context of counter-terrorism, is explained further in the following 
chapter. 
 
Given that the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute has been 
widely interpreted by some States and courts and in legal scholarship in recent years as 
the implied codification of universal jurisdiction, the following chapter examines the 
relationship between these two concepts and shows that treating them as one and the 
same appears to confuse jurisdiction for the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ 
and ‘international community values’. Thus, before discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of codifying protective jurisdiction, in chapter six, it is important to 
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enumerate some of the vital interests that have been included under protective 
jurisdiction lex lata and explain the fundamental conceptual distinction between ‘shared 
vital State interests’ and ‘international community values’.  
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Chapter Five 
  
‘Defining Protective Jurisdiction in Contemporary Customary International Law: 
A ‘Shared Vital State Interests’ Approach’ 
 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Theories relating to grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction in contemporary customary 
international law are little understood and often subject to confusion, and protective 
jurisdiction is no exception. One of the reasons accounting for this is that the protective 
principle, as with other grounds of jurisdiction, has yet to be codified. The issue of 
whether it is possible to define the protective principle and, if so, the form that this 
ought to take, has remained contested in legal scholarship since the efforts were made to 
codify extraterritorial jurisdiction by the League of Nations.1 There is thus a lack of 
clarity and certainty on the definition of protective jurisdiction, but also its scope and 
application, in contemporary international law.  
  
The purpose of this chapter is to shed important light on the definition of protective 
jurisdiction. One approach to defining this jurisdiction is to specify a list of offences 
over which the principle is applicable. However, this approach is problematic in that it 
may be difficult, if not impossible, to harmonise national laws, in particular widely 
divergent definitions of ‘terrorism’.2 The present chapter adopts an alternative approach 
and proposes that it may be possible to define protective jurisdiction, lex lata, based on 
vital interests. It does so by building on the detailed empirical analysis of State practice 
in chapter four and trying to deduce from that practice some of the vital interests that 
have been included under the ambit of the principle and around which a basic level of 
agreement appears to have clustered. The reason for proposing this approach is twofold. 
First of all, vital interests are at the heart of protective jurisdiction and provide its raison 
d’être.3 That said, vital interests are, generally speaking, not defined by national laws 
and treaties establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction. The type of vital interests that fall 
under protective jurisdiction as a matter of the law lex lata, as opposed to the 
perspective of lex ferenda, is therefore little understood by courts and in legal 
scholarship. The International Law Commission (ILC) has recently decided to include 
                                                        
1 Chapter three.  
2 Chapter four.  
3 Chapter two.   
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the topic of extraterritorial jurisdiction in its long-term programme of work and the ILC 
Secretariat has alluded to the need to consider vital interests in combatting international 
terrorism. Thus, the time is ripe for the re-examination of vital interests. Second, this 
approach to defining protective jurisdiction is not new and, it will be recalled from 
chapter three, was proposed by the Harvard Research in 1935.4  
 
However, what makes the present chapter different from the Harvard Research is that it 
enumerates a number of vital State interests that are shared by the international 
community. That is, the protection of such interests is sufficiently uniform in the 
practice of the community of States. This approach to defining protective jurisdiction is 
referred to in the present chapter as the ‘shared vital State interests’ approach. A similar 
approach has already been proposed lex ferenda by the Select Committee of Experts on 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, set up by the European Committee on Crime Problems.5 
The Committee of Experts inter alia referred to this approach as the ‘shared values 
approach’.6 The shared values approach was proposed as a way of delimiting grounds of 
jurisdiction under customary international law generally, rather than as a way of 
defining protective jurisdiction specifically. The meaning of ‘values’, as will be 
explained below, is overly vague and the Committee of Experts did not provide any 
explanation of what such values may comprise. More fundamentally, it risks confusing 
grounds of protective and universal jurisdiction; and, conceptually, it conflates the 
protection of vital State interests, which may be shared by the international community, 
with ‘international community values’, as they will be referred to by the present chapter, 
under the theory of universal jurisdiction. For these reasons, the present chapter does 
not adopt the ‘shared values approach’.  
  
There is, however, a further important reason why the focus of the present chapter is on 
‘shared vital State interests’, as distinct from ‘values’. The development of jurisdiction 
over piracy, and its subsequent expansion over war crimes in the aftermath of World 
War II, for the protection of certain shared vital State interests has been widely 
misinterpreted as the protection of international community values based on a theory of 
                                                        
4 Research on International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Part II, ‘Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime’. 29 AJIL (Supp.)(1935) 435 (Harvard Research).   
5 Council of Europe, European Committee on Crime Problems (1992). ‘Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction’, reprinted in 3 CLF 441, at p.468. 
6 Ibid.   
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universal jurisdiction.7 This collective belief inter alia would appear to have repeated 
itself in recent years, once again, in respect of the obligation to extradite or prosecute, a 
principle that has, starting with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, been used in more than 
sixty treaties, including counter-terrorism treaties.8 The present chapter suggests that the 
extradite or prosecute principle in counter-terrorism treaties should not, on closer 
inspection, be automatically interpreted as the exclusive treaty codification of a 
customary rule of universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community 
values. Rather, the chapter proposes an alternative interpretation. As will be explained 
below, the reason why extraterritorial jurisdiction arising out this principle does not 
explicitly require a prescriptive connection between a legislating State and an alleged 
offence committed abroad is necessary for States parties to implement the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute, the purpose of which is more effectively to protect their own 
sovereignty and certain of their vital interests. Thus, the party in whose custody the 
accused is present is obliged, failing extradition to the party that has a connection with 
the alleged offence, to initiate criminal proceedings on the latter’s behalf. The 
prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle is also 
sufficiently broad to encompass offences that implicate a party’s vital interests but 
which do not, or cannot be evidenced, to fall within one of the more narrowly defined 
circumstances specified by the relevant treaty. In the latter case, all that has to be 
evidenced by the legislating State is the presence of the accused on its territory. There is 
thus a fundamental conceptual distinction that needs to be made, for the purpose of 
distinguishing more clearly grounds of protective and universal jurisdiction, between 
the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ and ‘international community values’.  
 
The chapter concludes that, based on State, treaty and U.N. Security Council practice, 
13 vital State interests, 10 of which are shared by the international community, have 
been included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata. This finding could 
provide a useful basis on which to begin a more informed discussion on the codification 
of protective jurisdiction by the ILC.  
 
The chapter begins, in part two, by examining in depth a fundamental conceptual 
distinction between ‘shared vital State interests’ and ‘international community values’. 
                                                        
7 Chapter three.   
8 See U.N. Doc.A.CN.4/630 (18 June 2010). 
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It shows that the interpretation of extradite or prosecute as the implicit codification of a 
theory of universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community values has 
been accepted uncritically by courts and commentators, which have persistently either 
relied on tentative, secondary material, or cited primary materials, wholly out of con-
text. It also appears to be based, a priori, on a collective belief: namely that the 
protection of such values on the basis of universal jurisdiction already exists as an 
indisputable customary rule in respect of piracy and war crimes, and has done so 
historically, and can simply be analogised with the extradite or prosecute principle and 
expanded to include a broad range of treaty crimes. These issues are illustrated no 
better, perhaps, than the recent decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
case of Belgium v Senegal.9 As will be explained, the way in which the ICJ described 
extradite or prosecute as ‘universal jurisdiction’, absent, as it is, of any reasoning, 
simply amounts to a bald ipse dixit, and what the ICJ meant by ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
is thus open to question.  
  
Part three suggests that, on closer inspection, the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of 
the extradite or prosecute principle is equally capable of interpretation as a form of 
‘treaty-based’ extraterritorial jurisdiction. States parties to the relevant treaties 
concerned are able to use this mutually beneficial treaty-based jurisdiction in order more 
effectively to protect, or have protected on their behalf by other parties, their own 
sovereignty and certain of their vital interests, some of which are shared by the 
international community. This alternative interpretation of extradite or prosecute, it has 
to be stressed from the outset, is limited, for the purposes of this present analysis, to 
counter-terrorism treaties, given that the empirical research into State practice, in 
chapter four, includes national laws implementing extradite or prosecute contained in 
these treaties and that the focus of the present study is on international terrorism. That 
said, the extradite or prosecute principle in counter-terrorism treaties is modelled on the 
same principle used in approximately three-quarters of the multilateral treaties dealing 
with criminal matters that have been adopted since 1970.10 The present analysis could 
thus have broader implications. It is also worth noting that the aim this analysis is not to 
challenge the validity of universal jurisdiction in contemporary customary international 
                                                        
9 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2012, p.32. 
10 U.N. Doc.A/68/10 (2013), Annex A, paras.19, 21; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.829 (2013), at pp.6-10.  
150 
 
law; rather, it is to show that extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties and the 
theory of universal jurisdiction have different rationales - and are capable of protecting 
different values and interests - in the prevention of impunity. Having examined the 
distinction between shared vital State interests and international community values, the 
chapter then considers, in part five, existing approaches used to define protective 
jurisdiction and explains the reason for focusing on vital interests. The final part of the 
chapter enumerates some of the vital State interests that have been included under the 
protective principle lex lata and analyses some of these interests in order to show that 
they are shared by the international community.  
 
5.2. A Fundamental Conceptual Distinction: ‘Shared Vital State Interests’ and 
‘International Community Values’ 
 
Before examining some of the vital interests that have been included under the ambit of 
protective jurisdiction lex lata, it is important first to explain in some depth a 
fundamental conceptual distinction between ‘shared vital State interests’ and 
‘international community values’. The reason for making this distinction is that, since 
the Harvard Research codified grounds of jurisdiction lex ferenda, in 1935, there has 
developed an unfounded collective belief. It will be recalled from chapters one and three 
that this belief, which has largely gone unquestioned, has developed out of haphazard 
analyses of State practice and the overreliance on tentative, secondary sources of 
evidence of customary international law. It posits that the protection of ‘international 
community values’ under a theory of universal jurisdiction has developed as a 
customary rule for the past several hundred years over piracy and expanded to include 
crimes under international law in the aftermath of World War II. This belief appears to 
have repeated itself, once again, in recent years in respect of the treaty obligation to 
extradite or prosecute. This raises a broader question of the way in which extradite or 
prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties and its relationship with universal jurisdiction in 
international law should be interpreted, to which this chapter will now turn.   
 
5.2.1. Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute and Universal Jurisdiction   
  
Since the mid-twentieth century, starting with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, more than 
sixty treaties, including counter-terrorism treaties, have been elaborated to include the 
extradite or prosecute principle.11 This principle obliges the parties to relevant treaties to 
                                                        
11 Supra n 8.  
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establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in their national laws over specified offences 
occurring abroad in the absence of an explicit prescriptive connection between the 
impugned conduct and the interests of the legislating State. Thus, at first glance, the 
extradite or prosecute principle would appear to represent the implicit embodiment or 
codification of a theory of universal jurisdiction under customary international law, 
while the national laws implementing such treaties would appear to evidence 
widespread State practice in support of universal jurisdiction. It should, perhaps, be of 
little surprise that this is the way in which extradite or prosecute has been interpreted in 
recent years by some States and judicial opinions,12 members of the ILC,13 non-
governmental organisations,14 as well as in legal scholarship.15 This form of jurisdiction 
is sometimes referred to as ‘conditional’ or ‘subsidiary’ universal jurisdiction, on the 
basis that a party has an obligation to enforce such jurisdiction upon the accused’s 
presence on its territory.16 The U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in its 
                                                        
12 Council of Europe, supra n 5, at p.453; U.S. v Layton 509 F.Supp.212 (N.D.Cal., 1981); U.S. v Yunis 
924 F.2d.1086 (D.C.Cir., 1991), at p.1091; U.S. v Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d.189 (S.D.N.Y., 13 March 
2000), at p.215; R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) 
[1999] 2 All  ER 97, at p.111 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); ibid., at p.177 (Lord Millett); Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (Appeals Chamber), Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law, Terrorism, Conspiracy, 
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, STL-11-01/1, 16 February 2011, para.86 & note 134; 
U.N. Doc.A/65/181 (2010), paras.21-22; Sixth Committee, ‘The scope and application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction: information provided by Spain’, Note submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs 
pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/117 of 16 December 2009 (12 November 2010), at pp.9-11; 
Council of the European Union, ‘The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction’, 
Doc.8672/1/09, REV1 (16 April 2009), para.11 (Expert Report). 
13 U.N. Doc.A/49/10 (1994), para.200; ILCYB, vol.II (Part II) (1996), paras.5-7 ; U.N. Doc.A.CN.4/630, 
supra n 8, para.94. 
14 Institute of International Law (Rapporteur C. Tomuschat), ‘Resolution on Universal Criminal 
Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes’, Krakow, 
2005, para.2 (Institute); Sixth Committee, ICRC, Information and Observations on the Scope and 
Application of Universal Jurisdiction, Note submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs pursuant to General 
Assembly resolution 65/33 (30 April 2013); ALI, Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. 
(Third), Washington, D.C. (1987), para.404. 
15 Expert Report, supra n 12, paras.11,16 ; Cryer, R., ‘Zardad’, in Cassese, A. et al. (eds.). (2009). 
‘Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice’. Oxford: OUP, at p.979; Cryer, R. & Friman, H. & 
Robinson, D. & Wilmshurst, E. (2010). ‘An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure’. 
Cambridge: CUP, at pp.51-53; D’Aspremont, J. (2010). ‘Multilateral versus Unilateral Exercises of 
Universal Jurisdiction’. 43 Isr.L.Rev. 301, at pp.305-306; Kreß, C. (2006). ‘Universal Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes and the Instiut de Droit International’. 4 JICJ 561, at pp.566, 568, 573-576; 
O’Keefe, R. (2004). ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’. 2 JICJ 735, at pp.747, 755; 
O’Keefe, R. (2009). ‘The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction’. 7 JICJ 811, at pp.812, 
814, 817, 826; Saul, B. (2011). ‘Legislating from a Radical Hague: The UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
Invents an International Crime of Transnational Terrorism’. 24 LJIL 677, at pp.682, 690; Scharf, M.P., 
‘Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime: Universal Jurisdiction and the Harvard Research’, in Grant, J.P. & 
Barker, J.C. (eds.) (2007). ‘Harvard Research in International Law: Contemporary Analysis and 
Appraisal’. Buffalo: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., at p.283. 
16 U.N. Doc.A/65/181, supra n 12; Institute, supra n 14, para.3(b); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC 
v Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3, at pp.43-44 (Sep. Op. Judge Guillaume); Abi-Saab, G. 
(2003). ‘The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction’. 1 JICJ 596, at p.601; Cassese, A. (2003). ‘Is the Bell 
Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal Jurisdiction’. 1 JICJ 589, at pp.592-
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examination of the applicable grounds of jurisdiction for combatting international 
terrorism, in the light of counter-terrorism conventions and Security Council resolution 
1373, has suggested that ‘the most important form of jurisdiction’ that States are 
required to establish is extradite or prosecute, the corollary of which ‘means the 
establishment of universal jurisdiction’ in national laws.17 The ‘purpose’ of such 
jurisdiction is for ‘ensuring that there is no safe haven for terrorists’.18 The justification 
for the use of universal jurisdiction over terrorist acts, suggested the UNODC, is that: 
  
[c]ertain interests warrant universal protection. These involve the interests 
of the international community. In such instances the universality principle 
is applied. It enables national jurisdiction to be asserted vis-à-vis 
perpetrators of particularly serious acts who are arrested in the national 
territory. This is so with acts of terrorism.19 
  
The UNODC does not, however, explain what these international community interests 
comprise.  
 
The common denominator of all of these views is to place stress on the absence of any 
explicit prescriptive connection, for example, based on the nationality of the accused or 
threats to vital interests, between the legislating State and an offence committed abroad: 
that is, at the time of the commission of the offence, no other internationally accepted 
ground of jurisdiction to prescribe is needed to link the legislating State to the accused. 
The prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute, it is assumed, must 
therefore be to protect international community values on a ground of universal 
jurisdiction.20 This view is also based a priori on a fundamental assumption, namely 
that the protection of such values already exists as an indisputable customary rule in 
respect of piracy and war crimes, and has done so historically, which can simply be 
analogised with extradite or prosecute and expanded to include a wide range of other 
treaty crimes.21 This raises great uncertainty as to the most appropriate ground of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
593; Lowe, V. & Staker, C., ‘Jurisdiction’, in Evans, M.D. (2010). ‘International Law’. Oxford: OUP, at 
p.328; Shaw, M.N. (2008). ‘International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at pp.673-674. 
17 UNODC, ‘Guide for the Legislative Incorporation and Implementation of the Universal Anti-Terrorism 
Instruments’, New York: U.N. (2006), paras.350-354, 360, 367.   
18 Ibid., para.347.    
19 Ibid., para.366. Cf. UNODC, ‘Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols’, New York: U.N. 
(2004).  
20 E.g., Institute, supra n 14, preambular para.1. 
21 Layton, supra n 12, at p.223; Kreß, supra n 15, at p.566; Scharf, supra n 15, at pp.276-285; Third 
Restatement, supra n 14, para.404 & Reporters’ Note 1; Arrest Warrant, supra n 16, at pp.76, 78-79, 81 
(J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); U.N. Doc.A/65/181, supra n 12, para.27; Sixth Committee, U.N. 
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jurisdiction for combatting international terrorism, and the values or interests that States 
do, or should, protect. In order to illustrate the importance of these issues more 
forcefully, it is perhaps useful to refer to a few examples of eminent scholars in the 
field.  
 
Scharf has asserted that, as regards universal jurisdiction under customary international 
law, ‘[f]or the past 500 years, States have exercised jurisdiction over piratical acts on 
the high seas’. In support, Scharf cited the Harvard Research and one other tentative, 
secondary source.22 Scharf proceeded to suggest that, in the aftermath of World War II, 
a customary rule of universal jurisdiction expanded to cover war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, and that in recent years a growing number of other offences ‘have 
been made subject to universal jurisdiction through the negotiation of multinational 
conventions’.23 However, Scharf provided no analysis of primary or secondary sources 
in support of the expansion of universal jurisdiction over piracy to include war crimes 
or treaty crimes, or the international community values protected. Similarly, O’Keefe 
has suggested that the adoption of universal jurisdiction in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions ‘helped to catalyse a re-conceptualization already underway of the 
international legal basis for national jurisdiction over war crimes more generally.’24 The 
only way in which O’Keefe supported this assertion, by way of primary sources, was 
the citation of a single case arising out of State practice in the aftermath of World War 
II. As has already been explained elsewhere, O’Keefe misinterpreted this case as 
evidence of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction.25 O’Keefe proceeded to state, 
without any further analysis, that the codification of ‘mandatory’ universal jurisdiction 
by the grave breaches provisions ‘likely eased the passage of the long procession of 
international criminal conventions adopted since the beginning of the 1970s’ obliging 
States parties to establish universal jurisdiction in their national laws.26  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Doc.A/C.6/64/SR.12 (20 October 2009), paras.10, 95; ALI, Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the 
U.S. (Second), Washington, D.C. (1965), para.34, Comment (a)-(b) & Reporters’ Note 2; Randall, K. 
(1987-1988). ‘Universal Jurisdiction’. 66 TexL.Rev. 785. 
22 Supra n 15, at p.276.  
23 Ibid., at pp.278, 283.  
24 O’Keefe, supra n 15, at p.823 (italics added). 
25 Garrod, M. (2012). ‘The Protective Principle of Jurisdiction over War Crimes and the Hollow Concept 
of Universality’. 12 ICLR 93, at p.804. 
26 Supra n 15, at p.826. 
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The work of Kreß, to which reference has already been made in chapter one, is also 
particularly illustrative.27 Kreß has asserted the ‘undeniably customary title to universal 
jurisdiction in the case of piracy’28 and its expansion over war crimes,29 despite not 
having undertaken any research or analysis of primary or secondary sources. 
Nonetheless, Kreß suggested that it is ‘evident’ that what has emerged from subsequent 
State practice is ‘the existence of true universal jurisdiction over all the crimes under 
international law’.30 This leads Kreß to suggest that the extradite or prosecute principle, 
where it is used in treaties that proscribe conduct that is criminal under international 
law, is universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community values.31 
Kreß leaves unexplained the values that are protected based on universal jurisdiction. 
This raises the small matter of other treaties that use extradite or prosecute, the vast 
majority of which do not deal with international crimes, as well as the difficulty of 
connecting the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of these treaties with the protection 
of international community values. Kreß simply stated that:  
 
[w]hether or not those aut dedere aut judicare regimes ‘protect fundamental 
values of the international community’ is open to question and precisely for 
this reason it is a matter of controversy whether or not they should be 
brought within the concept of universal jurisdiction.32 
 
It is not clear how the nature of a crime transforms the extradite or prosecute principle 
into a theory of universal jurisdiction in some treaties, while the use of the same 
principle in other treaties does not.  A more persuasive explanation may be found in the 
fact that, as a matter of custom, international community values have traditionally not 
been protected under a theory of universal jurisdiction in respect of piracy and war 
crimes.33 It is precisely for this reason that commentators, such as Kreß, are now faced 
with the dilemma of trying to distinguish between the nature and purpose of extradite or 
prosecute in treaties dealing with international crimes and the majority of other treaties 
making provision for the same obligation that have no relevance to international crimes, 
such as acts of terrorism.  
                                                        
27 Kreß, supra n 15. 
28 Ibid., at p.569. 
29 Ibid., at p.566. 
30 Ibid., at p.573. 
31 Ibid., at pp.566-568. 
32 Ibid., at pp.566-567. 
33 Chapter three; Garrod, supra n 25; Garrod, M. (2014). ‘Piracy, the Protection of Vital State Interests 
and the False Foundations of Universal Jurisdiction in International Law’. 25 Diplomacy&Statecraft 1. 
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It suffices to say that the interpretation of extradite or prosecute as a theory of universal 
jurisdiction has been accepted uncritically, and often exaggerated, by courts and 
commentators, which have persistently either relied on tentative, secondary material, or 
cited primary materials, wholly out of context.34 It is open to question whether such an 
approach is sufficiently rigorous and provides for an accurate explanation of the law.35 
It also risks an oversimplification of the law. These issues are illustrated no better, 
perhaps, than the recent decision by the ICJ in the case of Belgium v Senegal, in which 
the ICJ pronounced, for the first time, on the obligation to extradite or prosecute and 
described the use of it in Article 5(2) of the 1984 U.N. Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the CAT) as ‘universal 
jurisdiction’.36 Since the present author has provided an in-depth analysis of the 
relationship between extradite or prosecute and universal jurisdiction elsewhere, 
including the judgment of the ICJ inter alia, the sections that follow are limited to a 
summary of the findings.37 Extradite or prosecute in the CAT is modelled on the same 
principle used in approximately three-quarters of the multilateral treaties dealing with 
criminal matters that have been adopted since 1970, including counter-terrorism 
treaties.38 It is therefore important to examine the way in which the ICJ described 
extradite or prosecute as universal jurisdiction in order to show, absent, as it is, of any 
reasoning, that it is simply a bald ipse dixit and the meaning given to ‘universal 
jurisdiction’ is thus open to question.39  
 
 
 
5.2.2. The Habré Case  
 
The case concerned the institution of proceedings by Belgium at the ICJ against Senegal 
over a dispute concerning the latter’s compliance with its obligations arising under the 
CAT. More specifically, Belgium submitted, firstly, that Senegal had breached its 
                                                        
34 E.g., references at footnotes 12 & 15.  
35 Yee, S. (2011). ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’. 10 Chinese JIL 503, para.14; 
Yee, S. (2013). ‘A Call for a More Rigorous Assessment of Universal Jurisdiction’. Annual Meeting of 
the American Society of International Law, April 2013). 
36 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; Judgment, supra n 9.  
37 Garrod, M., ‘The Unreasoned Relationship between Extradite or Prosecute and Universal Jurisdiction 
in International Law in Light of the Judgment by the ICJ in Belgium v Senegal’ (under review by the 
Chinese ILJ).  
38 Supra n 10.  
39 Yee (2013), supra n 35, at p.245. 
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obligation under Article 5(2) of the CAT by failing to establish universal jurisdiction in 
its domestic law over the crimes under the instrument and, second, that Senegal was in 
breach of its obligations by failing to initiate criminal proceedings against Habré, or, 
failing that, by extraditing Habré ‘to Belgium without further ado’.40 
  
The ICJ, from the outset of its judgment, described the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute under the CAT as ‘universal jurisdiction’.41 In the words of the ICJ, ‘[t]he 
Convention against Torture thus brings together 150 States which have committed 
themselves to prosecuting suspects in particular on the basis of universal jurisdiction.’42  
 
The starting point for analysis is that Article 5 of the CAT does not expressly provide 
for a ground of ‘universal jurisdiction’.43 This means that Article 5(2) has to be 
interpreted as universal jurisdiction. The way in which the ICJ approached this matter 
raises serious methodological concerns going to the heart of its reasoning. The ICJ 
described Article 5(2) as ‘universal jurisdiction’ in passing, as if such an interpretation 
was beyond question, and altogether avoided any analysis of extradite or prosecute, or 
the ground of universal jurisdiction in customary international law. On closer 
inspection, the ICJ appears to have impliedly followed the earlier decision of the U.N. 
Committee against Torture in the Habré case.44 However, the Committee inter alia did 
not provide any reasoning in support of its description of extradite or prosecute in 
Article 5(2) of the CAT as ‘universal jurisdiction’ either.  
 
As a general rule of treaty interpretation, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(the VCLT) provides, by virtue of Article 31, that a treaty shall be interpreted in 
accordance with ‘the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’.45 The ‘context’ of a treaty includes 
the instrument’s text and preamble.46 The ICJ in the present case interpreted the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of Article 5(2) as ‘universal jurisdiction’ according solely to the 
                                                        
40 Judgment, supra n 9, paras.44, 71, 118. 
41 Ibid., paras.74 & 115.  
42 Ibid., para.75. 
43 Arrest Warrant, supra n 16, para.41 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); Yee (2011), supra n 35, 
para.21; Yee (2013), supra n 35, at p.245. 
44 U.N. Committee against Torture, Suleymane Guengueng et al. v Senegal, Communication 
No.181/2001, decision of 17 May 2006, CAT/C/36/D/181/2001. 
45 Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 31(1).  
46 Ibid., Article 31(2).   
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supposed ‘object and purpose’ of the CAT. The phrase ‘object and purpose’ is not 
defined by the VCLT and its meaning is vague and thus open to interpretation.47 
Nonetheless, in order to interpret the object and purpose of Article 5(2), one would 
reasonably expect the ICJ, which is at the heart of the international legal system, to have 
some regard to its ‘context’.48 The ‘object and purpose’ of the CAT was inferred by the 
ICJ from a single, and somewhat ambiguous, preambular paragraph of the CAT, which 
merely provides that States parties desire ‘to make more effective the struggle against 
torture’.49 According to the ICJ, this paragraph means ‘avoiding impunity’ in order to 
protect ‘shared values’, which can only be combated by an obligation to establish 
universal jurisdiction.50 It may be the case that the ICJ placed more weight on this 
preambular paragraph than it is capable of bearing. In fact, the ordinary meaning given 
to Article 5(2) by the ICJ - by focusing on this preambular paragraph in isolation - is 
inconsistent with a basic textual analysis of the context of Article 5 as a whole and may 
even frustrate the textual situation.51 Article 5(2) makes clear that it cannot be 
considered in isolation to ‘the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article’. Yet the 
ICJ gave no consideration either to the meaning of this wording of the text of Article 
5(2) or Article 5(1). This will be returned to below. The ICJ left unexplained how, 
either as a matter of custom or within the context of the CAT, the need to avoid 
impunity, an imprecise expression, specifically gives rise to universal jurisdiction, or 
the ‘shared values’ that States are supposed to protect by preventing impunity.  
 
The VCLT provides for a supplementary means of interpretation, by having recourse to 
the preparatory work of the treaty, ‘in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31’.52 The only extent to which the ICJ was prepared to observe 
the travaux préparatoires of the CAT was to note, in passing, that Article 7(1) of the 
instrument is modelled on the 1970 Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.53 This 
statement explains nothing as to the meaning of extradite or prosecute under Article 
7(1) inter alia or, a priori, whether Article 5(2) of the CAT codifies a ground of 
                                                        
47 Buffard, I. & Zemanek, K. (1998), ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’. 3 
AustriaRev.Int’l&Eur.L. 311.  
48 Supra n 45, Article 31(3).  
49 Supra n 36, preambular para.6. 
50 Judgment, supra n 9, paras.50, 68, 74-75. See also Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v Senegal), Belgium Memorial, vol.I (2010), at pp.45-46. 
51 Garrod, supra n 37.  
52 Supra n 45, Article 32. 
53 Judgment, supra n 9, para.90. 
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jurisdiction recognised by customary international law, no less an obligatory theory of 
‘universal jurisdiction’.  
 
It is not possible here to provide an in-depth analysis of the travaux préparatoires of the 
CAT.54 It suffices to say that a close reading of the debates within the Working Group, 
which was established for the purpose of drawing up a draft convention, reveals that the 
nomenclature ‘principle of universality’ was used as nothing more than a way to 
describe the obligation to extradite or prosecute, a mechanism that was understood to 
correspond with provisions in a number of existing counter-terrorism conventions.55 As 
pointed out by Burgers and Danelius, the respective representatives of the Netherlands 
and Sweden to the Human Rights Commission and, respectively, the Chairman of the 
Working Group and the draftsmen of the first draft of the convention, Article 5(2) was, 
‘with some simplification, called ‘universal jurisdiction’’.56 To accept at face value the 
reference made by the Working Group to ‘universal jurisdiction’, other than as a non-
technical term used to describe extradite or prosecute, as have some,57 risks attributing 
to Article 5(2) legal effects and consequences that were not debated or intended. This is 
indicated for three reasons.  
 
First of all, the validity of universal jurisdiction under customary international law, as 
well as the implications raised by expanding this theory to include treaty-based crimes 
falling under the obligation to extradite or prosecute, was not examined by the Working 
Group. Second, it is unlikely that the Working Group intended to codify a theory of 
jurisdiction whose meaning and definition, then as now, are controversial and little 
understood.58 Lastly, a number of States that participated in the drafting of Article 5(2) 
have subsequently confirmed that it was not intended to codify a ground of universal 
jurisdiction.59 Notably, the only reason why extradite or prosecute appears to have been 
                                                        
54 See Garrod, supra n 37; also Burgers, J.H. & Danelius, H.  (1988). ‘The United Nations Convention 
against Torture. A Textbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment’. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff; Boulbesba, A. (1999). ‘The U.N. 
Convention on Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement’. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, chapter 4. 
55 Burgers & Danelius, ibid., at p.35.   
56 Ibid.  
57 Pinochet, supra n 12, ibid. (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  
58 U.N. Doc.A/65/181, supra n 12. 
59 Sixth Committee, U.K., Scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, Note submitted 
to the Office of Legal Affairs pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/33 of 6 December 2010 
(2011); ibid., Government of the People’s Republic of China, Information from and observations by 
China on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction, Note submitted to the Office 
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described as ‘universal jurisdiction’ is because of an over-simplistic analogy between 
the absence of an express prescriptive connection in Article 5(2) with an alleged offence 
and the presumed development of a theory of universal jurisdiction over piracy.60   
  
Nor was the ICJ in the present case prepared to consider the way in which Article 5(2) 
has subsequently been implemented and interpreted in State practice, in accordance with 
the VCLT, in order to deduce evidence of the emergence of a rule of universal 
jurisdiction.61 Whether the protection of international community values, or, to use the 
language of the ICJ, ‘shared values’, on the basis of universal jurisdiction has, in fact, 
developed as a customary rule through the implementation by States of treaties that 
utilise extradite or prosecute raises complex issues and would require nothing less than 
a rigorous, empirical assessment of State practice and opinio juris, which is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.62 It is worth noting, by way of an aside, that the idea that extradite 
or prosecute codifies a ground of universal jurisdiction has developed not out of State 
practice but, rather, out of comments and observations made by States. According to the 
ILC, the latter have the status merely ‘as secondary sources of information regarding 
State practice’.63 Such observations and comments describing extradite or prosecute as a 
theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’ may not necessarily correspond with, and may even be 
contradicted by State practice. This is illustrated no clearer, for example, than the verbal 
claims by Spain, a State regarded as one of the ‘pioneers’ of universal jurisdiction, in its 
comments and observations submitted to the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General 
Assembly on the topic of universal jurisdiction.64 In that connection, it is notable that 
the ICJ in the present case overlooked the fact that Belgium, one of only a handful of 
States to have previously established universal jurisdiction in its domestic law, amended 
its law in 2003, by which Belgium abolished universal jurisdiction and substantially 
restricted its scope over crimes committed abroad ‘only when the victim is, at the time 
of the events, Belgian, or having been staying effectively in Belgium for at least three 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of Legal Affairs pursuant to General Assembly resolution 64/117 of 16 December 2009, at pp.3-4, 8-10 
(2010). 
60 U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1314 (1978), paras.15, 69; also Pinochet, supra n 12, at ibid. (Lord Millett). 
61 Supra n 45, Article 31(3)(b). 
62 Garrod, M., ‘The Development of Universal Jurisdiction: A Plea for a More Rigorous Approach to 
International Law Making’ (under preparation). See also Yee (2013), supra n 35, at p.242. 
63 U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/659 (2013), para.24. 
64 See Spain, supra n 12; Sixth Committee, ‘Scope and principle of international jurisdiction: information 
provided by the Kingdom of Spain, Note submitted to the Office of Legal Affairs pursuant to General 
Assembly resolution 67/98 of 14 December 2010 (29 April 2013), para.15. 
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years.’65 Belgium’s submission in the present case that extradite or prosecute in the 
CAT requires States parties to establish universal jurisdiction is inconsistent with 
Belgium’s own practice.66  
 
The debate on universal jurisdiction at the General Assembly and its Sixth Committee, 
which has been on-going since 2009, shows that there is great confusion and 
disagreement on the meaning of ‘universal jurisdiction’ and its relationship with 
extradite or prosecute, and that a considerable number of States have cautioned against 
confusing them.67 Yee, having analysed the comments and observations during this 
debate, has found that extradite or prosecute has, through the use of loose language, 
inaccurately come to be described by many States as ‘universal jurisdiction’, which 
does not correspond with State and treaty practice.68 The same point applies, mutatis 
mutandis, to the efforts made to codify extradite or prosecute by the ILC, which has not, 
after almost a decade of work, reached agreement on the relationship between universal 
jurisdiction and the distinct obligation to extradite or prosecute.69 Thus, it may be open 
to question the extent to which the nomenclature of ‘universal jurisdiction’ used to 
describe extradite or prosecute can be relied upon in a meaningful way.  
  
In sum, the reason why the ICJ gave no analysis to the meaning of extradite or 
prosecute in Article 5(2) may be because the ICJ found that it had ‘no jurisdiction in 
this case’ over it.70 Yet, this raises the question whether the ICJ should have described 
extradite or prosecute as ‘universal jurisdiction’ at all.71 It also renders this aspect of the 
judgment to mere obiter. The judgment has, nonetheless, been welcomed in legal 
scholarship for ‘clarifying the obligation to extradite or prosecute … [by indicating] that 
the obligation is premised upon universal jurisdiction’, and for reinforcing ‘the principle 
that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of 
                                                        
65 Law of 5 August 2003, in Judgment, supra n 9, paras.5-8 (Diss. Op. Judge Xue); ibid., para.40 (Sep. 
Op. Judge Abraham).  
66 See also Expert Report, supra n 12, at p.30.  
67 U.N. Doc.A/65/181, supra n 12, para.15; Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc.A/C.6/64/SR.12 (20 October 
2009), paras.19, 48, 59, 66, 71, 82, 90, 95, 96; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.11 (13 October 2010), 
paras.10, 14, 17, 25, 27, 49; ibid., U.N. Doc.A/C.6/66/SR.12 (12 October 2011), paras.4, 7, 18, 27, 34, 47, 
59, 62, 72.  
68 Yee (2011), supra n 35. 
69 E.g., U.N. Doc.A/68/10, supra n 10, para.24; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/612 (2009); U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.774 
(2010), at pp.6-7; U.N. Doc.A/67/10 (2012), at pp.118-119; U.N. Doc.A/69/10 (2014), at pp.149-150. 
70 Supra n 9, para.74.  
71 Ibid.  
161 
 
international law’.72 However, the loose reference by the ICJ to universal jurisdiction 
can hardly be regarded as a meaningful pronouncement on the extradite or prosecute 
principle itself or its relationship, if any at all, with universal jurisdiction.73 On closer 
inspection, the extradite or prosecute principle may be capable of being interpreted in an 
alternative way, to which this chapter will now turn.  
 
5.3. Extradite or Prosecute: An Alternative Interpretation? 
 
Extradite or prosecute should not automatically be interpreted as codifying, or obliging 
States parties to establish in their national laws, a ground of universal jurisdiction.74 
Rather, the principle is, on closer inspection, equally capable of interpretation as a 
‘treaty-based’ form of extraterritorial jurisdiction.75 It has to be stressed, from the 
outset, that there is an important difference between such treaty-based jurisdiction and 
grounds of jurisdiction in general international law: the obligatory prescriptive 
jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle derives directly from 
treaty and ipso facto creates a prescriptive connection between States parties to the 
treaty concerned and the specified offences occurring abroad. It follows that the need 
for a legislating State, in implementing the extradite or prosecute principle, to justify the 
application of its national laws over the conduct of foreign nationals abroad - by 
evidencing, based on a particular ground of jurisdiction, a sufficiently close link 
between the impugned conduct and the interests of the legislating State - is not required 
as a matter of international law.76 Thus, the absence of an explicit prescriptive 
connection does not, in and of itself, lead to a finding that such jurisdiction is based on a 
theory of ‘universality’. 
 
The question that one has to ask is the reason why States provide for such broad, 
obligatory prescriptive jurisdiction under the extradite or prosecute principle? The 
                                                        
72 Andenas, M. & Weatherall, T. (2013). ‘International Court of Justice: Questions Relating to the 
Obligations to Extradite or Prosecute (Belgium v Senegal) Judgment of 20 July 2012’. 62 ICLQ 753, at 
pp.753, 768. 
73 See also Yee (2013), supra n 35, at p.245.  
74 Garrod, supra n 37; also Arrest Warrant, supra 16, para.41 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); 
Pinochet, supra n 12, at pp.115-116 (Lord Goff); ibid., at pp.187-188 (Lord Phillips); U.S. v Yousef, 327 
F.3d56 (2nd Cir., 2003), at pp.94-96, 108-111; Yee, ibid., at p.244; Yee (2011), supra n 35, paras.17-28; 
R v Bow Street Magistrates’ Court and others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte [1998] All ER (D)629(No 1), at 
p.14 (Lord Slynn); Institute of International Law (Rapporteur Lady Fox), ‘The Fundamental Rights of the 
Person and the Immunity from Jurisdiction in International Law’, 73 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit 
international 1 (2009), at pp.38-39.  
75 Garrod, ibid.; Yousef, ibid.; Arrest Warrant, ibid., para.41 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.). 
76 See also China, supra n 59, para.6. 
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answer to this question, it would appear, is not solely to protect international community 
values, as would otherwise be required by universal jurisdiction. The reason for this 
finding is that none of the treaties utilising extradite or prosecute expressly provide for a 
ground of universal jurisdiction; moreover, it would be odd for such treaties to 
implicitly codify one particular ground of jurisdiction, as opposed to any other, or, for 
that matter, to require States parties to establish universal jurisdiction in their national 
laws, given the fundamental disagreement on its meaning. Nor do treaties make 
reference to the supposed international community values that States parties are obliged 
to protect. These treaties are often adopted in response to certain offences that implicate 
the sovereignty and certain other vital interests of States. In the case of the CAT, for 
example, it is reasonable to suppose from the operative provisions of the instrument that 
States are concerned with the protection of their own nationals from acts of torture by 
State officials and that such acts implicate the sovereignty, political independence and 
governmental functions of the parties concerned.77  
  
A more persuasive explanation is to be found from a basic textual analysis of the 
extradite or prosecute principle used in three-quarters of the multilateral treaties dealing 
with criminal matters that have been adopted since 1970, including the CAT, which 
would appear to create a prescriptive connection, albeit one deriving from treaty, 
between States parties and treaty offences that occur abroad in two important ways.78 
Given that the focus of the present study is on international terrorism, these links are 
illustrated here by considering extradite or prosecute used in counter-terrorism treaties 
and, by way of example, the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Bombings (the Bombings Convention).79  
 
The Bombings Convention provides, by virtue of Article 6(4), that ‘[e]ach State Party 
shall ... take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such 
offences [referred to in Article 2] in cases where the alleged offender is present in its 
territory and it does not extradite that person to any of the States Parties which have 
established their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 or 2.’80 The obligation to 
                                                        
77 Garrod, supra n 37. 
78 See also Yee (2011), supra n 35, para.8. 
79 2149 U.N.T.S. 256.  
80 Italics added.  
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extradite or prosecute thus comprises two mutually distinct, but intertwined, aspects: 
jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce.   
  
In respect of prescriptive jurisdiction, the wording of Article 6(4) makes it sufficiently 
clear that the scope of jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle is, 
by definition, limited to treaty offences that have a specified prescriptive link with one 
or more of the States parties ‘which have established their jurisdiction in accordance 
with paragraph 1 or 2’ (paragraph 1 and 2 States). It is evident from the text of Article 
6(4) that the jurisdiction of the State in whose territory the accused is present, or the 
‘custodial State’, as it will be referred to in the present chapter, has to be read in 
conjunction with the jurisdiction of paragraph 1 and 2 States. These latter States are 
either required or permitted to provide for prescriptive jurisdiction under certain 
specified circumstances because they have links with the proscribed conduct. Article 
6(1) provides that States parties ‘shall’ establish their jurisdiction, for example, where 
an offence is committed in the territory of the legislating State or by one of its 
nationals.81 Article 6(2) sets out more specific circumstances in which States parties 
‘may’ establish their jurisdiction, for example, where an offence is committed against a 
national of the legislating State, or against a State or government facility of that State 
abroad, or if the offence is committed in order to compel that State to do or abstain from 
doing any act.82 As will be shown below, jurisdiction under these latter circumstances is 
to protect certain shared vital State interests. 
 
This alone would indicate that the jurisdiction of the custodial State under Article 6(4) 
is not ‘universal’; and to suggest that this jurisdiction is based on no prescriptive 
connection whatsoever with any State, other than the mere ‘presence’ of the accused in 
the territory of the custodial State, does not sit neatly with a reading of Article 6 as a 
whole. It is worth recalling that the ICJ in the Habré case considered the jurisdiction of 
the custodial State under Article 5(2) of the CAT in isolation from the jurisdiction of 
other parties under Article 5(1) of the instrument. This led the ICJ to suggest, somewhat 
artificially, that the custodial State’s jurisdiction is to protect exclusively international 
community values.83 It would have made little sense for delegations during the drafting 
                                                        
81 Supra n 79, Article 6(1)(a) & (c).   
82 Ibid., Article 6(2)(a), (b) & (d).  
83 Garrod, supra n 37.   
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of the Bombings Convention to negotiate and set out in Article 6(1) and (2) relatively 
narrow circumstances in which jurisdiction may be established, each of which requires a 
prescriptive link between an offence and the legislating State, only for Article 6(4) - a 
subsidiary paragraph - to create an all-encompassing, obligatory ground of universal 
jurisdiction. Article 6(1) and (2) would, moreover, be rendered superfluous.  
 
The reason why the custodial State, as a party to the Bombings Convention, is obliged 
to provide for prescriptive jurisdiction over treaty offences committed abroad having no 
connection to it, that is, offences that implicate the interests of other States parties, is in 
order to give proper effect to the obligation of extradite or prosecute. This obligation 
would not be able to function as a legal mechanism for facilitating inter-State 
cooperation and providing mutually beneficial protection of certain rights and interests 
shared by parties if the prescriptive jurisdiction under this principle was expressly 
limited to circumstances where there is a connection between an offence and specific 
interests of the legislating State. The ever-present possibility that extradition may not be 
forthcoming is precisely the reason for the mandatory treaty-based prescriptive 
jurisdiction arising out of the extradite or prosecute principle.84 Interestingly, the same 
interpretation of extradite or prosecute was made by De Visscher during the effort made 
by the League of Nations to codify extraterritorial jurisdiction and extradition. De 
Visscher suggested that ‘it might be desirable to stipulate that a State which refuses to 
surrender its nationals in respect of offences committed by them abroad of the kind 
mentioned in the extradition treaties should itself be required to put them on trial’.85 
This point is returned to below. 
 
There is, however, a further reason why the prescriptive jurisdiction of the custodial 
State under Article 6(4) is not universal. The wording of Article 6(4) is sufficiently 
broad to enable the custodial State to protect certain of its own vital interests, or even 
the vital interests of one or more of its allies, in situations where either the alleged 
offence or the vital interests implicated cannot be evidenced to fall within one of the 
more narrow circumstances specified by Article 6(2). This prescriptive jurisdiction, 
which impliedly creates a link with the alleged offence, may be enforced by the 
custodial State as soon as the accused is present on its territory and by failing to 
                                                        
84 Yousef, supra n 74, at pp.94-96, 108-111. 
85 Infra n 111, at p.258. 
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extradite the accused to another party.86 However, the custodial State does not have to 
evidence an actual prescriptive connection with the alleged offence. There may, of 
course, be other potential reasons why the custodial State fails to extradite the accused 
to a paragraph 1 or 2 State. It matters not, however, what these reasons may be. All that 
matters, from a legal perspective, is that the custodial State initiates criminal 
proceedings, failing extradition to a paragraph 1 or 2 State. The wording of Article 6(4) 
does not prevent such an interpretation of prescriptive jurisdiction.  
 
The extradite or prosecute principle not only gives rise to broad, obligatory prescriptive 
jurisdiction; it also gives rise to an obligation to extradite or prosecute. While 
prescriptive jurisdiction is extraterritorial, Article 6(4) makes clear that such jurisdiction 
must be ‘established’, or, to put it a different way, enforced, where the accused is 
present in the legislating State’s territory and it does not, for whatever reason, extradite 
that person to any paragraph 1 or 2 State. In situations where the custodial State fails to 
extradite the accused to a paragraph 1 or 2 State, whose disputed acts have no link at all 
to the custodial State, the prescriptive jurisdiction of the custodial State does not 
transform into a ground of universality, that is, in order to protect exclusively 
international community values. Rather, the wording of Article 6 implies that paragraph 
1 and 2 States have primary jurisdiction and Article 6(4) presupposes that, had the 
accused been extradited by the custodial State, one of the paragraph 1 or 2 States, each 
of whom has a specified prescriptive link with the accused or the offence, would upon 
obtaining custody be able to enforce their prescriptive jurisdiction.  
 
A perhaps more accurate way of interpreting the extradite or prosecute principle is, first 
and foremost, a means for a paragraph 1 or 2 State to obtain the custody of an accused 
and to establish its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the custodial State, by failing to extradite 
the accused to a paragraph 1 or 2 State, implicitly, and reasoning a fortiori, has an 
obligation to establish its jurisdiction on their behalf, in order to prevent the latter from 
becoming an ‘injured State’ within the meaning of Article 42 of the ILC’s Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility. In these circumstances, the custodial State is obliged to provide 
for treaty-based jurisdiction in order to implement the extradite or prosecute obligation 
                                                        
86 E.g., Yousef, supra n 74; Yunis, supra n 12, at p.1092; R v Zardad, High Court of 19 July 2005 (no 
written judgment is available); S v Okah (SS94/2011) [2013] ZAGPJHC 6 (21 January 2013); submission 
of Libya before the ICJ in the Lockerbie incident, infra n 90.  
166 
 
and, in turn, protect the interests (including certain of the vital interests) of a paragraph 
1 or 2 State if extradition fails. The enforcement of this prescriptive jurisdiction by 
States parties on each other’s behalf, where extradition is not forthcoming, is precisely 
the reason why the obligation to extradite or prosecute is triggered only upon the 
accused’s presence in the territory of a State party.  
 
The above interpretation of prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute 
is consistent with the facts of the Habré case. Belgium’s principal argument was that it 
had the right to assert jurisdiction over alleged acts of torture committed by Habré 
against Belgian nationals, by virtue of Article 5(1)(c) of the CAT, and that the refusal 
by Senegal to prosecute Habré under Article 5(2) of the CAT, failing extradition to 
Belgium, meant that Belgium was an ‘injured State’. It follows, according to Belgium, 
that Belgium had a ‘special interest’ in the Habré case.87 It is also the reason why 
Belgium - the first State to seek to enforce its rights under Article 5(2) of the CAT 
before the ICJ - as opposed to any other State, instituted proceedings against Senegal for 
the latter’s failure to prosecute Habré for alleged crimes committed against Belgian 
nationals, failing extradition to Belgium.88 It is worth noting that the ICJ in that case left 
unexplained the reason why it did not give any consideration to Belgium’s principal 
claim. The present interpretation of extradite or prosecute is also supported by the way 
in which extradite or prosecute has been implemented in domestic laws89 and exercised 
in the practice of States.90 The present discussion is limited to the principle of extradite 
or prosecute as formulated in counter-terrorism treaties and no comment is made on the 
formulation of this principle in other treaties, such as 1949 Geneva Conventions.91 That 
said, it is worth noting, by way of aside, that the grave breaches provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions are often described in legal scholarship and by many States as the 
                                                        
87 Supra n 9, para.65; Belgium Memorial, supra n 50, at pp.11, 44, 56-7, 78, 79, 82. 
88Judgment, ibid., paras.21-23 (Diss. Op. Judge ad hoc Sur); Belgium Memorial, ibid.; Application 
Instituting Proceedings, ICJ 2009, General List No. 144, at pp.3, 11, 15; oral proceedings, CR 2012/2 (12 
March 2012), paras.3-4, 12, 13; oral proceedings, CR 2012/6 (19 March 2012), paras.24, 50, 51, 53; oral 
proceedings, CR 2012/3 (13 March 2012), at pp. 28, 44, 47. 
89 National Laws and Regulations on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism: Part I, 
U.N. Legislative Series (U.N. publication, No.E/F.02.V.7), p.115; also China, supra n 59, para.6; Sixth 
Committee, U.N. Doc.A/C.6/64/SR.13 (24 November 2009). 
90 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v U.S.), Provisional Measures, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p.114, 
para.2 (J. Dec. Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar); also Pinochet (No 1), supra n 74, at 
p.5 (Lord Slynn); Zardad, supra n 86.   
91 Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Articles 49(I); 50(II); 129(III); 146(IV)). 
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first modern codification of universal jurisdiction.92 However, as has been shown by the 
present author elsewhere,93 this is not supported by a careful reading of primary sources, 
most notably the record of the Diplomatic Conference and the authoritative commentary 
of Pictet.94 
 
5.3.1. The Rationales of Universal Jurisdiction and Extradite or Prosecute   
 
Conceptually, the idea that extradite or prosecute impliedly codifies universal 
jurisdiction confuses ‘international community values’ and ‘shared vital State interests’. 
Extradite or prosecute and universal jurisdiction are both instrumental in combating 
impunity of perpetrators of serious crimes. However, they are conceptually distinct and 
have different aims - and are capable of protecting different values and interests - in 
preventing impunity. 
 
It will be recalled from chapter one that it is widely suggested by States and courts, and 
in legal scholarship, that universal jurisdiction is permitted as a matter of custom. The 
reason why this is so is because such jurisdiction transcends the interests of any State 
and every State is presumed to have an interest in preventing the impunity of 
perpetrators of certain ‘heinous’ offences in order to protect ‘international community 
values’.95 This raises two issues of great importance.  
                                                        
92 U.N. Doc.A.CN.4/630, supra n 8, para.44; O’Keefe, supra n 15, at pp.819, 828; Prosecutor v Tadić, 
Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Appeals 
Chamber) (2 October 1995), paras.79-80; Boelaert-Suominen, S. (2000). ‘Grave Breaches, Universal 
Jurisdiction and International Armed Conflict: Is Customary Law Moving Towards a Uniform 
Enforcement Mechanism for all Armed Conflicts?’. 5 J. Conflict Security Law 63; Henckaerts, J. & 
Doswald-Beck, L. (eds.) (2005). ‘Customary International Humanitarian Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at 
p.604; Van Elst, R. (2000). ‘Implementing Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions’. 13 LJIL 815, at pp.819-822. 
93 Garrod, supra n 25, at pp.810-812; Garrod, M., ‘A Re-Evaluation of the Codification of Universal 
Jurisdiction by the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ (under preparation); also, Yee (2011), supra n 35, 
paras.19-21; Röling, B.V.A., ‘Aspects of the Criminal Responsibility for Violations of the Laws of War’, 
in Cassese, A. (ed.) (1979). ‘The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict’. Naples: Editoriale 
Scientifica, at p.202. 
94 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Federal Political Department, Berne, 
Vol.II, Section B; Pictet, J.S. (1952). ‘Commentary, I, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field’. Geneva: ICRC. 
95 Arrest Warrant, supra n 16, at pp.76, 79, 81-82 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.); ibid., at pp.141, 167 
(Diss. Op. Judge van den Wyngaert); ibid., at p.98 (Diss. Op. Judge Al-Khasawneh); Judgment, supra n 
9, paras.123, 177 (Sep. Op. Judge Trindade); Eichmann v Attorney-General 36 ILR 277 (Supreme Court), 
at p.300; U.N. Doc.A/65/181 (2010), supra 12, paras.7, 9-11, 27; Sixth Committee, ‘Observations by 
Belgium on the scope and application of the principle of universal jurisdiction’, para.4; ibid., U.N. 
Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.11 (13 October 2010); Institute, supra n 14; Abi-Saab, supra n 16, at pp.599-600; 
Cassese, supra n 16, at p.591; Kreß, supra n 15, at p.567; O’Keefe, supra n 15, at p.824; Shaw, supra n 
16, at p.668; Macedo, S. (ed.) (2001). ‘The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction’. Princeton: 
New Jersey, at pp.23-24, 45; Simma, B. & Müller, A.T., ‘Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction’, in 
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The first of these is that, as has already been explained in chapters two and three, a 
customary rule of protective jurisdiction has developed over piracy for the protection of 
certain shared vital State interests. The no nexus requirement over piracy on the high 
seas has, since the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Moore in the Lotus case and the 
proposal lex ferenda by the Harvard Research, come to be inaccurately referred to as 
‘universal jurisdiction’. Secondly, if as claimed by some States and judicial opinions, 
and in legal scholarship, that international law permits States to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes because they are ‘heinous’, one may immediately 
question the reason why the ‘heinous’ nature of a crime gives rise to universal 
jurisdiction. The heinous rationale has its origins, and is dependent for its legitimacy, 
based on the assumption that it first developed in the case of piracy. The present author 
has shown elsewhere, however, that the condemnation of piracy as ‘heinous’ has 
nothing to do with universal jurisdiction or the protection of international community 
values.96 Rather, piracy was sometimes labelled as heinous because of the threat posed 
to the vital colonial trade and economic interests of the prosecuting State. The 
development of a customary rule of protective jurisdiction over piracy applies mutatis 
mutandis to war crimes in the aftermath of World War II. If States did protect 
international community values in the suppression of piracy and war crimes then this 
was, at best, incidental. In any case, there is no evidence, based on State practice, to say 
with certainty what such values may have comprised. It has to be borne in mind that the 
theory of universal jurisdiction in respect of piracy and war crimes has developed out of 
a collective belief ex post facto and dramatically diverges from history. This would 
explain the reason why such values are usually left insufficiently explained or 
unsubstantiated by courts and in legal scholarship.97 It would also explain why the 
debate on universal jurisdiction at the U.N. General Assembly, which has been on-going 
since 2009, shows that there is considerable confusion not only of the way in which 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Crawford, J. & Koskenniemi, M. (2012). ‘The Cambridge Companion to International Law’. Cambridge: 
CUP, at p.144; Villalpando, S. (2010). ‘The Legal Dimensions of the International Community’. 21 EJIL 
387, at p.406. 
96 Garrod (2014), supra n 33, at pp.199-200.    
97 Arrest Warrant, supra n 16, at pp.43-44 (Sep. Op. Judge Guillaume); ibid., at (J. Sep. Op. Judges 
Higgins et al.); Judgment, supra n 9; Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra n 12, paras.29, 86 & n 134, 91, 
118; Yunis, supra n 12, at p.1091; UNODC, supra n 19; Expert Report, supra n 12, at p.42; Institute, 
supra n 14, preambular paras.1-2; Kreß, supra n 15; Macedo, supra n 95, at pp.23-24; O’Keefe, supra n 
15; Randall, supra n 21; Second Restatement, supra n 21; Third Restatement, supra n 14. 
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universal jurisdiction has developed in custom but also the international community 
values that have been included under its ambit.  
 
In sum, the type of international community values that may now be protected by 
universal jurisdiction, as a matter of custom, is unclear and needs to be worked out and 
agreed by States. The preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
provides a useful illustration that one such international community value is the 
prevention of the impunity of perpetrators of ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole’.98 However, the operative provisions of the same 
instrument make equally clear that the protection of this value does not fall under the 
ambit of universal jurisdiction. The same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to the 
Genocide Convention.99  
  
In the light of the foregoing observations, it is apparent, in the first place, that it is 
inappropriate to analogise the no nexus requirement over piracy with the treaty 
obligation to extradite or prosecute and treat them as one and the same. In any case, the 
reason why States use the obligation to extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism 
treaties, in order to prevent impunity of serious crimes, is fundamentally different to the 
theory of universal jurisdiction: treaty offences implicate and have a connection with 
certain vital State interests shared by the parties. It is the threat to such interests by 
international terrorism that States adopt these treaties in the first place. Thus, States 
provide for broad prescriptive jurisdiction as a mutually beneficial means to protect 
certain of their own vital interests, or oblige other parties to protect such interests on 
their behalf in case extradition is not forthcoming. These shared vital State interests are 
not defined by treaties as such but, as is made sufficiently clear from their operative 
provisions, they include, for example, the State’s sovereignty, political independence, 
government facilities (including persons and premises entitled to special protection by 
international law) and nationals from certain acts of terrorism. These shared vital State 
interests are discussed below.   
 
                                                        
98 Rome, 17 July 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, preambular paras.4-6; also A/RES/67/1 (24 September 2012). 
99 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 9 December 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277, Article 6. 
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There is no evidence to suggest, either by virtue of the operative provisions of counter-
terrorism treaties or empirically based on the way in which they have been implemented 
in national laws that they have a connection with the protection of international 
community values, no less the exclusive protection of such values. Some counter-
terrorism treaties refer in their preambular paragraphs to ‘the occurrence of such acts is 
a matter of grave concern to the international community as a whole’.100 However, it 
would be a great leap to rely on such general statements in order to suggest that 
extradite or prosecute contained in the operative provisions in these treaties protects 
exclusively international community values or that such values are protected based on 
universal jurisdiction, as did the ICJ in the Habré case.101 Likewise, acts of terrorism 
committed against the State’s nationals and diplomatic personnel and premises, offences 
which are criminalised by counter-terrorism treaties, are ‘condemned in the strongest 
terms’ and described as ‘heinous’ by the Security Council.102 However, neither the 
Security Council nor the States whose interests are implicated have suggested that such 
crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community 
values.  
 
This is not to suggest, however, that the obligation to extradite or prosecute may not 
also involve or contribute in some way, perhaps indirectly or incidentally, to the 
protection of international community values by combatting the impunity of 
perpetrators of serious crimes. It may be the case that the conclusion of a treaty that 
proscribes certain conduct and uses the obligation to extradite or prosecute ipso facto 
gives effect to the protection of such values. That said, it is not clear, other than the 
prevention of such impunity, what these values are agreed to comprise, or, for that 
matter, whether they correspond with those values protected by universal jurisdiction. It 
would, in any case, go too far to suggest that the protection of international community 
values by extradite or prosecute transforms the prescriptive jurisdiction arising from it 
into a ground of universal jurisdiction. These issues are underscored by a close reading 
of the debate on universal jurisdiction at the General Assembly and the work by the ILC 
to codify extradite or prosecute, which exhibit fundamentally divergent views. 
                                                        
100 E.g., 1973 Protection and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, preambular para.3 (the Internationally Protected Persons 
Convention). 
101 Garrod, supra n 37.  
102 E.g., Press Statement, Attacks against U.S. Diplomatic Personnel, SC/10761-AFR/2440 (12 September 
2012). 
171 
 
 
The view that extradite or prosecute and universal jurisdiction are alike, or one and the 
same, and that the former gives effect to the protection of an international community 
value - the prevention of impunity - has been expressed by a number of States.103 On the 
other hand, a considerable number of States have cautioned that extradite or prosecute 
plays a crucial role in the prevention of impunity but that it should not be confused with 
universal jurisdiction.104 This disagreement among States is reflected in the work of the 
ILC. The ILC Rapporteur, having studied the inclusion of extradite or prosecute in 
counter-terrorism treaties since 1970, suggested in his preliminary remarks that there 
has been created a ‘principle of universality of suppression of appropriate terrorist 
acts’.105 He proceeded to caution that:  
 
The principle of universality of suppression should not be identified, 
however, with the principle of universality of jurisdiction […] The 
universality of suppression in this context means that, as a result of 
application of the obligation to extradite or prosecute between States 
concerned, there is no place where an offender could avoid criminal 
responsibility and could find so-called “safe haven”.106 
 
More recently, the ILC’s Working Group on the topic, following the decision of the ICJ 
in the Habré case, has suggested that the establishment of jurisdiction in the 
implementation of extradite or prosecute:  
 
when the crime was allegedly committed abroad with no nexus to the forum 
State […] would necessarily reflect an exercise of universal jurisdiction, 
which is “the jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons 
for extraterritorial events” […] However, the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute can also reflect an exercise of jurisdiction under other bases. 
Thus, if a State can exercise jurisdiction on another basis, universal 
jurisdiction may not necessarily be invoked in the fulfilment of the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute.107 
 
This statement reveals the extent of disagreement among the Working Group’s 
members of how to interpret extradite or prosecute and the protection of shared vital 
State interests and international community values. The suggestion that the custodial 
State’s jurisdiction would ‘reflect an exercise of universal jurisdiction’ inter alia 
                                                        
103 Supra n 12. 
104 Supra n 67. 
105 U.N. Doc.A/59/10 (2004), Annex, para.9. 
106 Ibid. 
107 U.N. Doc.A/68/10, supra n 10, para.24. 
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indicates that the Working Group is not unanimous that it is universal jurisdiction. This 
is confirmed by the fact that the Working Group quoted the Joint Separate Opinion of 
Judges Higgins et al. in the Arrest Warrant, namely that the custodial State has an 
obligation to ‘establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for extraterritorial 
events’.108 The judges in that case, having studied ‘the provisions of certain important 
treaties of the last 30 years’ that have included extradite or prosecute, the adoption of 
which, observed the judges, has been asserted in legal scholarship to ‘evidence 
universality as a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction recognised in international law’, 
concluded that they do not provide for universal jurisdiction.109 The suggestion by the 
Working Group that the custodial State’s jurisdiction ‘can also reflect an exercise of 
jurisdiction under other bases’ does not sit comfortably with the assumption that 
extradite or prosecute ipso facto codifies a ground of universal jurisdiction. It is to the 
meaning of shared vital State interests that the chapter will now turn. 
 
5.4. Approaches to Defining Protective Jurisdiction  
 
One of two approaches has been used in previous efforts to define protective 
jurisdiction. It is useful first to explain which of these approaches is adopted by the 
present chapter, before proceeding to enumerate some of the vital interests that have 
been included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata. The first approach is to 
define protective jurisdiction based on vital interests. This approach has historical 
precedents. It will be recalled from chapter three that the Institute of International Law 
defined protective jurisdiction based on crimes committed against the State’s ‘security’ 
and ‘credit’.110 Brierly, acting as Rapporteur for the League of Nations, did not give any 
consideration to vital interests, other than the State’s ‘security’. Brierly rejected this 
approach to defining jurisdiction as every State is ‘regarded as the judge of what 
endangers its own security.’111 Brierly’s point remains valid. As put by Jennings, a State 
may have ‘peculiar and even outrageous notions of what affects its security or vital 
interests’.112 De Visccher, on the other hand, who assisted Brierly, accepted the 
approach of defining protective jurisdiction based on vital interests and went further 
                                                        
108 Arrest Warrant, supra n 16, para.42 (J. Sep. Op. Judges Higgins et al.). 
109 Ibid., paras.25, 26, 41. 
110 Cited in Scott, J.B. (1932). ‘The Two Institutes of International Law’. 26 AJIL 87, at p.89.  
111 Brierly, J.L. & De Visscher, C., Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of 
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112 Jennings, R.Y. (1957). ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws’. 33 BYIL 
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than did Brierly by stating that, in addition to ‘security’, protective jurisdiction also 
covers offences committed against the State’s ‘credit’, ‘institutions’ and ‘essential 
interests’. However, De Visccher did not examine what these ‘essential interests’ 
comprised.113  
 
The Harvard Research, which defined the ‘protective principle’ in a Draft Convention, 
suggested that this ground of jurisdiction is applicable over ‘any crime’ committed 
against the State’s ‘fundamental interests’, namely its ‘security, territorial integrity or 
political independence’, as well as its currency, seals and public documents.114 This 
category of vital interests has since been described as ‘unobjectionable’.115 That said, it 
has to be borne in mind that the Harvard Research appears to have defined the 
protective principle stricto sensu, not only for the purpose of proposing a Draft 
Convention, which the Harvard Research hoped would merit the attention of the 
League, but also due to the perceived objections to protective jurisdiction by the U.S. 
and Britain. In any case, the definition of protective jurisdiction by the Harvard 
Research may be largely out of date. 
 
The ALI has adopted a similar approach to that of the Harvard Research in the 
Restatement (Third) and defined vital interests in narrow terms, namely the State’s 
‘security’ and ‘governmental functions’.116 The ALI appears to have attempted to 
counter the concern raised by Brierly and Jennings, as referred to above, by stating that 
the ‘class of offences’ covered by protective jurisdiction is ‘limited’ and are ‘generally 
recognised as crimes by developed legal systems’.117 The ALI is intended to be based 
on U.S. practice and does not reflect customary international law.118 Nevertheless, the 
approach by the ALI raises two important issues. First of all, the ALI, it will be recalled, 
referred to protective jurisdiction as an ‘unruly horse’ that could be used by States 
‘possibly objectionable to United States’ interests’.119 It is therefore reasonable to 
suppose that the ALI deliberately defined the category of vital interests falling under the 
principle in overly-narrow terms. One of the problems with defining the category of 
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vital interests narrowly is that all possible crimes have to fall, however unpersuasively, 
within the seemingly all-encompassing terms of ‘security’ and ‘governmental 
functions’.120 There has certainly been an overreliance by U.S. courts on the 
Restatement, as the only source to have codified protective jurisdiction, in this regard. 
On the other hand, the ALI left open-ended the crimes which are capable of being 
covered by protective jurisdiction, as long as they are ‘generally recognised as crimes 
by developed legal systems’. However, since publication of the Restatement in 1965, 
the U.S. Government and domestic courts have given a broad range of national laws 
extraterritorial application under the protective principle, regardless of their recognition 
in the national laws of other States.121 
  
The alternative approach to defining protective jurisdiction is, instead, to objectively 
categorise a list of crimes covered by this jurisdiction.122 This approach was observed 
by Brierly in his capacity as Rapporteur. Brierly suggested that ‘States, instead of 
reserving to themselves the right to decide for the purposes of their non-territorial 
jurisdiction what acts endanger their security, would accept an agreed and uniform list 
in which such acts would be specified.’123 The Harvard Research also discussed the idea 
of defining protective jurisdiction according to the specific acts which may be 
denounced as criminal.124 Lauterpacht has suggested that protective jurisdiction should 
cover ‘generally recognised’ crimes,125 while Mann has suggested that it should cover 
crimes as recognised in the ‘general practice of civilised states’,126 while Jennings has 
suggested that the principle should cover crimes committed against the ‘sovereign rights 
of a state as are universally admitted’.127 The problem with this approach is that it is not 
practicable or possible to define uniformly and exhaustively all of the crimes falling 
under the ambit of protective jurisdiction. As has already been explained elsewhere by 
Cameron, it is difficult to identify sufficiently uniform State practice in respect to which 
protective principle jurisdiction may extend due to the ‘differences in the types of 
offence which different states regard as capable of being encompassed by the 
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principle.’128 This is all the more apparent in the context of international terrorism, in 
particular the widely diverging national definitions of ‘terrorism’.129 Defining 
jurisdiction in terms of an exhaustive list of crimes, and getting States to agree to such a 
list, is likely to result in a principle which is overly-narrow and inflexible. This 
approach may be inappropriate for responding to the complex and evolving nature of 
the threat of international terrorism. It is probably for these reasons that this approach 
was not adopted by the Institute of International Law, the Harvard Research or the ALI.  
  
The approach adopted by the present chapter is therefore to define protective 
jurisdiction based on vital interests, by trying to infer such interests from the empirical 
analysis of State practice in chapter four. The need to examine such interests in the 
codification of protective jurisdiction has also been recognised more recently by the 
ILC.130 A similar approach to defining protective jurisdiction has been proposed by 
Cameron. After an extensive study of the principle, Cameron concluded that a more 
effective approach inter alia is to focus on the ‘generally recognised values underlying 
certain categories of offences’, although Cameron did not go so far as to examine or 
explain what these ‘values’ may comprise.131 The reason for this is that Cameron 
adopted the idea of ‘generally recognised values’ in defining protective jurisdiction 
based on a proposal made by the Committee of Experts on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 
discussed above, which did not explain what these values are either.132 The reason for 
this proposal appears to have been twofold.  
The first of these is that there is no agreement, and therefore no certainty, as to which 
interests are at present regarded as ‘vital’.133 Second, it is not clear, a priori, how 
interests should qualify as ‘vital’. In its examination of vital interests, the Committee of 
Experts stated that ‘[o]ne may wonder whether it really is possible and even wise to try 
and enumerate such interests’.134 True to its word, the Committee of Experts did not 
attempt to define a category of vital interests that is capable of falling under the 
                                                        
128 Cameron, I. (1994). ‘The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction’. Aldershot: 
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129 Chapter four.   
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131 Cameron, supra n 128, at pp.300-303.  
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protective principle. Rather, it merely suggested that ‘[t]o ensure that the application of 
this principle is in conformity with the general objectives of public international law, it 
should be confined to interests which are considered to be vital for the existence of the 
state, its institutions, and its constitutional and social order.’ It concluded by proposing, 
lex ferenda, that jurisdiction for the protection of such interests should ‘be in conformity 
with the State practice of a substantial part of the community of states’, an approach 
referred to as a ‘shared values approach’.135  
 
The work by the Committee of Experts raises two issues of great importance for the 
present chapter. First of all, and contrary to the proposal by the Committee of Experts, 
the present chapter does not adopt the ‘shared values approach’. The reason for this is 
that the meaning of ‘values’ is overly vague and was proposed by the Committee of 
Experts merely as a general and abstract way of delimiting all grounds of jurisdiction 
under customary international law, rather than as a way of defining protective 
jurisdiction specifically. Such an approach, if it was to be adopted, would be impractical 
for national legislators and courts to implement. More fundamentally, this approach 
risks confusing grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction, most notably protection and 
universality. Conceptually, it does not clearly distinguish vital State interests, a number 
of which may be shared by the international community, under the protective principle, 
with ‘international community values’, under the principle of universality. The need for 
conceptual clarity is all the more important in consideration of the collective belief, 
discussed above.    
 
Secondly, the notion that protective jurisdiction is only valid for the protection of 
interests that are ‘so vital for the State’s existence’, a view that has also been echoed 
more recently in legal scholarship, is incorrect.136 The link between vital interests and 
the State’s ‘existence’ dates back to the nineteenth century when the protection of vital 
interests fell within the broad right of self-preservation and the use of military force, to 
which reference has already been made in chapter two. That view has long been 
outdated; the protective principle is no longer part of self-preservation and a vital 
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interest does not require that an interest in question be a matter of the State’s 
‘existence’. The ILC has reached the same conclusion.137  
  
A matter of great importance, then, as has already been noted by Mann, is an assessment 
of those vital interests that are capable of falling under the ambit of protective 
jurisdiction.138 Lowe and Staker have suggested that only interests which are ‘truly 
vital’ may fall under protective jurisdiction.139 It is far from clear, however, what 
interests are covered by this qualification. Nor can any clear answer be given as to why 
certain interests are ‘vital’ and others are not; there is no established test for the 
qualification of interests as ‘vital’ that has been put forward by U.N. organs, for 
example, by the ILC or ICJ. This is so even though since the founding of the U.N. such 
interests are undoubtedly admissible before ICJ.140 This is made all the more 
problematic in that States have traditionally refrained from defining vital interests in 
arbitration treaties or subjecting them to compulsory adjudication before international 
tribunals ‘as only the sovereign can be judge of them’ and many arbitration treaties 
contained specific reservations to that effect.141 Likewise, the phraseology used by 
Security Council resolutions tends to be sufficiently broad to enable unilateral 
interpretations by its permanent members; resolution 1373 is a case in point.142 It is also 
worth noting that national laws criminalising conduct abroad generally do not refer to 
grounds of jurisdiction or define what vital interests they seek to protect.143 The reason 
why States tend not to define vital interests in national laws may be due, in part, to the 
fact that grounds of jurisdiction and vital interests in particular have not been 
codified.144 States may also prefer to retain discretion as to what interests may be 
protected by their domestic laws. It may be the case that national laws are left on the 
statute books and it is not until they are enforced or involved in inter-State disputes that 
States are prepared to justify and explain their extraterritorial application.  
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Paust has suggested that vital interests, ‘when viewed in context, should be of real 
significance’, which Paust believed ought to be decided by domestic courts.145 The 
judicial interpretation of vital interests on a case-by-case basis, as suggested by Paust, is 
in principle unobjectionable. However, it comes no closer, a priori, to defining more 
clearly and with certainty the vital interests - as agreed by States - falling under 
protective jurisdiction lex lata. Moreover, domestic courts are not always best placed to 
determine such interests as a matter of custom.146 The upshot of all this is that the 
meaning of vital interests is rather vague. While every State can determine such 
interests for itself, and some interests may be peculiar to particular States, the potential 
category of interests falling under protective jurisdiction is not limitless and that 
decision is ultimately subject to limits set by customary international law.147 It is 
therefore necessary to examine State practice in order to determine this question.  
 
The uncertain nature of vital interests provides a strong argument in support of, rather 
than against, the need to assess what these interests may include. Accordingly, the 
section that follows aims to dispel some of the ambiguity surrounding protective 
jurisdiction by trying to enumerate some of the vital interests that have been included 
under its ambit lex lata and around which some agreement appears to have clustered. A 
core category of these vital State interests appears to be shared by the international 
community and the approach to defining protective jurisdiction proposed by the present 
chapter, lex ferenda, is referred to as a ‘shared vital State interests’ approach. The 
requisite level of State practice needed to allow for the identification of a shared vital 
interest is less clear. It will be recalled that the Committee of Experts proposed that the 
protection of vital interests has to be ‘in conformity with the State practice of a 
substantial part of the community of states’.148 On the other hand, the ILC, in 
determining whether State practice allows for the identification of a customary rule, has 
suggested that the requirements of ‘uniformity’ and ‘generality’ need to be fulfilled.149 
However, the ILC has employed diverse terminology when determining whether such 
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practice satisfies these requirements, for example, ‘uniform practice’, ‘widely observed 
practice’, ‘established practice’ and ‘settled practice’.150 This is one of the reasons why 
the ILC is working to codify the formation and evidence of customary rules.151 The 
present chapter aims to identify shared vital interests based on State practice, though 
whether such practice is sufficiently uniform will ultimately have to be determined by 
States in the codification of protective jurisdiction.152 
  
It is useful at this point to say a few words on the materials used to identify vital 
interests. The present chapter has inferred vital interests that appear to be underlying the 
categories of offences, identified in chapter four, which are based on a detailed 
empirical analysis of State practice. The same approach was used by the Harvard 
Research and proposed by Cameron. Given that these national laws are limited to the 
context of international terrorism and that the vital interests underlying them have been 
inferred by the present author, the present work is intended to be of indicative value. In 
addition to these national laws, there are a number of other sources by which the 
inclusion of vital interests under protective jurisdiction may be verified. These sources 
provide supporting evidence that such interests sufficiently qualify as ‘vital’. The first 
of these is judicial practice.153 The second is international and regional counter-
terrorism treaties. Treaties are a primary source of international law.154 Furthermore, the 
empirical analysis of State practice in chapter four includes national laws implementing 
treaties. States are motivated to negotiate and adopt treaties in response to common 
threats to certain of their vital interests and there has in recent years been a trend in 
treaty practice to permit or require extraterritorial jurisdiction over proscribed conduct 
for the protection of such interests.155 Treaties thus indicate more clearly the vital State 
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interests that are shared by the international community. States are obliged by resolution 
1373 to become parties to these treaties. It has to be stressed, however, that theories 
relating to grounds of jurisdiction and vital interests are not specified by treaties; rather 
they provide for specified conditions for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
where there is a connection with the legislating State. The present work is not intended 
to provide a detailed analysis of each of these treaties, which has been undertaken 
elsewhere.156 Lastly, the chapter takes into consideration, where applicable, the practice 
of the General Assembly and Security Council in response to international terrorism.  
 
5.5. Shared Vital State Interests   
 
The following vital interests have been included under the ambit of protective 
jurisdiction lex lata: 
 
(i) Sovereignty;  
(ii) Territorial integrity;  
(iii) Political independence; 
(iv) Constitution;  
(v) Security;  
(vi) Nationals; 
(vii) Personnel and property; 
(viii) Heads of State/government;  
(ix) Registered aircraft and vessels;  
(x) Fixed platforms;  
(xi) Currency and official documents;  
(xii) Fundamental social, political, constitutional and economic order; and  
(xiii) International organisations.  
  
Not all of these interests are shared by the international community, namely fixed 
platforms; fundamental social, political, constitutional and economic order; and 
international organisations. It is not possible, due to the scope of the present chapter, to 
discuss each of these vital interests in depth; rather, the aim here is to analyse a number 
of these interests in order to show that they have sufficient uniformity in State practice 
and may be regarded as being shared. It is worth noting that these vital interests are not 
necessarily ideal types and may converge; for example, offences committed against the 
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State’s personnel and property may also be regarded as a threat to that State’s 
sovereignty, security, political independence, depending, of course, on how broadly 
these latter terms are defined. 
 
5.5.1. Sovereignty; Territorial Integrity; Political Independence; and Constitution  
 
The State’s territorial integrity, political independence and constitution have long been 
regarded by many States as being related to the concept of sovereignty and therefore 
each of these vital interests are discussed here together under the same sub-heading. The 
national laws of 76 States have used protective jurisdiction over offences committed 
against their sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and constitution. 
Protective jurisdiction has also been included in the majority of counter-terrorism 
treaties over offences committed against the State’s independence, which is commonly 
expressed in terms of acts committed in an attempt ‘to compel that State to do or abstain 
from doing any act’.157 These conventions include the 1988 Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms 
Located on the Continental Shelf (the Maritime Convention and Fixed Platforms 
Protocol);158 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel;159 the Bombings Convention;160 1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (the Financing Convention);161 2005 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (the Nuclear 
Terrorism Convention);162 and the draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
Terrorism (the draft comprehensive convention).163 While protective jurisdiction is a 
permissive ground of jurisdiction in the aforementioned conventions, this jurisdiction is 
mandatory in the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (the 
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Hostages Convention).164 The State’s territorial integrity and independence are also 
frequently referred to in the preambular paragraphs of these conventions.165  
 
The protection of independence is reflected in Security Council practice. In 2004 the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1566 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
providing for a basic, working definition of ‘terrorism’, although it is not expressly 
framed as such. This resolution merits special mention because it requires as its 
purposive element that an offence be committed, by its nature or context, to ‘compel a 
government’ or ‘intimidate a population’.166 The Security Council, it will be recalled 
from chapter four, also required in the same resolution that States ‘cooperate fully’ with 
those States where ‘terrorist acts’ are committed and, to that end, to provide in their 
domestic law for broad treaty-based jurisdiction under the extradite or prosecute 
principle in relation to ‘any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to 
participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist acts or 
provides safe havens’.167 The purposive element of ‘terrorism’, as defined by the 
Security Council, signifies precisely why international terrorism is regarded by States as 
problematic. Indeed, the purposive element inter alia was taken from the Financing 
Convention and has been included in the proposed definition of ‘terrorism’ by the draft 
comprehensive convention, both of which, as noted above, provide for protective 
jurisdiction over relevant offences committed against the State’s independence.168  
 
In that regard, it is worth noting that the Financing Convention provides for protective 
jurisdiction, by virtue of Article 7(2)(a), when the offence of collecting funds, as 
defined by Article 2(1), is committed abroad and one of the offences referred to in 
Article 2(1)(a) or (b), including an offence under one of nine counter-terrorist 
conventions, ‘was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an offence … in 
the territory of … that State’. The wording of the provision inter alia is sufficiently 
broad to encompass the protection of certain vital interests other than independence, for 
example, the State’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitution, security and 
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nationals. During the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism for the 
establishment of the draft comprehensive convention, delegations noted that ‘acts of 
terrorism constituted a major factor threatening the stability and sovereignty of 
States’,169 and well as their territorial integrity and the functioning of democratic 
institutions.170 In that connection, it is notable that this convention proposes to permit 
the State, by virtue of Article 6(2), to establish jurisdiction over offences set out in 
Article 2 which are committed ‘wholly or partially outside its territory, if the effects of 
the conduct or its intended effects constitute or result in, within its territory’. Protective 
jurisdiction is applicable where an offence has ‘intended effects’ within the State’s 
territory, which is broad enough to encompass offences that implicate or threaten 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitution, as well as security.171  
 
In response to the 14 February 2005 ‘terrorist bombing’ in Beirut, Lebanon, which 
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury to 
220 other people, the Security Council adopted a resolution under Chapter VII and 
determined that ‘the involvement of any State in this terrorist act would amount to ‘a 
serious violation of its obligation to respect the sovereignty and political independence 
of Lebanon’. The Security Council, noting with ‘extreme concern’ the conclusion by the 
International Independent Investigation Commission that the ‘terrorist act’ could not 
have been carried out without the involvement of Syrian officials, insisted that ‘Syria 
not interfere in Lebanese domestic affairs, either directly or indirectly, refrain from any 
attempt aimed at destabilizing Lebanon, and respect scrupulously the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, unity and political independence of this country’.172 The Security 
Council inter alia also expressed its readiness to consider additional requests from the 
Lebanese Government to ensure that all those involved in the planning, sponsoring, 
organizing and perpetrating of this ‘terrorist act’ are brought to justice.173 To that end, 
the Security Council, at the request of the Lebanese Government, and acting under 
Chapter VII, created the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in order to bring to trial those 
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accused.174 The tribunal was granted subject matter jurisdiction specifically in relation 
to crimes under the Lebanese Penal Code.175 The domestic law of Lebanon does not 
provide for universal jurisdiction176 and the applicable crimes inter alia, for example, 
‘acts of terrorism’, ‘illicit associations’ and crimes of conspiracy apply outside Lebanon 
under the protective principle. In effect, the tribunal amounts to the recognition by the 
Security Council that acts of international terrorism are capable of threatening the 
State’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence. There appears to be 
tacit authorisation by the Security Council for the use of protective jurisdiction in order 
to protect these interests from international terrorism, enforced not by Lebanese 
domestic courts but rather by a ‘tribunal of an international character’.177  
 
5.5.2. Nationals  
  
The national laws of 75 States have provided for protective jurisdiction over acts of 
terrorism and serious crimes committed in time of peace against their nationals inside 
and outside national territory. The importance of protecting the State’s nationals from 
terrorist acts is also evidenced by counter-terrorism treaties. The first international 
convention was the Hostages Convention, which was adopted in response to the 
increasing number of acts of international terrorism committed against the State’s 
diplomatic personnel, though it is applicable to offences committed against the State’s 
nationals more generally. The Hostages Convention focuses on the effect of the hostage 
taking on the State of nationality or an intergovernmental organisation. Article 1 inter 
alia creates an offence of hostage-taking where it is to ‘compel’ a State or 
intergovernmental organisation ‘to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or 
implicit condition for the release of the hostage’. Article 5(1)(c) establishes protective 
jurisdiction as a primary and mandatory basis of jurisdiction when an offence set forth 
in Article 1 is committed ‘[i]n order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing 
any act’, or by virtue of Article 5(1)(d), ‘[w]ith respect to a hostage who is a national of 
that State, if that State considers it appropriate’. 
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The Maritime Convention, which was precipitated by the Achille Lauro incident in 
1985, establishes protective jurisdiction when an offence is committed on board a 
foreign flag ship and ‘during its commission a national of that State is seized, 
threatened, injured or killed’.178 The Fixed Platforms Protocol establishes protective 
jurisdiction in identical terms to the Maritime Convention.179 The State’s nationals are 
also protected by the Bombing Convention. The convention inter alia, as indicated by 
its preamble, was adopted in response to ‘increasingly widespread’ acts of terrorism by 
means of explosives.180 The broad consensus among States as to the need to protect 
certain of their vital interests from such attacks may have been the reason why the 
convention was adopted unusually quickly.181 The convention creates an offence under 
Article 2(1)(a) of unlawfully and intentionally delivering, placing, discharging, or 
detonating an explosive or other lethal device in, into, or against a place of public use, a 
State or government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility 
‘[w]ith the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury’. The convention, by virtue of 
Article 6(2)(a), establishes protective jurisdiction over offences set forth in Article 2 
when ‘[t]he offence is committed against a national of that State’. It is irrelevant as to 
whether a State’s national is located within or outside national territory, as long as an 
offence is international in character.182 The convention also criminalises attempt; 
participating as an accomplice; organising or directing others; and contributing ‘in any 
other way’ to a group of persons acting with a common purpose, to commit an offence 
under Article 2(1)(a), all of which are capable of falling under protective jurisdiction if 
committed abroad.  
 
The Financing Convention, to which reference has already been made, permits States 
parties to establish protective jurisdiction, by virtue of Article 7(2)(a), when the offence 
of collecting funds, as defined by Article 2(1), is committed abroad and an offence 
referred to in Article 2(1)(a) or (b) ‘was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out 
of an offence … in the territory of or against a national of that State’. As with the 
Bombings Convention, it is irrelevant whether a State’s national is within or outside 
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national territory, as long as the offence is international in character. As the 
convention’s focus is the criminalisation of the collection of funds, it is not ‘necessary 
that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence’ set forth in Article 2(1).183 The 
convention also criminalises attempts, participation as an accomplice, or organising or 
directing others to collect funds under Article 2(1). This creates potentially expansive 
jurisdiction under the protective principle. The other international conventions which 
establish protective jurisdiction over offences committed against the State’s nationals 
include the 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft (the Tokyo Convention);184 Nuclear Terrorism Convention;185 2010 Beijing 
Convention and Protocol;186 and the draft comprehensive convention.187  
 
In the Lockerbie incident, the U.S. asserted its jurisdiction over the alleged offence of 
placing on board an aircraft an explosive device, pursuant to Article 5(1)(b) of the 
Montreal Convention, on the ground that the aircraft was registered in the U.S. and U.S. 
nationals were among the victims.188 As the alleged offenders were present in Libya and 
the Libyan Government refused to extradite them, the U.S. subsequently approached the 
Security Council. After the indictments against the alleged offenders had been handed 
down by a U.S. District Court and conveyed to Libya, the U.S. made a statement to the 
Security Council, in ‘concert’ with Britain and France, declaring that Libya must, 
amongst other things, ‘surrender for trial all those charged with the crime’.189 When 
extradition was not forthcoming, the U.S. and Britain negotiated with the Security 
Council the imposition of sanctions on Libya under Chapter VII, designed to coerce 
Libya to ‘surrender’ the two suspects for trial abroad and calling on all States to assist in 
the apprehension and prosecution of those responsible.190 The suspension of sanctions 
was conditioned on Libya surrendering those charged for trial in a U.S. or British court 
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and satisfaction of French judicial authorities.191 The reference to French judicial 
authorities was because a number of Libyan nationals were also wanted in connection 
with the 1989 bombing of Union des Transports Aériens flight 772 over Niger.192 In 
effect, the practice of the Security Council in response to the Lockerbie incident 
indicates a recognition by the Security Council of the right of States to protect their 
nationals from acts of terrorism and a sanction to exercise protective jurisdiction by the 
U.S.; to that end the Security Council was prepared to use its mandatory powers so that 
the U.S. could enforce that jurisdiction. This is further indicated by resolution 731, in 
which the Security Council reaffirmed the right of States, ‘in accordance with the U.N. 
Charter and relevant principles of international law’, to protect their nationals from acts 
of international terrorism.193  
  
The same can be said mutatis mutandis in respect of the assertion of protective 
jurisdiction by the U.S. in response to the bombing of its embassies and the killing of its 
nationals in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.194 The extradition of the alleged offenders to 
the U.S. was not forthcoming and so the U.S. negotiated with the Security Council the 
imposition of sanctions on the Taliban regime, under the belief that bin Laden and al-
Qaeda were behind those bombings and were stationed and training in Afghanistan, and 
for the refusal of the Taliban, following diplomatic pressure, to surrender bin Laden for 
trial abroad by the U.S. The Security Council initially responded by strongly 
condemning the ‘terrorist bomb attacks’ and calling upon all States to support the U.S. 
in bringing the perpetrators to trial.195 This was followed by demands that the Taliban 
‘stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their 
organizations, and that all Afghan factions cooperate with efforts to bring indicted 
terrorists to justice’.196 The failure of the Taliban to comply with these resolutions 
subsequently prompted the Security Council to take measures under Chapter VII by 
imposing a series of sanctions on individuals belonging to or associated with the 
Taliban to ensure that the Taliban ‘comply with previous resolutions’ and to: 
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take appropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory under its control is 
not used for terrorist installations and camps, or for the preparation or organization 
of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with efforts to 
bring indicted terrorists to justice.197 
  
The Security Council specifically demanded that the Taliban ‘turn over Usama bin 
Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been 
indicted’.198 This was an indirect reference by the Security Council to ‘the indictment of 
Usama bin Laden and his associates’ by the U.S. for conspiring to kill American 
nationals abroad and the request by the U.S. to the Taliban to ‘surrender them for 
trial’.199 The ‘failure’ of the Taliban to assist the U.S. in bringing to trial suspected 
terrorists was deemed to constitute a threat to international peace and security.200 The 
Security Council thus made specific reference, and expressly affirmed the right of the 
U.S., to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts of terrorism against its nationals, 
although the Security Council did not use the nomenclature ‘protective principle’ as 
such. That the jurisdiction of the U.S. was based on the protective principle was 
subsequently confirmed in the landmark case of U.S. v Bin Laden.201 
 
As regards more recent Security Council practice, the Council has used its Chapter VII 
powers to oblige Sates to prevent their territories from being used to commit ‘terrorist 
acts’ against the citizens of ‘other States’202 and to cooperate with those States against 
whose citizens ‘terrorist acts’ are committed, by making provision in national laws for 
the extradite or prosecute principle.203 Extradite or prosecute, as explained above, also 
requires broad, mandatory prescriptive jurisdiction, which States are able to use in order 
to protect certain of their vital interests, including where terrorist acts are committed 
against their nationals. It is worth recalling the purposive element of the Security 
Council’s definition of ‘terrorism’ in resolution 1566, above, which indicates that States 
are concerned with protecting their nationals from international terrorism.204 The 
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establishment by the Security Council of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, discussed 
above, was partly in response to acts of international terrorism committed against 
Lebanese nationals in the territory of Lebanon. More recently, the Security Council, 
acting under Chapter VII, has condemned the ‘terrorist acts’ of Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) and Al Nusrah Front (ANF) and ‘associated armed groups’ and 
strongly condemned the taking of hostages. The Security Council has also urged all 
States, in accordance with their obligations under resolution 1373, ‘to cooperate in 
efforts to find and bring to justice’ individuals and ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ associated 
with these groups who perpetrate, organise and sponsor terrorist acts.205 This resolution 
was adopted partly in response to the taking hostage of some of the nationals of the 
Security Council’s members. In response to the murder of U.S. and British nationals 
held hostage by ISIL, the Security Council has underlined the need to bring the 
perpetrators of these acts of terrorism to justice and urged all States, in accordance with 
their obligations under international law and relevant Council resolutions, to cooperate 
actively with the U.S. and Britain in this regard.206  
 
The Security Council has recently adopted a resolution condemning in the ‘strongest 
terms’ the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, on 17 July 2014, in Ukraine 
resulting in the loss of all 298 passengers and crew on board that comprised ten 
different nationalities, including the nationals of some of the members of the Council.207 
This resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII, due to the split between Russia and 
other Security Council members on the situation in Ukraine. The Security Council not 
only expressed its deepest condolences to the victims and ‘governments of the victims’ 
countries of origin’, and demanded that ‘all States and other actors refrain from acts of 
violence directed against civilian aircraft’,208 but it also reaffirmed the ‘rules of 
international law that prohibit acts of violence that pose a threat to the safety of 
international civil aviation’ and recognised the efforts made by ‘States who have lost 
nationals on MH17, to institute an international investigation of the incident, and 
call[ed] on all States to provide any requested assistance to civil and criminal 
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206 Press Statement, Murder of James Foley, SC/11531-IK/689 (22 August 2014); Press Statement, 
Murder of Steven Sotloff, SC11550 (6 September 2014); Press Statement, Murder of David Haines, 
SC11557 (14 September 2014); Press Statement, Murder of Alan Henning, SC11590 (3 October 2014).  
207 S/RES/2166 (21 July 2014), para.1. See also Press Statement, Malaysian Plane Crash, SC11480 (18 
July 2014). 
208 Ibid., paras.2, 14.   
190 
 
investigations related to this incident’.209 To that end, the Security Council demanded 
that ‘those responsible for this incident be held to account and that all States cooperate 
fully with efforts to establish accountability’.210 The reference by the Security Council 
to the violation of ‘rules of international law that prohibit acts of violence that pose a 
threat to the safety of international civil aviation’ is notable in that the Montreal 
Convention and the Tokyo Convention provide for protective jurisdiction. The Security 
Council explicitly recognised the right of ‘States who have lost nationals’ to exercise 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which implicitly includes the protective principle, in order 
to hold the alleged offenders criminally accountable. The response by the Security 
Council to this incident is the most recent institutional practice and opinio juris that 
States are permitted to use protective jurisdiction over acts of terrorism and serious 
offences when their vital interests are implicated. The Security Council also affirmed 
inter alia that ‘all States cooperate fully with efforts to establish accountability’ by 
those ‘States who have lost nationals’ undertaking criminal investigations ‘related to 
this incident’.  
 
5.5.2.1. Protective and Passive Personality Jurisdiction 
 
The basis of jurisdiction over terrorist acts abroad committed against the State’s 
nationals has given rise to considerable misunderstanding by courts and in legal 
scholarship in relation to the question of passive personality jurisdiction.211 The 
confusion as to the proper basis of jurisdiction is due to an over-reliance on tentative, 
secondary sources, and stems largely from the Eichmann case and the Restatement 
(Third). In the Eichmann case, Israel invoked both the protective and passive 
personality principles over war crimes and crimes against the Jewish people during 
World War II. The reason why Israel sought to rely on both grounds of jurisdiction may 
have been because there was, at that time, little understanding of what such grounds 
comprised. This is further indicated by the District Court inter alia holding that ‘the 
principle of “passive personality” … stems from the protective principle’.212 The 
Supreme Court ‘fully agree[d] with every word said by the [District Court] in upholding 
its ‘jurisdiction by virtue also of the “protective principle” and the principle of “passive 
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personality”’.213 It is fair to conclude that the court confused the theory of passive 
personality with that of protection.214  
 
Since Eichmann, courts and commentators have extended passive personality to include 
acts of terrorism, even though the facts of those cases would suggest that jurisdiction 
was really based on the protective principle.215 The source of this misunderstanding 
stems from the Restatement (Third), which conflated the passive and protective 
principles by asserting that passive personality is ‘increasingly accepted as applied to 
terrorist and other organised attacks on a state’s nationals by reason of their nationality, 
or to assassination of a state’s diplomatic representatives or other officials.’216 In 
support of this assertion, the Restatement relied exclusively on the 1986 Omnibus 
Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, section 2331, which applies 
extraterritorially based on protective jurisdiction.217 To be sure, section 2331 requires as 
a prerequisite for prosecution that an offence is ‘intended to coerce, intimidate, or 
retaliate against a government or a civilian population’.218 The District Court in the case 
of Bin Laden regarded conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals abroad under 18 U.S.C. 2332, 
which amended 18 U.S.C. 2331, as falling under the protective principle, on the ground 
that Congress intended this provision to have a ‘protective function’.219 It would appear 
that it is in the interest of States to protect their nationals from acts of terrorism and such 
offences also impact the State’s sovereignty, political independence and governmental 
functions.220 The U.K. Home Affairs Committee has stated that ‘[i]n recent times there 
have been reminders of the global nature of the terrorist threat and its ability to impact 
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upon UK interests.’221 The Committee inter alia proceeded to cite as examples the 
attack on In Amenas, in Algeria, which included six British citizens amongst the 40 
dead, and the attack on the Westgate shopping Mall, in Nairobi, in which six British 
citizens also died. The distinction between protective and passive personality 
jurisdiction was made sufficiently clear by De Visscher, during the effort to codify 
jurisdiction by the League of Nations. According to De Visscher, no ‘good reasons’ 
exist in favour of an exception to territoriality ‘based upon the nationality of the victim’: 
 
On the one hand, it can hardly be maintained that the general interests of a 
State have been attacked merely because one of its nationals has been the 
victim of an offence in a foreign country. On the other hand, the criminal 
law of the country where the offence has been committed owes foreigners 
such protection as will in general ensure the repression of such offences. 
The exception would therefore only be justified if one or other of these two 
considerations were invalid. This might be the case if the victim were the 
holder of a public office or, again, if the country where the offence was 
committed did not possess any criminal law worthy of the name.222 
 
De Visscher proceeded to suggest that ‘in the absence of any territorial authority, it 
would seem clear that the State which is injured directly or through its nationals has at 
least as vital an interest as the State of which the accused is a national.’223 It follows that 
the Restatement and the cases which have relied upon it provide no support for the 
passive personality theory and should be reconsidered as examples of protective 
jurisdiction. The confused relationship between the protective and passive personality 
principles perhaps provides a useful example of the need to codify protective 
jurisdiction, not least to provide guidance to courts. 
 
5.5.3. Personnel and Property 
 
The State’s personnel and property may, for the purpose of presentation and analysis, be 
divided into three sub-categories. The first of these is personnel and property entitled to 
special protection by international law, which includes, for example, Heads of 
State/government and diplomatic personnel and embassies.224 The second sub-category 
comprises personnel and property not accorded special protection by international law. 
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This includes public officials and government agents, officers and employees carrying 
out official duties;225 and government buildings, premises, installations, infrastructure 
facilities and aircraft. It also includes public and private water, energy, fuel and 
communications systems.226 The third sub-category consists of military personnel and 
premises, installations, weapons, aircraft and vessels.227 
 
The Internationally Protected Persons Convention establishes protective jurisdiction as a 
primary ground.228 Thus, Article 3(1)(c) establishes protective jurisdiction over offences 
set forth in Article 2, including threats, attempts and participation in such offences, 
which are ‘committed against an internationally protected person as defined in article 1 
who enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions which he exercises on behalf of that 
State.’229 In the Layton case, the District Court indicated that persons entitled to special 
protection constitute a vital State interest in asserting that:  
 
Congressmen were singled out for protection because of the position they 
hold in our constitutional government, because their protection is important 
to the integrity of the national government and therefore serves an important 
interest of the government itself.230 
 
The court also regarded crimes committed against such persons when performing 
official duties, wherever in the world, threatened the State’s security and the ‘free and 
proper functioning of government’.231 The court therefore found Article 3(1)(c) of the 
Internationally Protected Persons Convention and 18 U.S.C. § 1116, which incorporated 
that convention into U.S. domestic law, to be concerned with:  
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[p]rotecting the integrity and vital interests of this nation, in the context of 
the threat of terrorism, which can by its nature strike out at the United States 
anywhere in the world. This is clear not only from the nature of the 
legislation and its congressional history, but from the impetus of these 
international treaties, designed to deal with a problem which nations 
throughout the world feel to be a threat to their integrity and which cannot 
be adequately dealt with within the confines of their own borders.232 
  
Notwithstanding the reasoning of the District Court in Layton, it has been suggested by 
some courts and in legal scholarship that the theory of jurisdiction underlying Article 
3(1)(c) is based on passive personality.233 The apparent confusion surrounding the 
proper basis of jurisdiction under Article 3(1)(c) is explained by the convention’s 
travaux préparatoires. The draft article, which eventually became Article 3, inter alia, 
referred to the nationality of victims as a basis for jurisdiction as nothing more than a 
way of restricting the scope of the State’s extraterritorial jurisdiction and in refutation of 
a proposal by the ILC of a theory of universal jurisdiction.234 The theory of passive 
personality is at odds with Article 3(1)(c), which requires the sending State to establish 
jurisdiction over crimes committed against an internationally protected person, not by 
reason of his nationality, but because he ‘enjoys his status as such by virtue of functions 
which he exercises on behalf of that State.’ It is precisely for this reason that the 
convention does not cover crimes committed against the State’s nationals more 
generally, a proposition which was raised, but ultimately rejected, at the first debate of 
the ILC.235  
 
Protective jurisdiction has been at the heart of recent U.S. cases for the prosecution of 
acts of terrorism, and conspiracy to commit such acts, committed against embassies and 
diplomatic personnel, as well as property and employees not entitled to special 
protection, located abroad and within the U.S. In respect of the former, the case of Bin 
Laden concerned the almost simultaneous detonation of two bombs in front of U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998.236 The bombs caused significant 
destruction, killing 11 people and injuring 85 in Tanzania, and killing 213 individuals, 
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44 of whom were U.S. embassy employees, and injuring 4000 others in Nairobi.237 The 
indictment charged Osama bin Laden and 15 others with the embassy bombings as well 
as several other terrorist acts against U.S. military facilities and other property and 
personnel abroad since 1991.238 By the end of 2000, the indictment had been amended, 
bringing the number of named suspects to 21.239 At trial, during the first stage of the 
proceedings, four of the defendants challenged the extraterritorial application of various 
U.S. statutes which formed the basis of the indictment. It was argued that the majority 
of counts in the indictment should be dismissed because the acts allegedly committed 
outside U.S. territory were based on statutes that ‘were not intended by Congress to 
regulate conduct outside United States territory’.240 The court, in rejecting this 
argument, found that the extraterritorial application of a range of U.S. statutes named in 
the indictment, many of which include broad and inchoate offences which never before 
had been considered in relation to the conduct of foreign nationals abroad, to be 
consistent with the protective principle.241 The validity of protective jurisdiction inter 
alia was subsequently reaffirmed in the trial of one of the suspects named in the 
indictment for the embassy bombings.242 This ground of jurisdiction is also being used 
to prosecute Abu Khatallah, who is charged with the attack on 11 September 2012 of a 
U.S. diplomatic mission and the killing of four U.S. government personnel, including a 
U.S. Ambassador, in Benghazi.243  
 
As regards the use of protective jurisdiction in cases concerning acts of terrorism 
committed against personnel and property not entitled to special protection, notable 
examples include the indictment of Ahmed Ibrahim al-Mughassil and 13 others for 
bombing Khobar Towers, a military housing complex used by the U.S. in Saudi Arabia, 
on 25 June 1996.244 The defendants were also charged with conspiracy outside the U.S. 
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to murder U.S. nationals, employees serving in their official capacity, federal 
employees, destruction of U.S. property and attack national defence premises in Saudi 
Arabia.245 Other notable examples include the indictment of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
and others for conspiracy outside the U.S. to destroy the Twin Towers arising out of the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.246 In U.S. v Harun, the defendant, a national of 
Saudi Arabia, was indicted on 20 March 2013 for conspiracy between 2001 and 2011, 
‘within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States’, to murder American 
military personnel in Afghanistan and conspiracy to bomb American diplomatic 
facilities in Nigeria.247 It is notable that other States have been willing to cooperate with 
the U.S. by extraditing alleged terrorists present in their territories, where extradition 
agreements are in place, for trial.248 This indicates that States have recognised the 
reciprocal benefit, and indeed the practical necessity, of protective jurisdiction for 
combating international terrorism, in particular for protecting certain of their vital 
interests abroad.  
  
Protective jurisdiction has also been established in the Bombings Convention in relation 
to offences committed against diplomatic and consular premises as well as property not 
entitled to special protection under international law. The convention inter alia 
criminalises the act of intentionally delivering, placing, discharging or detonating an 
explosive or other lethal device in, into, or against a place of public use, a State or 
government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure facility:  
 
(a) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or  
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(b) to cause extensive destruction of such a place, facility or system, where 
such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.249  
 
The term ‘State or government facility’ is defined in Article 1(1) as including:  
 
any permanent or temporary facility or conveyance that is used or occupied 
by the representatives of a State, members of Government, the legislature or 
the judiciary or by officials of an intergovernmental organisation in 
connection with their official duties.250  
 
Article 6(2)(b) of the convention establishes protective jurisdiction as a subsidiary 
ground where ‘the offence is committed against a State or government facility of that 
State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that 
State’. The definition of ‘State or government facility’ is replicated in two further 
international conventions, on Financing and Nuclear Terrorism, and has also been 
incorporated into the draft comprehensive convention, each of which establish 
protective jurisdiction.251 It is useful to note that, while the Bombings Convention, as 
with the three latter conventions, has as its aim the protection of the State’s facilities 
located abroad, it indirectly protects the State’s representatives, personnel and 
employees performing official duties as well as other nationals present within those 
facilities not performing official duties. The other notable aspect to the Bombings 
Convention is that it criminalises a range of inchoate and ancillary offences set forth in 
Article 2, which would be covered by protective jurisdiction where these are committed 
abroad against a State or government facility abroad, or where they are intended to be 
committed against a State or government facility, a public transportation system or an 
infrastructure facility in the State’s territory.  
   
That the State’s property and personnel entitled to special protection constitute vital 
interests falling under protective jurisdiction is also supported by Security Council 
practice. The Security Council has been prepared to condemn and impose sanctions 
under the authority of Chapter VII in response to attacks on such interests.252 The 
Security Council has also indicated that attacks committed against embassies constitute 
                                                        
249 Supra n 79, Article 2.  
250 Ibid., Article 1(1). 
251 Financing Convention, supra n 161, Article 7(2)(b); Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra n 162, 
Articles 1(5) & 9(2)(b); draft comprehensive convention, supra n 163, Article 6(2)(d). 
252 E.g., S/RES/457 (4 December 1979); S/RES/1044 (10 January 1996). 
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an attack on the government of the sending State.253 In response to the bombing of U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, discussed above, the Security Council stated 
that it was ‘deeply disturbed’ by those attacks, which ‘jeopardise the security of 
States’.254 The Security Council also seemingly endorsed, or at least paved the way, for 
the use by the U.S. of protective jurisdiction in its adoption of resolution 1189, which 
‘strongly condemn[ed]’ the ‘terrorist bomb attacks’ in Kenya and Tanzania and called 
on all States to ‘cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the ongoing 
investigations in Kenya, Tanzania and the United States to apprehend the perpetrators 
… and to bring them swiftly to justice’.255 The Security Council has encouraged States 
and, to that end, imposed sanctions on the Taliban, to assist the U.S. in bringing the 
persons accused of the attacks to trial.256 
 
5.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to shed important light on the definition of 
protective jurisdiction in contemporary customary international law. One approach to 
defining this jurisdiction is to specify a narrow list of offences over which the principle 
is applicable. However, this approach is problematic in that it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to harmonise national laws, in particular widely divergent definitions of 
‘terrorism’. Defining protective jurisdiction in this way may also be overly rigid for 
responding to the complex and evolving nature of the threat posed by international 
terrorism.257 The present chapter has adopted an alternative approach and proposed that 
it may be possible to define protective jurisdiction by enumerating some of the vital 
interests that have been included under its ambit lex lata and around which a basic level 
of agreement appears to have clustered. It has done so by building upon the detailed 
empirical analysis of national laws, in chapter four and Annex A, as well as the use of a 
range of other primary sources, namely judicial practice, counter-terrorism treaties and 
Security Council resolutions. These latter sources verify that certain interests 
                                                        
253 U.N. Doc.S/23772 (2 April 1992); Mickolus, F.E. & Simmons, I.S. (1997). ‘Terrorism, 1992-1995. A 
Chronology of Events and a Selectively Annotated Bibliography’. USA: Greenwood, at p.148. 
254 S/RES/1189, supra n 195, preambular para.2. 
255 Ibid., paras.1, 3. 
256 See also the establishment by the Council of the Special Tribunal of Lebanon, which is authorised to 
exercise protective jurisdiction over the alleged offenders, in response to the assassination of the 
Lebanese Prime Minister, supra n 174; SC/10761-AFR/2440, supra n 102. 
257 See further chapter six.   
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sufficiently qualify as ‘vital’ and indicate more clearly which of these interests are 
shared by the international community. 
  
The chapter has also proposed lex ferenda that the protection of certain vital interests is 
sufficiently widespread and uniform in the practice of the international community of 
States that protective jurisdiction could be defined according to as a ‘shared vital State 
interests’ approach. The purpose of proposing this approach is twofold. First of all, it is 
to show that a core category of vital State interests is shared by the international 
community. The chapter has shown that 13 vital State interests have been included 
under the ambit of protective jurisdiction lex lata, 10 of which are shared by the 
international community. These are as follows: sovereignty; territorial integrity; 
political independence; constitution; security; Heads of State/government; personnel 
and property (including internationally protected persons and property); nationals; 
registered aircraft and vessels; and currency and official documents. The right to protect 
some of these interests from international terrorism by the use of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, most notably the State’s sovereignty, political independence, nationals, 
international protected personnel and property and registered aircraft, has been 
sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter VII. The Security Council has also 
used its Chapter VII powers in order to oblige States to extradite alleged offenders to 
those States whose vital interests have been implicated by an offence, or otherwise to 
prosecute the accused on their behalf.  
 
These vital interests are by no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, these interests are some 
of the most important that are threatened by international terrorism and they go some 
way to explaining the behaviour of States in seeking to combat it. Of course, the nature 
and scale of the threat is relative and can differ considerably, depending on the State 
against which terrorist groups are fighting, but the vital interests enumerated above 
serve to illustrate a number of common themes. The enumeration of such interests could 
also facilitate the codification of protective jurisdiction as they are indicative of areas of 
the law on which there is a basic level of consensus and agreement. These shared vital 
interests therefore provide a useful basis on which the ILC may begin a more informed 
discussion on the codification of protective jurisdiction. The codification of protective 
jurisdiction by the ILC as a necessary and desirable way forward is examined in the 
final, concluding chapter. 
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The present chapter does not aim to be comprehensive and there may well be other vital 
interests that have been included under protective jurisdiction, in particular outside the 
context of international terrorism. A case in point is ‘governmental functions’, which 
has been defined by the Restatement (Third) as one of two all-encompassing vital 
interests falling under protective jurisdiction. The validity of governmental functions as 
a vital interest has been recognised and relied upon by U.S. courts, and the judgments in 
question have not received international protest. The State’s governmental functions 
may even form an inherent part of, or underlay, some of the other shared vital State 
interests, enumerated above, most notably sovereignty and political independence, 
nationals and personnel and property.258 Simma and Müller have suggested that 
protective jurisdiction is applicable over acts that jeopardise a State’s governmental 
functions, the reason being that such functions reflect one of the cardinal elements of 
the very concept of the State, namely government power.259 However, the authors inter 
alia cite no authority, by way of State practice, in support of the proposition that 
governmental functions are a vital interest. It is thus unclear whether governmental 
functions fall under protective jurisdiction lex lata, as a stand-a-lone vital interest, or 
need to be approached from the perspective of lex ferenda. This could be determined by 
States during the codification of protective jurisdiction.      
   
The second reason for proposing a shared vital State interests approach in defining 
protective jurisdiction is to show that such interests are not to be confused and conflated 
with ‘international community values’. There is, as has been explained, a collective 
belief that the obligation to extradite or prosecute, a principle that has been used in more 
than sixty treaties, including counter-terrorism treaties, impliedly codifies a ground of 
universal jurisdiction for the protection of international community values. This 
interpretation of extradite or prosecute has been accepted uncritically, and often 
exaggerated, by courts and in legal scholarship, which have persistently either relied on 
tentative, secondary material, or cited primary materials, wholly out of context. As has 
been shown, this collective belief lacks sufficient rigour and provides for an overly 
simplistic and inaccurate description of the law. It is also based on a fundamental 
assumption, namely that the protection of international community values based on 
universal jurisdiction has traditionally developed as a customary rule in the case of 
                                                        
258 See Bin Laden, supra n 12, at p.221. 
259 Supra n 95, at ibid. 
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piracy and war crimes and can simply be analogised with extradite or prosecute and 
expanded to encompass a broad range of other treaty crimes. These issues have been 
illustrated by analysing the recent decision of the ICJ in the case of Habré. The chapter 
has shown that the description of the obligation to extradite or prosecute in the CAT as 
‘universal jurisdiction’ by the ICJ (which is modelled on the same obligation used in 
three-quarters of the multilateral treaties dealing with criminal matters that have been 
adopted since 1970, including counter-terrorism treaties) was merely dictum. The ICJ 
provided no analysis of extradite or prosecute or universal jurisdiction. The passing 
description of extradite or prosecute as universal jurisdiction, which is not supported by 
a close reading of the trévoux préparatoires of the CAT or a basic textual analysis of 
the instrument, hardly provides for a sufficiently rigorous and persuasive interpretation 
of the law. The debate on universal jurisdiction at the General Assembly and the effort 
made to codify extradite or prosecute by the ILC show that there is considerable 
disagreement on the meaning of ‘universal jurisdiction’ and its relationship with 
extradite or prosecute. It is thus premature to describe extradite or prosecute, as did the 
ICJ, as ‘universal jurisdiction’. 
 
The chapter has proposed that extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties should 
not, on closer inspection, be automatically interpreted as the exclusive treaty 
codification of a customary rule of universal jurisdiction for the protection of 
international community values. In the first place, it does not explain with sufficient 
accuracy the complex and relative nature of the threat posed by international terrorism 
and the reason why States negotiate the adoption of treaties in order to combat it. 
Rather, the prescriptive jurisdiction arising out of extradite or prosecute is equally 
capable of being interpreted as a form of ‘treaty-based’ protective jurisdiction. The 
reason why extraterritorial jurisdiction arising out of this principle does not explicitly 
require a prescriptive connection between a legislating State and an alleged offence 
committed abroad to be established is necessary in order for States parties to implement 
the obligation to extradite or prosecute, the purpose of which is more effectively to 
protect certain of their own vital interests. A number of these vital State interests are 
shared by the international community, discussed above. Thus, the State in whose 
custody the accused is present is obliged, failing extradition to the party that has a 
connection with the alleged offence, to initiate criminal proceedings on the latter’s 
behalf. This prescriptive jurisdiction is also sufficiently broad to encompass offences 
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that implicate a party’s vital interests which either do not, or cannot be evidenced, to fall 
within one of the more narrowly defined circumstances permitting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as specified by the relevant treaty. In the latter case, all that has to be 
established by the legislating State is the presence of the accused on its territory. This 
means that States do not have to make any reference to, or provide any evidence of, 
their vital interests that may be threatened or implicated by an alleged offence. In sum, 
States parties to the relevant treaties concerned are able to use this mutually beneficial 
treaty-based jurisdiction in order to protect, or have protected on their behalf by other 
parties, their own vital interests.  
 
At a conceptual level, the description of extradite or prosecute as universal jurisdiction 
confuses the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ with the protection of 
‘international community values’. Extradite or prosecute and universal jurisdiction are 
both instrumental in combating the impunity of perpetrators of serious crimes. 
However, they are conceptually distinct and have different aims - and are capable of 
protecting different values and interests - in preventing impunity. The reason why States 
use the obligation to extradite or prosecute in counter-terrorism treaties, in order to 
prevent impunity, is fundamentally different to universal jurisdiction: treaty offences 
have a connection with certain vital State interests shared by the parties. These vital 
State interests are evidenced by the operative provisions of the relevant treaties and the 
way in which they have been implemented. This is not to suggest, however, that the 
prevention of impunity under extradite or prosecute may not also contribute in some 
way, perhaps indirectly or incidentally, to the protection of international community 
values. However, whatever the extent to which extradite or prosecute may protect such 
values does not transform this mutually beneficial treaty-based protective jurisdiction 
into a ground of universal jurisdiction. It is also unclear, other than the prevention of 
impunity of perpetrators of certain serious crimes, what these values are agreed to 
comprise, or, for that matter, whether they correspond with the values which may be 
protected by universal jurisdiction under customary international law. The reason for 
this is twofold. First of all, it is not possible to deduce international community values 
from the operative provisions of treaties. Secondly, the international community values 
that may be protected by the customary rule of universal jurisdiction are, a priori, 
equally unclear and are, more often than not, left insufficiently explained or 
unsubstantiated by courts and in legal scholarship. There is thus a fundamental 
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conceptual distinction that needs to be made, for the purpose of distinguishing more 
clearly the grounds of protective and universal jurisdiction, between the protection of 
‘shared vital State interests’ and ‘international community values’.  
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Chapter Six 
 
‘Codification of Protective Jurisdiction by the International Law Commission as a 
Way Forward: Problems and Prospects?’  
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
As concluding remarks have been made at the end of each chapter, the focus of this 
concluding chapter is the codification of protective jurisdiction by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) as a potential way forward. The adoption of an instrument codifying 
protective jurisdiction is not only timely but also a ‘necessary and desirable’ 
endeavour.1 This is so for two important reasons. The first of these is that, within a 
criminal law paradigm, protective jurisdiction is the principal means by which States 
combat the complex and evolving threat of international terrorism. State practice, as was 
shown from a detailed empirical analysis in chapter four, may be sufficiently 
widespread to permit codification. Chapter five has also enumerated 13 vital State 
interests, 10 of which are shared by the international community, that have been 
included under protective jurisdiction lex lata. These vital interests are by no means 
exhaustive. Nonetheless, they go some way to explaining the reason why international 
terrorism is regarded as a serious threat and the type of interests that the international 
community of States seeks to protect in order to combat it. The codification of 
protective jurisdiction, as will be explained below, could potentially contribute to, and 
fill in the gaps left by, the existing international legal framework for combatting 
international terrorism. This is important in view of the determination by the U.N. 
Security Council that international terrorism is not only ‘one of the most serious threats 
to international peace and security’ but it is also one that is increasingly ‘diffuse’ and 
‘growing’.2 Secondly, the ILC has recently included the topic of ‘Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’, with a view to the codification of protective jurisdiction, in its long-term 
programme of work.3 The ILC has also recognised that protective jurisdiction may be of 
particular relevance for combatting international terrorism. The most pressing question 
thus turns not on whether codification is the most appropriate way forward but, rather, 
the range and scope of issues for consideration by the ILC and the outcome that such 
codification will eventually take. 
                                                        
1 ILC Statute, 1947, in A/RES/174(II) (21 November 1947), Article 18(2). 
2 S/RES/2178 (24 September 2014), preambular paras.2-3. 
3 Infra n 40.  
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The chapter concludes that, owing to the complex and politically sensitive nature of the 
topic and in view of the codification of similar topics touching on important State 
interests by the ILC, the final outcome of codification may be rather modest and could 
take a number of years, and perhaps even decades, to achieve. 
 
The chapter begins, in part two, by examining what can be learned from previous 
codification efforts before turning to examine, in part three, the decision of the ILC to 
include ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work. Part four 
assesses the draft prepared by the ILC Secretariat, upon which the ILC endorsed the 
inclusion of this topic in its long-term programme of work. As will be explained, the 
draft is to be welcomed, not least for highlighting that State practice is sufficiently 
uniform to permit codification and that protective jurisdiction may be of particular 
relevance for combatting new types of transnational crimes, including acts of terrorism. 
The draft also alludes to the need to examine vital interests in responding to 
international terrorism.  
  
On the other hand, the draft is subject to a number of shortcomings. One of the most 
important of these is that, contrary to the proposal by the draft, it is not helpful for the 
ILC to codify protective jurisdiction in isolation from other grounds of jurisdiction, 
most notably the theory of universal jurisdiction, or to break the law up into separate 
specialist fields. The reason for this is twofold. The first of these is the unity of 
international law as a legal system. Secondly, the draft, by assuming that protective 
jurisdiction has no relevance to international crimes and crimes contained in special 
regimes, appears to inadvertently entrench the jurisdictional dichotomy over domestic 
and international crimes. One of the main causes of this dichotomy, it will be recalled 
from chapter three, is that the ILC, since its First Session in 1949, has followed the 
same fragmented approach to codification as did the League of Nations and Harvard 
Research. The upshot of this approach is that the development and applicability of 
protective jurisdiction over piracy and war crimes has been given insufficient 
consideration by courts and in legal scholarship. The development of jurisdiction over 
these crimes for the protection of ‘shared vital State interests’ has also been 
misinterpreted as the protection of ‘international community values’ based on a theory 
of universal jurisdiction. It is on the basis of these special regimes that unilateral 
attempts have been made in recent years to expand universal jurisdiction to include 
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crimes outside these regimes, most notably offences falling in the treaty regime 
governing the obligation to extradite or prosecute and in general international law. 
These conflicting interpretations of the law are challenging the coherence of the 
international legal system. 
 
The chapter discusses, respectively in parts five and six, the principal advantages and 
disadvantages to codification that could be taken into consideration by the ILC. One of 
the most important advantages is that such an instrument could enumerate some of the 
shared vital State interests that fall under protective jurisdiction lex lata. As there is no 
legally binding definition of ‘terrorism’ in international law, it could also be used to 
enhance coherence and uniformity in the adoption of national laws, particularly in the 
implementation of Security Council resolutions, and strengthen the ad hoc regime of 
counter-terrorism treaties. The latter approach, as will be explained, is not entirely 
satisfactory for responding to the complex and evolving threat of international terrorism 
in all its forms and manifestations. The principal disadvantages, of which there are two, 
turn on the fact that agreement on protective jurisdiction would have to be in the 
abstract, and the difficulty of attaining consensus on the type of vital interests that may 
be protected. That said, neither of these disadvantages, in and of themselves, are 
sufficient to prevent codification. 
 
6.2. Previous Efforts to Codify Protective Jurisdiction  
 
The codification of protective jurisdiction, it will be recalled from chapter three, is not 
new and has historical precedents. It is useful to summarise what can be learned from 
these previous efforts, as well as the more recent decision by the ILC to include the 
topic of ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work, before 
proceeding to discuss the principal advantages and disadvantages of codification by the 
ILC. 
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6.2.1. League of Nations  
 
The first public effort to codify protective jurisdiction was made by the League of 
Nations.4 The League’s Committee of Experts ultimately decided that codification, 
‘although desirable, would encounter grave political and other obstacles’.5 The reason 
the Committee of Experts decided not to include protective jurisdiction in its list of 
topics as being ‘ripe’ for codification ‘at the present moment’ is because the League had 
limited itself to the selection of topics that could be codified by way of binding 
international conventions and was based on the recommendation by Brierly, acting as 
Rapporteur.6 According to Brierly, the U.S. and Britain opposed any exception to the 
territoriality of jurisdiction and therefore the possibility of any agreement would 
‘demand sacrifices’.7 The report by Brierly, as has already been explained in chapter 
three, was not based on research of primary sources and there was little primary analysis 
either; and, as with other Anglo-American jurists at that time, Brierly advocated a strict 
territorial approach to jurisdiction in international law, at least in respect of offences 
committed in the State’s territorial sovereignty. Brierly’s report showed, a contrario, 
that protective jurisdiction was widely used in State practice, a view that was confirmed 
by the observations of De Visscher, assisting Brierly.8 In any case, protective 
jurisdiction had, in fact, developed in the practice of Britain and the U.S., most notably 
over piracy on the high seas, though this was summarily dismissed by Brierly as having 
no relevance to the topic under consideration, as piracy occurred outside territorial 
sovereignty. Brierly’s recommendation inter alia thus appears to have been unfounded.  
  
One of the wider implications raised by the League’s decision inter alia is that the topic 
was not communicated to governments for their ‘opinion’ or deliberated at the 1930 
Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law.9 There was thus no 
opportunity for States to deliberate and exchange views on the nature, development and 
scope of protective jurisdiction, specifically, or its relationship with other grounds of 
jurisdiction, more generally, under customary international law.  
                                                        
4 Brierly, J.L. & De Visscher, C., Report of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of 
Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, ‘Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime’. 
20 AJIL (Spec. Supp.)(1926) 252. 
5 Ibid., at p.253.  
6 Ibid.   
7 Ibid., at p.258.  
8 Ibid., at pp.258-259.  
9 Documents from the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of 
International Law. 26 AJIL (Spec. Supp.)(1926) 1, at pp.12-20. 
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6.2.2. Harvard Research 
 
The League’s codification effort prompted the Harvard Research to produce a Draft 
Convention on the topic, in the hope that it would be of interest to, and merit the 
attention of, the League.10 The Harvard Research adopted the same approach as the 
League and limited itself to the codification of this topic in such a way that it could be 
adopted by means of an international convention. The Harvard Research, despite being 
a private codification effort, was the first study to systematise and codify theories 
relating to grounds of jurisdiction under customary international law, as well as use the 
nomenclature ‘protective principle’ and provide a definition of it. The Harvard Research 
examined State practice and found evidence of a ‘high degree of uniformity’ and 
‘almost universal approval’ of protective jurisdiction in national laws and, based on this 
practice, defined such jurisdiction as being applicable to any crime committed against 
the State’s ‘security, territorial integrity or political independence’.11  
 
However, the Harvard Research followed the same approach as Brierly and gave no 
consideration to protective jurisdiction over ‘piracy’ on the high seas and, instead, dealt 
with the latter topic under a wholly separate draft article. More importantly, the Harvard 
Research went one step further and proposed lex ferenda a theory of ‘universality’ of 
jurisdiction over a crime of piracy under international law.12 The Harvard Research, as 
has already been explained in chapter three, misinterpreted the right of every State to 
exercise jurisdiction over so-called ‘pirates’ on the high seas for the protection of their 
sovereignty and certain of their vital interests, which were shared by the international 
community, or at least by the maritime powers, and called it ‘universal jurisdiction’ by a 
different name. 
  
This misinterpretation by the Harvard Research was due, it will be recalled, to an 
overreliance on tentative, secondary sources, in particular the commentaries of Anglo-
American jurists and, most notably, the academic commentary of J.B. Moore, who later 
repeated his view in a Dissenting Opinion while serving as the first U.S. judge before 
                                                        
10 Research on International Law under the Auspices of the Harvard Law School, Part II, ‘Jurisdiction 
with Respect to Crime’. 29 AJIL (Supp.)(1935) 435 (Harvard Research).  
11 Ibid., at pp.446-447, 543, 546, 549, 551, 557. 
12 Ibid., at p.563 (Article 9 and commentary).  
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the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case.13 The reason why Moore 
defined ‘piracy’ as a crime under international law, and interpreted jurisdiction over it 
as a theory of ‘universal jurisdiction’, was due to an effort by Moore to distinguish 
between extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, which had undeniably 
developed in the practice of Britain and the U.S., from extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
general international law in respect of crimes occurring in the State’s territorial 
sovereignty. The opinion of Moore, which was typical of Anglo-American jurists at the 
time, was a strict territorial approach to jurisdiction in international law; thus, 
jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, for Moore, provided the only exception to 
territoriality solely on the basis that it had as its purpose the protection of international 
community values. The opinion of Moore and the Harvard Research were not based on 
State practice. It should thus be of little surprise, perhaps, that they were unable to 
explain what international community values were protected by universal jurisdiction, 
or provide any empirical evidence of the protection of such values.   
 
6.2.3. First Session of the ILC   
 
The way in which the League and the Harvard Research approached the codification of 
jurisdiction was relied upon by, and had important implications for, the codification 
effort by the ILC at its First Session, in 1949. The ILC, based on a memorandum 
submitted by the U.N. Secretary-General, identified the topic of ‘Jurisdiction with 
regard to crimes committed outside national territory’ as one of fourteen areas of 
international law that were ‘necessary and desirable’ for codification.14 The preparatory 
work by the Secretary-General was not based on an examination of State practice; 
rather, it reviewed the previous codification efforts by the League and the Harvard 
Research, the latter of which the Secretary-General regarded as being ‘of great value’.15 
On the one hand, the Secretary-General observed that the topic of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is ‘of considerable practical importance’ and ‘by general admission requires 
clarification and authoritative solution’, not least because protective jurisdiction is of a 
‘controversial nature’ and is ‘not free from difficulty’.16 On the other, the Secretary-
General appeared to adopt the opinion of Brierly, above, namely that objective 
                                                        
13 Moore, J.B. (1906). ‘Digest of International Law’, vol. II, at pp.951-952; Case of the S.S. “Lotus” 
(France v Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ Reports 1927, Series A. No.10, at p.70 (Diss. Op. Judge Moore).   
14 U.N. Doc.A/GN.4/1/Rev.l (10 February 1949) (Memorandum); ILCYB, 1949, vol.I, at pp.280-281. 
15 (Memorandum), ibid., at p.37. 
16 Ibid.  
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territorial jurisdiction provides an alternative to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Thus, the 
Secretary-General suggested that, in dealing with this topic, the ILC may wish to ‘attach 
importance’ to the doctrine of territoriality and argued that, in any scheme of 
codification, protective jurisdiction is of ‘limited compass’ and should ‘figure merely as 
a subdivision of a larger topic such as “Obligations and Limitations of Territorial 
Jurisdiction”’.17  
  
It is fair to say that the opinion of the Secretary-General inter alia, even if it was 
accurate at that time, certainly does not reflect accurately the contemporary situation 
and the important developments that have subsequently occurred in respect of 
transnational crime, most notably, the complex threat of international terrorism, and the 
trends in State and treaty practice to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to 
combat it. Given that the preparatory work by the Secretary-General was limited almost 
exclusively to a review of the codification efforts by the League and the Harvard 
Research, it should, perhaps, be of little surprise that no consideration was given to the 
applicability of protective jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas, which was treated 
by the Secretary-General under a separate topic of ‘The Regime of the High Seas’.18 
Nor did the Secretary-General give any consideration to the development of this 
jurisdiction in widespread State practice over war crimes in the aftermath of World War 
II.  
 
The ILC ultimately decided, perhaps in light of the Secretary-General’s remarks, to give 
priority to the formulation of a ‘daft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States’19 
and the codification of other topics, most notably ‘The Regime of the High Seas’.20 In 
the codification of the latter topic, the Rapporteur and the ILC relied exclusively, and 
without question, on the Harvard Research in the codification of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas; and neither of them examined or gave any consideration 
to the development of jurisdiction over piracy in State practice. Nor were they prepared 
to explain grounds of jurisdiction under custom and which of these grounds, if any, was 
codified by the convention in respect of piracy, or the interests or values that States are 
supposed to protect in the suppression of piracy. The ILC also considered, at its First 
                                                        
17 Ibid. See also U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/2 (15 December 1948), at pp.70-71. 
18 Ibid., at pp.8, 40-42.  
19 A/RES/178(II) (21 November 1947); A/RES/375(IV) (6 December 1949); A/RES/596(VI) (1951). 
20 ILCYB, supra n 14, at p.281. 
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Session, whether the ‘laws of war’ and the punishment of war crimes should be selected 
as a topic for codification but the majority of the ILC declared itself opposed to the 
study of this topic at that time.21  
 
The upshot of all this is that grounds of jurisdiction under customary international law 
and protective jurisdiction in particular have not previously been codified by the ILC, 
let alone debated and the views of governments exchanged. Nor has the development 
and applicability of protective jurisdiction over piracy and war crimes been given any 
consideration by the ILC.  
 
The first codification effort by the ILC raises broader implications of great importance 
for the present study. The first of these is that the way in which the ILC approached the 
codification of jurisdiction was fragmented: the ILC decided not to codify grounds of 
jurisdiction, on the one hand, and prioritised the codification of jurisdiction contained in 
the special legal regime governing piracy on the high seas, on the other. At the same 
time, the ILC decided not to codify the applicable grounds of jurisdiction in the special 
regime governing the laws of war. The obligation to extradite or prosecute in respect of 
war crimes amounting to grave breaches was codified in the four Geneva Conventions 
and adopted at the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims in 1949.22 The Diplomatic Conference 
worked on the basis of draft texts adopted by the Seventeenth International Red Cross 
Conference.23 However, at no point were grounds of jurisdiction over such crimes 
examined by the International Red Cross Conference or the Diplomatic Conference. 
This fragmented approach to codification had the effect of formally entrenching the 
jurisdictional dichotomy over international and domestic crimes - first developed by 
Moore and subsequently adopted by the League and, thereafter, codified by the Harvard 
Research; that is, extraterritorial jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas is, to borrow 
the words of the Secretary-General, above, ‘isolated and disconnected’ to the question 
of ‘[protective] jurisdiction over aliens for crimes committed abroad’ under the topic of 
                                                        
21 Ibid. 
22 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, available online: 
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/RC-Fin-Rec_Dipl-Conf-1949.html. 
23 Report of the Seventeenth International Red Cross Conference, Stockholm, August 1948, available 
online: www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_XVIIth-RC-Conference.pdf. 
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‘Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside national territory’.24 This 
dichotomy has subsequently resulted in the development and applicability of protective 
jurisdiction over piracy and war crimes to be given insufficient consideration by courts 
and in legal scholarship. Rather, protective jurisdiction is perceived, in the words of the 
Secretary-General, to be of a ‘controversial nature’ and limited to domestic crimes for 
the protection of a narrow category of State interests.  
 
Secondly, the priority given by the ILC to the codification of jurisdiction over piracy 
and, to that end, the reliance placed on the Harvard Research, has given rise to the 
collective belief, to which reference has already been made in chapters three and five. 
This collective belief has developed out of haphazard analyses of State practice and the 
overreliance on tentative, secondary sources of evidence of customary international law. 
It posits that universal jurisdiction has, for the past 500 years, developed over an 
international crime of piracy as a customary rule in order to protect international 
community values and that this ground of jurisdiction has been codified by the ILC. 
Moreover, the protection of such values on the basis of universal jurisdiction expanded 
in the aftermath of World War II from piracy to encompass war crimes and other crimes 
under international law; and, since the adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
universal jurisdiction has been implicitly codified in more than 60 treaties that use the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute, including counter-terrorism treaties. This collective 
belief is best illustrated, perhaps, by the successor of the Harvard Research and the only 
other private codification of jurisdiction, the American Law Institute in its Restatement 
of the law.25 As has already been explained in chapters three and five, this collective 
belief misinterprets jurisdiction for the protection of shared vital State interests as a 
theory of universal jurisdiction. It is worth noting, by way of aside, that this collective 
belief provides a useful example of the reason why the ILC decided in 2012 to include 
in its programme of work the topic of the ‘Formation and evidence of customary 
international law’ - with the aim of restraining haphazard analyses of the formation and 
sources of evidence of custom.26 
 
                                                        
24 Memorandum, supra n 14, para.104.  
25 Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (Second), Washington, D.C. (1965), para.34; 
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. (Third), Washington, D.C. (1987), para.404.  
26 U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/653 (30 May 2012), para.22. The title of this topic was subsequently changed to 
‘Identification of customary international law’, U.N. Doc.A/68/10 (2013), para.65; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/661 
(4 April 2013), at p.4. 
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6.3. The Inclusion of ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in the ILC’s ‘Long-term 
Programme of Work’ 
  
The ILC, having first identified ‘Jurisdiction with regard to crimes committed outside 
national territory’ as a topic in urgent need of codification in 1949, did not return to this 
topic for more than forty years. The ILC, at its Forty-Fourth Session, in 1992, embarked 
upon a more rigorous procedure for the selection of topics in international law for 
codification and, to that end, established a Working Group to consider a limited number 
of topics to be recommended to the General Assembly for inclusion in its long-term 
programme of work.27 The Working Group provisionally identified 12 topics as 
possible subjects of later work and individual members of the ILC were asked to write a 
short synopsis outlining the nature of the topic, the subject-matter to be covered and the 
extent to which the topic was already dealt with in treaties and private codification 
projects. One such topic proposed for the consideration of the Working Group, prepared 
by Mr. P.S. Rao, was entitled ‘Extraterritorial application of national legislation’.28  
  
The report prepared by Rao, in outlining this topic as suitable for future work by the 
ILC, was primarily based on secondary sources, rather than analysis of State practice. It 
suggested that national laws are given extraterritorial application in different contexts, 
one of which is ‘[t]o protect a State against treason, terrorism, drug trafficking and other 
offences affecting its power and security’.29 The exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is also ‘inevitable and even desirable’, the reasons for which include the 
interdependence of the international community which necessitates the extension of the 
State’s jurisdiction beyond its borders to regulate transnational activities which are of 
concern to the State; the desirability to avoid safe havens for criminals; and the 
imperatives of international cooperation to give full effect to treaty obligations.30 Rao 
suggested that some of the issues which have acquired prominence and require a 
comprehensive and conceptual response are the concern by States to control terrorism 
and drug-trafficking and the need for States to seek security, independence and enjoy 
their sovereignty.31  
 
                                                        
27 ILCYB, 1992, vol.II (Part Two), para.368; ILCYB, 1996, vol.II (Part Two), para.164. 
28 ILCYB, 1993, vol.II (Part One), at pp.237-242. 
29 Ibid., at p.237. 
30 Ibid., at pp.237-238. 
31 Ibid., at p.241. 
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Rao did not refer to the ‘protective principle’ or undertake any analysis of it. That said, 
Rao did not analyse other grounds of jurisdiction either. The reason for this may be 
because Rao took the view that, while all national legislation is prima facie territorial in 
character, there are ‘no uniform or universally settled principles’ regarding the 
extraterritorial application of national laws, which is essentially left to courts to 
determine in individual cases.32 It is notable, however, that Rao interpreted jurisdiction 
over acts of terrorism committed against the State’s nationals as a theory of passive 
personality jurisdiction.33 On closer examination, and contrary to the opinion of Rao, 
jurisdiction inter alia is more persuasively based on the protective principle.34 On a 
policy level, one of the issues that arises, suggested Rao, is ‘[w]hat should be the limits 
for exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the principles of “effects”, “passive 
personality”, or “active personality”?’.35 Rao thus suggested that the ‘various principles’ 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction - ‘the principle of universality, the principles of active and 
passive nationality and the principle of effect’ - therefore need to be analysed and 
consolidated.36 A study on the topic of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the ILC, for these 
and other reasons, suggested Rao, is thus ‘important and timely’.37 The proposed study 
of jurisdictional principles by Rao did not presuppose the existence of a jurisdictional 
dichotomy, discussed above.  
  
Notwithstanding the report by Rao, the topic of jurisdiction was not returned to by the 
ILC until 1996. The ILC, during its Forty-Eighth Session, established a non-exhaustive 
list of topics classified under 13 main fields of public international law for future study 
as part of its long-term programme of work.38 Of the various topics listed by the ILC, 
three of these were identified as ‘appropriate for codification and progressive 
development’ in the future work of the ILC, while numerous others, including the topic 
of ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’, were identified by the ILC as ‘possible future topics’.39 
The reason for the ILC’s decision inter alia was more a matter of capacity and not 
                                                        
32 Ibid., at p.239.  
33 Ibid., at p.237 & n 4.  
34 Chapter five. 
35 Supra n 26, at pp.238-239. 
36 Ibid., at p.241.  
37 Ibid., at p.242. 
38 ILCYB, 1996, vol.II (Part Two), Annex II.    
39 Ibid., at pp.97, 134.   
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because the ILC regarded ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ as inappropriate or undesirable 
for codification and progressive development at that time.40  
 
The ILC’s Planning Group established, during the Fifty-Fourth Session of the ILC, in 
2002, a ‘Working Group on the Long-term Programme of Work’. The Working Group 
submitted its report to the Planning Group at the Fifty-Eighth Session of the ILC, in 
2006. The report inter alia considered a number of topics for inclusion in the ILC’s 
long-term programme of work, one of which was ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’. The 
Working Group, in the selection of topics, was guided by the criteria set out in the 
recommendation by the ILC:  
 
(a) The topic should reflect the needs of the States in respect of the 
progressive development and codification of international law; (b) The topic 
should be sufficiently advanced in stage in terms of State practice to permit 
progressive development and codification; [and] (c) The topic is concrete 
and feasible for progressive development.41 
 
The Working Group requested the ILC Secretariat to prepare a draft on the topic of 
‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’. In the light of the Secretariat’s draft, the Planning Group 
recommended, and the ILC endorsed, the inclusion of the topic of ‘Extraterritorial 
jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work at the Fifty-Eighth Session.42 The 
topic has, however, not yet been placed on the ILC’s programme of work. Nonetheless, 
this development is noteworthy given that, until this point, extraterritorial jurisdiction 
was one of only four topics out of the list of fourteen originally agreed to by the ILC in 
1949 on which the ILC has not submitted a final report to the General Assembly.43 It is 
useful, therefore, to examine the Secretariat’s draft.  
 
6.4. Draft on ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ by the ILC’s Secretariat 
 
The draft on ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ produced by the ILC Secretariat stated that, 
while jurisdiction has traditionally been limited to the State’s territory, today 
extraterritorial jurisdiction ‘has become an increasingly common phenomenon’, one of 
the consequences of which is due to increasing transnational criminal activities, 
                                                        
40 Ibid., paras.246-247.   
41 ILCYB 1997, vol.II (Part Two), at pp.71-72, para.238. 
42 U.N. Doc.A/61/10 (2006), Chapter XIII, paras.257, 260; ibid., ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’, Annex E 
(ILC Secretariat); A/RES/ 61/34 (18 December 2006), para.7. 
43 The three other topics are ‘Recognition of States and Governments’; ‘Treatment of aliens’; and ‘Right 
of asylum’; available online: www.legal.un.org/ilc/ilcintro.htm. 
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including drug trafficking and international terrorism.44 The draft took the view that 
‘[t]he topic “Extraterritorial jurisdiction” is in an advanced stage in terms of State 
practice, and is concrete.’45 The draft noted that ‘some may question whether the 
practice is sufficiently uniform or widespread to support a codification effort at this 
time’; however, it suggested that ‘recent developments indicate that practice may be 
converging towards a more uniform view of the law’ and there appears to be a ‘strong 
need for codification in this field’.46 The innovations in communications and 
transportation, moreover, ‘make the codification and progressive development of the 
limits of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of States a timely and important endeavour’.47  
 
As regards grounds of jurisdiction, the draft stated that the territoriality principle is the 
primary basis for jurisdiction, while jurisdiction based on ‘principles such as the passive 
personality principle, the protective principle and the effects doctrine, has been more 
controversial.’48 It proceeded to suggest, however, that State practice is indicative of ‘a 
general tendency to broaden the classical bases for criminal jurisdiction in relation to 
specific types of crimes committed abroad, which have a particularly international scope 
and effect, such as terrorism, cyber crime and drug offences.’49 Notably, the draft 
suggested that protective jurisdiction ‘may be of particular relevance to new types of 
cyber crimes and terrorist offences.’50 In that regard, the draft suggested that ‘some 
States have broadened their interpretation of the concept of “vital interests” in order to 
address terrorism […] and introduced the protective principle in their legislation and 
applied it in some court cases.’51  
 
The draft suggested that an instrument ‘could aim at setting forth general principles and 
more specific rules governing the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction under public 
international law’ and that ‘there is a considerable amount of State practice relating to 
the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction which the Commission could draw upon in 
the elaboration of such an instrument.’52 It also suggested that the elaboration of such an 
                                                        
44 ILC Secretariat, supra n 42, para.1. 
45 Ibid., para.3. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., para.18.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., para.20. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., para.33. 
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instrument, in addition to codification, may require some ‘progressive development of 
the law’ due to ‘the increasing level of disagreement and uncertainty with respect to 
certain aspects of the law governing jurisdiction’.53 In that connection, the draft 
suggested that there are ‘several strong trends’ in State practice which may guide the 
ILC ‘in resolving the areas of disagreement and thereby provide greater clarity and 
certainty in an area of international law which is of increasing practical importance’.54 
 
There is little doubt, based on the Secretariat’s draft and the decision by the ILC to 
include the topic of ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction’ in its long-term programme of work, 
that the codification of grounds of jurisdiction and the protective principle in particular 
is ‘necessary and desirable’.55 The draft is to be welcomed for highlighting the ‘strong 
need’ to codify extraterritorial jurisdiction; this is so not only to provide for ‘greater 
clarity and certainty in an area of international law which is of increasing practical 
importance’, but also for alluding to the trend in State practice to use extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and the relevance of protective jurisdiction for combatting emerging 
transnational crimes, in particular international terrorism. The most pressing question, 
then, is not whether the codification of protective jurisdiction is an appropriate way 
forward but, rather, the range and scope of issues for consideration by the ILC and the 
form that such codification will eventually take. In that connection, the Secretariat’s 
draft is subject to a number of shortcomings.  
 
The draft did not give any consideration to the contextual and historical development of 
protective jurisdiction in State practice, most notably in respect of piracy and war 
crimes. It merely intimated, instead, that jurisdiction based on this principle has been 
‘controversial’ in the past.56 Yet the draft did not explain the reason why this was so. It 
also stated that protective jurisdiction ‘may be viewed as a specific application of the 
objective territoriality principle or the effects doctrine.’57 The draft thus 
misconceptualises protective jurisdiction in the same way as the ALI in its Restatement 
of the law.58 The draft also appears to have misinterpreted, as does the Restatement, the 
theories of protection and passive personality jurisdiction over acts of terrorism which 
                                                        
53 Ibid., para.34.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Supra n 1.  
56 Supra n 42, para.18. 
57 Ibid., para.13. 
58 Chapter five. 
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injure the State’s nationals. To be sure, the draft suggested that passive personality has 
gained ‘greater acceptance’ in State practice in recent years and in this regard 
international terrorism is a ‘paradigmatic’ example.59 The evidence relied upon by the 
draft in support of this proposition is the Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins et al. 
in the Arrest Warrant and two counter-terrorism treaties.60 However, the opinion of 
Judges Higgins et al. relied primarily on the Restatement (Third), the drafters of which, 
as has already been discussed in chapter five, misinterpreted the theories of protection 
and passive personality.61 The same point applies mutatis mutandis to the counter-
terrorism treaties cited by the draft.62 
  
A similar issue arises in respect of the draft’s treatment of universal jurisdiction. The 
draft did not examine universal jurisdiction and merely suggested that such jurisdiction 
applies with respect to international crimes and is exercised by the State ‘in the interest 
of the international community rather than exclusively in its own national interest, and 
thus, this principle of jurisdiction would fall outside of the scope of the present topic.’63 
It is notable, in this regard, that the draft proposed a fragmented approach to 
codification and excluded the study of extraterritorial jurisdiction in special legal 
regimes, including the law of the sea and international humanitarian law.64 The draft is 
thus based on the same assumption as the collective belief, discussed above; that is, 
only the theory of universal jurisdiction has traditionally developed over and remains 
applicable to international crimes, including piracy and war crimes, and that such crimes 
are suppressed to protect exclusively international community values, while grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction other than universality, including protective jurisdiction, are 
limited to offences defined by ‘national law applied extraterritorially’.65  
  
There is a strong case for proposing that it is neither in accordance with principle, nor 
helpful, for the purpose of codifying the topic of jurisdiction, for the ILC to codify 
protective jurisdiction in isolation from other grounds of jurisdiction, most notably the 
                                                        
59 Supra n 42, paras.10, 15, 19. 
60 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DRC v Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p.3, para.47; 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 14 September 
1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, Article 4; the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1316 
U.N.T.S. 205, Article 5. 
61 Third Restatement, supra n 25, para.402. 
62 Chapter five.  
63 Supra n 42, para.16. 
64 Ibid., para.36. 
65 Ibid., para.35. 
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theory of universal jurisdiction, or to break the law up into separate specialist fields. 
The reason for this proposal, first of all, is the unity of international law as a legal 
system.66 Thus, the need for a unified approach to codification has recently been 
proposed by the Special Rapporteurs in the codification of other topics.67  
 
The second reason is that the Secretariat’s draft, by assuming that protective jurisdiction 
has no relevance to international crimes, appears to inadvertently entrench the 
jurisdictional dichotomy, discussed above, between universal jurisdiction over piracy 
and international crimes, on the one hand, and the applicability of all other grounds of 
jurisdiction over domestic crimes, on the other. One of the main causes of this 
dichotomy, it will be recalled, is that the approach to codification by the League and 
continued by the ILC, since its First Session, has been fragmented. Such fragmentation 
does not necessarily challenge the coherence of the international legal system. However, 
the fact that grounds of jurisdiction have not been given any substantive consideration 
by the ILC has led to unilateral interpretations by some States, courts and in legal 
scholarship of the special legal regimes governing piracy and war crimes, both of which 
have been partially codified, as encompassing a theory of universal jurisdiction.  
 
It is on the basis of these special regimes that unilateral attempts have been made by 
some States in recent years to expand the theory of universal jurisdiction to include 
other crimes outside these regimes, most notably offences falling in the treaty regime 
governing the obligation to extradite or prosecute and in general international law. 
These conflicting interpretations of the law, which are challenging the coherence of the 
international legal system, have led to the topic of universal jurisdiction being the 
subject of heated debate at the General Assembly and its Sixth Committee.68 That 
debate, which has been on-going since 2009, is the first time that a particular ground of 
jurisdiction has received some exchange of views by governments at the international 
level and shows the importance of scrutinising long-standing, untested assumptions. It 
has also started to reveal some of the confusion and fundamental disagreement among 
States on the concept, scope and application of universal jurisdiction and its relationship 
                                                        
66 U.N. Doc.A/61/10 (2006), supra n 42, para.251(1); U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/653, supra n 26; U.N. 
Doc.A/CN.4/661, supra n 26. 
67 Ibid. 
68 A/RES/64/117 (16 December 2009); U.N. Doc.A/65/181 (29 July 2010); Sixth Committee, U.N. 
Doc.A/C.6/65/SR.10 (3 November 2010), para.60. 
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with other grounds of jurisdiction and the regime governing the extradite or prosecute 
principle in international law.69 Nonetheless, this debate has taken place in isolation, 
without any consideration of extraterritorial jurisdiction generally and of the 
applicability of protective jurisdiction over international crimes in particular. At the 
same time, the ILC, since it first included ‘The obligation to extradite or prosecute’ in 
its programme of work in 2005, has studied this topic in isolation from grounds of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, other than universality.70 
  
The time is ripe for the ILC to clarify grounds of jurisdiction, which means assessing 
the applicability of protective jurisdiction over international crimes and crimes in 
special legal regimes, as well as its relationship with prescriptive jurisdiction arising out 
of the extradite or prosecute principle. Indeed, the Secretariat’s draft inter alia 
suggested that ‘[d]efining the main concepts to be contained in an instrument would be 
one of the essential elements of the study’.71 This includes defining ‘[c]ore principles of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction’, including protective jurisdiction.72 The draft proceeded to 
state that in any such instrument ‘… it would be necessary to indicate the extent to 
which the various jurisdictional principles may provide a valid basis for the 
extraterritorial assertion of prescriptive … jurisdiction’.73 It may be the case that these 
basic aims of codification may not be fully realised unless the relationship between 
grounds of jurisdiction is first clarified. This would require a comprehensive and unified 
study of protective jurisdiction in the international legal system.  
 
6.5. Advantages of Codification 
 
There are advantages to codifying protective jurisdiction, a number of which have 
already been highlighted, above, by the ILC. The advantage of codification, first and 
foremost, is that it will provide the opportunity, for the first time, for the ILC to study, 
and for governments to debate and exchange views on, the basic concept of protective 
jurisdiction. In that regard, codification could modestly aim to define protective 
jurisdiction and indicate the extent to which it provides a valid basis of prescriptive 
                                                        
69 Yee, S. (2011). ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Concept, Logic, and Reality’. 10 Chinese JIL 503.  
70 U.N. Doc.A/61/10, supra n 42, paras.216, 226, 230; U.N. Doc.A/68/10, supra n 26, paras.2-4, 21, 24, 
26, 29; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/603 (10 June 2008), paras.46-47; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/612 (26 March 2009), 
para.33; U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.774 (24 June 2010), at pp.6-7. Cf. U.N. Doc.A/59/10 (2004), Annex, 
paras.9-10. 
71 Supra n 42, para.39. 
72 Ibid., para.42. 
73 Ibid., para.44. 
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jurisdiction over domestic and international crimes. This is important, not least because 
protective jurisdiction is little understood and therefore tends to be interpreted by courts 
and in legal scholarship in overly-narrow terms. It may be the case that the ambiguity 
surrounding this jurisdiction means that it is not always used to the full extent permitted 
by international law, or that other grounds of jurisdiction are inappropriately claimed in 
its stead.  
 
The ILC may decide whether such an instrument shall indicate the extent to which 
protective jurisdiction may be exercised collectively by States, for the mutually 
beneficial protection of each other’s vital interests from common threats. This would 
codify a customary right which developed in respect of war crimes in the aftermath of 
World War II and is currently being used by some States, by virtue of Article 105 of the 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, in response to the outbreak of Somali piracy.74 
Such a provision may be particularly useful for regional organisations, for example, the 
Council of Europe, African Union or Arab League, or by collective security alliances, 
for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Gulf Cooperation Council.75 
The ability for States to exercise protective jurisdiction on behalf of each other, in order 
to protect not only their own vital interests but also the interests of their allies, should 
they choose to do so, may be of particular value for combatting the threat of 
international terrorism. This was alluded to by the court in the Bin Laden case, which 
concerned the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.76 The court inter alia 
stated that there is no authority in international law for limiting the extraterritorial 
application of a statute justified under the protective principle ‘to victims who are 
citizens of the nation that enacted the statute’. The court continued: 
  
Nor is such a limitation consistent with the purposes the protective principle 
is designed to serve. Such a limitation [given that foreign nationals are 
                                                        
74 See chapters one & three. Garrod, M., ‘The Response by the International Community to Somali 
Piracy: Universal Jurisdiction or Collective Protective Jurisdiction Par Excellence’ (under preparation).  
75 NATO, ‘Strengthening NATO-Gulf cooperation’, 20 October 2014, available online:  
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113987.htm?selectedLocale=en; Wales Summit Declaration, 
‘Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Wales from 4 to 5 September 2014’, para.32, 5 September 2014, available online: 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/nato-summit-2014-wales-summit-declaration/the-wales-
declaration-on-the-transatlantic-bond; Remarks by President Obama at NATO Summit Press Conference, 
5 September 2014, available online:  
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/remarks-president-obama-nato-summit-press-
conference. 
76 U.S. v Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d.189 (S.D.N.Y., 13 March 2000). See also U.S. v Manssor Arbabsiar 
and Ali Gholam Shakur, 11 MAG 2617 (S.D.N.Y., 11 October 2011). 
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likely to be near Federal facilities located in foreign countries] could only 
weaken the protective function of a statute designed to protect United States 
interests.77  
 
It will be recalled from chapter five that numerous counter-terrorism treaties and 
Security Council Resolution 1373 already require States, pursuant to the obligation to 
extradite or prosecute, to establish ‘treaty-based’ jurisdiction on behalf of each other in 
circumstances where an accused is present on a State’s territory and is not extradited to 
the State that has a connection, including threats to its vital interests, with the alleged 
offence.78  
 
The instrument could clarify that protective jurisdiction does not require crimes to be 
directed at, or have an effect in, the prescribing State’s territory; that protective 
jurisdiction is applicable over acts of terrorism and other serious crimes against the 
State’s nationals; and that this jurisdiction is applicable over piracy on the high seas and 
ipso facto does not require any evidence of a connection with the prescribing State.79 
These considerations could, in turn, assist the ILC in attaining greater conceptual clarity 
between protective jurisdiction and other grounds, most notably the universality, 
passive personality and effects principles. The need for such clarity is highlighted by the 
Secretariat’s draft and is important for a further reason: theories relating to grounds of 
jurisdiction and the reliance on, or reference to such theories, by States and courts in 
order to support a particular assertion of jurisdiction do not always reflect with 
sufficient accuracy customary international law lex lata.  
 
The second advantage to codification, if the approach proposed in chapter five is 
adopted by the ILC, would provide an opportunity to identify more clearly the type of 
vital interests falling under the ambit of protective jurisdiction. It will be recalled from 
chapter five that there is no established test for the qualification of interests as ‘vital’. 
The instrument could enumerate, in a non-exhaustive way, what these interests 
comprise in order to indicate with greater clarity and certainty the scope and application 
of this jurisdiction in international law. The Secretariat’s draft, it will be recalled from 
the discussion above, alluded to a trend in State practice in the use of protective 
jurisdiction for responding to international terrorism and suggested that ‘some States 
                                                        
77 Ibid., at p.222.  
78 S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). 
79 See chapters two, three and five.  
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have broadened their interpretation of the concept of “vital interests” in order to address 
terrorism’.80 This would suggest that the Secretariat had in mind the need to study such 
interests by the ILC. This trend in jurisdiction for the protection of vital interests in 
response to the threat of international terrorism is confirmed by the detailed empirical 
analysis of State practice, in chapter four, and the growing body of treaty and Security 
Council practice, discussed in chapter five. It will be recalled that chapter five 
enumerated 13 vital State interests, 10 of which are shared by the international 
community, that have been included under protective jurisdiction lex lata. The 
fundamental conceptual distinction, explained in chapter five, between ‘shared vital 
State interests’ and ‘international community values’, needs to be duly taken into 
account by the ILC. The purpose of this distinction is not to enter into a theoretical 
analysis of the matter but, rather, in order to show more clearly that the protection of 
shared vital State interests is distinct from universal jurisdiction. 
 
The absence of an instrument codifying jurisdiction has meant that the rules on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction have been left wholly to State practice to regulate on an ad 
hoc and isolated basis. Accordingly, the third advantage to codification is that an 
instrument could provide a persuasive source of guidance for States in the drafting and 
enactment of national laws and for domestic courts in the application of the law and in 
the resolution of disputes. It could also prevent unpredictable developments and 
controversies arising from unilateral action. A related matter is ensuring some legal 
certainty and consistency in the discovery, interpretation and application of customary 
rules in respect of grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction by legislators and judges from 
across nearly 200 different States.  
  
The importance of these issues should not be underestimated. There is, at present, great 
uncertainty on how legislators and judges discover customary rules - both in terms of 
the formation process and sources of evidence - and how well equipped they are to 
grapple with the discovery of such rules. It is for these and other reasons that the ILC 
has included this topic in its programme of work.81 The empirical study into State 
practice in chapter four shows that States do not tend to explain in national laws the 
ground of prescriptive jurisdiction relied upon in order justify their extraterritorial 
                                                        
80 Supra n 42, para.20.  
81 U.N. Doc.A/66/10 (2011), Annex A; U.N. Doc.A/67/10 (2012), paras.19, 160. 
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application; nor do national laws tend to specify or define the vital interests protected. 
Judges, in the extraterritorial application of national laws in particular cases, are not 
always capable or willing to examine State practice in order to determine which theory 
should form the most appropriate basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In that regard, 
there appears to be a tendency by judges, in support of a particular ground of 
jurisdiction under customary international law, to rely on tentative sources of evidence, 
or to haphazardly rely on primary sources or interpret such sources wholly out of 
context.82 The adoption of an instrument codifying jurisdiction, thus securing a common 
understanding of protective jurisdiction, could be of considerable practical importance 
to States and courts by providing guidance in the ascertainment and application of the 
law. 
  
The need for consistency and certainty is all the more important with regard to the 
fragmentation of international law; this is illustrated no clearer than the conflict between 
the supposed codification of customary rules of jurisdiction by special legal regimes 
governing piracy and war crimes, on the one hand, and the rules on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the treaty regime governing extradite or prosecute and general 
international law, on the other.83 
 
The aforementioned considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the resolution of 
disputes by the ICJ. The ICJ in the Arrest Warrant was presented, for the first time 
since the Lotus case was decided in 1927, with the opportunity to examine grounds of 
jurisdiction under customary international law but it chose not to do so.84 The separate 
and dissenting opinions appended to the judgment, despite criticising the court, reveal a 
limited understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction and elements of confusion on the 
relationship between protective jurisdiction and theories of universality and passive 
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personality.85 In the more recent Habré case, the analysis of which has been undertaken 
in chapter five, the ICJ described obiter the obligation to extradite or prosecute as 
‘universal jurisdiction’, without having any regard to State practice or providing any 
analysis of grounds of jurisdiction in international law.86  
  
The codification of jurisdiction would also complement the existing codification efforts 
by the ILC of other legal regimes, not least the topics of ‘Obligation to extradite or 
prosecute’ and ‘Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction’. At 
present, the ILC has to codify these and other topics under the de facto precondition that 
all grounds of jurisdiction are relevant and taken into account and, at the same time, it is 
not able to undertake any assessment of, or pronouncement on, them as they fall outside 
of the immediate scope of these topics.87  
 
An instrument codifying jurisdiction could also be of practical significance for the 
Security Council in the adoption of counter-terrorism resolutions, a number of which, as 
will be recalled from chapter four, have obliged States to make provision for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction but have not referred to, or explained, grounds of 
jurisdiction. In that connection, an instrument codifying protective jurisdiction could 
contribute to a more comprehensive jurisdictional framework for combatting 
international terrorism. 
 
6.5.1. The Existing International Legal Framework for Combatting International 
Terrorism 
  
As a matter of practical importance, the fourth advantage of codifying protective 
jurisdiction, to which the ILC may have regard, is that such an instrument could be used 
to complement and strengthen the existing legal response by the international 
community in combatting the complex threat of international terrorism. This proposal is 
based on the finding that, first of all, one of the broad characteristics of international 
terrorism is that the State and its nationals tend to be the target, and acts of terrorism 
threaten or implicate, directly and indirectly, certain shared vital State interests; and, 
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secondly, protective jurisdiction is the principal means by which States combat the 
threat of international terrorism and the trend in State, treaty and Security Council 
practice in this regard.88 The ILC could draw on this fertile bed of practice in the 
elaboration of such an instrument. The desirability of codifying extraterritorial 
jurisdiction and its use for combatting international terrorism and other transnational 
crimes, it will be recalled, was alluded to by Rao,89 while the Secretariat’s draft reported 
that protective jurisdiction ‘may be of particular relevance to new types of cyber crimes 
and terrorist offences’.90  
 
The adoption of an instrument indicating more clearly the scope of protective 
jurisdiction, and some of the vital interests that fall under its ambit, could be used to ‘fill 
in’ gaps left by the existing regime of counter-terrorism treaties. There is, at present, no 
international jurisdictional framework in place, let alone a comprehensive one, for 
combatting international terrorism. The legal framework created by the Security 
Council in the adoption of counter-terrorism resolutions has remained silent as to 
grounds of jurisdiction.91 Counter-terrorism treaties have, since the 1960s, been adopted 
ad hoc, and often sporadically, in response to specific incidents.92 As there is no 
internationally agreed legal definition of ‘terrorism’, these treaties do not define 
‘terrorism’ or refer to it in their operative provisions. Nor do they specify grounds of 
jurisdiction or, for that matter, the type of vital interests that parties may protect.93 
Rather, such treaties specify a narrow set of objectively determined circumstances in 
which parties are required or permitted to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
well-defined offences. It is due to the inadequacy of the existing sectoral approach in 
responding to the complex and evolving threat of international terrorism, perhaps, that 
the more recent adoption of treaties criminalising terrorist bombing and financing 
provide for a wider range of circumstances in which parties are permitted to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.94 It also has to be borne in mind that international terrorism 
is not self-contained and is ‘closely connected’ to other transnational crimes falling 
outside counter-terrorism treaties, including organised crime, the traffic of illicit drugs, 
                                                        
88 Chapters four and five. 
89 Supra n 28, at pp.237-238. 
90 ILC Secretariat, supra n 42, para.20.  
91 Chapter four.   
92 See also chapters one and five. 
93 See also chapters one, four and five. 
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unlawful arms trade, money laundering and smuggling of nuclear and other dangerous 
materials.95 
 
The need for a more comprehensive approach in combatting international terrorism is 
the reason why the U.N. General Assembly mandated the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Terrorism to elaborate a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, 
which it has been negotiating since 2000.96 The Sixth Committee, in 2006, established a 
Working Group to carry out the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee more 
expeditiously.97 Neither the Ad Hoc Committee nor the Sixth Committee has been able 
to bring to completion and they have reached a point of ‘inertia’.98 One of the more 
fundamental reasons accounting for the failure to adopt a comprehensive convention, 
which has divided States since the beginning of negotiations, is the definition of 
‘terrorism’. The adoption of such a convention does not therefore appear likely in the 
foreseeable future. In any case, some of the delegations during the negotiations of the 
Ad Hoc Committee have observed that the comprehensive convention ‘would not be the 
final answer or sole response of the international community to combating international 
terrorism’.99  
 
The Security Council has determined and reaffirmed that ‘terrorism in all forms and 
manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and 
security’.100 However, the absence of an international definition of ‘terrorism’ means 
that ‘terrorism in all its forms and manifestations’, and the nature and scale of the threat, 
are ipso facto incapable of being objectively determined and encompassed within 
sectoral treaties. This means that the threat of international terrorism is relative and can 
differ considerably, depending on the State against which terrorist groups are fighting or 
against whose nationals and vital interests are implicated. It may be the case that the 
                                                        
95 S/RES/1373, supra n 78, para.3(4); S/RES/2160 (17 June 2014), preambular paras.3, 11, 18, 25 & 
operative para.4; S/RES/2161 (17 June 2014), preambular paras.18, 20; A/RES/49/60 (9 December 1994), 
preambular paras.4 & 5; A/RES/51/210 (17 December 1996), para.3(f); A/RES/60/288 (20 September 
2006). 
96 A/RES/51/210, ibid. Annual reports of the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism are available online: 
www.un.org/law/terrorism/index.html. 
97 U.N. Doc.A/C.6/61/SR.7 (7 November 2006), paras.101-106. 
98 U.N. Doc.A/64/37 (2009), Annex II, para.4. 
99 U.N. Doc.A/65/37 (2010), Annex I, at pp.5-6. 
100 S/RES/2161, supra n 95, preambular para.2; S/RES/2178, supra n 2, preambular para.1; S/RES/2133 
(27 January 2014), preambular para.1; S/RES/2170 (15 August 2014), preambular para.3; S/PRST/2013/1 
(15 January 2013), preambular para.3. 
228 
 
sectoral approach, which could reasonably be described as a ‘patchwork of 
jurisdictions’, limited to circumstances foreseen by treaties, is not entirely satisfactory 
for responding to the complex and evolving nature of the threat ‘in all its forms and 
manifestations’. In a globalised society, the use of information and communication 
technologies, in particular the Internet, for terrorist purposes, including recruitment, 
incitement, financing, planning and preparation, provides just one example.101 The 
reason why the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee has defended its position of 
not defining ‘terrorism’ and other related concepts used in resolution 1373 is that 
‘terrorists adapt to newer technologies and methods for committing terrorist acts.’102  
 
A number of recent incidents show the complexity and power of terrorist groups relative 
to that of States. The first of these is the armed conflict in the territory of Ukraine, since 
April 2014, between pro-Russian armed groups and the Ukrainian Government. These 
groups are allegedly trained, armed and funded by Russia.103 Yet they are regarded by 
Ukraine as ‘terrorists’ and, upon capture, prosecuted as such.104 On 17 July 2014, these 
groups allegedly used a surface-to-air missile in order to down a Malaysian registered 
civilian aircraft, flight MH17, resulting in the death of all 298 passengers and crew of 
ten different nationalities, including the nationals of some of the members of the 
Security Council. The Security Council has not recognised these ‘armed groups’ as 
‘terrorists’, perhaps due to the alleged relationship between them and Russia. 
Nonetheless, in the only resolution that the Security Council has managed to adopt on 
the situation in Ukraine, the Security Council has deplored the downing of the aircraft 
and emphasised the importance of holding those responsible criminally accountable.105 
The dynamics of the Security Council add a further layer of complexity in responding to 
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international terrorism and, as is made clear by resolution 2166, the inertia by the 
Security Council means that it is up to those ‘States who have lost nationals on MH17’ 
to institute criminal investigations related to this incident.106  
  
A further example of the ‘diffuse’ and ‘growing’ threat is shown by the ‘gravest 
concern’ expressed by the Security Council over the large-scale military offensive and 
control of territory in parts of Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL) and Al Nusrah Front (ANF) and ‘associated armed groups’, both of which, 
according to the Council, are ‘associated’ with al Qaeda.107 A new dimension to the 
threat of international terrorism, in the words of the President of France, speaking in a 
meeting of the Security Council in the adoption of resolution 2178 under Chapter VII, is 
that ‘it is now looking to conquer territory, to set up States … and also to recruit a 
growing number of our citizens, wherever they may be, into its ranks.’108 In that 
connection, the Security Council has expressed ‘concern’ over the scale of the 
unprecedented flow of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ from numerous other countries to 
assist ISIL and ANF and, to that end, the use of the Internet.109 These fighters are 
estimated to number between 11000 and 31000 and come from more than 80 States.110 
There is a concern that these fighters pose a major threat to States other than Iraq and 
Syria, first of all, by returning to their home States and committing acts of terrorism 
and, secondly, by planning and directing attacks against home States and the vital 
interests of home States located abroad, either from within Iraq and Syria or by crossing 
national borders to other ungoverned spaces.111 This makes the nature of the threat more 
diverse and geographically dispersed. These issues have recently been acknowledged by 
the U.K. Home Affairs Committee, in its assessment of the threat of international 
terrorism in the light of the Syrian crisis:   
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Today there are more Al Qa’ida inspired terrorist groups than in 2001, 
spread across a wider geography, with a more diverse and evolving set of 
capabilities. A common feature among these terrorist groups is that the UK 
features as a primary target. […] The threat from terrorism to the UK and its 
interests overseas is more diverse and geographically dispersed than it was a 
decade ago.112  
 
A further dimension of the threat is that States in support of the overthrow of the Syrian 
regime reportedly arm and fund anti-government groups operating in Syria, while some 
of these groups have complex relationships and allegiances with terrorist groups, 
including ISIL and ANF.113 The legitimate armed opposition groups of some States 
(particularly Western States) clearly continue to be the ‘terrorists’ of others (most 
notably Syria).114 
 
The taking hostage of British and U.S. nationals by ISIS and ANF marked an important 
turning point in the Council’s response to the threat posed by these groups. It prompted 
Britain to draft a resolution under Chapter VII, which was adopted unanimously as 
resolution 2170.115 This resolution, among other things, condemned the ‘terrorist acts’ 
of these groups and urged all States, in accordance with their obligations under 
resolution 1373, ‘to cooperate in efforts to find and bring to justice’ individuals and 
‘foreign terrorist fighters’ associated with these groups who perpetrate, organise and 
sponsor terrorist acts.116 The Security Council has urged all States, in accordance with 
their obligations under international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, to 
cooperate actively with the U.S. and Britain in this regard.117 ISIL and ANF pose a 
serious threat to certain of the vital interests of Iraq and Syria but also of other States, 
including the Council’s members, such as their sovereignty, security, territorial 
integrity, independence, internationally protected persons and property and nationals.118 
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This is made no clearer than the high-level summit on the adoption of resolution 2178 
inter alia by the Security Council and the large number of States whose interests are 
‘specially affected’ by the situation in Syria and Iraq.119 The gravity of the threat posed 
by ISIL and ANF may be summed up by the speech of President Obama on the U.S. 
strategy for combatting it: ‘if you threaten America, you will find no safe haven’.120 The 
threat is deemed so great that the U.S., with support of coalition partners, has conducted 
military airstrikes in Iraq and Syria where it is necessary to protect U.S. nationals, 
personnel and facilities.121  
   
The States in whose territory terrorist groups operate or acts of terrorism are committed, 
due to the complex, transnational nature of the threat, may be incapable or unwilling of 
undertaking prosecutions in all circumstances. This means that the States whose vital 
interests are implicated may need to establish protective jurisdiction in order to ‘bring to 
justice’ alleged offenders. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the adoption by 
the ILC of an instrument codifying protective jurisdiction may be timelier than ever 
before. Such an instrument, as noted above, could have as its focus the vital interests 
that States are permitted to protect, rather than a list of specified offences. This 
approach provides for essential flexibility in order to respond to the evolving nature of 
international terrorism and overcome the differing and divergent national laws on 
‘terrorism’, on the one hand, and indicates the permissible limits of jurisdiction, on the 
other.122 An instrument of this type would apply equally to other transnational crimes, 
including those connected to international terrorism.  
 
While such an instrument will not solve the problem of international terrorism, it could 
provide part of a response to what has been described by the Ad Hoc Committee on 
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Terrorism as a ‘multifaceted’ problem requiring a ‘multidimensional and coordinated 
approach’.123 In that connection, an instrument indicating more clearly the vital interests 
that may be protected from international terrorism could enhance coherence and 
uniformity in the adoption of national laws, in particular in the implementation of 
Security Council resolutions, which simply use the term ‘terrorist acts’. It could also 
potentially strengthen inter-State cooperation.  
 
6.6. Disadvantages to Codification 
 
Notwithstanding the advantages of an instrument codifying protective jurisdiction, such 
an approach does have its disadvantages owing to the inherently complex and sensitive 
nature of the topic. This is so because it reflects two cardinal elements of the very 
concept of the State, namely sovereignty and government power. 
  
The first principal disadvantage turns on the fact that agreement on jurisdiction would 
have to be in the abstract. The reason for this is that the form of jurisdiction under 
consideration is jurisdiction to prescribe. The ‘protective principle’, as with all theories 
relating to grounds of jurisdiction, is an academic construct, first defined by the Harvard 
Research in a Draft Convention, and its use in State practice has to be inferred 
principally from national laws.124 The number of occasions on which such jurisdiction is 
applied by national courts is very small. Since the Harvard Research, there have been 
hardly any inter-State disputes arising from the exercise of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction, with the majority of jurisdictional conflicts arising out of national laws 
governing international trade.125 The ICJ, since the Lotus case was decided in 1927, has 
been presented with only two opportunities to examine grounds of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.126  
 
In view of the limited application of extraterritorial jurisdiction by domestic courts and 
the absence of authoritative guidance by the ICJ, one might doubt whether there could 
be any possible agreement on a ground of prescriptive jurisdiction, such as the 
protective principle, in the abstract. This is made all the more problematic in that, since 
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the Harvard Research, States have unilaterally adopted their own interpretation of 
grounds of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which may have become embedded in their own 
national legal systems, constitutions and cultures. In that connection it should be borne 
in mind that there will be differences of opinion as to which theory should form the 
basis of a particular form of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The difficulty of reaching 
agreement, even on a regional level, is illustrated by the report of the Select Committee 
of Experts on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, set up by the European Committee on Crime 
Problems, which was mandated to ‘make a comparative study of the rules and principles 
of territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction applied in member states or derived from 
international agreements, as well as their justification’. According to the Committee of 
Experts, the terms of reference in respect of the form that its findings were to take were 
‘probably deliberately vague’.127 The reason for this, according to the Committee of 
Experts, is due to the realisation by the Committee of Ministers that it would not be easy 
to reach agreement on the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction.128 In the light of this 
reality, the Committee of Experts therefore chose to prepare a general report, ‘confined 
to making a number of statements for consideration by member states, in particular 
when legislating to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction’.129 The Committee of Ministers 
was asked only to agree that the report merited publication and distribution, and not to 
endorse the statements put forward in it.130  
 
That said, the ILC and the Secretariat’s draft do not regard the abstract nature of the 
topic as preventing codification.131 Protective jurisdiction has increasingly been applied 
by some domestic courts and required extradition of alleged offenders in order to be 
enforced, which the ILC may draw upon.132 This practice has not been internationally 
protested. The ILC’s inclusion of other topics in its programme of work, for example, 
‘Formation and evidence of customary international law’ and ‘The obligation to 
extradite or prosecute’ and ‘Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal 
jurisdiction’ and ‘Fragmentation of international law: difficulties arising from the 
diversification and expansion of international law’, shows that States are prepared to 
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codify topics in the abstract.133 The abstract nature of topics, a contrario, presents an 
argument in support of codification. Indeed, in the absence of such codification, it is not 
until States attempt to unilaterally enforce extraterritorial jurisdiction and inter-State 
disputes ensue that abstract concepts are debated. This is precisely what has occurred in 
respect of the theory of universal jurisdiction. The debate on universal jurisdiction 
shows that because of its abstract nature there is little understanding of, and 
considerable differences of opinion on, the basic concept, as well as the way in which it 
has developed in State practice; its contemporary scope and application; and the 
international community values that it is supposed to protect. Nonetheless, it also shows 
that States are willing to debate and try and reach agreement on jurisdiction in the 
abstract. Given that similar issues are likely to arise in respect of protective jurisdiction, 
codification appears all the more necessary and desirable.  
   
The second disadvantage to codification relates, more specifically, to the difficulty of 
attaining consensus on the type of vital interests that may be protected. One of the main 
reasons why this is so, it will be recalled from chapter five, is because the meaning of 
vital interests is ambiguous and they might not be easy to identify. Another is that some 
such interests, for example, ‘sovereignty’, ‘governmental functions’ and ‘security’, are 
capable of expansive interpretation.134 Ryngaert has observed that, while it appears 
desirable to adopt a convention on protective jurisdiction, nonetheless, as in other fields 
of jurisdiction, ‘such a convention might prove elusive in the face of tenacious State 
interests.’135 The observation by Ryngaert reflects the opinion of the drafters of the 
Restatement, which favoured a narrow approach to protective jurisdiction so that it 
could not be used in ways objectionable to U.S. interests.136  
  
In modern treaty practice, since the mid-twentieth century, States have favoured the 
approach of defining narrow circumstances in which parties are permitted or required to 
establish extraterritorial jurisdiction, rather than make reference to, or define, the type of 
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vital interests that may be protected.137 It is certainly the case that the reason why States 
have been able to adopt a considerable number of treaties providing for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in response to transnational offences, including acts of terrorism, often 
speedily, is because such treaties avoid any negotiation of, or agreement on, vital 
interests.138 The same point applies mutatis mutandis to the adoption by the Security 
Council of resolution 1373.139 The upshot of all this is that vital interests generally have 
to be inferred from national laws, treaties and Security Council resolutions. The 
difficulty of achieving consensus on vital interests is further illustrated by the 
Committee of Experts, discussed above. The report inter alia was able to explain the 
theoretical justification for protective jurisdiction as the protection of ‘essential 
interests’ but it observed that ‘[t]here seems to be no consensus, however as to which 
interests should be defined as essential.’140 The report was not prepared to examine vital 
interests; instead, it observed that ‘it is far from clear what kind of interests are covered 
by this qualification’ and suggested that [o]ne may wonder whether it is really possible 
and even wise to try to enumerate such interests’.141 
  
Contrary to the opinion of the Committee of Experts, however, the ambiguous meaning 
of vital interests provides an argument in support of the need to examine and enumerate 
in an instrument, though not necessarily in an exhaustive way, what these interests 
comprise.142 This is so because it reflects the needs and mutually beneficial interests of 
States. The latter point has previously been the subject of works by Lauterpacht and 
Brierly; that is, to ignore such interests, as if they do not exist, is unrealistic and 
counterproductive.143 Given that each State is able to unilaterally define its own vital 
interests and decide whether or not to recognise the validity of claims to such interests 
by other States, it is mutually beneficial to remove some of this ambiguity and bring 
such interests more clearly within the law’s protection.144 Securing a basic level of 
agreement on the meaning of vital interests could also be of considerable practical 
                                                        
137 E.g. Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Articles 49(I); 50(II); 129(III); 146(IV)); U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, Article 105. 
138 Chapter five.  
139 S/RES/1373, supra n 78; also chapter four.  
140 Supra n 125, at p.451. 
141 Ibid.  
142 Chapter five. 
143 Lauterpacht, H. (1933). ‘The Function of Law in the International Community’. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press; Brierly, J.L. (1924). ‘The Shortcomings of International Law’. 5 BYIL 4; Brierly, J.L. (1944). 
‘Vital Interests and the Law’. 21 BYIL 51. 
144 Lauterpacht, ibid. 
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importance. As has already been discussed above, this is so not least because it would 
allow for greater clarity and certainty of the extent to which the use of this jurisdiction 
is permitted by international law. It is perhaps worth noting, by way of aside, that the 
definition of vital interests by the Restatement, notwithstanding that it is a private 
codification of the law and does not reflect customary international law, has been 
heavily relied upon and applied by U.S. courts; the application of the Restatement does 
not appear to have received protest by the international community. It would also go 
some way to alleviating concerns raised in legal scholarship concerning the real and 
perceived abuse of protective jurisdiction.145   
 
The adoption of an instrument enumerating the type of vital interests that are 
encompassed by protective jurisdiction is of particular relevance for combatting 
common threats to such interests posed by transnational crimes, not least international 
terrorism. It will be recalled that the Secretariat’s draft, above, observed that some 
States have broadened the concept of vital interests in order to combat international 
terrorism and indicated the need for the ILC to study this concept. This would suggest 
that vital interests are, in principle, regarded by the ILC as capable of codification. The 
latter point is supported by the finding in chapter five. That chapter aimed to shed 
important light on the matter by enumerating, based on State, treaty and Security 
Council practice, 13 vital State interests, 10 of which are shared by the international 
community, that have been included under protective jurisdiction lex lata. This body of 
practice has not led to inter-State disputes or protests by the international community. It 
would suggest a general acceptance by the international community of a core category 
of vital interests that is, in principle, capable of codification. The ILC could draw on 
this practice in the elaboration of an instrument. 
 
6.7. Final Outcome of Codification 
  
In sum, the above disadvantages are, in and of themselves, insufficient to prevent 
codification. A more common issue raised by codification is that there is a risk of 
stunting the development of the law. However, the need for codification seems 
especially significant given the wide gulf between what the law of protective 
                                                        
145 E.g., Ryngaert, supra n 135, at p.97; Bowett, D.W. (1982). ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of 
Authority over Activities and Resources’. 53 BYIL 1, at pp.10, 24; Cameron, I. (1994). ‘The Protective 
Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction’. Aldershot: Dartmouth, at p.327; Shaw, M.N. (2008). 
‘International Law’. Cambridge: CUP, at p.667.  
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jurisdiction is and what it is widely assumed to be. Rather, the main issue for 
consideration turns on the extent of agreement, which depends on the range and scope 
of the topic, and the form in which the instrument is to take.  
 
The outcome of codification could take one of several forms. If the ILC decides to adopt 
a set of draft articles with commentary and recommends to the General Assembly the 
conclusion of a convention, requiring ratification, then any form of agreement may, at 
best, be rather limited.146 It will be recalled that the efforts made by the League and the 
Harvard Research to codify protective jurisdiction were handicapped by the fact that 
they restricted themselves to questions that could only be codified by international 
conventions. It is worth noting that if the Assembly does decide to negotiate a 
convention on the topic and such a convention is eventually adopted and it is relevant 
for combatting international terrorism then States may be obliged, by virtue of 
resolution 1373, to ratify it.147  
 
On the other hand, the elaboration of an instrument on this topic need not be in the form 
of a convention. Rather, the ILC may be satisfied with a more modest approach, and 
avoid possibly divisive and inconclusive debate in the Sixth Committee, by the 
publication of a report containing a set of draft articles and commentary and a 
recommendation to the Assembly to take no further action. Alternatively, the ILC could 
recommend to the Assembly to ‘take note’ of or ‘adopt’ the aforesaid report in the form 
of a resolution or declaration and without taking any further action.148 The latter 
approach was adopted by the Assembly in respect of the ILC’s draft articles on State 
responsibility, which have subsequently been used as a persuasive source of guidance 
and referred to and relied upon by States and the ICJ,149 and in respect of the work of 
the ILC on the fragmentation of international law.150 The conclusions of the ILC’s work 
on fragmentation are aimed to provide ‘a set of practical guidelines to help thinking 
about and dealing with the issue of fragmentation in legal practice’.151 Likewise, as 
regards the ‘Formation and evidence of customary international law’, it has been 
                                                        
146 ILC Statute, supra n 1, Article 23(c)-(d).  
147 S/RES/1373, supra 78, para.3(d). 
148 ILC Statute, supra n 1, Article 23(a)-(b).   
149 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, ILCYB, 2001, vol.II (Part Two); 
A/RES/56/83 (12 December 2001); Application of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p.43. 
150 U.N. Doc.A/RES/61/34 (18 December 2006).  
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proposed that the outcome of the ILC’s work could take the form of a series of 
‘propositions’ or a set of ‘conclusions’, with commentaries, the purpose of which 
should result in a practical guide for judges, government lawyers and practitioners.152 
The ILC may decide to take a similar approach in respect of jurisdiction. It has to be 
borne in mind that, whichever of these approaches the ILC decides to take, the adoption 
of an instrument on this topic may take a number of years, and perhaps even decades. 
This has certainly been the case with equally complex and politically delicate topics that 
touch upon important State interests, for example, the Law of Treaties, Diplomatic 
Relations and State Responsibility, all of which were identified as ‘necessary and 
desirable’ for codification by the ILC at its First Session.153 
                                                        
152 U.N. Doc.A/67/10, supra n 81, paras.160, 166, 191; U.N. Doc.A/68/10, supra n 26, paras.68, 73. 
153 Memorandum, supra n 14, at pp.50, 56; ILCYB, supra n 14, at pp.280-281; Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra n 149; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 
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Appendix A 
 
The use of Protective Jurisdiction in National Laws 
 
 
The purpose of this Appendix is to provide a full list of the categories of offences over 
which protective jurisdiction has been used in national laws. On the basis of a detailed 
analysis of the available data, the national laws of 160 States, out of a total of 181 of the 
available sample, have made provision, to varying degrees, for an exception to the 
territoriality of jurisdiction under the protective principle.1 Only a small number of 
States, 21 in total, some of which regard acts of terrorism as posing a threat to their 
security and certain other of their vital interests, have not made provision in their 
national law for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign nationals 
abroad.2  
 
It will be recalled from chapter four that the purpose of systematising offences into 
categories, where they appear to be of a similar subject-matter, is to try and provide, as 
a preliminary matter, a more general overview and identify some of the more common 
themes and general trends in national laws relating to jurisdiction, in particular, the 
types of vital interests that have been included under the ambit of protective jurisdiction 
and around which a basic level of agreement appears to have clustered. In turn, it may 
be possible to propose the codification of protective jurisdiction based not on a narrow 
                                                        
1 These States are listed in alphabetical order as follows: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Colombia, 
Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, 
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Oman, Palau, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of 
Belarus, Republic of Korea, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, Republic of Senegal, 
Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, Republic of Suriname, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tanzania, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tongo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, Ukraine, UAE, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen and 
Zambia. 
2 These States are listed in alphabetical order as follows: Andorra, Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Chad, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, Eritrea, 
Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Namibia, Niue, Papua New 
Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.  
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list of offences but, rather, based on a core category of shared vital State interests.3 It is 
important to bear in mind that the categorisation of offences in this way is not to suggest 
that the offences within a particular category are uniform and complementary, or even 
the same. On the contrary, the offences defined in national laws tend to be broad, and in 
some cases overly-vague, and contain different and divergent objective and subjective 
elements. This is particularly evident in respect of the different and divergent ways in 
which national laws define ‘terrorism’. The offences contained in these categories also 
contain offences dealing specifically with a specially defined offence of ‘terrorism’, as 
well as ordinary criminal offences that are not limited to acts of terrorism. 
 
The categories of offences that follow are not listed in any particular hierarchical order: 
 
1. Crimes committed against the State; the State’s sovereignty; impairing its 
territorial integrity or political independence; compelling the government to do 
or abstain from doing any act; undermining or overthrowing the State’s 
constitution. This includes threats, attempts and conspiracies.4 
2. Crimes committed against the State’s governmental system; conspiracy or 
advocating the overthrow of government by force or violence.5 
3. Crimes committed against the foundations of the State; endangering the State’s 
existence.6   
4. Crimes and ‘terrorism’ (as defined by national laws) committed against the 
State’s fundamental social, political, constitutional or economic order.7   
5. Crimes committed against the State’s internal or external security.8 
6. Threats; assaults; use of force against the Head of State, public ministers, 
government or public officials and employees or agents.9  
                                                        
3 See chapters five and six.  
4 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordon, Kiribati, Latvia, 
Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic 
of Belarus, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Rwanda, 
Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, U.S., Uzbekistan and Venezuela.  
5 Israel, Maldives, Palau, Rwanda and U.S. 
6 Czech Republic and Turkey. 
7 Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Gambia, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Libya, Luxemburg, Mauritius, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of South 
Africa, Syria, Turkey and Uzbekistan.  
8 Afghanistan, Angola, Armenia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Bulgaria, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea,  Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, 
Guinea, Guyana, India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, 
Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Belarus, 
Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, Romania, 
Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, Tongo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
U.S., Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela and Yemen.  
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7. Crimes committed against internationally protected persons carrying out their 
official duties abroad, including diplomatic and consular personnel; their 
transportation, premises, embassies and missions located abroad; State and 
government property and institutions located abroad; and intergovernmental 
organisations located abroad. This includes threats, incitement, attempts and 
conspiracies.10 
8. Insult or destruction of the State’s flags or other symbols.11  
9. Insulting the nation.12 
10.  Insults against the President.13 
11.  Forgery, alteration or counterfeit of official documents, seals, marks, currency, 
bonds, stocks and securities.14  
12.  Crimes committed against the registered State’s fixed platforms and off-shore 
installations.15  
13.  Crimes committed against or on board the registered State’s vessels.16 
14.  Crimes committed on board or against, or the hijacking of, the registered State’s 
civil aircraft.17 
15.  The use, production, construction, or otherwise acquiring, transferring, 
receiving, possessing, importing or exporting anti-aircraft missiles or their 
components. This includes threats to use such missiles.18 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 Angola, Austria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 
Belarus, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, 
U.K. and U.S.  
10 Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, 
China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, France, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, New Zealand, 
Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Belarus, Republic of South 
Africa, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, U.K., U.S. and Uzbekistan. 
11 Angola, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Germany, Latvia, Libya, Poland and San Marino. 
12 Libya, Poland, Slovenia and San Marino.  
13 Germany, Oman and Poland. 
14 Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Djibouti, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, 
Liberia, Libya, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Senegal, 
Republic of Serbia, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Tongo, 
Turkey, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Vanuatu  and Yemen.  
15 Afghanistan, Australia, Barbados, Cambodia, Canada, Cuba, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Kiribati, Mauritius, Monaco, Niger, Norway, Palau, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Saint 
Vincent and The Grenadines and U.S.  
16 Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, 
Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, 
Guyana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritius, Monaco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Republic of Macedonia, 
Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Russia, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, 
Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, Syria, Tongo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, U.S and Yemen.  
17 Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Cambodia, Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Palau, Philippines, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, 
Republic of South Africa, Russia, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Samoa, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Solomon Islands, Tanzania, Tonga, Tongo, Turkmenistan, U.K., U.S., Vanuatu, Viet Nam and Yemen.  
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16.  The sabotage, damage or destruction (including by the use of explosives and 
bombs) of State or government buildings, property or premises; infrastructure 
facilities; information systems; installations; aircraft; and public transportation 
systems located inside and outside national territory. This category also includes 
offences committed against national defences, such as defensive sea areas and 
military weapons, facilities, equipment, installations, utilities, premises, vessels 
and aircraft located inside and outside national territory. It also includes the 
bombing of public places and against public or privately owned facilities, 
including water, energy, fuel and interstate and foreign communications 
systems. This includes attempts and conspiracies.19  
17.  Crimes committed against the State’s Armed Forces during peace.20 
18.  The illicit manufacture, traffic, importation or supply of military weapons, 
unmarked plastic explosives; nuclear and radioactive materials; dangerous 
waste; chemical and biological weapons; contagious disease pathogens; and 
weapons of mass destruction, to be used, or threatened to be used, against the 
State or the State’s interests.21   
19.  The unlawful obtaining, use or threat to use nuclear materials in order to 
threaten or compel the government or an international organisation to do or 
refrain from doing any act; against government property located within or 
outside the country; or against the State’s citizens and corporations within or 
outside the country. This also includes attempts and conspiracies. 22 
20. Crimes and ‘terrorism’ (as defined by national law), including by the use of 
bombs and weapons of mass destruction, committed in order to kill, injure, 
intimidate or compel the State’s nationals or a section of society inside or 
outside the territory of the State. This also includes threats and incitement, 
attempts and conspiracies against the State’s nationals.23  
                                                                                                                                                                  
18 U.S.  
19 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Barbados, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Israel, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Korea, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, New Zealand, Oman, Palau, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Serbia, 
Republic of South Africa, Rwanda, Samoa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, 
Turkmenistan, U.K., U.S. and Uzbekistan. 
20 Angola, Austria, Bahrain, Poland, Switzerland and U.S. 
21 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Cambodia, Cape 
Verde, Chile, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Gambia, 
Germany, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Kiribati, Korea, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Montenegro, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Republic of Belarus, Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
Vincent and The Grenadines, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, U.S. and 
Uzbekistan.  
22 Afghanistan, Australia, Barbados, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, France, Germany, Guyana, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Kiribati, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Palau, Republic 
of Serbia, Rwanda, Slovenia, Switzerland and U.S.  
23 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Barbados, 
Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, 
Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Korea, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Republic 
of Belarus, Republic of Korea, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, San Marino, 
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, U.K., U.S., 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Zambia. 
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21.  Acts against the State by terrorist groups, armed bands, subversive associations, 
military and paramilitary groups and criminal organisations (as defined by 
national law), which transcend national boundaries. This includes membership, 
organising, participating, facilitating, instructing, support, recruitment, directing 
and leadership of such groups and their activities. It also includes threats, 
incitement, attempts and conspiracies.24 
22.  Receiving military training from a foreign terrorist organisation.25 
23.  Incitement of terrorist acts (as defined by municipal law); encouragement or 
facilitation of the State’s nationals to take part in terrorist activities or armed 
conflict abroad.26  
24.  Collecting or providing funds or other forms of direct or indirect support to 
terrorist and armed groups abroad in order to commit crimes against the State or 
an international organisation.27  
25.  Terrorist acts or other crimes committed in order to compel international 
organisations and institutions to do or abstain from doing any act or damaging 
their economic and other fundamental structures. This includes, for example, the 
International Red Cross and entities of the United Nations, including military, 
peace building, peacekeeping, humanitarian and other missions.28  
26.  Terrorist acts committed abroad against an entity or institution of the European 
Union that is based in the territory of the prosecuting State.29  
27.  ‘Terrorism’ committed on the high seas.30 
28.  Terrorist activity abroad to cause a public emergency or resurrection within the 
State.31 
29.  Threats or violence committed at the direction or benefit of a foreign terrorist 
group that induces or attempts to induce any person to harm the State 
‘interests’.32 
30.  Harbouring terrorists.33  
                                                        
24 Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kiribati, Korea, Latvia, Libya, Lebanon, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Nepal, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Belarus, 
Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Serbia, Republic of South Africa, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint 
Vincent and The Grenadines, San Marino, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, U.K., U.S., Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela and Yemen.  
25 U.S. 
26 Barbados, Canada, China, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Jordan, San Marino, Sri Lanka, U.K. and U.S. 
27 Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Canada, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Korea, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Monaco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Palau, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Qatar, Republic of South Africa, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and The 
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Tanzania, U.K., U.S., Uzbekistan and Venezuela. 
28 Afghanistan, Austria, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Gambia, Germany, 
Grenada, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, 
Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of South Africa, San Marino, Singapore, 
Thailand, Tonga, U.S. and Uzbekistan. 
29 Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands and U.K. 
30 U.S. 
31 South Africa. 
32 Canada. 
33 U.S. 
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31.  Cyber crime; cyber ‘terrorism’ in order to interfere, intercept or damage 
information systems; essential infrastructure; government computers; and 
national security.34  
32.  Hostage-taking in order to compel a government or an intergovernmental 
organisation or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any 
act.35 
33.  Broadcasting or publication of propaganda with a view to threatening public 
security.36 
34.  Publication or communication of news relating to national defences and security 
where this has been prohibited or of false news likely to infringe national 
security.37  
35.  Flying over national territory without agreement or diplomatic permission.38 
36.  Crimes committed against State secrets or intelligence concerning security, 
defence, military and economic interests, including the communication of such 
information to a foreign government or organisation or terrorist group.39  
37.  Espionage.40  
38.  Economic/commercial espionage in favour of another person, organisation or 
State, to the detriment of national economic, security and defence interests.41  
39.  Harm to the State’s financial system or status or economy.42 
40.  Crimes committed against the State or defrauding the State. This includes 
conspiracies.43 
41.  Bribery, or promises or offers thereof, of public officials by a foreigner to 
engage in certain acts, including ‘terrorism’.44 
42.  Treason; high treason by residents or foreign nationals employed by the State.45  
43.  Crimes committed against the State’s ‘interests’.46 
44.  Damage to national resources.47  
45.  Serious damage to the environment.48  
46.  Traffic of illicit drugs.49  
                                                        
34 Cuba, El Salvador, France, Germany, Malaysia, U.K. and U.S. 
35 Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Cook Islands, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Guyana, Ireland, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Nepal, 
New Zealand, Niger, Oman, Palau, Philippines, Poland, Republic of Belarus, Republic of Macedonia, 
Republic of South Africa, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Samoa, Singapore, 
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, U.K., U.S., Uzbekistan, Viet Nam and Yemen. 
36 Egypt, Libya, Myanmar, Republic of Macedonia and Switzerland. 
37 Cyprus, Norway and Romania. 
38 Gabon and Republic of Senegal. 
39 Belgium, Canada, Cape Verde, Gabon, Germany, Israel, Latvia, Montenegro, Norway, Republic of 
Macedonia, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Serbia, Romania, San Marino, Tanzania. 
40 Angola, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, El Salvador, Gabon, Hungary, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Norway, Oman, Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Senegal, Republic of Serbia, San Marino, Slovenia 
and Tanzania.  
41 Afghanistan, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Germany, Montenegro and Switzerland. 
42 Gabon, Israel, Latvia, Oman and Jamaica. 
43 Marshall Islands, Republic of South Africa and U.S. 
44 Kiribati, Libya and U.K. 
45 Angola, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Germany, Japan, Oman, Republic of Macedonia, Republic 
of Senegal and Romania. 
46 Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Republic of Korea, Latvia, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Tunisia.  
47 Bolivia. 
48 Austria, Belarus, France and Philippines.  
49 Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany and Peru. 
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47.  Illicit traffic of persons.50  
48.  Genocide.51    
49.  Crimes against humanity.52  
50.  Crimes committed against the property or functioning of any designated 
national association or body.53 
51.  Crimes and hostile acts committed in order to expose the State to the danger of 
war or a breakdown of its relations with a foreign power.54  
52.  Attempt or conspiracy to undertake mercenary activities, or any person 
recruiting, equipping, funding or training mercenaries, against the State.55 
53.  Taking up of arms; waging war; aggression and preparation for aggression, 
inciting aggression, attempting, assisting or facilitating a foreign State to commit 
aggression.56  
54.  Recruitment of the State’s nationals or residents for service in foreign armed 
forces, military organisations or mercenary military service during armed 
conflict against the State.57 
55.  Subduing national defence facilitates and installations and military weaponry 
belonging to a State’s armed forces during war.58 
56.  Interfering with the operation of the States military forces during war.59 
57.  Offering assistance to the enemy for the purpose of weakening the military 
force of the State in time of war.60  
58.  Infiltrating by disguise the State’s national and military defences.61  
59.  Taking pictures or drawings of military or naval defences where this has been 
prohibited.62 
60.  Maintaining correspondence with a hostile power; being at the disposal of a 
foreign army without government authorisation and where it may harm national 
security, during war or in time of peace.63 
61.  Crimes committed against the State or the State’s nationals in time of war, 
including those persons not directly involved in armed conflict in order to 
intimidate the population or compel the government.64   
62. War crimes.65  
 
                                                        
50 Austria and Kiribati.  
51 Belarus. 
52 Azerbaijan and Cuba. 
53 Israel. 
54 Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cuba, Ecuador, Gabon, Israel, Japan, Libya, Norway, Panama, Republic 
of Belarus, Republic of Senegal, Romania and Uzbekistan.  
55 Angola and Cape Verde. 
56 Angola, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Gabon, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Libya, 
Malaysia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Norway, Oman, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Macedonia, 
San Marino, Singapore and Slovenia. 
57 Cape Verde, Gabon, Libya, Poland and Republic of Macedonia. 
58 Norway and Romania. 
59 U.S. 
60 Hungary. 
61 Republic of Senegal. 
62 Gabon, Germany and Republic of Senegal. 
63 Gabon, Republic of Senegal, Tunisia. 
64 Bahrain, Barbados, China, Egypt, Luxemburg, Monaco and Norway. 
65 Belarus, Switzerland and U.S. 
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